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The nature and size of the borders of the European Union changed radically with the 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Since the enlargement of the Schengen area in 
December 2007, nine of the new Member States now form part of the area without 
border controls, whose new external land border extends over ten thousand 
kilometres. 
 
Apart from its length, the new border has other notable characteristics. Whereas 
previously the EU bordered on countries with which it had a special relationship (in 
the form of Europe agreements or the EEA area), it now has nine neighbours with 
whom it has no formal, structural links. There are different forms of cooperation 
between the EU and Morocco, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey and the Balkan 
countries, but for most of these countries this cooperation cannot be qualified as a 
‘special relationship.’ For all but Turkey and the Western Balkans it is without the 
prospect of membership offered by the Europe agreements.  
 
While some of the new neighbours have no special relationship with the EU, a 
number of them have had (and still have) special relationships with the new EU 
Member States.1 One manifestation of this was the accumulation of pre-enlargement 
special rules on border controls and visa regulations enjoyed by the new Member 
States prior to accession. For example, Poland had visa-free travel with Ukraine; 
Hungary had the same for Yugoslavia and Ukraine.2  
 
Upon accession to the EU, all these special visa arrangements had to be abandoned by 
the new Member States and replaced by the visa policy rules of the European Union. 
The latter originate in the Schengen inter-governmental accord which, by abolishing 
                                                        
1 The basis for these special relationships differs from case to case. Cross border national minorities 
constitute one reason, but economic issues, such as the importance of local cross border trade also play 
a role. 
2 See chapter 7 for more details on this. 
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checks at the EU’s internal borders, was considered in need of ‘flanking’ measures 
and a gradual harmonization of the rules relating to external border controls.  
 
It is not the first such extension of the application of EU visa rules. The Schengen 
agreement itself changed from the original 5 to 15 members after the most recent 
expansion in 2007. What has also changed is the level of deviation permitted to the 
countries joining the agreement. In all previous cases, because of the 
intergovernmental nature of the agreements, the country that joined could have its 
special position appreciated, namely through the acknowledgement of the declarations 
and special rules in existence before accession.   
 
The new enlargement rules, however, required unconditional acceptance of the 
Schengen acquis, and with this all visa-related rules were subject only to 
unconditional acceptance. Each acceding state had to adopt all Schengen rules and 
apply most of them as of the date of accession. This situation clearly had the potential 
to create tensions across the external borders of the EU, where previously visa-free 
travel was replaced by the much stricter Schengen visa rules. 
 
The difficulties faced by the new Member States in the visa policy field are 
symptomatic of a wider problem affecting the external relations of both the Member 
States and the EU, namely the problem of the transfer of regulatory powers to the 
European level, and the effect this has on the special relationships of individual 
Member States with third countries. The issue arose at the very start of the European 
integration project in relation to the former colonies of Member States.  In the process 
of trying to resolve the tension between the national external policy priorities and 
loyalty to the Community, the original Member States were successful in 
transforming their bilateral special relations into Community ones.  
 
Two main paths to Europeanization developed in parallel – the intergovernmental one 
and the Community one. The intergovernmental path culminated in the Schengen 
cooperation, whose rules on visas will be studied in detail. The Community path of 
Europeanization includes cooperation in the visa field as developed under Maastricht. 
And ultimately both paths merged into one in the Amsterdam Treaty, where visa 
policy rules are clearly situated in the Community pillar but the substance of the rules 
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themselves is based on the results achieved in the framework of the Schengen 
cooperation.  
 
Usually, the Europeanization of a certain policy field occurs when there are important 
economic, social or other conditions that make regulation at a higher level of 
governance, in this case the European one, more efficient. The move towards an area 
without internal frontiers inevitably led to a quest for cooperation, and even to the 
harmonization of an increasing number of visa policy elements.  
 
We might expect to see similar forces at play as this same policy is Europeanized. 
However, to adopt the same logic at the European level of regulation would be 
misleading. Not least because it would assume that the factors determining the policy 
choices at national level have the same meaning across Europe, which is not the case. 
While the full communitarization of, say, the common commercial policy means that 
the factors linked to international trade have a similar meaning everywhere in the EU, 
a regionally concentrated phenomenon like tourism, for example, may entail different 
considerations in Italy and in Luxembourg. A similar but increased divergence of 
interests can be observed when other policy issues are concerned. It is particularly 
noticeable in the case of cultural links. While both Spain and the United Kingdom 
have a wide range of countries with which they have strong cultural and linguistic 
links, the list of those countries is different and one can imagine the difficulties 
involved in merging diverse cultural concerns into a common, European, one. The 
same is true if we take immigration concerns as a key factor determining visa policy. 
Immigration fears are influenced by a variety of factors, one of which is the specific 
economic situation of a country. Thus, when different EU states face different 
economic challenges, their attitudes towards immigration vary. At one point in time 
Spain might see advantage in attracting immigrants to work in Spain while Germany 
might seek to limit their numbers, and this situation is likely to change over time. 
 
The lack of commonality among EU Member States in the factors determining visa 
policy engenders a rather complicated system of interactions when it comes to making 
policy choices and adopting legal acts. Thus, in the visa field, the policy ‘compass’is 
in fact pointing to three spheres at once. In the first sphere, policy choices are made at 
national level depending on the national conditions at the time. In the second sphere, 
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Member States negotiate among themselves to achieve a common 
understanding/meaning of the factors at European level. And finally, in the third 
sphere, the compass inclines to where there is interplay between the Member States 
and the supranational institutions, in order to determine the most appropriate 
regulation level. 
 
The complexity of the policy-making process as described above leads to certain 
particularities in the Europeanization of the visa field, and also goes some way 
towards explaining the choices made in law-making.  
 
More than any other body of EU regulation, visa policy rules have been created as a 
result of a bottom-up approach to European law-making. The EU rules on visas are 
not the result of a general principle agreed in the founding Treaties, whose meaning 
was clarified through Court rulings and whose application eventually culminated in a 
piece of secondary legislation, as, for example, in the field of equality between the 
sexes. Instead, EU visa rules are the culmination of decades of work outside the EU 
structures. To understand these rules it is not enough to study the rules themselves but 
also the processes linked to their adoption and implementation. In the visa policy 
field, more than in any other, the process is what counts, for the process reveals the 
search for a balance between the national and supranational; between freedom and 
security.  
 
2. Aims and objectives 
The core subject of this thesis is European visa policy and the transfer of sovereignty, 
competences and regulatory powers, formerly from the Member States to the 
European Community and then to the European Union. It considers the changes to 
relations with third states that such a transfer entails and the difficulty Member States 
face in transforming their special bilateral relations into special relations between the 
Community and third states.  
 
Why visa policy? Visa policy has four distinctive characteristics that make it 
particularly suitable as a case study for the transfer of sovereignty from Member State 
to the European level. These include the importance of the visa in the exercise of 
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territorial sovereignty, its pivotal role in the area of freedom, security and justice, its 
importance in relation to the whole process of accession and its particular symbolic 
value. All these aspects will be explored in the following chapters. 
 
Visa and territorial sovereignty  
Visas are at the core of territorial sovereignty and the right of each state to decide 
whom to admit to its territory. This decision is very much influenced by the foreign 
policy and internal security considerations that are specific to each state and depend 
on the geographic, political and economic position of that state. The transfer of 
sovereignty in this field transforms a bi-polar relationship between two states into a 
tri-polar one, by adding the Community to the mix. In this new configuration tension 
can build on all three axes as the states try on the one hand to reconcile their special 
relationships with third states, their loyalty to the Community and on the other, to 
transform this special relationship into one between the Community and the third 
state. Such tensions can be observed throughout the communitarization process of 
visa policy since the Maastricht Treaty, but they have always been met with the 
possibility of flexible arrangements. 
 
Visas and the area of freedom, security and justice  
The issue of visas was the first one within the area of freedom, security and justice to 
be communitarized (parts of it are already in the Maastricht treaty) and thus present an 
interesting case study of the stages through which the transfer of sovereignty has 
passed. 
 
Visas and enlargement 
Schengen acquis (of which visa acquis is part) presents a particular challenge to the 
Member States that joined in 2004 and 2007, as it is one of only two fields (together 
with the EMU) that requires unconditional acceptance and allows for no transitional 
arrangements. This fact somewhat intensifies the shock of the transfer of sovereignty 
in such a sensitive field for the new Member States. Unlike the EU-15, for the new 
Member States the transfer occurred all at once on the accession date (partially 
smoothed by the two-stage Schengen integration), thus depriving them of the 




Visas and cultural differences  
Visas are among the issues that reveal a significant cultural difference between the 
former EU-15 and the 10 countries from the former Soviet space that joined in 2004 
and 2007 (EU-10).3  This cultural difference is grounded in two issues of considerable 
symbolic and political significance: borders and the free movement of persons. For 
the ‘old’ EU-15, visas were only a technical issue of little concern to the general 
public or the political elite. Most of the EU-15 enjoyed some form of free movement 
among themselves over the last 50 years, and whenever their citizens needed to obtain 
a visa, it was essentially a bureaucratic process involving no affront to their dignity. 
Due to the Iron Curtain, until the late 1980s there was no need for and no possibility 
of operating ‘friendly’ borders.  
 
By contrast, visas constitute a highly sensitive and symbolic issue for the EU-10. 
Having lived under totalitarian regimes where any movement (even relocation from 
one town to another) required the prior permission of the authorities and leaving the 
country was subject to an exit visa, the populations of the EU-10 consider visas as an 
instrument of control that undermines the free movement principle; a cherished 
achievement of democracy. Moreover, most of these populations have personal 
experience of being subjected to humiliating visa procedures from supposedly 
friendly countries.4 This historical context explains the reluctance of the EU-10 to 
subject their neighbours to such procedures. Moreover, due to the post WWII state-
building in Eastern Europe, most borders cut through minorities and ethnic groupings, 
so the sealing of borders through the implementation of Schengen rules is not an 
attractive proposition to the EU-105 countries. 
 
                                                        
3 Cyprus and Malta are not included in this group. 
4 E. JILEVA, “Stabilizing the East while keeping out the Easterners: internal and external security logics 
in conflict”, in S. LAVENEX AND E. M. UÇARER (eds.) Migration and the externalities of European 
integration, Lexington Books (Oxford, 2002). For the experiences of the new neighbours (Ukraine, 
Russia, Belarus) subjected to visa requirements, see Visa Policies of the European Union Member 
States — Monitoring Report, Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw, 2006) which is is based on the 
extensive survey of those applying for visas in the Consulates of certain EU Member States in Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine. The Report presents a comparative review of visa policies followed 
by certain Schengen States as well as non-Schengen States that are soon to join the group of the former 
(Latvia, the Czech Republic and Poland). The report is available at: 
http://www.batory.org.pl/english/intl/pub.htm  
5 For more details see Chapter 7. 
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Existing research on visa policy is rather fragmented. There is only one English 
language study dedicated exclusively to visa policy and it is authored by Annalisa 
Meloni,6 focusing on the principle of consistency between the three pillars and its 
application in the visa field. Visas are also covered as a side issue by a few 
comprehensive studies on Justice and Home Affairs law7 or European migration 
policy,8 where visa policy and its development are studied in the context of the 
respective general field. The remaining research can be divided into two groups: one, 
focusing on the consequences for the individual of the development of European visa 
policy and the other on the difficulties linked to enlargement. The first group includes 
works by Elspeth Guild, Richard Cholewinski and others, and addresses the issue of 
the individual rights of third country and EU nationals in relation to visa policy, free 
movement rules and data protection. The second group includes numerous policy 
papers by research institutes throughout Europe, which are highly focused on 
problems faced by a particular country before or after enlargement and the adoption 
of European visa rules.   
 
The present work builds upon the existing literature. Its focus is on European visa 
policy and its institutional and policy setting, placing the dynamics of visa policy 
development in the context of transfer of sovereignty, competences and external 
relations law. The aim is to study, from a legal point of view, the tensions arising 
between the Community loyalty of the Member States and their own foreign policy 
priorities during the process of the transfer of sovereignty in the field of visa policy. 
The study compares the vertical shift of sovereignty that occurs when a field is 
Europeanized for the first time to the horizontal shift occurring with the accession to 
the EU and the effect such a shift has on special relationships with third states.  
The main research questions this study attempts to answer are: 
- How do the Member States react to the transfer of sovereignty in the visa 
policy field? 
- What legal tools do they use to release the tensions resulting from this 
transfer? 
                                                        
6 A. MELONI, Visa Policy within the European Union Structure, Springer, (Berlin, 2006). 
7 S. PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2006). 
8 G. PAPAGIANNI, Institutional and Policy dynamics in the European Migration Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, (Leiden, 2006); and FUNGUEIRINO-LORENZO R., Visa-, Asyl- und Einwanderungspolitik vor 
und nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag, Peter Lang, (Frankfurt, 2002). 
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- To what extent are Member States successful in transforming their special 
relationships with third states into a Community special relationship with the 
same third state? 
- To what extent have the 2004 and 2007 enlargements influenced the 
development of a common visa policy? 
- What happens when third countries are not willing to recognize the internal 
transfer of sovereignty (reciprocity)? 
- How is the compatibility of existing individual Member State obligations with 
the newly communitarised visa policy achieved? 
 
3. Method and organization of the study 
To realize this research objective the analysis is organized along three lines: transfer 
of sovereignty; accession; and relations of the EU with third countries - depending on 
whether the analysis is conducted from the position of the EU or from the position of 
the acceding state. Each provides a different perspective on the issues under 
investigation.  
 
The transfer of sovereignty angle allows for a detailed analysis of the gradual 
movement of the regulation of more and more visa-related issues from the national to 
the European level. Studying the treaty provisions and the secondary legislation 
adopted on the basis of these provisions, as well as the exceptions and flexible 
provisions negotiated by some Member States, will allow the identification of the 
tensions caused by this process, the legal reaction to these tensions and the legal 
instruments chosen to resolve them.  
 
The accession line allows the same phenomenon to be studied from a different 
perspective. In effect accession is a form of transfer of sovereignty in itself but it has 
certain temporal and substantial differences to the classic transfer that might occur 
internally.  The accessions of 2004 and 2007 will be the basis for the analysis, as 
those are the first that occur after the full communitarization of visa policy. The 
tensions inherent in this process will be identified and compared to those identified in 
the previous part of the study. Potential differences and similarities will be explored.  
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Throughout, the term ‘Europeanization’ is used to refer to both the development of 
EU levels in the visa field9 and to the top-down influence from the EU level to 
national systems, in particular the adoption of the acquis in the accession process of 
new Member States.   
 
The shift of visa policy to the European level occurred in several phases which will be 
analyzed consecutively here. This particularity determines the method used to study 
the Europeanization of visa policy here. The method used in this study is thus akin to 
a journey.  At each stage of this journey, the aim is to identify which part of visa 
policy regulation (as identified at national level) has been moved to a higher level of 
regulation, what the reasons were for this move and what alternative arguments were 
put against this proposal. The result will be a reverse pyramid showing how more and 
more of the elements determining visa policy come under the EU umbrella. Such an 
exercise is necessary because it will reveal the most sensitive areas for the Member 
States as regards the transfer of sovereignty in such a contentious field as visa policy. 
These points of contention might be expected to emerge for the acceding Member 
States once they encounter the EU system of visa rules. Their problems may well be 
similar to those of the ‘old’ Member States in the Europeanization process, and thus 
the solutions to these problems might find their precedent in previous experiences.  
 
The research for this thesis was completed in November 2009 and reflects the law in 
force on 30 November 2009. The innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and 
other relevant developments adopted until March 2010 are also incorporated 
whenever relevant.  With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 
2009, the European Union now has legal personality and has acquired the 
competences previously conferred on the European Community. Community law has 
therefore become European Union law, which also includes all the provisions 
previously adopted under the Treaty on European Union as applicable before the 
Treaty of Lisbon. However, this was not the case beforehand.  This is why this study 
                                                        
9 See RISSE, COWLES, AND CAPORASO (eds.), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic 
change, Cornell University Press, (Ithaca, 2001), where Europeanization is defined as: “the emergence 
and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, 
and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the 
actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules”.  
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refers to ‘Community Law’ and makes, a distinction between the Community and the 
Union wherever this was appropriate under the pre-Lisbon legal framework 
 
4. Outline of the thesis 
This study is composed of ten chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 set the theoretical 
framework for the analysis.  
 
Chapter 1 starts with a definition of the concept of the visa and covers the theoretical 
and historical developments of this concept and then concentrates on visa policy 
issues at national level. The focus is on the policy functions of the visa, the factors 
influencing policy formation and the implementation of visa policy. By analyzing this 
implementation, it defines the elements that are crucial for the exercise of territorial 
sovereignty. It also provides some quantitative evidence on the importance of 
different types of visa in the European context. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a concise overview of current legal thinking on the three themes 
that run through the entire study: the transfer of sovereignty, accession and relations 
of the European Union with third countries. It is not an attempt to engage in a debate 
on legal theory but rather serves to introduce the main concepts behind the 
terminology used throughout the rest of the study. 
 
Chapters 3 to 6 follow the process of the vertical Europeanization of visa policy, 
namely the transfer of regulatory powers on different aspects of visa policy to 
European level, and analyze the responses of the states involved in the process to the 
loss of sovereignty in this field at each step. 
 
Specifically, Chapter 3 follows the intergovernmental cooperation on visas in 
Europe. The chapter starts by looking at three regional initiatives involving a limited 
number of countries, namely the Benelux travel area, the Nordic Passport Union and 
the free travel area between the United Kingdom and Ireland. This is followed by a 
study of several initiatives that prepared the ground for Schengen. These initiatives, 
outside the EC framework but involving Member States, were the idea of a passport 
union, popularized in the mid-1970s and various intergovernmental working groups 
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formed on issues related to freedom of movement, which were mostly active in the 
1980s. The main body of the chapter focuses on the most elaborate example of 
regional intergovernmental cooperation on visas: the Schengen area. 
 
Chapter 4 identifies the conditions under which special arrangements, based on 
national concerns linked to visas, were allowed in the intergovernmental period of the 
Schengen cooperation. It analyzes the accessions to the Schengen Convention that 
took place before the final incorporation of the Schengen acquis into EU Law. It then 
looks at the relationship between the ‘insiders’ (Schengen Member States) and 
‘outsiders’ (states acceding to Schengen) and how this relationship changed to 
accommodate the special links with third countries. The cases of the accession of 
Portugal and Spain to the Schengen Convention are studied in this context. 
 
Chapter 5 analyzes the legal basis for visa policy in the Treaties. It starts with a brief 
description of how visas appeared for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty and then 
goes on to detail the more complete provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty. It also 
provides an analysis of the differentiation in the field under Amsterdam in the 
Schengen area, the willing outsiders (Norway, Iceland and later Switzerland) and the 
reluctant insiders (Denmark, Ireland and the UK).  Finally, this chapter summarizes 
the legal and institutional developments post-Amsterdam: the Vienna Plan, Tampere 
and The Hague programmes. 
 
Chapter 6 looks at another case of flexible application of the rules outlined in 
Chapter 5, in order to accommodate the special concerns of one Member State. The 
case of Greece is studied in this context, because prior to the Eastern Enlargement it 
was the only Schengen state with two specificities that became much more 
widespread after the Eastern enlargement. Namely, Greece shared land borders only 
with third countries that were on the Schengen and later the EU visa ‘black’ list, and it 
also had a sizeable national minority in one of its neighbouring countries: Albania. 
 
Chapters 7 to 9 move to the second type of Europeanization, as experienced by the 
states that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007, and study the reactions of both the 
new Member States and the EU to the process of transfer of sovereignty in the visa 
field. However, this time the transfer is abrupt and takes place at the accession date, as 
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opposed to the gradual Europeanization in the visa field experienced by the old 
Member States.  
 
Chapter 7 looks at how the Member States that joined the EU after the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty reacted to the requirement to transfer part of their 
sovereignty in the visa field. It starts with a brief description of the legal framework 
for the accession process, which required compulsory Schengen integration as part of 
the acquis. The candidate countries thus had to accept that the various derogations, 
opt-outs and opt-ins of some of the old member countries were not available to them. 
The chapter then traces the various steps from membership negotiations to full 
Schengen membership, with the lifting of internal border controls.  Based on this, the 
chapter then analyzes the reasons for the difficulties and tensions that arose in this 
context.   
 
Chapter 8 analyzes the impact of enlargement at EU level and the EU reaction to the 
new Member States’ concerns. It considers three specific tools developed in response 
to enlargement: (i) special travel documents for Kaliningrad, ii) special rules for local 
border traffic and iii) visa facilitation. It thus documents the fragmentation of the legal 
space that resulted from the attempt by the EU to take into account the concerns of the 
new Member States. 
 
Chapter 9 looks further at the impact of enlargement on the EU level but this time 
focuses on a measure with more horizontal than geographical effect, namely the 
principle of reciprocity. This chapter first traces the genesis of reciprocity in EU visa 
policy. Against this background, it analyzes two issues in particular: i) the extent to 
which the Eastern enlargement influenced the introduction and development of the 
reciprocity mechanism in the framework of the common visa policy and ii) the 
implications of this process for the scope of exclusive Community competence in this 
field and for the role of the European Commission.  
 
Chapter 10 concludes by returning to the heart of the territorial sovereignty question, 
namely the decision as to who gains access to the common territory. The chapter 
assesses to what extent the criteria of the EU have become as transparent, detailed and 
objective as they should be and as the EU’s own partners expect them to be. It also 
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explores the potential for a further application of the road maps for visa liberalization 
or ‘visa conditionality’ in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy or other 
external relations with other third countries. This chapter also analyzes the Soysal 
judgment in which the ECJ concluded that the EU-Turkey Association Agreement 
implies potentially important limitations for the ability of the EU and its Member 









CHAPTER 1 – THE VISA AS AN EXPRESSION OF TERRITORIAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the key object of this study, namely the nature 
of the concept ‘visa’, and how it is likned to sovereignty, especially in the EU context. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, each exploring these elements in turn, with 
a fourth section drawing conclusions. 
Starting with a definition of the concept of the visa, the chapter covers the theoretical 
and historical developments of this concept and then concentrates on visa policy 
issues at the national level. The focus is on the policy functions of the visa, the factors 
influencing policy formation and the implementation of visa policy. These elements 
constitute the exercise of territorial sovereignty in reality.  
This background material is designed to help answer the following questions: 
  
- What are the elements of visa policy most likely to be regulated at national 
level?  
- What are the factors that influence the decisions taken on these elements? 
 
A final section provides some quantitative evidence on the importance of different 
types of visas in the European context. 
 
1. What is a visa? 
As with any complex notion, the term visa has many different connotations, 
depending on the context in which it is used.  
 
1.1. Usual meaning of ‘visa’ 
Nowadays the word ‘visa’ is so widely taken to mean an international travel 
document allowing free movement between countries that it is difficult to imagine a 
meaning outside the context of border control. But, when looking at the definitions 
given by linguists, different meanings do emerge.  
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines visa as “an endorsement on a passport 
indicating that the holder is allowed to enter, leave or stay for a specified period of 
time in a country”.1 The origin dates from the 19th century and has been adopted into 
English from French. 
 
The word visa - original meaning: “things seen” derives from the Latin verb videre 
meaning to see, to observe. 2 
 
In French, to which we owe the modern day revival of the term visa, it has a much 
wider meaning than the pure migration instrument we find in other languages.3  
 
In the Vocabulaire Juridique4 we can find the following definition:  
 
A formality meant to authorise a foreigner to enter the national territory, either to 
cross it or to stay temporarily and materialised through the posting of a mention 
with this effect in a passport (short-stay and long-stay visa). 
 
In the more specialized field of consular law, LEE defines visa as “a stamp or 
endorsement placed upon a passport testifying that the passport having been examined 
and found in order, the bearer is entitled to passage to or continued residence in the 
country granting the visa”.5 
 
As the above definitions show, a visa is always a type of permission; an authorization 
to enter the territory of a state but it is not only the physical manifestation of the 
authorization but also the process itself.  
 
                                                        
1 J. PEARSALL (ed.), Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th edition, Oxford University Press, 
(Oxford, 2002), p. 1601.  
2 Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen, erarbeitet unter der Leitung von Wolfgang Pfeifer, 
(Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999). 
3 In some of the early sources, dating from 1527, it was defined as an “attestation that an act was 
examined and which makes the act valid”. In a source from 1912, a visa is identified as a “stamp posed 
on a passport”. And although the word is used in some theological and economic contexts, its most 
important use is reserved for law. 
4 Association Henri Capitant, Vocabulaire Juridique, publié sous la direction de Gérard Cornu, 
Quadrige, (Paris, 2004). 
5 L. LEE, Consular Law and Practice, Clarendon Press, (Oxford, 1991).  
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1.2. Meaning in the context of European law 
The first definition of a visa at European level is not to be found in a primary or 
secondary legislation document but in a judgment of the European Court of Justice, in 
a case which did not deal directly with visas. In the 1979 case of Pieck6 the ECJ held 
that the terms “entry visa or equivalent requirement” covered any formality for the 
purpose of granting leave to enter the territory of a Member State which is coupled 
with a passport or identity card check at the frontier, whatever the place or time at 
which that leave is granted and in whatever form it may be granted.7  
 
Later, when the first agreements with effect on visa policy were signed, the Schengen 
Agreement8 and in particular the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement,9 did not contain any specific definition of the term visa but referred to it 
directly in their texts. 
 
The official European definition appeared in 1995 in a Regulation determining the 
third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders of the Member States.10 Article 5 of the Regulation stated that: 
 
Visa shall mean an authorisation given or a decision taken by a Member State 
which is required for entry into its territory with a view to:  
- an intended stay in that Member State or in several Member States of no 
more than three months in all, 
- transit through the territory of that Member State or several Member States, 
except for transit through the international zones of the airports and transfers 
between airports in a Member State. 
 
                                                        
6 Case C-157/79 Pieck ECR [1980] 2171. 
7 Ibid., para. 10. The dispute arose in relation to the implementation of Directive No 68/360 which 
explicitly forbids Member States to demand visas from EC nationals migrant workers (Article 3 (2) of 
the directive). However, there is a possibility to request visas from the family members of the migrant 
worker, who are third country nationals. Still, the Member States are obliged, according to Article 9(2) 
of the directive, to facilitate the issuing of visas and to issue them free of charge.  
8 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common 
borders, signed at Schengen on 14 June 1985. 
9 Convention implementing the Schengen agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on 
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990. 
10 Regulation No 2317/95, O.J. 1995, L 234/1. 
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This definition is still valid today and is reproduced with small changes in the 2001 
Regulation listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement.11 
 
Visa shall mean an authorization issued by a Member State or a decision taken by 
such State which is required with a view to: entry for an intended stay in that 
Member State or in several Member States of no more than three months in total; 
entry for transit through the territory of that Member State or several Member 
States, except for transit at an airport. 
 
There was a different definition for transit visas, in particular given in a Third Pillar 
instrument adopted in 1996, as “documents affixed to passports or travel documents 
which permit a third country national to pass through an airport but not to enter a 
state”.12 
 
As far as the permitted duration of stay is concerned, visas are defined as short stay 
visas and long stay visas, and as such imply different legal consequences. The short 
stay visas are defined as documents affixed to passports or travel documents which 
permit the holder to arrive at the border of the issuing state and, subject to further 
checks, to pass that border and stay on that territory for a limited period of time, 
usually three months (but in some cases, such as the UK or Australia, the period can 
be as long as 6 or even 12 months). During that stay, the holder of the visa is not 
allowed to undertake any employment but could be engaged in economic activity, 
such as meeting clients or settling contracts.13  
 
While on the European level we still speak in terms of a certificate and a process, 
there are two key differences to the national level: the issuing authority and the effects 
of the decision. While on the national level, there is inevitably a single nation state 
taking the decision and giving the authorization that ultimately only affects its own 
territory, on the European level, in practice, we have one nation state taking a decision 
and giving authorization that can affect the territory of another state. It is still not the 
Union that issues the European visas but its Member States and in doing so, by 
                                                        
11 Regulation No 539/2001, O.J. 2001, L 81/1. 
12 O.J. 1996, L 63/11. 
13 O.J. 1999, L 72/2. 
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issuing a common visa and recognizing the visas issued by their partners, their 
hospitality is also extended to the territories of their partners.  
 
1.3. Other countries 
In the United States there are two major categories of visa: immigrant (permanent) 
and non-immigrant (temporary). A visa allows an individual to travel to the US border 
and seek entry into the United States. However, holders of visas are not guaranteed 
automatic admission to the United States and inspectors at the border always have the 
final discretion to permit or deny entry.14  
 
The definition of a visa is of special importance when considering reciprocity. 
Whether a certain requirement imposed on incoming travellers can be qualified as a 
visa or not, determines whether the automatic (in some cases) reciprocity mechanism 
will enter into force. Such was the case with the proposed ESTA (Electronic System 
for Travel Authorisation)15 which the United States introduced for the citizens of 
countries participating in the Visa Waiver Programme. In this case, the European 
Commission had to examine the proposal and determine whether or not it could be 
considered as a visa. 
 
1.4. Working definition and key elements 
Based on the definitions outlined above, we can extract the following key elements of 
the term visa, which will be used and analyzed in the following chapters. A number of 
criteria can be used: 
1. Form – a visa can be either the act of examining a case and the issuing of 
authorization, or the physical form of that decision (a stamp, for example); 
2. Issuing authority – a state authority, as linked to the sovereign right of a state 
to determine who and under what conditions a traveller enters its territory. 
                                                        
14 For a recent review of the US visa procedures, see YALE-LOEHR, PAPADEMETRIOU AND COOPER, 
Secure Borders, Open Doors: Visa Procedures in the Post-September 11 Era, Migration Policy 
Institute, (Washington, 2007). 
15 For the main characteristics of the system see http://www.visitusa.org.uk/visitors/esta.aspx  
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3. Validity – valid on certain territories for a specified length of stay or for 
transit. 
 
2. Theoretical and historical background to the origins of the visa 
The concept and usage of the visa is inextricably linked to the concept of sovereignty. 
This section explores this link by providing some background to the origins of the 
visa. Moreover, visas have a dual nature; as a document and as a procedure. As a 
document, they are developed in parallel with the development of the passport. As a 
procedure, they are developed as part of the entry control system of each state. Both 
elements also have a long history behind them. 
 
2.1. Sovereignty v. interdependence 
MAX WEBER put forward the argument16 that a central feature of the modern 
experience was the successful expropriation by the state of the “means of violence” 
from individuals. Drawing on WEBER’s idea, TORPEY17 argues that “modern states, 
and the international state system of which they are part, have expropriated from 
individuals and private entities the legitimate ‘means of movement’,18 particularly 
though by no means exclusively across international borders”.  Limitations on ‘means 
of movement’ already existed in pre-modern times, of course.  In feudalism serfs, 
among others, were tied to a territory by their lord.  Some forms of feudal serfdom 
persisted quite late in the Russian empire, which might be another reason why the free 
movement of people is a more sensitive issue in Eastern Europe than elsewhere (see 
also Chapter 7 on this). 
 
The basic idea of TORPEY is that the ways in which states regulate movement 
constitute the very “state-ness” of states. He claims that states have sought to 
monopolize the capacity to authorize the movements of persons – and unambiguously 
to establish their identity in order to enforce this authority. States’ efforts to 
                                                        
16 M. WEBER, The theory of social and economic organization, Free Press, (New York, 1964).  
17 J. TORPEY, The Invention of the passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge studies 
in law and society, (Cambridge, 2000). 
18 “Means of movement” should be understood to mean the various documents required by the state 
before the individual is effectively allowed to move and in particular to cross international borders.   
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monopolize the legitimate means of movement have involved a number of mutually 
reinforcing aspects: the gradual definition of states as nation states and the 
codification of laws establishing which types of person may move within or across 
their borders; determining how, when, and where they may do so. These efforts also 
involve the stimulation of the development of techniques for uniquely and 
unambiguously identifying each and every person on the face of the globe from birth 
to death; the construction of bureaucracies designed to implement this regime of 
identification and the scrutiny of persons and documents to verify identities; as well 
as the creation of a body of legal norms designed to adjudicate claims by individuals 
to entry into particular spaces and territories.19 The creation of the modern passport 
system has led to the treatment of any unauthorized movement as illegal and thus 
consolidated states’ monopoly over the “means of movement”. Finally, TORPEY holds 
the view that modern “nation-states” and the international system in which they are 
embedded have grown increasingly committed to and reliant upon their ability to 
make strict demarcations between mutually distinct bodies of citizens, as well as 
among different groups of their own citizens. The need to distinguish “who is who” 
becomes especially acute when states wish to regulate movement across external 
borders. The idea of belonging, the protection that a state can offer as well as the 
obligations of its citizens that are at the root of the concept of citizenship are all 
undermined when people cross borders.  
 
From a legal perspective, there is a debate about the existence or non-existence of a 
right permitting a state to impose direct20 controls on alien immigration.21 In essence 
this is the question of whether any rule of international law requires a state to admit 
aliens onto its territory.22 And to answer that question, one can relay one of two very 
different principles: the principle of sovereignty and the principle of interdependence. 
                                                        
19 TORPEY, op.cit., p. 7 
20 ‘Indirect’ immigration controls; i.e. measures designed to affect the rate or composition of migrant 
flows by altering the conditions under which migrants will live, once they have been admitted to their 
new domiciles. See R. PLENDER, International Migration Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
(Dordrecht, 1988). 
21 R. PLENDER, International Migration Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (Dordrecht, 1988). The 
question is also discussed in detail in A. MELONI, Visa Policy within the European Union Structure, 
Springer, (Berlin, 2006). 
22 This issue is quite distinct from the right to leave one’s own country, which has been enshrined in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
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According to PLENDER, the first is supported by the majority of Anglo-Saxon theories, 
while the second, by the European continental school and Latin American scholars.  
 
The choice of principle also determines the differences, in some instances quite 
significant ones, between the immigration policy of the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
the European continent. Such differences can be observed at every stage at which 
immigration controls are performed – from the procedure governing visa application 
to the presence, or lack of, a judicial remedy in the case of refusal of visa or entry. 
Moreover, as will be demonstrated in Section 3 of this chapter, when the national visa 
policies are analyzed, the major choice of each visa policy – on whom to impose visa 
requirements – is usually made by balancing the need of a country to ascertain its 
sovereignty with the need to acknowledge its interdependence.    
 
2.2. Historical development of the concept of the visa 
Because of the dual nature of the visa, as a document and as a procedure, the visa is 
usually considered either in the context of identity documents, mainly the passport, or 
in the context of entry controls. Thus, there are no studies dealing explicitly with the 
historical development of the visa, and information is usually dispersed in sources that 
deal with passports or entry controls. The most recent study on passports was carried 
out by Torpey, and due to the link between passports and visas, contains certain 
references to visas. Earlier references can be found in books by TURACK and 
GOODWIN-GILL.23 A concise review of their findings is necessary for the 
identification of the factors that influenced the different countries’ visa policy choices.  
 
The history of the concept of the visa is inevitably intertwined with the history of the 
passport, which in turn is linked to the rise of the nation state, starting with the French 
Revolution. It is true that some regulation of the movement of aliens also existed in 
the Middle Ages, but this was greatly determined by commercial needs and limited to 
granting travel rights to merchants. Examples from that period can be found both in 
Western and Eastern Europe. In English common law it was established that an alien 
                                                        
23 For the history of the passport, see also D. TURACK, The passport in international law, Lexington 
Book, (Lexington,1972); and G. GOODWIN-GILL, International Law and the movement of persons 
between states, Clarendon Press, (Oxford, 1978). 
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committed no offence if he entered England without sovereign permission and both 
the principle of sovereignty (allowing the King to exclude unwanted individuals) and 
the principle of free movement (giving aliens the right to enter the kingdom) co-
existed.24 On the other side of Europe, in Bulgaria, the Second Bulgarian Kingdom 
established relations with the merchants of Dubrovnik and guaranteed their right of 
entry.25 
 
The fundamental principle set down by VATTEL in 1758 still holds:  
 
A sovereign may prohibit entrance into his territory, either to all foreigners in 
general or to certain persons, or in certain cases or for certain particular purposes, 
according as the welfare of the State may require.26 
 
This approach changed dramatically with the emergence of ‘nation states’. Under 
mercantilism, the foreigner, although otherwise treated like any other subject in legal 
terms, typically enjoyed greater freedom to emigrate than a native-born subject. 
Towards the latter half of the 18th century foreigners increasingly became exposed to 
the same hindrances as nationals with respect to departure from their homeland. 
Moreover, they tended to be seen for many reasons as a potential threat (they might 
spread dangerous ideas and they could not be expected to help defend the country in 
any international conflict). The foreigner was perceived more and more ipso facto as a 
suspect27.  With the French Revolution came then the modern passport system as we 
know it today and with it the concept of the visa. 
 
2.2.1. 19th century developments 
France 
Amid the many debates on the passport system in France, a Frenchman, Montagnard 
Julien Souhait, already envisioned in the 18th century the international visa system 
                                                        
24 For details see Plender, op. cit., p. 62. 
25 D. TOKUSHEV, History of the Bulgarian Medieval State and Law, SIBI, (Sofia, 2009). Reference 
translated from Bulgarian. 
26 E. DE VATTEL, Le Droit des gens, vol. II, § 94, (1835), cited in LEE AND QUIGLEY, Consular Law and 
Practice, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2008), p. 221. 
27 J. TORPEY, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge studies 
in law and society, (Cambridge, 2000), p.42. 
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that would gradually develop over the next century and a half.28 His argumentation is 
interesting: Souhait begins his remarks by noting that the government required 
passports for all those leaving their domicile, “as proof of their good conduct and 
their respect for liberty and public tranquillity.” But if this were reasonable enough 
for French persons, he continued, there was all the more reason to require passports of 
foreigners, “men who cannot offer, like the French, the natural guarantee of their 
attachment to la patrie, nor the same means to repair the damage they might do 
through corruption and immorality.” Souhait insisted that the foreign emissaries 
could not be trusted to take French security concerns into account in their passport 
practices. 
 
Souhait then delivered a statement that directly articulated the notion of the state’s 
monopolization of the legitimate means of movement, as well as the shift towards 
making the French political space a place “of and for” the French: 
 
Passports are a police measure of the government on whose territory travellers 
circulate. None other than the government, or its agents, has the right to bestow 
them, for none other has the interest and none other has the right and obligation to 
watch over good order, liberty and the public security. The agent of the foreign 
power cannot be your agent, even in his own interest; you cannot give him any 
authority, even less one that the constitution expressly delegates exclusively to 
the French and to the magistrates of the people. The foreigner, like every resident, 
is subject to the laws of the country in which he travels. This subjection is the 
price of the protection that he receives; it is the prerogative and the right of the 
public authority. A natural-born Frenchman may not travel in France without the 
permission of the government or the magistrates of the people; the foreigners 
must therefore also obtain permission. 
 
One way to obviate the problem of foreign undesirables entering the country with 
documents issued by foreign rather than French authorities, he suggested, would be to 
establish a system whereby French representatives in the traveller’s country of origin 
would issue passports to those wishing to come to France. Unlike foreigners, French 
officials could be relied upon not to distribute passports to those who might 
undermine public order in France.29 
 
 
                                                        
28 TORPEY, op. cit., p. 52-53. 
29 TORPEY, op. cit., p. 52-53. 
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Germany 
Early in the reign of Frederick William I of Prussia (1713-1740), a law intended to 
tighten controls on beggars for the first time required foreigners to have in their 
possession a passport, which was to be visa-ed nightly at the ‘way stations’ along 
their route. In 1813, a new law was adopted and new documentary requirements 
introduced. Upon entering Prussian territory, travellers from abroad were obliged to 
take possession of a Prussian passport issued not by local authorities (the usual and 
accepted practice), but by higher level officials ranging from the Royal Chancellor 
down to the central government’s police representative at provincial level. The 
persistence of the practice whereby incoming travellers were furnished with a 
passport by the receiving state, rather than by the state of the traveller's origin, is 
notable here.  
 
Later the passport law of 1817 liberalized the restrictive provisions of the earlier law, 
mainly by restoring to local, border and port officials the authority to issue valid 
documents for entry into Prussia. Most importantly, Prussian diplomats accredited at 
foreign courts, official trade emissaries and consuls – and most notably – the 
‘national’ and provincial officials of other states were also added to the list of those 
authorized to issue passports for entry. 
 
A liberal development was the Pass-Card Treaty (Passkartenvertrag) of 1850 signed 
by “all the German states” except the Netherlands, Denmark, Hessen-Homburg, and 
Lichtenstein, which loosened the passport requirements for travellers within these 
states.30 The treaty simplified and standardized the information that was to be 
included in pass-cards. The practice of taking away a traveller’s pass-card for the 
duration of his or her stay was not expressly abolished, but in practice merely 
showing the card to the authorities was regarded as sufficient. Above all, visas were 
no longer required. Soon after, an agreement between Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, 
and a number of other states abolished reciprocal visa requirements; Bavaria soon 
abandoned the practice altogether as “useless”. 
 
                                                        
30 TORPEY, op. cit., p. 58. 
  26
Despite lingering mercantilist attitudes, rulers in the German lands increasingly found 
themselves drawn towards a more liberal stance in matters of migration. Over the next 
few years passport and visa requirements were relaxed or abolished between 
‘German’ states (including the Netherlands) and a series of other countries such as 
England, France, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries (although such relaxation 
only acquired force where it was reciprocal). Saxony eliminated visa requirements 
entirely in 1862. Also in 1862, Switzerland eliminated visa requirements and 
abolished the requirement of a passport for entry into or travel within its territory. 
 
A further step was the Passport Treaty concluded in 1865 by Saxony, Bavaria, 
Hanover and Württemberg. The treaty abolished the requirement that travellers within 
these states, whether their subjects or foreigners, be equipped with a passport for 
entry, exit, or internal circulation, as well as any obligation to have papers visa-ed by 
the authorities. This was followed a few years later by the liberal North German Law 
of 1867, which remained the fundamental statute regarding passport controls in 
Germany until after the Second World War.  
 
These developments in 19th century Germany signalled a broader European shift 
towards greater freedom of entry and exit, even for foreigners. In that period there 
were already established notions of reciprocity among nations and of the treatment 
that states expected for their nationals abroad.31 
 
The 19th century German experience of liberalization and integration is instructive 
because it seems to follow a pattern which can also be observed in European 
integration today:  travel is made easier initially only among citizens of a group of 




In 1884, the United States adopted an act which contained an early version of the 
system of ‘remote control’ of immigration – involving passports and visas stamped at 
the emigrants’ point of departure by consular officials of the destination country. In a 
                                                        
31 TORPEY, op.cit., pp. 57-100. 
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case involving the aforementioned act (dealing with Chinese immigrants in the United 
States), the Supreme Court ruled that “any independent nation must have jurisdiction 
over its own territory, including the power to exclude aliens, if it were to be truly 
sovereign”.32   This was reaffirmed in 1892, when the US Supreme Court ruled that: 
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the 
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the 
entrance of foreigners within the dominions, or to admit them in such cases and 
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.33 
 
Thus the US adopted a stance that was identical to that of the European states 
although, as an immigration state, it had developed a tradition of accepting large 
numbers of foreigners. In the US the visa system was used from the beginning to 
control immigration. By contrast, in Europe, the visa system was more directed at 
temporary travellers (far fewer in number) and the concerns were mainly of a national 
security type. 
 
2.2.2. Developments after the First World War 
 
With the beginning of the First World War, most countries in Europe introduced 
stricter border controls, requiring passports and visa in most cases. 
For example, in Germany the emergency clauses of the law were used to introduce 
new passport restrictions. Now, anyone who wished to enter or leave the territory of 
the Empire was to be in possession of a passport. Moreover, foreign passports for the 
purposes of entry into the Empire were required to have a visa from German 
diplomatic or consular authorities. A further order from 1916 contained the terms and 
conditions for the issuance of visas, depending on whether these were for exit from, 
entry into, or transit through German territory. Similar rules were adopted by most 
other states. 
 
The general anxiety about borders that prevailed during the war did not subside with 
the end of the war. Instead, the “temporary measures implemented to control access 
                                                        
32 Chae Chan Ping v. US, 130 US 581 (1889).  
33 Nishimura Ekiu v. US, 142 US 651, 659 (1892), cited in LEE, op.cit.  
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to and departure from the territories of European states persisted into the interwar 
period”.34 
This was not limited to Europe.  In 1924 the new American Immigration Act provided 
that American consuls abroad be charged with the task of keeping control of the quota 
introduced earlier and with distributing visas accordingly. 
 
The newly permanent passport controls that persisted after WWI generally applied not 
just to foreigners but to both citizens and aliens. This was a necessary outcome of the 
desire to control borders against unwanted entrants, and aliens had increasingly come 
to be seen as lacking any prima facie claim to access the territory of a state other than 
their own.  
 
2.2.3. The Jewish visa problem 
 
With the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933, many laws, such as those on 
citizenship, naturalization and passports, were changed. In 1937, following the 
authorization by the “Law on Passports, the ‘Foreigner Police’ (Auslaenderpolizei), 
and Residential Registration, as well as on Personal Identity Documents”, the 1867 
law of the North German Confederation was abolished. It was this law that had 
eliminated passport requirements other than as temporary, emergency measures.  
 
The newly established international visa system was put to the test at the League of 
Nations conference in Evian, France that was convened in early July 1938 to address 
the growing problem of refugees from Germany and Austria and their difficulties in 
finding safe havens of settlement. The Nazi plan to expel the Jews was not necessarily 
consistent with an international system that reserved the right to admit only those 
whom they chose to admit. Although all of the delegations to the Evian conference 
expressed their commitment to humanitarian assistance, only the Dominican Republic 
made a concrete offer of admission. Some countries, like Switzerland, responded to 
the increased number of refugees from Austria by imposing visa requirements for the 
holders of Austrian passports.  
                                                        
34 TORPEY, op. cit., p. 116. 
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Whether or not the ‘paper wall’ created around the West, with its strict visa 
requirements and quotas and the unwillingness of most countries to admit Jews as 
refugees, contributed to the death of many Jews is a subject of  ongoing debate. 
According to the now widely-held view, defended by DAVID WYMAN35, the 
immigration restrictions that emerged from the First World War and their strict 
enforcement during the 1930s in an effort to protect national labour markets during 
the depression consigned many Jews to their deaths, because they were unable to find 
refuge from Nazi persecution.36 The opposite view is defended by WILLIAM 
RUBINSTEIN37, who argues that the notion of ‘paper walls’ surrounding Western 
democracies – and the broader claim that the democracies could have rescued more 
Jews in various ways, such as by bombing Auschwitz – is an historical myth. 
Rubinstein insists that the ‘paper walls’ argument is misguided for one simple reason. 
According to him, relatively few Jews left Germany before November 1938 because 
they believed that this was one of those periodic outbursts of anti-Semitism that 
would soon ‘blow over’. But, in contrast to the claims of the critics of Western 
policies towards the Jews, those who did leave Germany found refuge in Western 
countries without great difficulty. What must be understood, in Rubenstein’s view, is 
that after the beginning of the war in September 1939, the obstacle Jews confronted 
was no longer that of getting into other countries, but rather that of getting out of 
Nazi-controlled Europe. According to TORPEY, like many other groups, Jews faced 
significant barriers to admission into countries of potential safe haven during the 30s, 
and the ‘paper walls’ that had been erected during the early interwar period 
complicated the negotiation of an international space for all of them. With the 
development of new bureaucratic apparatuses since the First World War, states had 
become much more effective at identifying possible interlopers and using 
documentary restrictions to keep out those they did not wish to admit. 
 
                                                        
35 DAVID S. WYMAN, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1968) 
36 TORPEY, op. cit., pp.131-143.  
37 WILLIAM D. RUBINSTEIN, The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More 
Jews from the Nazis, (Routledge, 1997) 
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2.2.4. Post-war developments 
 
After the end of the WWII, efforts to reduce the severity of the passport regime 
inherited from the interwar period were made at the national level. Even before the 
war had officially ended, Belgium and Luxembourg had exchanged notes aimed at 
reducing passport controls. By 1950, the Netherlands joined this effort and nationals 
of the three countries were given the right to travel between them with only a national 
identity card38. In mid-1954, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland agreed that their 
nationals could travel without passports or other travel documents to these countries 
and such persons no longer needed to be in possession of a residence permit when 
residing in a Scandinavian country other than their own. These arrangements were 
extended by a 1957 Convention that provided for the elimination of passport controls 
at the internal frontiers of Scandinavian countries (which thus implicitly extended the 
freedom of movement to non-nationals travelling among these countries).39 
 
Since then, one of the main objectives of the advocates of liberalized movement in 
Europe was the creation of the European passport. However, the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Experts on Passports and Visas abandoned the broader aim of a 
European passport and instead submitted proposals to the Committee of Ministers for 
a more restricted form of standardization,40 proposals which were adopted in March 
1952.41 The drive towards greater freedom of movement in post-war Europe was 
closely connected to the effort to create a common market. Apart from the agreements 
reached within the remit of different organisations, in 1985 the Schengen Agreement 
signed between France, Germany and the Benelux countries was ultimately designed 
to achieve the goal of unrestricted travel within Europe. 
 
                                                        
38 This is all the more remarkable as the Netherlands refused national ID cards, partly in reaction to 
Ausweis obligation during occupation.  
39 These regional travel areas are studied in detail in Chapter 3.  
40 See Council of Europe, Recommendation 39, Text adopted by the Assembly, 1949. 
41  The Committee of Ministers in 1952 adopted two resolutions urging the governments to standardize 
national passports and abolish visas (Third Report of the Committee of Ministers, Documents, 1952, 
document 2, para 93-95). By January 1956 visas were effectively abolished for nationals of all Member 
States (Council of Europe News, January 1956, p. 3), cited in L. LEE, Consular law and practice, 2nd 
edition, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 1991). 
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3. The function of the visa at national level today 
3.1. Policy functions of visas 
Nowadays the visa is considered to have three main policy functions: to guarantee 
national security, to keep out crime and to control immigration.42 It is employed as a 
policy tool in the context of foreign policy and immigration policy. 
 
Until the mid-1980s, the visa was generally considered as a foreign policy tool, and in 
order to determine whether a country was to be placed on the visa list or not, one of 
the main determining factors was the type of relationship that existed between the two 
states in question. Reciprocity thus played an important role in visa imposition. 
 
National security. The origins of the visa are much more linked to security concerns 
than to inter-state relations, however. As was demonstrated earlier, visas appeared for 
the first time during the time of the French Revolution with the purpose of restricting 
the access of aliens into the country, thus increasing state security. Therefore, one of 
the policy functions that can be considered includes guaranteeing national security by 
excluding those that are considered ‘undesirable’ (implemented by a list of designated 
persons who can be refused admission). 
 
The security function, defined as such, was historically always reinforced in periods 
of conflict or inter-state tension, when distrust in the ‘other’ was high and tensions led 
to the imposition of special limitations on their nationals, including visa restrictions. 
The security function can be considered as the classic visa function, also because of 
its link to reciprocity (discussed above), where the imposition of visa requirements is 
carried out on the basis of bilateral relations at a particular point in time. In addition, it 
follows on from the classic approach that visas are determined between states, on the 
basis of the relations between them, rather than on the basis of the behaviour of 
individuals belonging to a particular state.  
 
In this sense the visa function is clearly linked to national security and is meant to 
exclude potentially dangerous individuals based on their country of origin. 
                                                        
42 These functions can be retrieved from the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2001 Visa Regulation. 
MELONI has also identified them at MELONI, op.cit., p. 37. 
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After the mid-1980s a new logic of determining visa restrictions gradually took hold, 
which was much more linked to individual behaviour than to the bilateral relations 
between two countries. Two new policy objectives emerged: keeping out crime and 
controlling immigration.  
 
Keeping out crime. The function of keeping out crime is well explained in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the present Visa Regulation, with an illustration of 
where the behaviour of a particular individual can affect the perceptions of his 
country of origin and indirectly influence the visa requirements imposed on its 
nationals. Meloni also cites an interesting example from Italian legislative practice, 
where the respective law43 included as one of the criteria for determining which 
nationals should be subject to visa requirements, the nationality of those sentenced for 
drug trafficking during the three-year period prior to determination. In this case 
individual behaviour rather than the policies of a state determine the position of a 
specific country on the visa list.44 This approach can also be considered as an example 
of individual risk assessment.   
 
In practice, this policy function can also be served by the list of ‘undesirable’ visitors 
drawn up by every country (or is common in the case of common travel areas). 
Similarly, the crime-control function of visas can also be served by the specific 
grounds for denials that are to be found in national legislation. 
 
Immigration control. Visas have always been a tool for immigration control in the 
countries of immigration (USA, Australia, and Canada). Their system is based on the 
assumption that each visa applicant is a potential immigrant and therefore the balance 
of their immigration control system generally tilts towards strict entry control.  
                                                        
43 This law is of course no longer relevant today since the black list has been communitarized (see 
Chapters 3 and 5). Legge Martelli, Legge 28 febbraio 1990, n. 39 (in Gazz. Uff., 28 febbraio, n. 49). 
Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 30 dicembre 1989, n. 416, recante norme 
urgenti in materia di asilo politico, di ingresso e soggiorno dei cittadini extracomunitari e di 
regolarizzazione dei cittadini extracomunitari ed apolidi già presenti nel territorio dello Stato. 
Disposizioni in materia di asilo. [Converting and amending Decree-Law of 30 December 1989, n. 416 
on emergency measures for political asylum, entry and residence of third country nationals and 
regularization of non-EU nationals and stateless persons already present in the territory. Provisions 
relating to asylum]. 




However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fears of mass immigration to the 
West, controlling immigration, including through visa requirements, has emerged as 
an important policy tool in Europe.  
 
As argued above visas are one of the ways of screening potential immigrants in 
immigration countries and generally form part of national immigration policy.  
However, in Europe the link between immigration controls and visas is present, but 
not so dominant.45  If one looks at the criteria determining whether a country presents 
an immigration risk or not, these can include criteria such as the number of suspected 
illegal residents, the number of refused asylum applications; factors that are generally 
deemed to demonstrate the likelihood of illegal immigrants from the country in 
question. 
 
There are two interrelated factors that influence the immigration function of visas, at 
least in Europe. One of them is the general public’s attitude towards immigration. In 
periods of economic depression and even more so recession, when the numbers of the 
unemployed grow and there is a general feeling of economic instability, the hostility 
towards immigrants who are perceived to be stealing jobs is higher, and this is often 
reflected in the imposition of visa requirements. This can explain some of the later 
tensions in immigration policy in general and visa policy in particular at the European 
level. Despite the fact that economic policy and conditions should supposedly be the 
same or similar, there are substantial differences between Member States in economic 
growth at any one time and these are inevitably translated into different attitudes 
towards immigration. Two major fronts of difference persist, one is between the North 
and South and the other is between East and West. These differences will be explored 
later. 
 
The second factor important to Europe is the perception that grew in the late 1990s 
that there were too many immigrants trying to benefit from the welfare systems in 
Europe and the integration of these immigrants presented challenges to European 
                                                        
45 A further reason for the difference in attitude is also that at least all continental EU Member States 
have a system of national residence control with an obligation of all residents to report their presence to 
the local authorities.  This second line of defense against undesirables makes it somewhat easier to 
relax controls at the border via visas. 
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societies. Moreover, the measures which could be used by different states to control 
immigrants already on their territory were limited by the human and civil rights 
guarantees offered in Europe. 
 
This approach can explain how visa policy and the possible relaxation of visa 
requirements is linked to bilateral agreements with the immigrants’ countries of 
origin, ultimately aimed at decreasing the number of immigrants. Typical measures in 
this regard include readmission agreements, taking on obligations related to the 
increase of the security of identity documents, and the joining of conventions related 
to protection against human trafficking or the protection of human rights, which could 
increase the chance of a country being considered as ‘safe’ in the context of asylum 
applications. 
 
MELONI includes visa requirements in the definition of ‘external’ immigration control 
measures; those that are aimed at preventing the arrival or entry of the migrants. Next 
to visas, typical manifestations of ‘external measures’ include carrier sanctions; 
border controls; information campaigns in source and transit countries; training of 
airline staff and immigration officers and the posting of liaison officers for the 
detection of fake and forged documents.46 ‘Internal’ measures of immigration control 
would include: identity checks, residence and work permit requirements; employers’ 
sanctions; inspection; removal; restriction of access to social benefits and restrictions 
on legal integration.  
 
Considering the developments in new technology, the latest development in visas as 
an immigration tool is the move towards additional security features in the visas 
themselves, thus bringing them closer to an identity document.  Moreover, the 
creation of special databases linked to the visa application and visa denial follows a 
similar line. 
 
The three policy functions of visas outlined above: to guarantee security, limit crime 
and control immigration, are the cornerstone of any formulation of national visa 
policy. However, when it comes to determining which country should be included on 
                                                        
46 MELONI, op. cit., p. 39. 
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the visa black list and which should be exempt from visa requirements, a number of 
factors are at work that will be studied below. 
 
3.2. Factors that influence the formation of visa policy at national level 
When it comes to deciding on a particular national visa policy, apart from the 
technical aspects of its implementation (such as format, conditions for issuing, 
administrative authorities involved, etc.), the main decision to be taken is which 
countries are to be placed on which country’s visa list and which are to be exempt. 
This decision always involves the weighing of two types of factors: those that push 
towards a more liberal visa policy, such as economic relations, the level of bilateral 
trade, tourism, cultural links, etc. and those that push towards a more restrictive visa 
policy: security, illegal immigration and cross-border crime concerns. Ultimately, visa 
policy at the national level is always a result of the balancing of these factors at a 
particular moment in time.  
 
The factors that influence the imposition of visa requirements at national level very 
much depend on the particular situation of individual countries. Tourism is an 
influencing factor for some, while for others maintaining ethnic links or national 
territory continuity is important. There is no comprehensive study into the factors that 
influence visa policy formation, or the relative weight of each of them. 
 
However, in a study of 2005, ERIC NEUMAYER tries to bring some clarity to this issue 
with an empirical study based on the bilateral visa restrictions for 189 sovereign 
nation states.47 Neumayer studies two groups of factors, those for which the states 
tend to impose visa restrictions, which will be called ‘negative’ factors; and those for 
which states refrain from imposing visa restrictions. Then he tests his hypothesis 
empirically and comes up with some interesting findings. 
 
‘Negative’ factors. The main factors that are expected to influence the imposition of 
visa requirements are: a possible threat of illegal immigration, and security concerns 
linked to either national security or to public health.  
                                                        
47 NEUMAYER, “Unequal access to foreign spaces: how states use visa restrictions to regulate mobility 
in globalised world”, Global Migration Perspectives, No 43, (2005). 
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The illegal immigration concern stems from the fear that visitors might become 
immigrants by staying in the country instead of returning to their home country. This 
fear is enforced by the fact that would-be immigrants now have more information, 
better contacts and easier travel access to the high-income OECD countries. At the 
same time, the factors pushing people towards migration such as poverty, political 
repression, human rights abuses, war and civil conflict, have not diminished.48 
Meanwhile, this assumption is challenged by the data showing that only 20% of 
illegal immigrants have crossed the border illegally, while a significant majority have 
entered legally but have overstayed their allowed term for a visit. Visas can be a 
powerful deterrent to migration because to obtain one is relatively complicated and 
time-consuming and might involve additional costs. Visas thus exert the dual 
influence of pre-selection and deterrence. 
 
Apart from immigration, another concern which has influenced the elaboration of 
national visa policy is the fear linked to crime and public health. There are concerns 
of potential infiltration by members of organized crime groups, potential terrorists, 
drug traffickers and other persona non grata. There have been cases when entry was 
refused to people with infectious diseases (e.g. AIDS)49. The emphasis is on the threat 
to national security by politically motivated violence and transnational networks of 
crime.  
 
‘Positive factors’. On the other side of the coin are the factors that push towards a 
more liberal visa policy. Obviously, it can be expected that countries will refrain from 
imposing visa restrictions on countries from which they do not fear either illegal 
immigration or the entry of unwanted individuals. “Poorer countries have an 
incentive to exempt passport holders from high-income countries from visa 
restrictions in the hope of bolstering foreign investment and knowledge spill-overs 
into their country. Major tourist destinations have an incentive not to impose visa 
                                                        
48 NEUMAYER, op. cit., p. 8. 
49 See for example the 20 year old US travel ban against people with HIV, lifted by President Obama as 
of 1 January 2010. For a comprehensive list of other countries with restrictions on entry, stay and 
residence, see: www.hivtravel.org  
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restrictions on sending countries in order to remain attractive in the increasingly 
competitive market of mass tourism”.50  
 
Apart from economic reasons, there are also political reasons to grant a visa-free 
status. Those usually include factors such as belonging to the same region or having 
historic or civilizational links.  
Historical, geographical and civilizational patterns of shared belonging are likely 
to influence visa restrictions given that the latter are a powerful manifestation of 
inclusion and exclusion. Providing for visa-free travel for the nationals of a 
certain country can be interpreted as one of the most welcoming types of status as 
regards access to territory, short of passport union, where all internal restrictions 
on travel are lifted. However, such unions are rather rare with only four of them 
functioning at present, of which three are in Europe: the Nordic Union (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), the Schengen area, the UK-Ireland Union 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and United Arab Emirates).51 
 
It would be interesting to speculate on the reasons that make Europe the most prolific 
area in the development of passport union. One of the reasons could be the general 
civilizational closeness and the integration processes going on within it. However, 
another explanation could be simply geographical, considering that Europe (at least in 
its EU part) has a relatively small territory compared with the state structures of other 
continents, and thus without the simplification of travel formalities it would be 
impossible to maintain a reasonable level of exchange in every conceivable field.  
 
In his work, NEUMAYER started from the assumptions outlined above and built upon a 
model comparing bilateral visa restrictions based on GDP per capita, restrictions to 
political freedom, armed political conflict, international outbound tourists, 
international tourist receipts, bilateral trade, same region, same civilization, colonial 
links, and restrictions to political freedom in the home country. 
 
What he discovers is that reciprocity still governs most visa imposition policies. 
However, there is an imbalance in the system as OECD passport holders enjoy far 
fewer restrictions on travel abroad than their countries impose on passport holders 
from other countries. NEUMAYER thus identifies as the most striking feature of the 
                                                        
50 NEUMAYER, op. cit., p. 8. 
51 M. SALTER, Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations, Lynne Rienner, (Boulder, 
2003). 
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system of bilateral visa restrictions the high degree of inequality in access to foreign 
spaces. On the one side are the 25 countries facing the fewest visa restrictions, and 
they are all Western high-income OECD countries. On the other side are those 
countries whose nationals need a visa for any trip abroad; generally countries with a 
history of violent political conflict, strict autocratic regimes or abject poverty.  
 
In some cases there is certain symmetry between facing and imposing visa 
restrictions, but this does not apply to the group of richest countries.  
 
Whereas the average OECD citizen faces visa restrictions in travel to 
approximately 93 foreign countries, the average non-OECD citizen needs a 
visa to travel to approximately 156 countries. Passport holders of OECD 
countries therefore enjoy relatively easy access to foreign spaces, but 
OECD countries do not generally provide easy access to their own 
spaces.52  
 
In addition to the study of NEUMAYER, the consultancy HENLEY & PARTNERS, a firm 
specialized in international immigration, consular and citizenship law has developed 
the Henley Visa Restrictions Index.53 The Index is a global ranking of countries 
according to the travel freedom their citizens enjoy, based on the analysis of the visa 
regulations in all the countries and territories of the world. The authors consider their 
Index to be the first time a global ranking shows the international travel freedom of 
the citizens of various countries as well as the international relations and status of 
individual countries relative to others.  
HENLEY & PARTNERS also acknowledge that visa restrictions are used to control the 
movement of foreign nationals across borders and that the choice of imposing visa 
restrictions is influenced by the relations between the countries, thereby reflecting the 
status of a country within the international community of nations.  
 
The findings of NEUMAYER are confirmed again in the Henley Visa Restrictions Index 
for 2009, see Table 1.1., below. The score reflects the number of countries that can be 
entered without a visa by the citizens of the countries listed.  There is very little 
difference between countries until rank 9, as all countries in this group are members 
                                                        
52 NEUMAYER, op. cit. 
53 Website of Henley and Partners, section on visa restrictions: http://www.henley-
partner.com/citizenship/visa-restrictions/.  
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of the OECD with high incomes per capita.  The only exception in this group is 
Portugal (whose specific problems in the Schengen visa system are discussed in 
Chapter 4).  At the other end of the scale one finds poor countries, especially those 
involved in conflicts, whose passports offer visa-free access to only a few dozen 
countries. 
 
Table 1.1. Henley Visa Restrictions Index - global ranking of selected countries 
2009  
Rank  Score Rank  Score 
1 Denmark 157 14 Malta 139 
2 Finland 156 24 Israel 118 
2 Ireland 156 17 Hungary 131 
2 Portugal 156 20 Argentina 127 
3 Belgium 155 23 Brazil 122 
3 Germany 155 26 Romania 115 
3 Sweden 155 27 Mexico 114 
3 United States 155 29 Croatia 108 
4 Canada 154 35 South Africa 88 
4 Italy 154 38 St. Kitts & Nevis 84 
4 Japan 154 42 Turkey 75 
4 Luxembourg 154 44 Dominica 71 
4 Netherlands 154 53 Russian Federation 60 
4 Spain 154 54 Taiwan 59 
5 Austria 153 61 Thailand 52 
5 Norway 153 61 United Arab Emirates 52 
6 France 152 70 Saudi Arabia 42 
6 United Kingdom 152 72 Bosnia and Herzegovina 40 
7 Australia 151 75 India 37 
8 New Zealand 150 78 Egypt 34 
8 Singapore 150 79 China 33 
9 Greece 149 82 Jordan 30 
9 Switzerland 149 83 Korea, Dem People's Republic 29 
10 Iceland 146 87 Pakistan 25 
11 Malaysia 145 87 Iran 25 
12 Korea, Republic of 144 88 Iraq 23 
13 Liechtenstein 140 89 Afghanistan 22 
14 Cyprus 139    
 
The inequality in access to foreign spaces was summarized by KUMAR as follows:  
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For those who live in affluent countries, the passport is of use for international travel 
in connection with business or vacations”, whereas for those living in the poorer 
nations of the world “the passport is without any value if it does not have the visa. In 
other words, it is meaningless as a passport.54  
 
Unfortunately it seems that this situation is likely to persist because the migratory 
pressure is uniformly from the poorer to the richer countries. Only a rapid 
convergence in levels of income could diminish this pressure. The Southern European 
Member States constitute the best illustration of the key importance of this basic 
economic factor of migration: during the 1950s and 1960s, when their levels of per 
capita income were much lower than those in Northern Europe, they were important 
source countries of emigration.  Today their per capita income is close to (in some 
cases above) the EU average and they have all become important destination countries 
for immigration. 
 
One interesting aspect in the context of the present study, which has been neglected in 
the literature, is that the Henley Visa Restrictions Index shows large differences 
among EU member countries.  For example, the value for Romania is only 115, a full 
40 points lower than the value for Belgium or Germany (whose passports holders can 
travel to 155 countries without a visa).  Even among members of the Schengen area 
one finds large differences with the index for Hungary at only 131, 24-25 points less 
than the top-ranked countries from this ‘visa union’. If reciprocity were to work 
perfectly there should be no difference among Schengen members. However, in 
reality reciprocity is not perfect. A country from which the EU (or rather its Schengen 
area member countries) requires a visa might not ‘reciprocate’ and might not impose a 
visa requirement on some member countries.55   
 
Another source of differentiation among Schengen members is the case of negative 
reciprocity: a country might impose visa requirements on some Schengen members 
although the EU does not impose visa requirements on the citizens of that country. 
                                                        
54 A. KUMAR, Passport photos, University of California Press, (Berkeley, 2000), cited in Neumayer, 
op. cit., p. 11.  
55 See for example Turkey, which requires visas from Belgian citizens but not from German or 
Bulgarian ones, Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visa Information, available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?cc4e437c-6769-4d79-9017-10b63c651224.  
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This is the case for the US and it has created a host of legal issues at the EU level, 
which are discussed at length in Chapter 9. 
 
3.3. Visa policy implementation 
General background. Visa policy is that part of government migration policy that 
deals with the rules and regulations for the admission of foreigners onto the state 
territory and in particular the rules for entry. 
 
The entry and movement of foreigners on the national territory is generally regulated 
by Alien Laws. They deal with the entry and residence requirements.56 Aliens are 
defined as those not having the nationality of the country of residence. And 
nationality in most cases means the citizenship of the country.57 
 
Entry control. One of the ways in which a state exercises control over its territory is 
by laying down the conditions under which it will allow entry. In terms of the ways in 
which this control is exercised, there are at present two distinct systems employed by 
most countries in the world. 
 
The first system is based on strong entry control, meaning that very restrictive policies 
are applied when entry is allowed. Such restrictions may take the form of national 
quotas or accepting a presumption that every visitor is a potential immigrant. In 
general, the entry control is based on the objective to make the entry into a country 
difficult. Once the entry is granted, the residence formalities are simplified. Such 
                                                        
56 The analysis in the following pages is extensively based on three comparative studies of the aliens' 
law regulation in different countries, respectively from 1987, 2004 and 2007. The studies are: FROWEIN 
AND STEIN (eds), The Legal Position of Aliens in National and International Law, Springer-Verlag, 
(Berlin, 1987); I. HIGGINS (ed.), Migration and Asylum Law and Policy in the European Union, FIDE 
2004 National Reports, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 2004) and ADAM AND DEVILLARD 
(eds), Comparative study of the laws in the 27 EU Member States for legal immigration, including an 
assessment of the conditions and formalities imposed by each Member State for newcomers, European 
Parliament, (Brussels, 2008), p.563. 
57 See for example, the case of the British citizens who are not nationals of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the purposes of Community law, and as such can be subject to 
visa requirements. These groups include: British overseas territories citizens who do not have the right 
of abode in the United Kingdom, British overseas citizens, British subjects who do not have the right of 
abode in the United Kingdom and British protected persons. See Annex I of Council Regulation No 
539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from this requirement. 
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systems are more typical for ‘immigration nations’, such as United States or Australia 
or for island countries, which have a natural barrier to access. 
 
The second type of regulation of entry is the residence control system. There the 
presumption of immigration does not exist and it is relatively easy to gain access to 
the territory (although some visa conditions can still apply). Such a system was 
typical for continental Europe. However, the residence formalities in such countries 
(most of continental Europe) are much more demanding and indeed in these countries 
it is often easier to gain access than to establish residence. The US (and to some 
extent other Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the UK, Canada and Australia) do not 
have elaborate residency control systems.  For these countries (de facto) residency is 
often easier to establish than access to the territory. 
 
However, now that most of the continent is part of the Schengen area, one can 
observe that there has been a move towards a more balanced system, including both 
entry and residence control. In the Schengen area the move was rather towards having 
a more restrictive system, limiting both entry (through strict visa and entry 
conditions), while at the same time leaving residence formalities in place.58 
 
Pre-entry procedure (application for a visa). As was indicated above, the most 
common form of state control is the decision to grant entry. Before the invention of 
the modern visa system, such control was exercised for the first time directly at the 
border and conditional on the traveller meeting the state’s entry conditions. This rule 
still applies in the cases where a visa is not required for travellers from certain 
nationalities who are granted short term access to the territory without the need to 
apply for a visa. In these cases, individuals are subject to one point of control at the 
border. 
 
However, with the development of the modern visa system, a second layer of control 
has also been added, in the form of the visa application. This type of control has been 
                                                        
58 WOLF, “Entry and Residence: Comparative Report”, in Frowein and Stein (eds.), The Legal Position 
of Aliens in National and International Law, Springer-Verlag, (Berlin, 1987), p. 1874. 
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called by Bigo59 “remote control” or “remote policing”. In its essence, it provides for 
a control prior to the control exercised at the borders. There are three main differences 
between the proper entry control and the “remote control”. The first difference is 
based on the location at which the control is performed; in the first case – directly at 
the border, while in the second – it is in the applicants’ country of residence. The 
second difference is linked to the authorities involved in the control procedure. In the 
first case, they are the border guards of the respective country (usually linked to the 
Ministry of Interior), while in the second the controlling authority is the diplomatic 
and consular authorities in the traveller’s country of residence. Finally, the substance 
of the checks performed is the same, whether or not the person in question meets the 
entry conditions as set down in the national legislation.  
 
In the case of remote control, travellers are obliged to apply for a visa abroad and 
provide proof that they meet the entry conditions (by specifying aim of entry, funds 
available, health insurance, etc.).60 
 
While in the 1980s WOLF stated that immigration countries normally required that the 
visa be applied for abroad when entry was sought for residence or immigration,61 in 
certain cases it was still possible to apply and receive short stay visas directly at the 
border (usually in countries with a well-developed tourism sector). Nowadays, the 
rule is application for a visa prior to the date of travel and in the traveller’s country of 
residence, even in cases of short stay. The issuing of visas at the borders is kept to a 
minimum and reserved for exceptions, such as refugees, for example.  
 
The tightening of controls resulting from the development of the two-tier control 
system is demonstrated by the fact that although when issuing a visa the diplomatic 
and consular authorities check that the traveller meets the entry criteria, the visa itself 
does not represent an entry permit and thus does not guarantee entry into the country 
for which it has been issued. The visa only gives the person to which it has been 
issued the right to present him/herself at a border crossing point and apply for entry 
                                                        
59 BIGO AND GUILD, “Policing at a distance: Schengen visa policies”, in BIGO AND GUILD (eds), 
Controlling frontiers: free movement into and within Europe, Ashgate, (Aldershot, 2005).  
60 WOLF, op. cit., p. 1876. 
61 Argentina, Australia, Chile, United States (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit). 
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(also to avoid being refused entry on the grounds of not being in possession of a visa). 
Following the logic of the two-tier control system, a traveller can be refused entry 
despite having a visa in cases when there is a change in circumstances in the period 
between the issuing of the visa and the presentation at the border check point.62 Thus, 
at present, most of the countries practise the two-tier system of remote and actual 
control when deciding to grant entry to their territory.  
 
In certain circumstances there is a possibility to waive the remote entry control by 
allowing certain categories of traveller visa-free entry (meaning that they are 
subjected to only one control as to whether they meet the entry conditions – at the 
border). Usually, the exception is based either on a bilateral treaty providing for visa-
free travel or on obligations flowing from international agreements – in the case of 
refugees and asylum seekers.63 In addition, for certain categories of persons there is a 
possibility to apply for a visa directly at the border without the visa requirements 
being waived. Such a practice is typical in the cases of transit or in cases of aliens 
from neighbouring countries.64 
 
The practice of imposing an obligation to apply for a visa prior to travel also exists in 
non-immigration countries.  There is also the possibility for an exception to the rule 
based on bilateral agreements.65 One of the forms of cooperation based on the waiver 
of visa requirements for all categories of travellers and also the waiver of the 
requirement to meet the entry conditions is the establishment of common travel areas, 
resulting in the creation of common external frontiers. In these cases, the internal 
border controls (meaning those between the participating states) are either abolished 
(as in the case of Benelux) or controls are only abolished for citizens of the states 
participating in the regional agreement (as in the case of the Nordic states).66  
 
Control at the border. Once the traveller is at the border, one of the controls to be 
performed would be whether that person is in possession of a visa (visa control). Such 
                                                        
62 Argentina, United States, Canada, United Kingdom (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit). 
63 Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, United States (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
64 Norway, Poland, USSR, United States (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
65 GDR, Italy, Austria, Greece, Switzerland, Turkey, Ireland, Israel, Yugoslavia (data 1986, see WOLF, 
op. cit.). 
66 Denmark, Norway, Sweden (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
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a control is performed by the border guard authorities. However, as of the mid-1980s, 
a tendency towards the externalization or even privatization of this control developed. 
Wolf cites the example of Australia where in 1986 airlines and shipping companies 
were involved in the visa control system to a level of being liable if they disembarked 
a passenger without an entry visa. The privatization developed further in Europe 
where nowadays, based on part of the Schengen acquis, there are carriers sanctions67 
envisaged for the airlines that take passengers on board without the necessary visas. 
 
The power to grant or not to grant entry resides with the border guard who performs 
the control at the respective border check point. His decision is taken with discretion 
as to the interpretation of the conditions for entry, as enshrined in the respective laws. 
The immigration officer has to assess in each individual case whether the various 
conditions the applicant has to meet correspond to the declared aim of entry and the 
actual objectives of the applicant.68 In some countries, the discretionary power also 
includes the possibility of the administrative authority to take into consideration some 
elements that are not prescribed by law or in some cases even to waive some 
conditions that are prescribed by law and thus are normally required for the granting 
of entry.69 
 
The administrative authority responsible for performing border controls might not 
have discretion where the law provides for a right of entry once the conditions for 
entry have been met.70 Still, even then it is the administrative authority that has to 
judge whether those entry conditions have been satisfied or not.71 According to Wolf, 
it is rare that a state imposes on itself the duty to admit aliens complying with all entry 
conditions. Such a provision could amount to a self imposed obligation to admit 
aliens, which is a rather controversial right, to be discussed in the context of the 
judicial review of the decision on entry in the next section. However, in certain cases 
                                                        
67 See Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ L 187, 10.7.2001, p. 45–46, 
whose purpose is to harmonise the financial penalties imposed on carriers transporting into the territory 
of the Member States third-country nationals lacking the documents necessary for admission. 
68 Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Poland, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia 
(data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
69 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, India, Switzerland (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
70 France, Ireland, Netherlands, Nigeria (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
71 Canada, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Nigeria (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
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where there might be an obligation to grant entry it is included in administrative 
regulations using formulations such as:72 “subordinate authorities are only empowered 
to deny entry on the ground prescribed in these regulations”.73 In most cases, the law 
does not foresee an automatic obligation for the authority to refuse entry once one of 
the prescribed entry conditions is not met. There might be an imposition of an 
obligation to deny entry in the cases when it is prescribed by a higher administrative 
authority.74 The ultimate right to grant entry is in the hands of the higher 
administrative authority, usually the respective ministry. In cases such as these, entry 
may ultimately be granted following an administrative appeals procedure, despite the 
fact that entry was refused by the border guard or immigration officer.75  
 
The discretionary power of the administrative authorities responsible for performing 
border controls is limited with regard to certain categories of travellers. This usually 
holds true for refugees and asylum seekers, whose rights are guaranteed by 
international agreements or national regulations76. For those privileged groups of 
persons, in addition to the inability of the competent authorities to refuse entry, there 
is the possibility to waive part of the entry requirements and the requirement to 
present certain documents at the border.77 
 
Judicial control. According to WOLF, in most countries that participated in the survey 
in 1986, there was no legal remedy against the refusal to grant visas as such decisions 
were not considered to be subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts.78 Even 
where there was a general administrative procedure applicable to all immigration 
matters, it was unclear whether there was any protection against a refusal of entry 
abroad at the level at which the visa application was made.79 In some of the countries, 
                                                        
72 Argentina, Chile, GDR, India, Ireland, United Kingdom (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.) 
73 Federal Republic of Germany, GDR, India, Ireland (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.) 
74 India, Ireland (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.) 
75 India (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
76 See for example, Article 5 (2) of the Schengen Implementing Convention holds that an alien who 
does not fulfil the set entry condition must be refused entry “unless a contracting party considers it 
necessary to derogate from that principle on humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or 
because of international obligations…”.  
77 Argentina, Chile, France, India, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States, USSR (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
78 United States, Poland (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
79 Argentina, France, Greece, Italy, Turkey, USSR (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
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denial of entry was treated as an act of state that was not subject to constitutional 
restrictions or judicial review.80 Such an approach relates to the debate about whether, 
under international law, an individual has a right that stems from the state obligation 
to admit aliens.  
 
Within the context of European law, the European Court of Justice ruled in 
Panayotova and Others81 that the scheme applicable to entry permits (in this case, 
temporary residence permits):  
 
must be based on a procedural system which is easily accessible and capable of 
ensuring that the persons concerned will have their applications dealt with 
objectively and within a reasonable time, and refusals to grant a permit must be 
capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.82 
 
In the cases where it is not the visa but entry that is refused, and especially in those 
cases where a valid entry visa was available, a review procedure is in place.83 
In reality however, a judicial review consists only of a legality check or a control of 
compliance with procedural rules, and this is typically the case in areas where 
administrative authorities hold discretionary power.84 The decision of the authorities 
is therefore not subject to any control as regards its substance.  
 
According to WOLF, the types of conditions the aliens have to meet in order to be 
granted entry and the information they are required to provide is nearly the same in all 
countries.85 
  
Legal framework.86 The majority of countries, regardless of their status within the EU 
or the Schengen system, base their visa policy on an Aliens Act adopted by the 
legislature which sets out the general conditions of entry; the criteria the aliens have 
                                                        
80 Austria, United States (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
81 ECJ, Case C-327/02 Panayotova and Others, [2004] ECR, I-11055 and the Opinion of the Advocate 
General Maduro.  
82 ECJ, Case C-327/02 Panayotova and Others, op. cit., para 27. 
83 Australia, Canada, United Kingdom (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
84 Argentina, Canada, France, Greece, Switzerland (data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
85 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Federal Republic of Germany, France, GDR, Ireland, 
Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, USSR, 
Yugoslavia(data 1986, see WOLF, op. cit.). 
86 For a recent overview see ADAM AND DEVILLARD (eds), Comparative study of the laws in the 27 EU 
Member States for legal immigration, including an assessment of the conditions and formalities 
imposed by each Member State for newcomers, European Parliament, (Brussels, 2008), p. 563. 
  48
to meet in order to be admitted to the territory; the types of visas and procedures for 
their issuance and control. All further administrative formalities are dealt with in a 
secondary legislation, including the adoption of lists of countries whose nationals are 
exempted/required to be in possession of a visa in order to be granted entry. The only 
exception seems to be Portugal, where the core legal act dealing with aliens is adopted 
by the government based on a special authorization by the parliament. 
 
Competent authorities. Generally, the authorities involved in visa policy are from one 
of the following three groups: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Internal 
Security (Interior, Justice); and the Border Guards.   
 
In all countries, there is a distinction made between the two visa processes – the 
decision to issue a visa and the issuing process itself. In all countries too, the issuing 
of visas is performed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its diplomatic and 
consular missions abroad. As a rule, the consulates can also decide to issue short-stay 
visas, in certain cases (Belgium and Denmark, for example) only after authorization 
by the overall responsible body. However, even here, it is the services of the Ministry 
of Interior that perform the necessary database checks for ‘undesirables’. In some 
countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark), the decision is taken by the 
Ministry of Interior or a specially authorized body (e.g. the Migration Board)87. Once 
the decision is taken, the consulates execute it through the granting or refusal of visas. 
The involvement of the Ministry of Interior is mainly linked to the issuing of visas 
that entitle the holder to residence. 
 
Border Guards have the authority to decide upon and issue visas in exceptional 
circumstances and the definition of these is country-specific, depending on national 
interests, minorities across the borders or the protection of displaced persons. 
 
Types and number of visas. There are different types of visa which can be 
categorized in different ways: by length of stay, by reasons for entry (transit or not) 
and by category of persons (e.g. those without a passport and special visas for tourist 
groups).  The next section will show that the Schengen states mostly issue a so-called 
                                                        
87 See I. HIGGINS (ed.), Migration and Asylum Law and Policy in the European Union, FIDE 2004 
National Reports, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 2004) 
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‘Schengen visa’ (which is valid for no more than three months for the whole area) and 
national visas allowing for longer stays in the issuing country.  
 
3.4. The reality of visas in Europe today 
Schengen visas are by now a significant global phenomenon. The citizens of the EU 
have little awareness of this fact, but for the citizens of over 100 countries, including 
some in Europe that are in principle on the road to membership, obtaining a Schengen 
visa is a necessity for all travel to the EU. 
 
Schengen visas thus have a considerable socio-economic impact. But this could not be 
documented previously because systematic data on the issuance of Schengen visas 
have only recently become generally available. The relevant data are now published 
on the website of the Council.88  This section provides some overall statistics.   
 
A first point to bear in mind is that one visa is not the same as another. There are 
seven different types of visa referred to in the official statistics, which can be divided 
into three groups: 
 
1) Standard Schengen visa, valid for access or transit through the territory. To 
this category belong the so called A, or airport transit visa; the B, or normal 
transit visa and, most importantly, the C, or standard short-stay visa valid for 
up to three months, which account for over 95 % of this category. 
2) A second group of national visas, comprising the type D or long-stay 
NATIONAL visa and the so called D+C or a NATIONAL long-stay visa valid 
concurrently as a short-stay visa. The latter are used mainly by Romania and 
Italy. 
3) Finally there is a mixed group for special cases comprising two types: the so- 
called LTV or VTL: a visa with limited territorial validity, and the ADS type: 
special visas issued for members of tourist groups from the People’s Republic 
of China. 
                                                        
88 See Council of the EU, Exchange of statistical information on uniform visas issued by Member 
States’ diplomatic missions and consular posts. The data for different years can be found under 
7496/04 (data for 2003), 10700/07 (data for 2006) and 8215/08 (data for 2007).  
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The last two types clearly represent special cases.89 The VTL type was meant for 
exceptional cases but in reality is widely used for the citizens of Macedonia 
(FYROM) whose passports are not recognized by Greece because of the dispute over 
the name of their country.  Greece alone accounts for about one half of all VTL visas 
issued. 
 
Table 1.2., below shows the absolute number of each type of visa issued and their 
relative importance. This table is based on the data published on the website of the 
Council (in compliance with the decision of the Executive Committee of 22 
December 1994 on the exchange of statistical information on the issuing of uniform 
visas – SCH/COMEX(94)25). These data do not include the UK and Ireland, given 
that these two countries do not issue ‘uniform’ visas. The data below thus refers to the 
sum of the visas issued by 27 countries (the 27 Member States minus the UK and 
Ireland, plus Norway and Iceland). 
 
Table 1.2. Number of visas issued by Schengen countries in 2007 
 Total issued % of total 
A (airport transit) 80 000 0.6 
B (transit) 380 000 2.6 
C (normal Schengen) 11 920 000 83.8 
D (long stay, national) 1 100 000 7.7 
LTV 212 000 1.5 
D+C 375 000 2.6 
ADS (Chinese tourists) 170 000 1.2 
Grand total all types 14 200 000 100 
Source: Council website: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st08/st08215.en08.pdf. 
 
                                                        
89 They are explained on the Council website in the following way: 
VTL: “The Schengen Convention stipulates that any alien who does not fulfil all the conditions for 
entry into the Schengen area must be refused entry, unless an issuing State considers it necessary to 
derogate from this principle on humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or because of 
international obligations (Article 5(2) of the Schengen Convention). In such cases authorisation to enter 
is restricted to the territory of the issuing State and a VTL visa is issued.” 
ADS: “The Memorandum of Understanding between the European Community and the National 
Tourism Administration of the People’s Republic of China on visa and related issues concerning tourist 
groups from the People’s Republic of China (ADS) (O.J. 2004, L 83, p. 14) stipulates that designated 
travel agencies in China can act as authorised representatives of visa applicants from the People’s 
Republic of China who are travelling in a group. Such groups may be issued a Schengen visa, limited 
to a maximum of 30 days and bearing the reference “ADS”.” 
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It is apparent that by far the most common type of visa is the C or ‘standard’ short 
term (up to three months) Schengen visa, which accounts alone for about 84 % of all 
‘uniform’ visas issued.  This type, together with the transit type, is usually referred to 
as a ‘Schengen visa’. The two together account for 87% of all visas issued. This 
implies that, at least numerically, Schengen covers the bulk of visa activity in most 
Member States.  These proportions have not changed noticeably over time. 
 
The second most important type (in numerical terms) is the D or long-term national 
visa. This is usually referred to in short hand as a ‘national visa’. It accounts for a 
little less than 8% of all visas issued.  
 
All other types of visa are of limited numerical importance, although the LTV type is 
of considerable political importance to some Member States. 
 
The number of Schengen (short-term) visas has increased considerably in recent 
years.  Between 2005 (the earliest year with complete data) and 2007 the issuance of 
Schengen visas by the Schengen-15 increased by about 1.2 million or almost 20% and 
even more so by the non-Schengen group (increase from 3.1 to 3.9 or almost 30%).  
By 2007 visa issuance had reached 8 million during 2007 (for the then Schengen-15) 
and almost 4 million for the (as of 2007), 10 Member States that had not yet lifted 
border controls.   
 
Table 1.3. Issuance of C (short-term) visas in millions 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Sub-total for SCHENGEN-
15 
6.8 7.5 8.0 8.3 
Sub-total for countries 
NON SCHENGEN in 2007 
3.1 3.7 3.9 3.2 
(of which 0.9  
BG and CY) 
Total  9.8 11.2 11.9 11.5 
Source: Council website: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st08/st08215.en08.pdf. 
 
These numbers show that EU visa policy affects millions of individuals. Moreover, 
the data also show that visas were more important for the new Members States than 
the old ones. In 2007, that is, prior to their accession to Schengen, the new Member 
States issued about one half as many visas as the Schengen 15 (3.9 million against 8 
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million). However, the ratio in terms of population is about 3:1 (330 million for the 
Schengen 15 versus 103 for the non-Schengen).  The new Member States thus issued 
about one half more visas per head of population (3.8 per hundred) than the old 
Member States (which dominate the Schengen 15 group) which issue only about 2.4 
per hundred. This difference in the importance of visas may account for the tensions 
between old and new members on a number of issues – as analyzed in Chapter 7.   
 
The data for 2008 also show that the concerns of the new Member States about the 
restrictiveness of the Schengen regime had some merit. All the new Member States 
from Eastern Europe which had joined the EU in 2004 joined the Schengen space in 
December 2007. The last column of Table 1.3 shows that this group experienced in 
the following year (2008) a strong decline in the number of short-term visas issued. In 
2008 the short-term (Schengen) visas fell by over 30 % in the nine new Schengen 
Member States (but rose slightly for Bulgaria and Romania, the only continental EU 
Member States then still outside Schengen).  This is clear evidence that the decline in 
visa issuance during 2008 was not due to the onset of the economic crisis, but a 
consequence of the Schengen regime. 
 
The issuance of long-term (national) visas has remained less frequent. Their numbers 
have been stable at around 1 million until 2007.  Table 1.4 shows the relevant data. It 
is also apparent that until 2007 the new non-Schengen Member States issued 
relatively fewer long-term (national) visas than the Schengen Member States. This 
was to be expected as long-term visas are related to persons wishing to immigrate, 
study or take up work. On all these counts the older, Member States are of course the 
more popular destinations with the result that until 2007 almost all D visa were issued 
by the old Member States (mainly for overseas visitors). This changed drastically in 
2008, i.e. with the accession of the nine new Member States to Schengen, which 
resulted in a fall of the number of short-term visas, but also a very marked increase in 
D visas issued by them. This sudden shift across visa categories is another example of 
the considerable flexibility member countries retain de facto within the legal 





Table 1.4. Issuance of the long-term D national visas 
In millions 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Sub-total for SCHENGEN-15 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 
Sub-total for 
NON SCHENGEN in 2007 
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 
(of which 0.05 
BG and CY) 
Total  1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 
Source: own calculations based on data from Council website, op.cit. 
 
There are other important differences among Member States involving almost all 
aspects such as the number of visas issued, the types of visas issued, rejection rates, 
etc. Not surprisingly, the largest Member States account for the bulk of issuance. The 
three largest (DE, FR and IT) Schengen Member States account for about 60% of the 
total number of visas issued by the entire group of Schengen 15 in 2007. 
 
The average rejection rate is about 9% (in 2007 there were about 8.7 million 
applications, of which about 8 million were granted. But the rejection rate varies from 
lows of around 4% in Portugal and Italy to a high of over 16 % in Belgium.  
 
The fees also represent considerable revenue for Member States: for the Schengen 15 
the total revenue must have amounted to around €500 million annually (8 million 
visas times €60). With an overall total for the enlarged Schengen-24 of about 14 
million, the total revenue should ultimately about €1 billion.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter has traced the emergence of the modern visa through the history of the 
formation of the modern nation state. The visa arose as a tool to control the perceived 
threat from ‘others’ who wished to enter the national territory from abroad. Control 
over movements at the border is now an essential element of sovereignty. Ceding part 
of this control to the European level was thus naturally a difficult process that took 
some time, as described in the subsequent chapters.  
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Another consequence of visa policy being close to the heart of sovereignty was later 
the limited judicial control in this area (as in Justice and Home Affairs in general90). 
This chapter also provided some statistical evidence on the importance of visas and 
the wide differences in their usage even within the Schengen area. 
 
The chapter also provided some evidence on the importance of visa issuance and the 
impact Schengen membership had on the new Member States. 
                                                        
90 This is indeed an important issue and applies to administrative law in general; the continental vision 
of separation of powers leading to separate administrative tribunals to review administrative acts.  
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CHAPTER 2 – THE CONCEPT OF THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY IN 
THE EU CONTEXT 
 
This chapter provides a concise overview of current legal thinking on the three themes 
that run through the entire study: the transfer of sovereignty, accession and relations 
of the European Union with third countries. It is not an attempt to engage in a debate 
on legal theory; it merely serves to introduce the main concepts of the terminology 
used throughout the rest of the study. 
 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the effect of the transfer of sovereignty on the 
allocation of competences between the EU and the Member States in general. Then it 
moves on to look at the specific challenges that an acceding Member State might face 
with regard to the transfer of sovereignty. Next, it looks at the particular difficulties 
inherent in the visa policy field for Member States, both for those present and those 
acceding. Finally, some reflections on the process of Europeanization of visa policy 
are offered. 
 
Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the 
European Union now has legal personality and has acquired the competences 
previously conferred on the European Community. Community law has therefore 
become European Union law, which also includes all the provisions previously 
adopted under the Treaty on European Union as applicable before the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The need to distinguish between the Community and the Union under the pre-
Lisbon framework applies in particular to the present chapter.  In general the term 
‘Community Law’ is used to designate what has become ‘Union Law’ and the term 
the ‘EU’ or the ‘Union’ is used to designate what used to be called the ‘Community’. 
 
1. Transfer of sovereignty and allocation of competences 
Supranational organization. What distinguishes the European Union from the other 
international organizations is its supranational character. Although it was created on 
the basis of an international agreement between sovereign states, the relations 
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between those states are no longer governed by international law. Instead, the 
relations between the Member States of the European Union, its institutions and the 
individuals are governed by EU law. As a supranational entity, the Union is 
characterized by four important elements: (1) independent institutions, which are able 
to act independently of the Member States in terms of their composition and manner 
of operation; (2) autonomous decision-making allowing the Union to take decisions 
by majority, but which are still able to bind all Member States; (3) the implementation 
of decisions either by the Union itself or by the Member States under the supervision 
of the Union; and (4) a separate legal order.1 
 
The sovereign character of European law. The legal order created by the EC Treaty 
and now extended to the entire EU is separate to that of the Member States and 
sovereign in its own right. This sovereign character of European Union law has three 
main consequences: the primacy of European law over conflicting national rules, its 
direct effect to the benefit of individuals, and its effect on the division of competences 
between the Community (now the Union) and its Member States. Since only the last 
element is of special concern for the present study, the division of competences will 
be addressed in detail below.  
 
“The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields”.2 
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its 
own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the 
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the 
Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their 
nationals and themselves. 
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community 
legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a 
permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent 
unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.3 
 
                                                        
1 LENAERTS AND VAN NUFFEL, Constitutional law of the European Union, 2nd edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell (London, 2005), p. 11; referring to the European Community prior to the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
2 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. See pp. 
47-48. 
3 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.  
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Transfer of sovereignty. The Union may act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Treaties – the principle of conferral enshrined in Article 5 (2) 
TEU new4. The way in which these competences are exercised is limited by the two 
fundamental principles – the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of 
proportionality. These three principles form the basis for the division of powers 
between the Union and the Member States. 
 
This approach recalls the way in which this transfer is organized in the national legal 
order of the Member States. The national constitutions establish the agreement on 
how the sovereign powers are distributed and exercised in the state, and embody the 
idea that no supreme power can be imposed outside the constitutionally established 
mechanisms.5 The first exception to this principle was the application of international 
law in the internal legal order. With the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community the participating states decided to yield sovereign powers to this 
supranational institution. This was done on the basis of the constitutional provisions 
permitting limitations of sovereignty or the transfer of sovereign powers to 
international organizations. In most of the Member States, their constitutions regulate 
the transfer and contain a specific article on this issue.  
 
It is established that membership of the European Union entails a transfer of 
sovereign rights to the supranational entity. The scope of those rights is regulated by 
the scope of Union competence in the field regulated by the Treaties. The moment at 
which the actual transfer occurs and, respectively, the moment at which the Member 
State loses the possibility to regulate in the field, determines the temporal element of 
the transfer of sovereignty. Thus, there can be either an initial transfer, embodied in 
the specific articles of the respective national constitutions, a transfer that covers all 
areas of Union action, or a gradual transfer that occurs following the accession to the 
EU as a result of a gradual adoption of EU measures in a certain field which, as a 
result, pre-empts further independent action by the Member States.  
 
                                                        
4 The abbreviation "TEU" used after a Treaty article refers to the Treaty on European Union in its 
version until 1 December 2009, while “TEU new” refers to the same Treaty, in its version as of 1 
December 2009.  
5 A. ALBI, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, (Cambridge 2005), p. 9. 
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The principle of conferral. The Union does not have its own powers; but only those 
conferred on it by the Treaty. Article 5 TEU new (ex Article 5 EC) enshrines this 
principle known as the principle of conferral or the principle of attribution of powers. 
Thus, Article 5 (2) TEU new provides that “the Union shall act within the limits of the 
competences conferred on it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein.” This principle must be respected in both the internal and 
the external action of the Union.6 In essence, the principle raises questions about 
whether the European Union is competent to act in a certain field and if there is 
indeed a competence – what its scope is. As the case law and the doctrine on these 
questions developed in reference to the Community, the word “Community” is used 
in the following paragraphs, but the conclusions apply to the entire European Union 
as of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
Existence of Community competence. The technique of attribution employed in the EC 
Treaty was (in most cases) highly specific.7 Typically, a substantive provision in a 
specific field defined the type of action the EU is authorized to take. The relevant 
legal basis prescribes the decision-making procedure to be used for the exercise of 
this power and the legal instruments to be used.  
 
The division of competence between the EU and the Member States is determined by 
the legal basis. Where the EU is not empowered to act such action falls within the 
residuary competence of the Member States. The first paragraph of Article 5 of the 
EC Treaty made a distinction between Community powers depending on their legal 
basis. The Community exercised “the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty” where 
the action undertaken fell, expressly or by implication, within one of the tasks listed in 
Article 3 and Article 4 of the EC Treaty and the power was expanded upon in one of 
the subsequent titles of the Treaty. The expression “objectives assigned to [the 
Community]” refered to a competence to act which did not as such follow from a 
Treaty provision, but appeared necessary in order to attain one of the objectives 
assigned to the Community by the Treaty (EC Treaty, Art. 308, now Article 352 
TFEU)).  
                                                        
6 LENAERTS AND VAN NUFFEL, op.cit., p. 86. 
7 WYATT, DASHWOOD, ARNULL AND DOUGAN, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, 5th 
edition, Sweet and Maxwell (London, 2006). p. 85. 
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Scope of Community competence. Once it is established that a Community 
competence indeed existed, in accordance with the principle of attribution of powers 
under Article 5, the question arose as to the nature of the competence conferred upon 
the Community; more precisely, the different sorts of legal consequences which the 
existence or the exercise of the Community competence may have for the national 
regulatory competences in the policy area concerned.8 Depending on their relationship 
to the powers of the Member States, the Community competences were subdivided 
into exclusive and non-exclusive competences (see the second paragraph of Art. 5 of 
the EC Treaty and Art. 43(d) of the EU Treaty). Non-exclusive competences were 
sometimes referred to as “shared” (see the second subparagraph of Art. 133(6) of the 
EC Treaty), “parallel” or “concurrent” competences.9 
 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it is now the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which “organises the functioning of the 
Union and determines the areas of, delimitation of, and arrangements for exercising 
of its competences” (Article 1 (1) TFEU10). Title I of the same Treaty defines the 
categories and areas of Union competence.  
 
Exclusive Union competence11. In these areas regulatory authority belongs to the 
Union alone: the Member States have lost the right to act autonomously. However, 
exclusive Union competence constitutes very much the exception; most EU powers 
are non-exclusive. There were only four uncontroversial cases of exclusive 
competence prior to entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: the regulation of external 
trade under the common commercial policy, the conservation of marine biological 
resources, customs union and monetary policy (for those Member States which have 
adopted the euro).12 Article 3 TFEU now lists five areas: customs union; the 
establishing of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; 
monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; the conservation 
                                                        
8 WYATT, DASHWOOD ET. AL., op. cit., p. 85. 
9 Adapted from LENAERTS AND VAN NUFFEL, op. cit., p. 86. 
10 The abbreviation "TFEU" used after a Treaty article refers to the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, while EC refers to the Treaty establishing the European Community in force until 1 
December 2009. 
11 Areas of exclusive competence are defined in Article 3 of the TFEU. 
12 WYATT, DASHWOOD ET. AL., op.cit., p. 85. 
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of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; and common 
commercial policy.  
 
The principle that any action by a Member State in a field of exclusive Union 
competence is a priori in conflict with the Treaty can also cause problems. For 
example, if the EU does not act, necessary measures may remain untaken. 
Furthermore, changed political and economic circumstances may make action on the 
part of Member States desirable.  This is why it has been argued in relation to the 
European Community that the exclusive character of a Community competence 
should remain limited to what is essential in order to attain the objectives of the 
European Community.13 
 
Another specific case arises if the EU decides, in an area of exclusive competence, to 
delegate certain means of exercising that competence to the Member States. As a 
consequence Member States then act as agents of the EU pursuant to a “specific 
authorization”. In these cases the EU must specify in what way and according to what 
procedure the Member States are to act.14 
 
Shared competence15. Here, EU law recognizes that both the EU and the Member 
States are competent to regulate the relevant sectors; however, the actual exercise of 
EU regulatory power limits the scope for exercising national regulatory power with 
respect to the same matters. Shared competence is the normal case.16 It applies, 
among others, to the legal bases of visas. 
 
The principle of pre-emption. This applies in the areas of shared competence: so long 
as the EU has not exercised its regulatory competence, the Member States remain free 
to exercise theirs.  In doing so they must, of course, comply with any general 
obligations resulting from the Treaty, such as in the field of free movement of goods, 
persons, services or capital.  
 
                                                        
13 LENAERTS AND VAN NUFFEL, op. cit., p. 86. 
14 For a concrete example, see part II of Chapter 8 which discusses local border traffic agreements. 
15 Areas of shared competence are defined in Article 4 TFEU. 
16 Adapted from WYATT, DASHWOOD ET. AL., op.cit., p. 85. 
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Once the EU has exercised its (shared) regulatory competence, the room for 
maneouvre for Member States is even more restricted: in principle they remain free to 
exercise the competence – but now they must also respect the relevant EU legislation 
in this field. EU measures thus have the so-called “pre-emptive” effect, i.e. they 
occupy at least part of the relevant regulatory field, and prevent Member States from 
exercising their own competence therein. 
 
In the extreme, the pre-emptive effect could be total: EU measures might completely 
regulate the field, thereby preventing Member States from lawfully adopting 
divergent national regulatory standards. From the point of view of a Member State, 
fully pre-emptive EU secondary legislation creates a similar situation to exclusive 
competence under the Treaty itself.  
 
In most cases, however, the pre-emptive effect of EU legislation is only partial: while 
imposing certain obligations on Member States as to how they must exercise their 
own regulatory competences, the EU measure nevertheless leaves the national 
authorities a substantial margin of discretion to make their own independent policy 
choices, even within the occupied field. A typical case in point is all the Community 
legislation that provides for only minimum harmonization. 
 
At the other extreme it is also possible that, in certain areas of shared competence, 
owing to the particular nature of the authorized activity, the actual exercise of EU 
competence has no pre-emptive effect at all. This could be the case in areas where 
measures by the EU do not take the form of regulation, but of specific actions. For 
example, in the fields of humanitarian aid or development co-operation, EU measures 
(e.g. aid to certain regions in a state of emergency) do not have the consequence of 
precluding autonomous action by the Member States with respect to the same subject-
matter. In these fields, the competences of the EU and the Member States are 
perfectly parallel: the exercise of either competence leaves open the full range of 
possibilities for the future exercise of the other.17  
 
                                                        
17 Based on WYATT, DASHWOOD ET. AL., op.cit., p. 85. 
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Therefore, in order to determine whether a certain competence lies with the EU or the 
Member States, it is necessary to determine to what extent the EU action in a 
particular area still leaves room for the Member States to legislate. Action on the part 
of the EU restricts the power of the Member States to such an extent that in future 
they can only act in conformity with the EU provision. Depending upon the extent to 
which the EU exercises its power, it may confer upon it an “exclusive nature,”18 even 
though exclusive competence has not been transferred to the Community within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 5 of the EC Treaty.19 
 
However, there are still some substantial differences between the exclusive 
competence “by nature” and “by exercise”. In areas of exclusive competence “by 
nature” there are rules that make the transfer of sovereignty in this field irreversible. 
For example, the establishment of closer cooperation among Member States in areas 
which fall within the exclusive competence of the EU is precluded by the Treaty.20 
Furthermore, the EU cannot transfer a field in which it has exclusive competence back 
to the Member States because the text of the Treaty itself categorically rules out 
competence on the part of the Member States.  
 
In contrast to the definitive character of loss of sovereignty in the cases of exclusive 
competence “by nature”, in the areas of shared competence that have become 
exclusive “by exercise” there can be a reversal of the transfer. The EU may in 
principle repeal the EU measure, leaving the Member States in a position to exercise 
their powers in full again. The repeal must accord, however, with the objectives of the 
Treaty provision forming the legal basis of the measure and with the principle of 
subsidiarity.21 This possibility is confirmed by Article 2 (2) TFEU. 
 
Relevance for the case of visa policy. As visa policy was not part of the EC Treaty 
from the very beginning, the attribution of powers process follows a special 
                                                        
18 Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organisation concerning safety in the 
use of chemicals at work [1993] ECR I-1061, Opinion 1/94, Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organisation [1994] ECR I-5267; Opinion 2/92, Accession by the Community to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] ECR I-1759.  
19 LENAERTS AND VAN NUFFEL, op.cit., p. 86. 
20 Article 43(d) Treaty on the European Union. Confirmed by Article 20 (1) TEU new. 
21 LENAERTS AND VAN NUFFEL, op. cit., p. 86. 
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dynamic.22 This process is sometimes referred to as Europeanization, in the sense of 
shifting regulatory powers from the national to the European level. 
 
In practice the process began with the inclusion of a special provision in the EC 
Treaty allowing for Community action. In the case of visa policy, this occurred with 
the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, which contained the special provision of 
Article 100c. It referred to two very specific powers: visa list and visa format. The 
attribution of power on these two issues also had provisions with regard to the 
decision-making process of the exercise of power and the types of act that could be 
adopted in the process. 
 
When the first Community acts were adopted, the Community exercised its 
competence, and thus occupied the field and limited the exercise of regulatory powers 
by the Member States. However, the field was not occupied completely, as the 
adopted Community acts already foresaw several exceptions residing in the regulatory 
powers of the Member States.  
 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, a wider range of issues linked 
to visa policy was subjected to Community rules. The gradual process of the transfer 
of sovereignty therefore repeated itself. The first step was the inclusion of a specific 
reference to visa policy in an EC Treaty article or articles. This act in itself creates the 
possibility for Community action and for the potential limitation of Member States’ 
competences. The second step involved the adoption of a Community act in the 
exercise of conferred powers. By the simple act of adoption, the Member States’ 
competence to regulate the field actually decreases. Moreover, even within the limited 
scope still left open to them, they are constrained by the obligation not to adopt acts 
that contradict Community rules.  
 
Thus, the more the EC acted, the more sovereignty Member States transferred and the 
less regulatory power they have as a consequence. This process is bound to create 
tensions, especially in fields where the rules are strongly influenced by national 
                                                        
22 For a reflection on the relationship between competence, European community law and the third 
country nationals prior to the Maastricht Treaty, see: R. PLENDER “Competence, European Community 
Law and Nationals of Non-Member States”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 39 (1990), 
pp. 599-610. 
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tradition or specific external relations priorities, such as visa policy. Because, unlike 
the field development aid, for example, it is not possible to have the EC (and now the 
EU) and the Member States act in parallel; there can be only one regulator, and that is 
the EU.  
 
2. Transfer of sovereignty in the EU accession process23 
Accession and the transfer of sovereignty. As mentioned above, the transfer of 
sovereignty can take two forms. The first is gradual and occurs in areas of shared 
competence when the Community and now the Union acts and adopts community 
rules; it pre-empts future action by the Member States and thus limits their regulatory 
powers. The second is more abrupt and occurs every time a new state accedes to the 
EU; it transfers part of its sovereignty to the supranational entity. Usually, this 
transfer takes the form of special provisions, authorizing the transfer in the national 
constitutions of the country concerned.24 
 
In essence, the founding members of the ECSC had to perform the same action and 
authorize the same transfer. However, while the first Member States had to accept the 
transfer in principle and the resulting primacy and direct effects only later, the 
countries joining at a later stage also had to accept the body of law created, but prior 
to their accession. Moreover, a Member State could participate in the adoption of 
Community acts through its government representatives in the institutions, and could 
thus make its specific concerns heard at that stage. This possibility is not open to an 
acceding state – it has to accept the rules as they stand at the date of its accession, 
subject to specific conditions agreed in the Act of Accession.  
 
For the sake of clarity one can extract two elements in the process: the pure transfer of 
sovereignty and the limitation of regulatory powers, or what is known as ‘competence 
decrease’. In this case the pure transfer of sovereignty will refer to the 
acknowledgement of primacy of Community law in the national legal order. And as 
such the substance of this transfer does not change over time. The competence 
                                                        
23 Since the rules on accession have only so far been applied prior to the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the references to the Community in this section were maintained.  
24 For a detailed look at the case of the fifth enlargement, see: A. ALBI, EU Enlargement and the 
Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge 2005), p. 9. 
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decrease is the result of the division of powers between the Community and the 
Member States.  Due to the ongoing process of deepening, the powers of the former 
have tended to increase after each subsequent accession. Thus, the countries that 
acceded last to the EU had to surrender a broader scope of competences than any 
other country before them. This applies also in the field of visa policy as will be 
illustrated throughout this work. 
 
An additional element of the fifth accession25 was the development of elaborate pre-
accession machinery, which ultimately had the effect of limiting the regulatory 
powers of the candidates for accession long before the actual accession date. An 
impressive set of rules and procedures, which some authors went as far as calling 
“customary enlargement law”,26 has been developed around the single article in the 
EU Treaty governing the accession procedure - Article 49 TEU. In order to 
understand the precise nature of the sovereignty transfer and competence decrease 
upon accession it is necessary to have an overview of the three main elements of the 
accession process: the general legal framework and the conditions for accession, the 
accession negotiations and the accession treaties. A concise overview is provided 
below.  
2.1. The legal framework of accession 
The formal accession procedure. The procedure of accession is set out in Article 49 
TEU which in its pre-Lisbon version reads: 
Any European State, which respects the principles set out27 in Article 6 (1) may 
apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the 
                                                        
25 DG Enlargement consistently treated the accessions of 2004 and 2007 as two waves of a single 
enlargement.   
26 See for definition, DIMITRY KOCHENOV, EU enlargement and the failure of conditionality: pre-
accession conditionality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, Volume 59 of European 
monographs, Kluwer Law International, 2008, pp. 63-64 
27 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced changes in the first paragraph of Article 49 TEU new which now 
reads : 
Any European State, which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting 
them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national parliaments 
shall be notified of this application. The applicant state  shall address its application to the Council, 
which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the 
European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members.The conditions of 
eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account. 
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which 
such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the 
applicant state. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
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Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after 
receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute 
majority of its component members. 
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an 
agreement between the Member States and the applicant state. This agreement 
shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements. 
 
The text clearly outlines two tracks of the accession procedure – one, involving the 
Member States and a second one, involving the Community institutions. The 
Accession Treaty is concluded between the Member States and the applicant state and 
is ratified by the parties according to their individual constitutional requirements. The 
European Community is not a party to this international agreement28 and the 
acceptance of new Member States is not an exercise of Community competence.29 
However, the Community institutions prepare the stage for the conclusion of the 
agreement as the latter is conditional upon the Commission submitting an Opinion, 
the European Parliament giving its formal assent and the Council deciding 
unanimously on the issue. Ultimately, the two tracks are interdependent and 
supplementary to each other.30 
 
When looking at the text of Article 49 TEU, it is difficult to find in it the complex 
accession procedures witnessed during the fifth enlargement. The text simply states 
that application for accession is addressed to the Council, which has to consult the 
Commission on it. The position of the Commission takes the form of an Opinion. 
In fact, in practice, there are two Commission Opinions. The first is delivered 
following an application for membership; it evaluates the compatibility of the country 
with the accession criteria and recommends to the Council to open or not negotiations 
for membership with the country in question. However, in legal terms this first 
opinion is not a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations.31 
 
                                                        
28 J.P. PUISSOCHET, L’elargissement des Communautés européennes, Editions technique et 
économiques, (Paris, 1974), p. 28. 
29 MACLEOD, HENDRY AND HYETT, The External Relations of the European Communities, Clarendon 
Press, (Oxford, 1996), p. 226. 
30 HOFFMEISTER, “Changing requirements for membership”, in OTT AND INGLIS (eds), Handbook on 
European Enlargement. A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, Asser, (The Hague, 2002). 
31 AVERY & CAMERON, The Enlargement of the European Union, Sheffield Academic Press, 
(Sheffield, 1998), p. 23. 
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The second formal Opinion is delivered once the accession negotiations are 
completed. The period between the two opinions is taken up with active work on the 
part of the Commission, which is engaged in the process of continuous evaluation 
through regular reports in the framework of a ‘pre-accession’ strategy. The 
Commission is also involved in the preparation of the common negotiating positions 
of the Member States and assists the Presidency of the Council in the negotiation 
process. Thus, the discrepancy between the text of Article 49 TEU and the actual 
practice of its implementation has led some authors to claim that the development of a 
customary enlargement law is in process.32 
 
Conditions for accession. From the text of Article 49, it seems that it is mainly 
concerned with the procedure, rather than the conditions of accession. From the first 
paragraph of the text, one can identify two conditions. The first is geographical, as the 
text speaks of a “European state”. The second is linked to the principles set out in 
Article 6 (1), namely freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law. Moreover, the Court of Justice has already ruled that the 
Treaty provision on enlargement only sets out the procedure for the admission of new 
Member States but leaves it to the authorities involved in this procedure to determine 
the conditions of accession.33 This interpretation and the lack of legally binding 
accession criteria in Article 49 led to the gradual adaptation of the conditions for 
accession in each subsequent enlargement.  
 
In this sense the fifth enlargement is unique, as the accession conditions were 
developed into a set of accession criteria,34 which stemmed from European Council 
conclusions and as such were determined unilaterally. Despite the fact that those 
criteria do not have a legally binding effect, their formulation and general application 
                                                        
32 D. KOCHENOV, “EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments: Treaty – Custom 
Concubinage?”, European Integration Online Papers 6 (2005). 
33 ECJ, Case 93/78, Mattheus [1978] ECR 2203, para 7-8. 
34 The glossary on enlargement, provided by the DG Enlargement in the European Commission reads: " 
The accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria, are the essential conditions all candidate countries must 
satisfy to become a Member State. They were set at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and at 
the Madrid European Council in 1995", see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/glossary/terms/accession-
criteria_en.htm 
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has given them a ‘quasi-constitutional’ nature.35 Thus, the basis of the accessions of 
2004 and 2007 and the framework in which the accession negotiations develop now 
with Croatia and Turkey are based on the so-called Copenhagen criteria, stemming 
from the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993. 
 
The geographical criterion. The requirement for an applicant state to be European has 
been part of the accession procedure and requirement since the Treaty of Rome.36 
However, the issue of whether a country is European enough for membership arose 
only once before the Turkish application for membership. Thus, the application of 
Morocco was refused by the Council in 1987 on the grounds that Morocco did not 
meet the geographical criteria for membership.37  
 
The issue gets more complicated in relation to countries which undoubtedly belong 
geographically to the European continent, but somehow are not considered part of the 
European family. In order to solve this difficulty, different criteria have been applied. 
One of them is the membership of the Council of Europe, which although it can prove 
a certain adherence to a set of democratic values, nevertheless still includes countries 
such as Azerbaijan; not seriously considered as a potential EU Member State. Thus 
the membership of the Council of Europe is necessary but not a sufficient condition 
when the European character of a candidate is being evaluated. In an attempt to bring 
some clarity to this question, the Commission tried to define this European identity as 
a mixture of geographical, historical and cultural elements and concluded that “the 
shared experience of proximity, ideas, values and historical interaction cannot be 
condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding 
generation’.38 
 
The Copenhagen criteria. Based on a proposal from the Commission, the European 
Council gave a membership perspective to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe “as soon as they are able to assume the obligations of membership by 
                                                        
35 C. HILLION, “Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis”, in ARNULL AND WINCOTT 
(eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2002), 
p. 412. 
36 See Article 237 of the original EEC Treaty. 
37 HOFFMEISTER op.cit., in footnote 22, pp. 91-92. 
38 European Commission, “Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement”, Bull EC, Suppl. 3 (1992), 11. 
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satisfying the economic and political conditions required.”39 The exact conditions 
were then elaborated further and included: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
(2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and (3) the ability to 
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union. Although some of the criteria (especially the political 
one) have already been used in the framework of previous accessions, the fact that 
they were clearly defined and included in European Council conclusions led them to 
supplement the provisions of Article 49 and “redefine the constitutional framework 
for enlarging the Union”.40 By providing the candidate countries with a clear road 
map to accession, the Copenhagen criteria set in motion the process of “membership 
conditionality” which later was considered a determinant for the successful and timely 
completion of the necessary reforms by candidate countries, prior to membership in 
the EU.  
 
The absorption capacity. The Copenhagen European Council of 1993 also included an 
internal criterion which had to be met prior to enlargement, namely “the Union’s 
capacity to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of European 
integration” as “an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union 
and the candidate countries”.41 It has generally been accepted that this was a call for 
institutional reform to be completed prior to the accession of the Central and Eastern 
European countries. However, after the latest accession and following the agreement 
on institutional reform, the Commission considered the need to elaborate further on 
this criterion. It did so in its Strategy Paper on Enlargement of the end of 2006, which 
defined the “absorption” or “integration” capacity using three main elements: 
institutions, budget and policy fields.42 
 
                                                        
39 Copenhagen European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, 21-22 June 1993, Bull. EC 6 (1993), 
I.13. 
40 C. HILLION, “The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny”, in C. Hillion (ed.), EU Enlargement. A 
Legal Approach, Hart, (Oxford, 2004), p. 13. 
41 Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council (21-22 June 1993), Bull. EC 6 (1993), I.13. 
42 European Commission, “EU Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007” (including 
annexed special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members), available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2006_en.htm.  
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The political criteria. The political criteria for membership can be considered as being 
linked to the reference to Article 6(1) TEU which appears in the Article 49 TEU. 
Introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, it refers to the EU’s founding principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law. However, some sort of political requirement towards the candidates for 
membership was already applied prior to the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty.43 What was added in the case of the fifth enlargement was the inclusion of 
“respect for and protection of minorities” among the elements of the political criteria; 
next to democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The political criteria, and 
especially the part defined as the “stability of institutions,” were used to monitor the 
reform of the judiciary. After all the difficulties in this particular field, notably with 
Bulgaria and Romania,44 the issues of “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” constitute 
a new negotiating chapter in the ongoing negotiations with Croatia and Turkey. 
 
The economic criteria. The economic criteria, as defined by the Copenhagen 
European Council, are two: the existence of a functioning market economy45 and the 
capacity to withstand the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.46 
Their precise definition and the further breaking down to concrete elements whose 
performance can be monitored marked a new development in economic 
conditionality. Earlier, in the evaluation of the candidates for accession, their 
economic conditions were always under consideration.47 However, the exact 
determination of the two elements – “functioning” and “competitive” market 
economy – were mentioned for the first time in the Commission’s 1992 report 
                                                        
43 For the practice of previous enlargements, see C. HILLION, “The Copenhagen Criteria and their 
Progeny”, in C. HILLION (ed.), EU Enlargement. A Legal Approach, Hart, (Oxford, 2004), p. 13. 
44 See, among others: NOUTCHEVA, “Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the EU: Postponement, 
Safeguards and the Rule of Law”, CEPS Policy Brief, n. 102 available at:  
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1329.  
45 This includes: liberalized prices and trade; the absence of significant barriers to market entry and 
exit; an effective legal system which regulates property rights and allows the enforcement of laws and 
contracts; macroeconomic stability, including adequate price stability, sustainable public finances and 
external accounts; broad consensus about the essentials of economic policy; and a well-developed 
financial sector. (Agenda 2000, pp. 42-43). 
46 This includes: an existence of a functioning market economy with macroeconomic stability; a 
sufficient amount of human and physical capital, including infrastructure, at an appropriate cost (i.e. 
energy supply, telecommunication, transport, …), education and research; government policy which 
stimulates competition; trade integration with the Union; and the proportion of small firms. (Agenda 
2000, pp. 42-43). 
47 See for example the cases of the UK, Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
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“Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement”.48 The economic criteria do not refer to 
income per capita as an element. In reality the difference in the income or GDP (gross 
domestic product) per capita between the old EU-15 and the ten candidate countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe constituted a key background factor.  This huge 
difference in income and wages nurtured a fear in the old Member States that their 
labour markets would be swamped by migrants from the new members. Hence the old 
members insisted on long (7 year) transition periods for the free movement of 
workers. Moreover, during the negotiation period the old member countries were 
particularly sensitive about the issue of illegal migration and forced some candidates 
to take decisive action to curb this phenomenon (see Chapter 10). 
 
The ability to take on the obligations of membership. This criterion relates to the 
obligation to adopt the so-called acquis communautaire which encompasses “the 
whole body of rules, political principles and judicial decisions which new Member 
States must adhere to”.49 Over the consecutive accessions, the term has been clarified 
and is now considered to include: the content, principles and political objectives of the 
Treaties; secondary legislation adopted in application of the Treaties; the case law of 
the Court of Justice; declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; measures 
relating to the CFSP; measures relating to Justice and Home Affairs; international 
agreements concluded by the Community and those by the Member States between 
themselves in the field of the Union’s activities.50 However, the simple adoption of 
the rules would not be sufficient without structures that can apply the rules properly. 
Such concerns led to the definition of an additional criterion in the case of the fifth 
enlargement, which was later called “the administrative capacity criterion”.51 
 
Administrative capacity criterion. The existence of such a criterion is based on the 
belief that the mere existence and adoption of the EU rules is not sufficient in the 
                                                        
48 European Commission, ‘Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement’, 24 June 1992, Bull. EC 3 
(1992), Suppl., para 9. 
49 GIALDINO, “Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire”, Common Market Law Review, 32/5, 
(1995), p. 1090. 
50 Scadplus glossary, available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/index_en.htm.  
51 There is a disagreement in the literature as to whether the requirement is indeed a separate criterion 
(see: HILION, op.cit., p. 17) or a sort of procedural element of the third criterion (see: HOFFMEISTER, 
op.cit., p. 98). The argument for the second view is based on the understanding that the ability to take 
on the obligations of membership implies not only the adoption of the rules but also the existence of 
appropriate structures that are able to actually apply them. 
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absence of adequate administrative and judicial structures to ensure the 
implementation and enforcement of the acquis. This view was formally established by 
the Madrid European Council in 1995, which for the first time stressed that applicant 
countries should develop their administrative structures to ensure the effective 
implementation of the acquis. This point was later reiterated in the Presidency 
Conclusions of subsequent European Council meetings and included in the 
conclusions of the General Affairs Council on EU Enlargement. In an annex to the 
December 1998 Vienna European Council it is, for instance, very clearly stated that 
 
The transposition of the acquis is not sufficient in itself but must be followed by 
effective implementation and enforcement. Therefore the development of 
administrative and judicial capacities is a crucial aspect of preparation for 
accession and the existence of credible and functioning structures and institutions 
an indispensable precondition for future membership.52  
 
The effects of the adoption of the acquis. The rationale behind the principle that the 
candidate countries have to adopt the acquis communautaire before accession is to 
ensure that they are put on an equal footing with the Member States and are subject to 
the same obligations as the existing Member States.53 However, despite the fact that 
the acquis is incorporated into the national legislations of the countries concerned, the 
rules take on the force of European law only at the date of accession. So, it is only at 
the date of accession that the sovereignty to regulate the areas covered by the acquis 
will be transferred to the Community. It is also at this moment that the supranational 
character of the Community law will be felt.54 If a country faces particular difficulties 
with this post-accession effect, it can negotiate certain exceptional or temporal 
derogations in the process of negotiations for membership. What is typical for the 
fifth enlargement, however, is that there are certain areas in which it is a priori 
defined that no exceptions are possible and thus the candidate countries can only 
either adopt the measures or abort their membership application. Such is the situation 
in two sensitive fields, in particular: economic and monetary union55 and Schengen.56 
                                                        
52 Vienna European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, 11-12 December 1998, Bull. EU 12 (1998), 
Annex III, p.3. 
53 ECJ, Case 44/84, Hurd [1986] ECR 29, para 30. 
54 ECJ, Case C-302/04, Ynos [2006] ECR I-00371, para 36. and Case C-414/07 Magoora, [2008] ECR 
I-0000.   
55 “Adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”, as required by the Copenhagen 
criteria, implies that new Member States commit to further integration. (HOFFMEISTER, op. cit., p. 98). 
56 Article 8 of Protocol on Schengen to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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As a result, there is a deviation regarding the rule established by the ECJ in C-44/84; a 
sort of reverse discrimination. And precisely because the candidate countries have to 
adopt the acquis, they will not be subject to the same obligations as the existing (or at 
least some of the existing) Member States. This situation could create additional 
difficulties for the transfer of sovereignty and competences, as it deprives the 
candidate states of the possibility of flexible application that was granted to the 
incumbent Member States. 
 
The “Pre-accession strategy”. The fifth enlargement towards the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe was not only the biggest enlargement in terms of the number of 
states acceding at once but also the enlargement that followed the most structured 
approach. The time between the application for membership and the accession date 
was taken up with a number of initiatives of differing legal significance and the 
relationships between the European Union and the candidate states were regulated by 
several overlapping instruments. Firstly, the Copenhagen criteria for membership 
were defined in June 1993. In the same year, most of the countries signed their 
Europe Agreements.57 In 1994, following the Essen European Council, a “pre-
accession strategy” was launched. It included, among other elements, a so-called 
structured dialogue, which in effect involved a “structured relationship with the 
institutions of the Union” and consisted of joint meetings between the Council and the 
associated CEECs on issues of common interest. However, the meetings were of an 
advisory nature and explicitly excluded the possibility of joint decision-making.  
 
Enhanced Pre-Accession Strategy. As a tool for the support of all CEE countries in 
their preparation for accession, the Luxembourg European Council proclaimed an 
enhanced version of the pre-accession strategy.58 The enhanced pre-accession strategy 
established a comprehensive legal framework for supporting and monitoring the 
situation in the applicant countries.59 The three pillars of the new strategy were the 
Accession Partnerships, the increased pre-accession aid and the annual progress 
reports prepared by the Commission. 
                                                        
57 See Annex 1 for the timeline of the fifth enlargement. 
58 Luxembourg European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, 12-13 December 1997, Bull. EU 12 
(1998), Annex I.2. 
59 P. VAN ELSUWEGE, EU Enlargement and the Baltic States: A Legal and Political Analysis, PhD 
Thesis, University of Gent, (Gent, 2007). 
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Accession Partnerships. The Accession Partnerships (APs) were adopted annually for 
each candidate country and took the form of a Council decision, adopted by qualified 
majority voting in the Council. The adoption of each individual AP was based on 
Council Regulation 622/98 of 16 March 1998. Adopted on the legal basis of Article 
308 EC, it performed the role of a basic legal act to the adoption of the individual 
APs. As substance, the APs included the priority areas where action was necessary for 
further progress towards accession and the financial assistance to be made available 
for the implementation of those priorities. Those areas were identified on the basis of 
the regular reports prepared by the Commission.60 In essence, the APs were unilateral 
documents with no direct legal relationship to the candidate countries. However, in 
reality all candidate countries had to adopt unilateral documents in their respective 
national legal orders with the same content. A so-called “National Programme for the 
Adoption of Acquis” was adopted by each individual country and included a timetable 
and information on the administrative, institutional and financial resources for 
achieving the priorities and intermediary objectives set out in the APs.  
 
Annual European Commission Reports. In addition to the idea of accession 
partnership, the Luxembourg European Council also requested the Commission to 
produce annual progress reports on each candidate country in order to monitor its 
progress towards meeting the accession criteria for membership. What the 
Commission monitored in effect were the legal measures adopted in implementation 
of the APs and the NPAAs, and made an evaluation of what remained in order to meet 
the criteria in every field. Based on the findings and conclusions of the annual reports, 
the Council updated the Accession Partnerships annually and likewise the candidate 
countries updated their NPAAs annually.  
 
Membership conditionality. The procedure outlined above formed the basis of a 
phenomenon called “membership conditionality”. By developing concrete conditions 
for membership which could be further specified and broken down into specific 
regulatory steps, the European Union gained enormous leverage over the candidate 
                                                        
60 For further details see INGLIS, “Pre-Accession strategy and Accession Partnerships”, in OTT AND 
INGLIS (eds.) Handbook on European Enlargement. A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, 
Asser, (The Hague, 2002), pp. 106-108. 
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countries. In effect, almost all political, economic and legal reforms in the candidate 
countries of the fifth enlargement were dominated by the requirements and priorities 
identified by the European institutions. “The carrot of accession and the mechanism 
of conditionality61 included in the pre-accession legal instruments placed the EU in a 
privileged position to monitor and influence the domestic policy choices of the 
candidate countries”.62 As a result, even before accession, the regulatory and law-
making choices of the candidate countries (and the exercise of their sovereignty in 
this way) were limited by the fact that they could choose policy solutions only from 
among those falling within the scope of European regulation.  
 
In practical terms, the dominant role of the EU in the internal decision making of the 
candidate countries was exercised through a variety of procedures; chief among them 
were the individual assessments on the basis of the regular Commission reports. 
These were flanked by the Accession Partnerships coupled with conditionality in the 
EU’s pre-accession financial instruments.  Given also the differences in size, the 
relationship between the candidate countries and the EU was thus characterised by a 
growing asymmetry.63  
 
The clearest indication of this evolution came with the shift from the bilateral EAs to 
the White Paper on law approximation and the unilateral Accession Partnerships as 
the main instruments of the pre-accession strategy. The White Paper on the 
approximation of laws illustrates two aspects of this. In the Paper, the EU lays down a 
long list of unilateral requirements that the candidate countries have to accept. The 
dominant position of the Commission in this process can be seen in the fact that it 
prepared this White Paper, and from the key role the 1997 Commission Opinions 
played in forming the starting point of the sophisticated machinery of legal 
conditionality and constant monitoring, which constituted the legal and political 
framework for the enlargement process and thus largely determined the policy choices 
of the candidate countries.64  
                                                        
61 For the effects of conditionality, see H. GRABBE, The EU’s transformative power: Europeanization 
through conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, (Basingstoke 2006). 
62 VAN ELSUWEGE, op.cit., p. 203. 
63 K. MANIOKAS, Methodology of the EU Enlargement: A Critical Appraisal, EIPA Maastricht, 
available at : www.eipa.nl/Topics/Enlargement/maniokas_paper.doc.  
64 VAN ELSUWEGE, op.cit., p. 226. 
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This conditionality had two aspects: ‘political conditionality’ and ‘acquis 
conditionality’.65 The first element relates to the Copenhagen criteria which were 
political and constituted a precondition for the opening of accession negotiations. The 
second element, namely the adoption and implementation of the acquis, only had to 
be fulfilled by the date of accession (but regular progress towards adoption had to be 
shown throughout the enlargement process). One could argue that this working 
method limits the EU’s leverage in terms of political conditionality once the 
negotiations have started. Moreover, the political criteria in general are rather vague 
and constitute a subjective judgment of the socio-political situation in the candidate 
country.66 This is different for most chapters of the acquis whereby the candidate 
countries are confronted with a catalogue of EU legislation – whose proper 
implementation can be verified by the Court after accession.67  
 
2.2. The legal framework of EU accession negotiations 
The scope of accession negotiations. The purpose of the accession negotiations is to 
reach an agreement between the Member States and the applicant country on the 
conditions of admission and the adjustments to be made to the Treaties following 
accession.68 The negotiations are conducted around different chapters covering the 
different areas of activity of the European Union. The equal character of the 
negotiations has often been questioned, because the conditions of admission are 
unilaterally fixed by the EU and the possibility for adjustments to the Treaties are 
quite limited.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the new Member States are expected to apply, implement and 
enforce the entire acquis upon accession.69 When a country has specific concerns 
                                                        
65 SCHIMMELFENNIG AND SEDELMEIER, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastren Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (2004), p. 
669. 
66 VAN ELSUWEGE, op.cit., p. 227. 
67 HUGHES, SASSE AND GORDON, Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to 
Central and Eastern Europe. The Myth of Conditionality, Palgrave, (Basingstoke, 2004), p. 85. 
68 Article 49 (2) TEU. 
69 European Commission: Agenda 2000- For a stronger and wider Union (1997) EU Bull. Suppl. 5, p. 
61 
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linked to a particular chapter of the acquis, it can request deviation from the rules in 
the form of flexible solutions in the framework of the accession negotiations. These 
flexible solutions generally take the form of two tools: transition periods and 
safeguard clauses. Both can be fixed to the benefit of either or both of the negotiating 
parties. Transition periods are a temporary postponement of the application of parts of 
the acquis, which is limited in scope and duration. In contrast, the safeguard clauses 
allow for the exemption of the acquis only in the case of specific events. However, as 
an additional proof of the one-sided character of the accession negotiations, even 
those instruments which under normal circumstances are available to both parties had 
limitations on their use imposed unilaterally by the EU. In certain cases, where there 
is no possibility for the use of one of the two tools, or where the implementation of 
the acquis is difficult, there is a possibility for financial assistance, as in the case of 
the Schengen acquis. 
 
The first move on the side of the Commission towards limiting the scope of use of the 
transition periods was the Agenda 2000, where it stated that “the measures necessary 
for the extension of the Single Market should be applied immediately’.70 Later,71 the 
possible transitional measures were divided into three categories: acceptable, 
negotiable and unacceptable, depending on their possible impact on competition and 
the functioning of the internal market. When the impact was insignificant, the 
transitional arrangements were deemed acceptable; when the impact was more 
significant, the transitional arrangements were deemed negotiable but could be 
accepted only under certain conditions. When there was a danger that the measures 
could fundamentally undermine the workings of the Single Market, they were deemed 
unacceptable. Moreover, from the beginning of the negotiations the Commission 
declared that any permanent derogation would be unacceptable.72 
 
Structure of the accession negotiations. The negotiations as such are conducted within 
the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference between the EU Member States 
and each applicant country. The decision to start accession negotiations is taken by 
                                                        
70 Agenda 2000, op. cit., p. 61. 
71 See: European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy Paper. Report on Progress Towards Accession 
by each of the Candidate Countries”, COM (2000) 700, Brussels, 8 November 2000, p. 26. 
72 Agenda 2000, op.cit., p. 61. 
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the European Council on the basis of the Opinion delivered by the Commission and 
certain political considerations. Following the decision on the start of the negotiations, 
a bilateral and multilateral screening is performed. The actual negotiations start when 
an applicant country presents its first ‘position paper’ outlining its negotiating 
position on a certain chapter of the acquis. The ‘position paper’ contains information 
about the way the acquis is implemented in the field of this chapter and describes the 
administrative capacity of the country to implement it.73 The candidate country also 
indicates potential problems and/or requests transitional periods. On the basis of this 
information, the Commission draws up the EU’s draft negotiating position. After 
discussion of the proposal in the Council Enlargement Working Group and the 
COREPER, the General Affairs Council adopts the official ‘EU Common Position’ by 
unanimity. At this point, the chapter can be ‘opened’ and negotiations can begin.74 
 
Participants in the accession negotiations. In the framework of the intergovernmental 
conference, the negotiations are conducted by the respective ministers from the 
Member States and the applicant country. In preparation for this high level of formal 
negotiations there are several other layers of negotiations involving participants with 
decreasing levels of responsibility. They include: deputy ministers, the permanent 
representatives of the Member States and the chief negotiator of the applicant state. 
Their work is prepared by the respective working groups in the council and the 
negotiating team of civil servants of the applicant state.  
 
Procedures of the accession negotiations. “When all parties agree on a common 
position, the chapter in question will be ‘provisionally closed”. The Union always 
reserves the right to reopen negotiations until agreement has been reached on all 
negotiating chapters. If compromise proves difficult on certain issues, negotiators can 
also decide to ‘set aside’ those chapters to be revisited at the end as part of a global 
package deal. At this final stage, negotiations will no longer respect the neat division 
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into chapters but rather focus on the horizontal balance of the Accession Treaty. If no 
breakthrough can be achieved within the formal negotiating structures, the European 
Council will be brought in to decide on the most sensitive issues. This was the case 
with the fifth wave of enlargement. For instance, the EU Member States decided to 
transfer discussions on other financial issues such as the creation of a cash-flow and 
Schengen facility to the end of the negotiations.”75 At the 12-13 December 2002 
Copenhagen European Council, the Heads of State or Government managed to strike 
a deal on the cost of enlargement, which paved the way for the formal conclusion of 
accession negotiations and the drafting of the Accession Treaty.76 
 
The experience of the fifth enlargement. The acquis is divided into 31 negotiating 
chapters (more now in the case of Croatia and Turkey). Usually, negotiations start 
with the so-called “easy chapter” in areas in which the Community does not have 
exclusive competence and as a result, the acquis is not extensive. Such chapters 
include SMEs, science and research, education and training. Usually, these chapters 
do not require any transition periods or safeguard clauses. 
 
The EU’s enlargement was prepared by a Joint Action concerning the evaluation of 
applicant States’ adoption of the EU third pillar acquis.77 
 
2.3. The Accession Treaty 
Structure of the Accession Treaty. The results of the accession negotiations are 
enshrined in an Accession Treaty which contains the conditions of accession and the 
necessary adjustments to the Treaties. Although the negotiations are in a sense 
bilateral between the Member States and each individual applicant country, the 
Accession Treaty is one for every round of enlargement.78 In practice, the conditions 
of accession and the adjustments are embodied in three separate documents: the 
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Accession Treaty, the Act of Accession and the Final Act. However, according to 
Article 1(2) of the Accession Treaty, the provisions of the Act of Accession form an 
integral part of the Treaty of Accession. The Treaty itself simply proclaims that the 
countries involved become members of the European Union and thereby parties to the 
Treaties on which the Union is founded on the basis of the conditions and adjustments 
to the Treaties, set out in the Act of Accession. The conditions of accession include all 
transition periods and safeguard clauses agreed during the negotiations while the 
adjustments to the Treaties are of a technical nature. Any more substantial 
adjustments would be subject to the Treaty amending procedure of Article 48 TEU.  
 
Legal nature of the Accession Treaty. The Treaty of Accession is an international 
agreement between the Member States and the acceding states. At the same time, it 
also has the status of primary Community law. As to its relationship with the founding 
treaties, Article 1(3) TA states that the provisions concerning the rights and 
obligations of the Member States and the powers and jurisdictions of the Union apply 
in respect to the Accession Treaty. This, together with the obligation of the acceding 
countries to accept the acquis communautaire, forms the basis of the continuing 
Community legal order after the accession of the new Member States.79 
 
On the other hand, numerous provisions concern transitional arrangements and 
technical adjustments to secondary legislation. The Act of Accession, therefore, 
clarifies that the acts adopted by the institutions to which the transitional measures or 
amendments apply retain their status in law and can be repealed or amended on the 
basis of the procedures for amending those acts.80 The details of the permanent and 
temporary adaptations to the acts of the institutions are included in 18 annexes and 10 
protocols to the AA.81 The Final Act, containing no less than 44 declarations from the 
acceding countries and/or the old Member States, supplements the Treaty of 
Accession and the Act of Accession. The ECJ has generally concluded that such 
                                                        
79 In this respect, the ECJ proclaimed the principle that ‘the provisions of Community law apply ab 
initio and in toto to new Member States, derogations being allowed only in so far as they are expressly 
laid down by transitional provisions’, ECJ Case 233/97, KappAhl [1998] ECR I-8069, para 15. 
80 Articles 7-9 Act of Accession. 
81 As the Court declared in Austria v. Council, protocols and annexes to an Act of Accession have the 
status of primary law. ECJ Case 445/00 Austria v Council, [2001] ECR I-1461, para 62. 
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declarations do not have binding legal force but must nevertheless be taken into 
consideration for the purpose of interpreting the Accession Treaty.82 
 
2.4. The legal consequences of accession 
Internal consequences. The accession to a supranational entity requires the regulation 
of the transfer of sovereignty by constitutional means. Thus, most of the acceding 
states of the fifth enlargement have undertaken special constitutional amendments to 
tackle the general transfer of sovereignty but also other issues resulting from the 
accession, such as the voting rights of EU nationals in the country, as well as some 
amendments related to economic and monetary union.83 
 
A second internal consequence related to accession is linked to the adoption of the 
acquis. As was already discussed in detail, the acceding state is obliged to adopt the 
acquis prior to its accession date. As a result, the national rules on a wide ranging set 
of issues are replaced by the Community acquis. However, there are still some rules 
whose adoption is postponed until the accession date. Most importantly, although the 
rules would have been adopted prior to accession and as such form part of the national 
legal system only after the accession date, those rules take the form of Community 
law. Although the rules would have been in force prior to accession, individuals 
would therefore have powers towards the national authorities based on national rather 
than on Community law. As a result, after the accession date, the transfer of 
sovereignty becomes final and the new Member State loses all possibility of action in 
all fields of exclusive Community competence (either by nature or by exercise).84 
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External consequences. The accession also has powerful external consequences both 
for the relations of the acceding state and of the EU with third states. These 
consequences can be divided into three main categories: legal, economic and political. 
Some of the consequences are addressed in the accession treaty itself or are taken over 
by international agreements. 
 
Legal external consequences. As the position of the acceding state changes in relation 
to the third states upon its accession to the EU, there are three sets of tools that help to 
clarify the triangular relationships. Firstly, in the process of accession negotiations, a 
set of international agreements to which the EC and/or the Member States are party 
are included as part of the acquis in the Chapter dealing with external relations. As a 
result, the acceding state is under obligation to accede to those international 
agreements as well. In addition, there are a set of agreements to which the acceding 
state becomes a party on the accession date.  
 
The legal consequences of previous agreements are addressed through the provision 
of Article 307 EC85. The first paragraph of Article 307 EC gives precedence in 
principle to “the rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the 
entry into force of this Treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand, 
and one or more third countries, on the other” by providing that they “shall not be 
affected by the provisions of this Treaty.”86 This means that national courts must 
ensure that non-member countries’ rights under earlier agreements are honoured and 
the relative obligations of Member States are fulfilled.87 
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The purpose of this provision is clear: in accordance with the principles of 
international law, the application of the Treaty should not affect the duty of Member 
States to respect the rights of third countries under a prior agreement (see Case 812/79 
Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, paragraph 8; Case C-84/98 Commission v Portugal [2000] 
ECR I-5215, paragraph 53; and Case C-216/01 Budĕjovický Budvar [2003] ECR 
I-13617, paragraphs 144 and 145) (paragraph 33).  
The second paragraph of Article 307 EC obliges the Member States to take all 
appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities between Community law and 
agreements concluded prior to their accession. Under that provision, the Member 
States are required, where necessary, to assist each other to that end and, where 
appropriate, to adopt a common attitude.88 
Even potential inconsistencies between EC law and treaty obligations of individual 
Member States can constitute a breach of Community law.89 Accordingly, the 
Member State in question must start negotiations with a view to adapting the prior 
agreement. If such negotiations are unsuccessful, the Member State will have, if 
possible, to terminate the agreement.90 91 
A Member State that fails to take all necessary steps to eliminate incompatibilities 
will be in breach of its obligations under Community law. Despite this, the application 
of the prior agreement will continue to be assured under the first paragraph of Article 
307 EC since that provision is primarily designed to protect the rights of non-member 
countries.92 
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In the case of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, Article 307 EC also had its 
importance,93 however, in the field of visa policy and border controls, all the bilateral 
agreements which the candidate countries had in place were denounced prior to their 
accession, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 7. Thus, in this particular field, the issue 
of prior agreements did not arise, as there were simply no prior agreements in force at 
the date of accession (see in particular the local border traffic agreements, discussed 
in detail in part II of Chapter 8). 
 
Economic external consequences. The accession of a state to the EC can also have 
economic consequences for its relations with third states. This is especially true in the 
case of common commercial policy, where the quotas for imports can be affected. 
One contentious example includes the import quotas of Brazilian beef to Bulgaria, 
which in absolute terms were higher than the total quota for Brazilian imports to the 
EU. Thus, the accession of Bulgaria caused an increase in the Brazilian quota. 
Political external consequences. Unilateral or multilateral declarations can be 
attached to the accession treaty clarifying the position of the acceding state and the 
EU as a whole, on issues of political importance. Most importantly, the accession of a 
state requires that it become party to a number of international agreements; which in 
general require the explicit consent of the third parties.  Achieving this consent can 
sometimes, lead to political difficulties. Such was the case in the extension of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia towards the countries which 
joined the EU in 2004. Another difficulty stems from the fact that accession can lead 
to an alteration in the special relations a state previously held with a particular third 
country. 
 
3. Relations with third states 
Transfer of sovereignty and external relations. The problems in relations with third 
states do not arise directly from the transfer of sovereignty as such but from two other 
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factors: the legal personality of the EU and the division of competences between the 
EU and the Member States. Both will be addressed below. 
Legal personality. In principle, the Member States as subjects of international law can 
have relations with third states and conclude international agreements with them. 
However, the EC Treaty granted legal personality to the European Community and as 
a result it also could interact with other states and conclude international agreements 
with them. Now, the European Union is also granated legal personality by Article 47 
TEU new. In theory, it would be possible for the EU and the Member States to act 
independently but due to the special character of EU law, this is not always the case. 
Key issues in EU external relations law. The law governing the EC’s external 
competence is mainly developed through the case law of the ECJ. Under the original 
EC Treaty, the express external powers were not many; early on the Court gave a 
wide interpretation of the Community’s implied powers, sowing the seeds for what 
has become known as the principle of parallelism of internal and external powers. 
As with the discussions about internal competences, there are also two important legal 
questions here. The first is whether a given external power exists and the second is 
whether it is exclusive to the Community or shared with the Member States. While 
the ECJ has consistently answered the first in very broad terms, it has grown more 
cautious in relation to the second. Since Opinion 1/94 on the WTO agreements, the 
ECJ has interpreted many of the EC’s external powers as being shared with the 
Member States. At the same time, it has gradually given a less expansive reading to 
the scope of the EC’s common commercial policy. 
The existence of many shared competences has led to the phenomenon of “mixed 
agreements”, involving the participation of both sets of actors in the negotiation, 
conclusion, and implementation of agreements. While this has problematic 
consequences for international partners in terms of efficiency and visibility, it has 
been praised as a unique feature of the EC’s federalism, and an important source of 
practical co-operation between the Community and the Member States. 
Apart from the many areas of EC external competence, the EU in the pre-Lisbon 
system enjoyed external powers under the second and third pillars, in the common 
foreign and security policy area and the area of police and judicial cooperation in 
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criminal matters. Given the overlaps in subject matter between the three pillars, a 
range of legal issues arose. These include the appropriate legal basis for action, the 
proper delimitation of the scope of each pillar, and the organization of co-operation 
across pillars.  
The ECJ has played an active role in EU international relations. It has played a key 
role in determining the existence, scope and nature of the EC’s and increasingly the 
competences of the EU. It has treated international agreements (including mixed 
agreements) as acts of the EC that are subject to the full range of its jurisdiction. It has 
confirmed that international agreements are a binding and integral part of the EC legal 
order, and that in principle, they may enjoy direct effect. However, it has consistently 
ruled that provisions of the WTO Agreements may not be invoked before European 
courts.94  
ECJ case law basis. The Community had treaty-making powers, which virtually 
extended to all agreements capable of achieving the aims of the Treaty. However, it 
does not have the general power to enter into all agreements directly related to the 
objectives of the Treaty. Instead, this power coincides – at least in principle – with the 
internal powers conferred to the Community. Such powers are those that are expressly 
provided for in the Treaty; but they may also be derived implicitly “from other 
provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted within the framework of those 
provisions, by the Community institutions”.95 They may also be extended, on the 
basis of Article 308 EC, as well as following the formal revisions of the Community 
Treaties in sectors traditionally reserved for State sovereignty. Where the 
Community’s internal powers are exclusive, its external powers will also be 
exclusive, thus supplanting the concurrent powers of the Member States both “in the 
Community sphere and in the international sphere”.96 However, where the 
Community’s powers are originally concurrent with those of the Member States they 
also become exclusive once they have been exercised. In particular, the Court held 
that:  
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Each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy 
envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever 
form these may take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting 
individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries 
which affect those rules. As and when such common rules come into being, the 
Community alone is in a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations 
towards third countries affecting the whole sphere of application of the 
Community legal system.97 Prior adoption of such provisions may be dispensed 
only if “the conclusion of an international agreement is necessary in order to 
achieve Treaty objectives which cannot be attained by the adoption of 
autonomous rules.98  
Should the Member States be able to retain “concurrent power, so as to ensure that 
their own interests were separately satisfied in external relations”, they could “in 
relations with third countries, (…) adopt positions which differ from those which the 
Community intends to adopt and would thereby distort the institutional framework, 
call into question the mutual trust within the Community and prevent the latter from 
fulfilling its task in the defence of the Common interest”.99 
Where the Community has exclusive powers, the problem should not even arise, 
because as we have seen in this instance all concurrent powers of the Member States 
are barred. Instead, where concurrent powers are concerned, possible interference 
cannot be excluded because the Member States cannot be precluded – for that whole 
vast area – from concluding an agreement before possible actions. Thus in these 
cases, the Court has taken steps to avoid any negative impact on the unity of the 
Union’s international representation by stressing the general obligation of co-
operation as much as possible, which is expressly provided for in the EC Treaty 
(Article 10 EC). Therefore, it has been repeatedly stated that until the Community 
exercises its own powers, the Member States must refrain from any measure that may 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty and thus affect provisions 
already adopted or alter their effectiveness or even undermine the future exercise of 
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Community powers. Moreover, they even have a duty to act where inertia may 
jeopardize the attainment of common objectives.100 
Pre-emption of national powers. As some Treaty provisions explicitly recognized, the 
Community’s non-exclusive external powers do not deprive Member States of the 
power to act externally. It follows, however, from Article 10 of the EC Treaty that:  
To the extent to which Community rules are promulgated for the attainment of 
the objectives of the Treaty, the Member States cannot, outside the framework of 
the Community institutions, assume obligations which might affect those rules or 
alter their scope.101  
This means that Member States retain their powers as long as the Community has not, 
or only partially, exercised its (non-exclusive) powers. Where, however, the 
Community adopts a measure internally or internationally, the Member States should 
attune their international action in light of that measure. This would be the case if a 
Member State were to enter into international commitments falling within the scope 
of the Community rules, or in any event within an area which is already largely 
covered by such rules, even if there is no contradiction between those commitments 
and the Community rules. Whenever the Community has included in its internal rules 
provisions relating to the treatment of nationals of non-member countries or has 
expressly conferred on its institutions powers to negotiate with non-member 
countries, it acquires an exclusive external competence in the spheres covered by 
those measures.102  
A Community measure may, however, authorize a Member State to conclude 
international agreements diverging from that measure. The upshot is that the 
extent of the Member States’ international competence depends on whether or not 
the Community has exercised its internal and external powers exhaustively. The 
Member States have recognized this consequence of the judgment in the AETR 
case, even in those areas where the Treaty confirms their international 
competence in principle. In this sense, the allocation of external powers between 
the Community and the Member States changes with the intensity with which the 
Community exercises the power relating to the field in question.103  
The test used by the ECJ to determine when an implied external competence of the 
EC has become exclusive and whether a certain policy area has been largely or 
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completely harmonized by the Community law was broadened by Opinion 1/03, in 
which the Court also examined the nature and content of the envisaged agreement in 
order to determine whether the uniform and consistent application of Community law 
is affected by the envisaged agreement.104 It goes on to state that a comprehensive and 
detailed analysis must be carried out to determine whether the Community has the 
competence to conclude an international agreement and whether that competence is 
exclusive. In doing so, account must be taken not only of the area covered by the 
Community rules and by the provisions of the agreement envisaged, in so far as the 
latter are known, but also of the nature and content of those rules and provisions, to 
ensure that the agreement is not capable of undermining the uniform and consistent 
application of the Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which 
they establish. 
Opinion 1/03 led to the transformation of a large part of the external competence for 
the conclusion of international agreements on civil law matters into exclusive 
Community competence. To deal with the consequences of this for numerous bilateral 
agreements already held by Member States in these fields, the Commission made two 
proposals aimed to authorise the Member States to exercise the competence on behalf 
of the Community and setting out a procedure as to how this should be done.105 
On Transparency:  
The allocation of powers between the Community and the Member States in the 
field of external relations constitutes a purely internal matter as far as the 
Community is concerned. However, its changing nature makes contracting parties 
uncertain as to who is assuming the international obligations flowing from a 
given agreement. Indeed, other parties have made the conclusion of an 
international agreement on the part of the Community conditional upon its being 
signed in parallel by the Member States. It is for this reason, too, that multilateral 
agreements often require signatory international organizations to deposit a 
declaration as to the situation with regard to the internal division of powers. In 
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such a case the Community is subject to an obligation of international law 
requiring it to submit a complete declaration of its competences. Where the 
Council authorizes the Commission to accede to a Convention, the duty to co-
operate in good faith, to which the institutions are subject, requires the Council to 
enable the Commission to comply with the international law by submitting a 
complete declaration of competences.106  
External dimension of internal policies – competence in Title IV EC. With regard to 
Title IV EC on “Visas, Asylum and Immigration and Other Policies Related to the 
Free Movement of Persons” there is, on the basis of AETR reasoning, clearly an 
implied competence to conclude agreements over the whole area. The EC has 
exercised this in its negotiation of readmission agreements of illegal immigrants, and 
by integrating migration issues into its overall relations with third countries. Finally, 
the ECJ held in Opinion 1/03 that the EC had exclusive competence to conclude the 
Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, a subject matter that is also covered by Title IV of 
the Treaty.107  
Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, external relations 
concerning immigration, asylum and civil law were governed by Community law 
principles on external relations. EC law provides that the Community can enjoy 
external relations competence either expressly (by a provision such as Article 133 EC, 
which grants express power to the EC to adopt treaties concerning trade policy), or 
implicitly (as a corollary of the exercise of its internal powers).  Title IV of the EC 
Treaty was governed by the implied powers principle.  
Another question is the intensity of the power of EC external relations: it becomes 
exclusive, leaving no competence to Member States when Community powers over an 
issue are inherently exclusive, or where the EC has fully harmonized the issue 
internally. Otherwise, where the EC has only partially harmonized a field, the EC’s 
competence is shared with the Member States, and most treaties within the field of 
shared competence are likely to be “mixed agreements”, containing provisions falling 
within the scope of both EC and Member State power.108 Most issues regulated by the 
EC, including most Title IV issues, fall within the scope of the EC’s shared 
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competence but, for example, the EC has exclusive external power over visa waiver 
treaties, due to the full harmonization of the visa list issued by internal EC law.109  
Treaties concluded by the EC are binding on the Community and its Member States, 
and take precedence over secondary EC law, but, as a matter of internal EC law, the 
EC Treaty and the EC’s general principles of law take precedence over treaties 
concluded by the Community. The Court of Justice has the jurisdiction to interpret 
treaties concluded by the EC, and the measures implementing them, on preliminary 
rulings from national court, and to enforce such treaties via infringement proceedings. 
It can also rule that the conclusion or termination of a treaty is invalid (as a matter of 
internal EC law) pursuant to an annulment action or an indirect challenge to validity 
through the national courts. The Court also has a special jurisdiction in relation to 
external relations: Article 300 EC grants jurisdiction to give an opinion on whether a 
planned treaty would conflict with the EC Treaty, including the division of 
competence between the EC and its Member States. 
To date, the EC has negotiated or concluded a modest number of treaties within the 
scope of Title IV, although in several cases Member States have been authorized to 
act to conclude treaties within the scope of EC competence.110 There is also an 
important external relations aspect to several Title IV subjects, leaving aside the 
formal adoption of treaties. Only one case has reached the Court of Justice111: an 
Article 300 case concerning the extent of EC competence over a civil law treaty, the 
Lugano Convention; here the Court found that the relevant Convention fell within the 
scope of EC external powers, as regards both the rules for jurisdiction and the rules on 
the recognition of judgments. It has been assumed in practice that the allocation of 
parts of the Schengen acquis to the EC Treaty gives the EC competence over such 
measures in the normal way. In particular, the EC has (jointly with the EU) negotiated 
a treaty with Switzerland on association with the Schengen acquis. An earlier treaty 
with Norway and Iceland apparently also binds the Community, although it was 
negotiated according to a sui generis procedure set out in the Schengen Protocol.  
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It should be reiterated that where not all Member States participate in particular 
internal EC legislation, the non-participating Member States are not bound by the 
EC’s external competence in the relevant field; this principle is obviously particularly 
important to Title IV issues. In fact, the EC has taken the unusual step of negotiating 
treaties with one of its Member States (Denmark), in order to associate that State with 
certain pieces of Title IV legislation, despite its opt-out from most aspects of Title 
IV.112  
The EC has implied external relations powers, in particular to conclude treaties, even 
in the absence of express external powers. The EC’s external powers become 
exclusive if it has fully harmonized an issue in its internal law. The implications of 
this are discussed in chapters 3 (development of Schengen acquis), 5 (integration of 
Schengen framework of the EU) and 9 (Member States negotiating visa waiver 
agreements with the US).  
In the area of visas and border control, apart from the special issue of the Schengen 
treaties with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, the EC has concluded a treaty with 
China, and visa facilitation and readmission agreements with other third states113.  
Member States have also negotiated a treaty that falls within EC competence because 
it addresses the issue of seafarers’ visas, but because it was too late to arrange for the 
EC to become a party to the treaty, the Council adopted a Decision authorizing the 
Member States to sign the treaty, effectively as trustees of the EC’s external power.114 
In all these examples, it is assumed that allocation of parts of the Schengen acquis to 
the EC legal order has bestowed external competence on the EC in exactly the same 
way as a Community act.115 
The Treaty of Amsterdam attached a special Protocol to the EC Treaty concerning 
external competence over external borders. According to this Protocol, Article 62 (2) 
(a) is “without prejudice to the competence of Member States to negotiate or conclude 
agreements with third states as long as they respect Community law and other 
relevant international agreements”. This Protocol could be interpreted to mean either 
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that the EC would fail to gain exclusive external power over this issue even if it fully 
harmonized the internal law, or merely that Member States retain external power as 
long as there is no internal legislation fully harmonizing the issue. In other words, the 
EC’s external power is not exclusive by nature, but can only be exclusive by exercise. 
Given the obligation to respect Community law, the better interpretation is the latter 
one, but it should be recalled that even where EC external powers are exclusive, the 
EC can always authorize the Member States to exercise some limited external powers 
anyway if it so chooses. In practice, there are already provisions in the Schengen 
acquis limiting Member States’ competence to conclude external border treaties.116 
Furthermore this issue is relevant to the agreed Regulation on establishing a border 
traffic regime, which provides for common rules governing Member States’ bilateral 
border traffic treaties, although, as noted above, the agreed text fails to make any 
reference to the external borders Protocol.  
Special relationships. A ‘special relationship’ here is defined as the existence of 
political, economic, social, cultural or other links between a member and a candidate 
state of the EU and a third state. Such special links could have been legally 
acknowledged in an international agreement or in an act of the Community. 
The issue of special relationships and the way in which EU membership affects them 
has been studied extensively in several fields, most notably external trade and 
development policy. However, in both fields the effect of transfer of sovereignty to 
the EU level has special legal implications. External trade is a field of exclusive 
Community competence. Development policy is one of the few fields for which the 
ECJ has stated that the exercise of the Community competences does not limit the 
Member States’ competence as both can exist in parallel.117 
Accession and special relationships. But what about those cases where there are 
special relationships but they cannot be accommodated in the accession treaty 
framework, because they fall within fields for which full and unconditional adoption 
of the acquis is necessary, such as visa policy? In these cases the principle of 
                                                        
116 Article 136 of the Schengen Convention. 
117 ECJ, Case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council [1996] ECR I-6177,Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council 
[2008] I-3651 
  94
solidarity should mean that the Union tries to protect this special relationship through 
other means.   
 
External recognition of the internal shift of competences. The large body of literature 
on the transfer of competence to the EU level briefly surveyed above seems to have 
almost totally neglected one important issue, namely what happens if the rest of the 
world does not recognize this internal development.  In principle, it is clear that a 
transfer of competence to the European level does not have any impact on the rights 
and obligations resulting from existing international Treaties between Member States 
and third countries. The third party, for example the United States, might simply not 
recognize the internal EU transfer of powers and might not be willing to negotiate 
with the EU. This problem has not arisen in the past because most of the external 
competences of the Community concern economic or related issues (e.g. trade or the 
air traffic case mentioned above). Since the EU has one of the largest markets in the 
world, third countries, including the US, usually had a strong economic interest in 
reaching an agreement with the EU on these issues. This is probably the key reason 
why the rest of the world has usually recognized (at the cost of minor concessions 
when existing treaties had to be renegotiated) the additional external competences as 
they arose from case law or Treaty changes. 
Visa policy might be different because it goes to the heart of sovereignty. The 
practical problem arises from the principle of reciprocity, as explained in Chapter 9. 
The US is still imposing visa requirements on some member countries (including 
Schengen member countries). This situation is not compatible with the principles of 
solidarity and reciprocity. If these principles were strictly adhered to the EU would 
have to put the US on the so-called visa black list. Such a step would of course be 
politically hazardous and the EU has so far refrained from taking it.   
This particular example shows that shifting competence within the legal order of the 
EU is not enough to bring about a full transfer of power. The EU can take over the 
sovereignty from its member countries but this has also to be recognized by the global 
community. Chapter 9 shows that this external recognition of the transfer of 
competence still has to be fully achieved in the field of visa policy.   
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4. Europeanization of visas  
LAHEV118 reviews the various existing definitions of Europeanization. 
Europeanization can refer to a number of slightly different phenomena including: the 
development of EU-level policies and/or policy networks (e.g. Risse, Cowles, and 
Caporaso 2001); an increase of positive evaluations of the EU (Niedermayer 1995a); 
the two-way institutionalization of Europe through norms and formal structures (e.g. 
Sandholz and Stone Sweet 1998); top-down influences from the EU level to national 
systems (e.g. Ladrech 1994); policy-making patterns (e.g.Schmidt 1996; Falkner and 
Leiber 2003); or very broadly, the sum of all these notions (e.g. Börzel 1999). In this 
analysis the first definition119 will be used and Europeanization will refer to the 
development of EU-level policy in the field of visas. 
 
The shift of visa policy to the European level occurred in several phases, which will 
be analyzed in turn here. Two main Europeanization paths developed in parallel – the 
intergovernmental one and the community one. The intergovernmental path 
culminated in the Schengen cooperation, whose rules on visa will be studied in detail. 
The Community path of Europeanization includes cooperation in the visa field 
developed under Maastricht. And ultimately both paths merge into one in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, where visa policy rules are clearly situated in the Community 
pillar but the substance of the rules themselves is based on the results achieved within 
the framework of the Schengen cooperation.  
 
Usually, the Europeanization of a certain policy field occurs when there are important 
economic, social or other conditions that make regulation at a higher level of 
governance, in this case the European one, more efficient. In the field of visa policy 
such a factor was the move towards an area without internal frontiers that inevitably 
led to a quest for cooperation and even the harmonization of an increasing number of 
visa policy elements.  
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It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that the visa policy choices at national 
level are determined by the interplay of two sets of factors. The positive ones, such as 
economic cooperation; tourism; and cultural links push towards a more liberal and 
open visa policy. The negative factors such as security concerns and fears of increased 
immigration push towards a more restrictive visa policy. The actual policy adopted 
and implemented with certain legal rules is the result of the pendulum position (if we 
use the accepted Helen Wallace pendulum model120) at a particular moment in time. 
 
One would expect that similar forces would be at play when this same policy is 
Europeanized. However, to adopt the same logic at the European level of regulation 
would be misleading. Not least because it would assume that the factors determining 
the policy choices at national level have the same meaning across Europe, which is 
not the case. While the full communitarization of, say, common commercial policy 
means that the factors linked to international trade have a similar meaning everywhere 
in EU, a phenomenon like tourism, for example, may lead to different considerations 
in Italy and in Luxembourg. A similar but increased divergence can be observed when 
the negative policy factors are concerned. It is particularly visible in the case of 
cultural links. While both Spain and the United Kingdom have a wide range of 
countries with which they have strong cultural and linguistic links, the list of those 
countries is different and one can imagine the difficulties involved in merging these 
cultural concerns into one. The same is valid if we take immigration concerns as a 
negative factor determining visa policy. Immigration fears are influenced by a variety 
of factors, one of which is the specific economic situation of a country. Thus, when 
different EU states face different economic challenges, their attitudes towards 
immigration vary. At one point in time Spain might see advantage in attracting 
immigrants to work in Spain, while Germany might seek to limit their numbers, and 
this situation is likely to change over time. 
 
The lack of commonality among EU Member States in the factors determining visa 
policy leads to a complicated system of interactions when it comes to making policy 
choices and adopting legal acts. Thus, in the visa field, the policy pendulum is 
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actually swinging through three dimensions. In the first dimension, policy choices are 
made at national level depending on the national conditions at the time. In the second 
dimension, Member States negotiate among themselves to achieve a common 
understanding/meaning of the factors at European level. And finally, in the third 
dimension, the pendulum swings where there is interplay between the Member States 
and the supranational institutions to determine the most appropriate regulation level. 
 
The complexity of the policy-making process as described above leads to certain 
particularities of the Europeanization process in the visa field and at the same time 
goes some way to explaining the choices made in law-making.  
 
More than any other body of EU rules, visa policy rules have been created as a result 
of a bottom-up approach to European law-making. The EU rules on visas are not the 
result of a general principle agreed in the founding Treaties, whose meaning was 
clarified through Court rulings and whose application eventually culminated in a 
piece of secondary legislation, as, for example, in the field of equality between the 
sexes. Instead, EU visa rules were the culmination of decades of work outside the EU 
structures. To understand these rules it is not enough to study the rules themselves but 
also the processes linked to their adoption and implementation. In the visa policy 
field, more than in any other, the process is what counts; for the process is what 
reveals the search for a balance between the national and supranational; between 
freedom and security. 
 
This particularity determines the method used to study the Europeanization of visa 
policy here – it is akin to a journey.  At each stage of this journey, the aim is to 
identify which part of the visa policy regulation (as identified at national level) has 
been moved to a higher level of regulation, what the reasons were for this move and 
what alternative arguments were put against this proposal. The result will be a reverse 
pyramid showing how more and more of the elements determining visa policy come 
under the EU umbrella. Such an exercise is necessary because it will show the most 
sensitive areas for the Member States as regards the transfer of sovereignty in such a 
contentious field as visa policy. Those points of contention might be expected to 
emerge for the acceding Member States once they encounter the EU system of visa 
rules. Their problems may well be similar to those of the ‘old’ Member States in the 
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Europeanization process, and thus the solutions to these problems might find their 
precedent in previous experiences. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was mainly to describe and summarize the key concepts 
underlying the transfer of sovereignty in the European context and the stages and 
consequences of enlargement. The process of Europeanization in visa policy is 
somewhat different from other areas as it is not based on a development through the 
jurisprudence of a principle enshrined from the beginning in the Treaty. European 
visa policy evolved through a series of distinct legal steps, starting with 
intergovernmental agreements and ending with the full communitarization in the 































Bulgaria Europe 8 March 1993 Feb 1995 14 Dec 1995 29 Jan 1996 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 15 Feb 2000 25 April 2005 1 Jan 2007 
Cyprus Association 19 Dec 1972 June 1973 4 July 1990 17 Sep 1990 30 June 1993 13 March 2000 31 March 1998 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 
Czech 
Republic 
Europe 4 Oct 1993 Feb 1995 17 Jan 1996 29 Jan 1996 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 31 March 1998 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 
Estonia Europe 12 June 1995 Feb 1998 28 Nov 1995 4 Dec 1995 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 31 March 1998 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 
Hungary Europe 16 Dec 1991 Feb 1994 31 March 1994 18 April 1994 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 31 March 1998 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 
Latvia Europe 12 June 1995 Feb 1998 27 Oct 1995 17 July 1995 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 15 Feb 2000 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 
Lithuania Europe 12 June 1995 Feb 1998 8 Dec 1995 29 Jan 1996 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 15 Feb 2000 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 
Malta Association 5 Dec 1970 April 1971 16 July 1990 17 Sep 1990 30 June 1993 13 March 2000 15 Feb 2000 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 
Poland Europe 16 Dec 1991 Feb 1994 5 April 1994 18 April 1994 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 31 March 1998 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 
Romania Europe 1 Feb 1993 Feb 1995 22 June 1995 17 July 1995 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 15 Feb 2000 25 April 2005 1 Jan 2007 
Slovakia Europe 4 Oct 1993 Feb 1995 27 June 1995 17 July 1995 15 July 1997 16 March 1998 15 Feb 2000 16 April 2003 1 May 2004 




CHAPTER 3 – MOVING ONE LEVEL UP – INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
COOPERATION ON VISAS IN EUROPE 
 
The starting point for all cooperation on visas is of course the political will to 
facilitate the economic, political and social contacts with neighbouring countries. 
Visas and other control measures that exemplify sovereignty at the border then 
become obstacles. When the aim to facilitate the free movement of persons becomes 
paramount, a process of lifting these obstacles then gains momentum in those states 
that are inclined to strengthen ties. 
 
The first step in this process is the lifting of visa requirements, where the state 
voluntarily surrenders the possibility of control at a distance for those wishing to enter 
its territory. The individual will still be checked when crossing the border, however.  
A second step on the trust journey of a state is the acceptance of simplified border 
controls for the nationals of the other state, necessitating internal identification 
documents rather than the usual travel documents. This second step implies the 
mutual recognition of the documents of the other state. A further step is the abolition 
of controls on own nationals while at the same time maintaining controls over the 
third country nationals entering the territory.  
The final level is the abolition of border controls altogether. However, this entails the 
regulatory ‘merging’ of their territories as one for the purposes of external border 
controls and a number of measures linked to this. Among them the most significant 
measures are linked to visa policy, common rules on the persons not to be admitted to 
the common territory, and certain readmission rules.  
 
This chapter starts by looking at three regional initiatives involving a limited number 
of countries, namely the Benelux travel area, the Nordic Passport Union and the free 
travel area between the United Kingdom and Ireland. This is followed by a study of 
several initiatives that prepared the ground for Schengen. These initiatives, outside the 
EC framework but involving Member States, took the form of a passport union that 
was popularized in the mid-1970s, and the intergovernmental working groups, mostly 
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active in the 1980s. The main body of this chapter focuses on the most elaborate 
example of regional intergovernmental cooperation on visas, namely the Schengen 
area. 
Throughout, the focus is on visa policy and its various elements as identified in 
Chapter 1 of this study, but it is studied here in a wider context. 
 
1. Historical examples of regional travel areas in Europe 
Closer economic and social links between neighbouring countries (provided they are 
on friendly terms) inevitably demand some facilitation of the controls on persons 
travelling between them. Following the Second World War several regional travel 
areas emerged which, to varying extents provided freedom of movement to persons 
on their territory. However, the conditions under which the need for cooperation 
emerged and the substance of this cooperation varied according to a number of 
factors. Here, three examples of regional cooperation are studied from a comparative 
perspective: 1) the Benelux travel area, 2) the Nordic Passport Union, and 3) the 
United Kingdom and Ireland travel area. Although the three areas developed 
differently they can be usefully compared along several lines:  
- the core objective of the cooperation and how visa policy was seen in that 
context; 
- the legal basis of the cooperation; 
- the beneficiary of the simplified rules – only for nationals of the participating 
states or also the third-country nationals residing on their territory? 
- the rights of third country nationals admitted for short stay; 
- the visa policy – is there a common visa list format and are there common 




1.1.1. Early cooperation 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have a long tradition of arrangements to 
stimulate and facilitate free travel within the area. Before the Second World War, a 
system of regional travel existed in the Benelux area which allowed the citizens of 
those countries to cross the borders between them with only the presentation of an 
identity card.  
 
After the end of the Second World War and before the establishment of the Benelux 
Economic Union in 1958, a series of bilateral agreements was signed between 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands and Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, aimed at facilitating travel among all three countries.2 The agreements 
generally regulated the types of documents that were acceptable for the border 
crossing of nationals from one of the countries into the territory of another. Those 
documents included, in addition to national passports, national identity cards issued 
by the contracting parties, and certain types of aliens’ identity cards. 
 
An interesting solution for the facilitation of the limited border traffic was an 
Agreement for the Liberalisation of Minor Frontier Traffic, signed between Belgium 
and the Netherlands on 26 March 19533. According to the provisions of this 
agreement, citizens of both countries could cross the border if they held either a 
national identity card, a passport (either valid or expired in the last five years) or 
another proof of citizenship. Interestingly, the agreement also stipulated that the 
border crossing could also take place anywhere other than just at the designated 
                                                        
1 For early analysis see Chapter 10 of the book of D. TURACK, The passport in international law, 
Lexington books, (Lexington, 1972), pp. 89 -100. 
2 See for example for the relations between Belgium and Luxembourg: Agreement on the 
Reestablishment of the Freedom of Movement of Persons, signed between Belgium and Luxembourg 
in 1945; Supplementary to it the Agreement of 1949; Agreement on the Freedom of Movement of 
Persons from 1950; and for the relations between Belgium and the Netherlands: Agreement on the 
Abolition of the obligation to carry a passport for travel between the two countries of 1950; Agreement 
for the Liberalization of Minor Frontier Traffic; Agreement Relative to the Removal of Undesirable 
Persons from 1958; as well as various bilateral agreements dealing with particular categories of 
travellers: seamen, refugees. Prior to the establishment of the Benelux Economic Union, the most 
significant trilateral treaty was the Labour Treaty of 1956. 
3 United Nations, Treaties Series, Vol. 165, p. 297 
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border crossing points; a right initially limited to the period between sunrise and 
sunset but modified in 1955 to mean any time of day. 
 
1.1.2. Benelux Economic Union 
The Benelux Economic Union was established based on a Treaty signed in The Hague 
on 3 February 1958. Article 1(1) includes the free movement of persons between the 
elements of the economic union to be established by the participating states. Article 2 
foresees the possibility for nationals of each Member State to freely enter and leave 
the territory of the other Member States, indicating treatment equal to that of the 
country nationals as regards freedom of movement, residence and establishment. In 
order to put this provision into practice, Article 55 of the Treaty provided for the 
conclusion of a convention  
determining, in the interest of public order, public security, public health or 
morality … such provisions which may be applied to nationals of the High 
Contracting Party in the territory of another High Contracting Party with regard 
to their entering or leaving its territory, and to their freedom of movement, of 
residence/sojourn and of establishment therein, and to their expulsion.  
 
The Convention, implementing Articles 55 and 56 of the Treaty Instituting the 
Benelux Economic Union, was signed on 19 September 1960. It established the 
principle that nationals of the Member States could enter the territory of another 
Member State on presentation of a valid identity document to be determined by the 
Benelux Council of Ministers. These documents were generally considered to be the 
national passports and identity cards of the Member States. However, in addition there 
were numerous other documents that could guarantee entry, some of which also 
served as proof of nationality while others were not valid for this purpose. In addition, 
Benelux nationals had the right of residence in the other countries of the Union under 
the conditions of having adequate means and proof of character (absence of criminal 
record).  
 
1.1.3. Freedom of movement – detailed provisions 
What is more interesting for our analysis is how the entry conditions were organized 
for the non-nationals of the Benelux countries. Unlike the Nordic approach, the 
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Benelux countries first concentrated on the establishment of common external border 
controls, and only then on the liberalisation of internal travel. On 11 April 1960 a 
Convention was signed concerning the Transfer of Entry and Exit Controls to the 
External Frontiers of the Benelux Territory.4 The Convention entered into force upon 
ratification on 1 July 1960. According to Article 2 of the Convention, it established 
the Benelux countries as a single unit for the purpose of entry and exit controls. The 
controls at the internal frontiers were abolished and thus both Benelux nationals and 
non-nationals could enjoy free movement among the three states. The implementation 
of border controls was relocated to the external frontier of the Benelux Union and 
presentation of travel documents was required only at that point. The control executed 
there was valid for the entire Benelux territory and the officials who executed it did so 
not only for their own countries but also for the two other Benelux partners. 
 
Undoubtedly, such an enterprise requires what TURACK calls a “unification of 
administration, harmonization of national legislation and a common policy taken by 
the three governments”. However, as demonstrated below in the case of the Nordic 
countries, such a system could also function when based on mutual recognition and 
trust, rather than harmonization.  
 
Without going into the details of the regulation, only certain elements that are 
pertinent to the further analysis will be considered. Common rules were established in 
various fields, and these served later as a model for the Schengen group. As far as 
visas are concerned, a common Benelux visa was created by the Convention, valid for 
a stay of up to three months and issued by any of the consulates of the Benelux states 
(Art. 4). In the case of an agreement with a third country featuring issues of the free 
movement of persons, the Benelux countries agreed to apply the most liberal 
application adopted by any of them.5 In addition to the harmonized visa policy, 
common rules governing entry conditions and the documents were developed (Art. 5 
                                                        
4 Convention entre le Royaume de Belgique, le Grande-Duché de Luxembourg et le Royaume des 
Pays-Bas, concernant le transfert du contrôle des personnes vers les frontières extérieurs du territoire 
du Benelux, signée à Bruxelles, le 11 avril 1960. Moniteur Belge, 01/07/1960, [Convention between 
the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Netherlands concerning the 
transfer of control on persons to the external borders of the Benelux territory]. 
5 As will be demonstrated later, the approach chosen by the Schengen group was exactly the opposite; 
in the case of different rules regarding a third country’s nationals, the most restrictive application was 
chosen. See section 3.3.2. of this chapter. 
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and 6). The list of undesirable persons who could not be admitted to the Benelux 
territory was also common and a special procedure applied for the inclusion of 
persons on this list (Art. 10).6 There were also readmission arrangements in case of 
entry of undesirable non-Benelux nationals from the territory of one of the Member 
States to the territory of another (Art. 9). The free movement was also extended to the 
non-Benelux nationals legally resident in one of the three countries who could travel 
on presentation of a valid residence card (Art. 8). 
 
The coordination of the process was performed by a Working Party composed of 
representatives of all Benelux Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice and in 
addition, of representatives of the Minister of State for Luxembourg and the Minister 
of Interior of the Netherlands. Finally, the reestablishment of border controls was 
allowed for reasons of national security or public order, which also included public 
health (Art. 12).  
 
The Benelux system of the free movement of persons, although similar to the Nordic 
Passport Union, used different measures to achieve the same result. Probably due to 
the different administrative systems and residual cultural differences, the Benelux 
travel area could only be achieved following the harmonization of all provisions 
related to entry and exit controls. Such an approach inevitably resulted in the 
development of a complex system of regulations, as every single aspect remotely 
linked to the movement of persons had to be discussed and a common agreement 
ultimately reached. Despite its relative complexity and due to the fact that this was 
one of the examples of the creation of a space without internal frontiers among 
countries with close, but still different, legal and administrative traditions, the 
experience of the Benelux countries later constituted the basis for the Schengen area, 
which involved even more cooperation in the free movement of persons among a 
wider range of countries in Europe. 
 
The Benelux travel area grew out of long-lasting cultural and political links among 
the states concerned and was created within the framework of a wider economic 
cooperation where the free movement of persons was a natural continuation of the 
                                                        
6 Possibly the precursor of the SIS.  
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economic integration. The Agreement on the establishment of common controls on 
the external borders put in practice the proclaimed objective of free movement in the 
context of wider Benelux economic cooperation. 
 
1.2. Nordic Passport Union7 
1.2.1. Early cooperation 
The cooperation between the Scandinavian countries on movement of persons issues 
has a long history. Before the First World War, as elsewhere in Europe, there was 
complete freedom of movement without the need to show identity documents. Even 
later, when more restrictive practices were introduced elsewhere, for the period 
between 1929 and 1939, the nationals of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden could travel among those states without the need to present a passport. As a 
first step towards free movement, immediately after the end of the Second World 
War, all visas for travel among the Scandinavian states were abolished (with the 
exception of Finland). The modern objective of freedom of movement was set in 1951 
by the Scandinavian Inter-Parliamentary Committee, which proposed a return to the 
movement without identity papers among the Scandinavian states. 
 
As a response to this political initiative, a series of multilateral international 
agreements was signed in the period 1952-1957 foreseeing more and more elaborate 
cooperation. The first agreement was a protocol dated 14 July 1952, concerning the 
abolition of passports for travel between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The 
provisions of the protocol exempted the citizens of these countries from the need to 
show travel documents for entry and short stay (not requiring a residence permit) on 
the territories of the other signatory states. On the same day, possibly as a 
                                                        
7 For an early analysis see Chapter 9 of the book by D. TURACK, op.cit., pp. 81-88. For more 
information on the Nordic cooperation in general, see F. WENDT, Cooperation in the Nordic Countries, 
Nordic Council, (Stockholm, 1981) and TURNER AND NORDQUIST, The other European Community: 
integration and co-operation in Nordic Europe, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, (London,, 1982). For the 
movement of persons aspects see: J. VEDSTED-JANSEN, ‘Abolition of Border Controls within the 
Nordic Region and Security of Residence in Denmark’, in GUILD AND MINDERHOUD, Security of 
Residence and Expulsion Protection of Aliens in Europe, Kluwer Law International, (The Hague, 
2001). 
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compensatory measure, an agreement was signed, on the readmission of aliens who 
had illegally entered the territory of another contracting party.  
 
The second agreement regulated rules on residence. The protocol of 22 May 1954 had 
the same signatories as the previous agreement (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) and dealt with the exemption of the signatories’ nationals from the 
obligation of possessing a passport or residence permit while residing in a 
Scandinavian country other than their own. Thus, following the entry into force of this 
protocol it was possible for the citizens of the four signatory states to both enter and 
reside (without limitation in time) in the territory of the other states, without the need 
for travel documents. However, in this context a travel document was seen as a 
document allowing international travel and, in the majority of cases, meant a passport.  
 
At this stage, however, despite the abolishment of requirements for the presentation of 
travel documents, border controls, both internal and external, were still maintained. In 
practice, this meant that at the external frontier of the Nordic area, both Scandinavian 
and non-Scandinavian nationals’ passports were controlled, meaning that they needed 
to present a valid travel document. The internal border controls, those from one 
signatory state to another were also maintained. However, at these border crossings, 
Scandinavian nationals were not required to present a passport, while other nationals 
needed to do so. This system was possible in practice through the implementation of 
two separate corridors for border controls; a system used later in the implementation 
of another ‘free from internal frontiers area’ – the Schengen space.  
 
1.2.2. Nordic Passport Union 
The third agreement, leading in practice to the creation of a common travel area and 
the abolition of control on the internal frontiers, was the Convention of 12 July 1957, 
concerning the waiver of passport control at intra-Nordic frontiers. It was also signed 
by the four countries involved in this cooperation – Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden. The objective of the agreement was the achievement of a passport union, a 
single travel area. The agreement transferred the passport controls to the “outer 
Nordic frontier”. It was defined as the border between one of the signatory states and 
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a non-signatory state.8 The abolition of controls on the internal borders resulted in 
extension of the free movement rights to legally resident aliens, as in effect their 
movement could not be controlled once the border controls were abandoned.  
Additional elements of the system created also included: 
- entry and exit control cards that non-Scandinavian travellers, who were 
required to have visas, had to fill in at arrival and departure; 
- the compilation of lists of prohibited persons to notify the border crossing 
points 
- a two-gate system for Scandinavian and non-Scandinavian travellers was 
maintained 
- a common policy allowing for entry based on ID cards instead of passports 
maintained towards France, West Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg and 
Austria. 
 
According to TURACK, the passport union created by the Scandinavian countries can 
be considered as the first regional passport union. The construction of the passport 
union was hinged on two levels. The first involved liberalising the travel of nationals 
of the participating countries to move between those countries, extended further to 
cover nationals, as well as the legally resident third country nationals. The second 
level involved the transfer of the border controls personnel to the external borders of 
the entity. The sequence of the two levels was a result of the initial objective that put 
the integration plan in place; namely, the complete freedom of intra-Scandinavian 
travel without identity papers. 
 
The first level was achieved on the basis of the waiver of passport requirements, while 
the second required the development of a common policy and the harmonization of 
national laws. However, this harmonization did not go so far as to include either 
common visa lists or the development of a common Nordic visa (at least until 1972). 
Each of the Nordic countries maintains its own policy with regard to visas. Thus an 
example was created of a passport union and an area without internal frontiers which 
functioned well without the harmonization of visa policies. However, this was only 
                                                        
8 As such border crossing points were considered not only those on land, but also airports or sea ports 
where aliens coming from a non-contracting party would be expected to enter. 
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possible due to a certain level of trust among the participating states, allowing them to 
accept aliens who had been issued visas by other countries and authorities. 
 
1.3. The Common Travel Area between the United Kingdom and Ireland9 
The third regional free travel area under discussion here is the one shared by the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.10 In contrast to the two other areas, the 
Common Travel Area is not based on an international agreement or convention in the 
classic sense. The intention is again to have an area in which people can travel 
without frontier controls, but in contrast to the Benelux and Nordic approach, the goal 
in the case of UK and Ireland is achieved through administrative arrangements 
between the respective authorities (or the Home Office and the Irish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs respectively) which are then implemented through pieces of parallel 
domestic legislation in the UK and Ireland respectively. In effect, this is a case of the 
alignment of policies and legislation, rather than harmonization. 
 
1.3.1. Early cooperation 
The first common travel area was established immediately after the foundation of the 
Irish Free State in 1922, based on a co-operation between the British Home Office 
and the Irish Ministry of Home Affairs. The main elements of the agreement provided 
that:  
- each state would enforce the other’s conditions of landing for aliens; 
- the British suspect index and circulars relating to aliens would be provided to 
the Irish authorities; 
- aliens who moved between the two states would be subject to at most minimal 
registration requirements; and 
- each state would enforce the others deportation decisions.  
                                                        
9 For a comprehensive analysis of the Common Travel Area, see B. RYAN, “The Common Travel Area 
between Britain and Ireland”, The Modern Law Review, vol. 64:6, November, (2004). For a detailed 
account of British law on entry, see N. ANDREW, ‘The Common Travel Area’, in Guild and 
Minderhoud, Security of Residence and Expulsion Protection of Aliens in Europe, Kluwer Law 
International, (The Hague, 2001). 
10 Formally the Common Travel Area comprises the United Kingdom (i.e. England and Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland), the Channel Islands (i.e. the two bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey), 
the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland.  
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A transposition of the rules into the national immigration legislation allowed for the 
mutual introduction of the general rule that an alien arriving from one of the two 
states would not require leave to enter. Unrestricted movement between the two states 
continued until the Second World War.  
 
The legal basis of the modern common travel area lies in an exchange of letters 
between the Home Office and the Irish Department of Justice in early 1952.11 The 
objective was “to follow a similar immigration policy, to set up a similar system of 
immigration controls, and to agree that any alien who … got into the other country 
would be accepted back if the second country did not want him to stay”.12 The 
substantial part of the cooperation provided that: 
- each state would refuse leave to land to persons in transit to the other state 
whom “it was satisfied that for any reasons … would not be allowed to land in 
the other country”;   
- the two states were to notify one another of any action taken in relation to 
persons on the other’s list of undesirable aliens; 
- the two states were to readmit aliens who, having entered the other state 
through their territory, were not permitted to remain there.  
- a single index of entry and exit of the two states could be maintained.  
 
Thus, following these arrangements, Britain abolished immigration controls on travel 
to Great Britain from the island of Ireland in April 1952, through repeal of the 
requirement for aliens to obtain leave to land if their journey was from Ireland. The 
following year, the term “common travel area” was mentioned for the first time in the 
changes in the British law on aliens.  
 
1.3.2. The common travel area in law 
According to RYAN, the reasoning behind the introduction of this arrangement was 
based on the UK consideration that “the extension of immigration control to Ireland 
                                                        
11 For a detailed analysis see RYAN, op.cit., p. 858. 
12 Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Geoffrey de Freitas, HC Deb vol 478 col 847 28 
July 1950, cited in RYAN, op.cit., p. 858, footnote 25. 
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was thought impossible – firstly, because “no effective control over that border is 
possible, and … control of the main roads and railways would cause great 
inconvenience to the inhabitants of Northern Ireland” and because it was considered 
politically unacceptable to introduce permanent immigration controls between the 
island of Ireland and Great Britain.  
 
Although based on administrative arrangements, the common travel area has been 
manifest in various ways in British and Irish law. For the purposes of this study of 
special interest are the provisions related to the admission of foreigners to the 
common territory, or, as in British immigration law terminology – the leave to enter. 
Within British immigration law, the following three kinds of permission can be 
identified: entry clearance, leave to enter and leave to remain. For the purpose of this 
study, only the first two categories are of relevance.  
 
Entry clearance is permission to seek entry to the United Kingdom and is obtained 
prior to departure. It can take the form either of a visa (for visa nationals) or an entry 
certificate (for non-visa nationals). When entry clearance is required, it is obtained 
from entry clearance posts around the world. Leave to enter the United Kingdom is 
ordinarily issued by an immigration officer at the port of entry, and usually only in 
cases where entry clearance is not a requirement. Since 2000, entry clearance in itself 
legally confers leave to enter. It is however possible for this leave to be cancelled 
upon arrival at a UK port of entry. Leave to enter is usually for a limited period.  
As in the regulation of the whole common travel area, the provisions making the 
system work are not common but are to be found in the British and Irish national laws 
on entry.  
 
British law provisions 
Under the British legislation and more precisely Section 1(3) of the 1971 Act “arrival 
in or departure from the United Kingdom on a local journey from or to any of the 
Islands or the Republic of Ireland shall not be subject to control under this Act”, and 
goes on to state that “in this Act the United Kingdom and those places … are 
collectively referred to as “the common travel area”. The effect of section 1(3) is to 
establish a presumption that no-one travelling from Ireland must obtain leave to enter 
Britain, as would otherwise be required under Section 3 of the 1971 Act. 
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The general principle that those arriving from Ireland do not require leave to enter is 
however subject to a number of exceptions.  
Some individuals do not have a right to enter without leave: 
- those with a deportation order against them; 
- those to whom leave to enter has previously been refused (and has not been 
subsequently granted); 
- those who have been excluded from Britain on the grounds that this is 
“conductive  to the public good”. 
 
Leave to enter is also required by certain categories of persons: 
- visa nationals; 
- those (other than Irish nationals) who travel by air from Ireland, having 
commenced their journey outside the common travel area, but who were not 
given “leave to land” in Ireland; 
- those who entered Ireland unlawfully from outside the common travel area; 
- those who enter Ireland from another part of the common travel area which 
they entered unlawfully or where they have remained after expiry of their 
leave. 
While the purpose of these exceptions is to ensure that British immigration 
requirements cannot be avoided by entry through Ireland, it may be harsh in 
individual cases, since it could be difficult in practice to obtain leave to enter from 
Ireland.  
 
British law places automatic conditions upon the right to remain of persons arriving 
from Ireland, apart from Irish nationals and those with a right of abode in Britain. In 
the usual case, the right to remain is: 
- limited to three months; and 
- an individual may not engage in employment or occupation for reward unless 
they are a European Union national.  
 
However, if the individual is a visa national with a ‘short stay’ visa, they may only 
stay for one month and must register with the police. In addition, if an individual’s 
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right to remain expires while they were outside Britain, then the right to remain 
without renewal is limited to seven days.  
 
Another aspect of the British law on entry is that no sanctions are imposed upon 
carriers who have transported non-nationals with inadequate documentation from 
Ireland.  
 
Irish law provisions  
Irish immigration law also makes special provisions for entry from Britain, but is less 
detailed, and avoids referring to the common travel area in specific terms. Its 
approach is to place different obligations on aliens according to whether they have 
entered from Britain or elsewhere. Under the Aliens Order 1946, an alien who wishes 
to enter Ireland from a state other than Britain must land at a designated port, and 
must obtain leave to land, which may be refused on various grounds. By contrast, 
aliens who enter Ireland from Britain do not ordinarily require leave to enter. They are 
instead obliged: 
- to have a visa, if they are visa nationals; 
- to report to a ‘registration officer’ within seven days; 
- to obtain leave to remain within one month of taking up business or 
employment, or three months in other cases. 
 
The law on entry in Ireland was the subject of a significant amendment in 1997, as a 
result of which immigration officers may now examine aliens entering from Britain, 
and apply the same conditions to them as if they had arrived from elsewhere. 
 
In addition to special provision for entry to Britain from Ireland, and vice versa, the 
common travel area implies that Britain and Ireland may be called upon to enforce the 









The common travel area has also led Irish visa policy being strongly influenced by 
Britain.13 Comparative tables developed by Ryan show a consistent pattern between 
1985 and 1998 that once Britain imposed a visa requirement upon the nationals of a 
given state, Ireland quickly followed.14 The same does not hold true the other way 
round; in the cases where Ireland first imposed a visa requirement, evidence of 
Britain’s willingness to follow suit is hard to find. The clear implication is that in the 
area of visa policy, Ireland has been upholding British requirements, rather than vice 
versa.  
 
Irish law and practice have also upheld British immigration decisions in relation to 
individuals. A key provision in this regard authorizes the exclusion from Ireland of 
non-nationals who are undesirable in Britain. In addition to refusing entry to certain 
persons thought likely to travel to Britain, the Irish authorities have also been willing 
to deny residence to those subject to a deportation order in Britain.  
 
The discussion so far has shown the durability of the “arrangements … relating to the 
movement of persons” between Britain and Ireland. These arrangements have 
influenced the status of Irish nationals in Britain and British nationals in Ireland and 
as a consequence there have been no systematic immigration controls on travel 
between Britain and Ireland. They have also led the two states – and Ireland in 
particular – to be prepared to enforce each other’s immigration requirements.  
 
1.4. Interim conclusions 
This brief comparative analysis of the examples of regional free travel areas shows 
that different country groups chose different approaches to deal with the fundamental 
problem of any free travel area: how to reconcile internal free movement with the 
sovereign right of each country to determine which persons can enter its territory. 
                                                        
13 The British ‘negative list’ of states whose nationals require a visa is set out in HC 395 (1993-94), 
Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry, HC 509 (1971-72), para 8. Appendix I (as 
amended). 
The Irish ‘positive list’ of states whose nationals do not need a visa is set out in Aliens (Visas) Order 
2001 (SI No 36 of 2001).  
14 See RYAN, op.cit., p. 866-867. 
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The Nordic Union was composed of a small group of very homogeneous countries 
which had a high level of trust among each other and could thus function without 
elaborate common rules for the external border. The Nordic Union could not serve as 
a model for the EC because this level of trust did not exist among the member 
countries of the EC. 
 
The bilateral free travel area between the UK and Ireland could not serve as a model 
either because it constituted a practical arrangement between two countries that could 
not have worked on a multilateral basis among a much larger number of countries. 
However, it is symptomatic that these two countries that preferred to keep their 
bilateral arrangement even when most countries on the continent decided to pursue 
the avenue of multilateral cooperation, albeit first outside the EC legal framework. 
 
The Benelux Passport Union became in the end the model for the Schengen area.   
However, the road to the Schengen area was not direct. It involved several aborted 
attempts. 
 
2. Pre-Schengen intergovernmental cooperation on visas15 
2.1. Precursor ideas: Passport Union 
As was demonstrated earlier, in the EEC Treaty, it was already established that EC 
nationals have an individual right of entry into other Member States without the need 
of a visa and without the need of a stamp in their passports.16  
                                                        
15 For a detailed review of the pre-Maastricht cooperation see D. PAPADEMETRIOU, Coming together or 
pulling apart? The European Union’s Struggle with Immigration and Asylum, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, (Washington D.C., 1996), pp. 19-50; S. PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs 
Law, Longman (London, 2000), pp. 15-16; A. GEDDES, Immigration and European Integration: 
Towards Fortress Europe?, Manchester University Press, (Manchester, 2000), pp. 67-68, DEN BOER 
AND WALLACE. “Justice and Home Affairs”, in Wallace and Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the 
European Union, 4th edition, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2000), pp. 494-495, A. CRUZ, “An 
Insight into Schengen, Trevi and other European Intergovernmental Bodies”, CCME Briefing Papers 
No 1 (Second edition), Brussels, (1992). 
16 Of course, within the existing systems of visa free travel, both bilateral (United Kingdom and 
Ireland) or multilateral (the Benelux countries) the right of free movement was even wider. Case C-
157/79 Pieck [1980] ECR 2171 illustrates this. The case involved a Dutch national, resident in Cardiff, 
Wales, pursuing an activity as an employed person, against whom criminal proceedings were brought. 
The charges were that, being a person who was not a "patrial" (British national having a right of abode 
in the United Kingdom) and having only been granted leave to enter the United Kingdom or to remain 
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Third country nationals did not benefit from such treatment and in all cases the 
national visa rules of each country still applied to them. The only group of third 
country nationals to which common rules applied was the family members of EC 
nationals who exercised their right of free movement. For such third country 
nationals, Member States were obliged to grant and facilitate the issuing of visas.17 
 
The first initiative that included short term visas in its scope at the European level was 
the Commission Consultative Document on Passport Union, presented in 1975.18 In 
                                                                                                                                                               
there for a limited period, knowingly remained beyond the time limited by the leave. The accused held 
no residence permit; when he last entered the territory of the United Kingdom, on 29 July 1978, an 
endorsement containing the words "given leave to enter the United Kingdom for six months" was 
stamped on his passport. In the course of the procedure before the Court, the British Government 
maintained that the phrase "entry visa" means exclusively a documentary clearance issued before the 
traveller arrives at the frontier in the form of endorsement on his passport or of a separate document, on 
the contrary an endorsement stamped on a passport at the time of arrival giving leave to enter the 
territory may not be regarded as an entry visa or equivalent document (paragraph 6). The Court did not 
uphold this argument and stated that "for the purpose of applying the Directive, the object of which is 
to abolish restrictions on movement and residence for Community workers within the Community, the 
time at which clearance to enter the territory of a Member State has been given and indicated on a 
passport or by another document is immaterial". Furthermore, the right of community workers to enter 
the territory of a Member State which Community law confers may not be made subject to the issue of 
a clearance to that effect by the authorities of that Member State (paragraph 8). The Court also held that 
Article 3 (2) of Council Directive No 68/360 prohibiting states from demanding an entry visa or 
equivalent requirement for Community workers moving within the Community must be interpreted as 
meaning that the phrase "entry visa or equivalent requirement" covers any formality for the purpose of 
granting leave to enter the territory of a Member State, which is coupled with a passport or identity 
check at the frontier, whatever may be the place or time at which that leave is granted and in whatever 
form it may be granted (paragraph 10). 
17 For a recent case confirming this, see Case C-157/03 Commission v. Spain [2005] ECR I-2911. The 
proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations originated from two complaints submitted to the 
Commission by Community nationals exercising the right of freedom of movement conferred on them 
by the EC Treaty, whose spouses were refused a residence permit in Spain; the reason given was that 
they should first have applied for a residence visa at the Spanish consulate in their last country of 
domicile. The facts giving rise to those complaints took place in 1998 and 1999. The Court held that 
"in accordance with Article 3(2) of Directive 68/360 and Article 3(2) of Directive 73/148, when a 
national of a Member State moves within the Community with a view to exercising the rights conferred 
on him by the Treaty and those directives, the Member States may demand an entry visa or an 
equivalent document from members of his family who are not nationals of one of those States." 
(paragraph 32) (also MPAX, paragraph 56). However, those States must grant family members who are 
not nationals of one of the Member States every facility to obtain the necessary visas. In that regard, 
the Court has held that if the provisions of Directives 68/360 and 73/148 are not to be denied their full 
effect, a visa must be issued without delay and, as far as possible, at the place of entry into national 
territory (MRAX, paragraph 60) (paragraph 33). Right of entry of family members derives from the 
family relationship alone. See also Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591 (paragraphs 56 and 60). 
18 “Towards European citizenship: implementation of point 10 of the final communiqué issued at the 
European Summit held in Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974 concerning a Passport Union”, Report 
presented by the Commission to the Council, COM (75) 322 final, Brussels, 2 July 1975; Detailed 
analysis of the initiative and history of its development can be found in A. MELONI, Visa Policy within 
the European Union Structure, Springer (Berlin, 2006); and House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities (1979), Passport Union, 10th Report, 24 July 1979. 
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its report the Commission set two short-term objectives for the establishment of a 
Passport Union. The first was the creation of a uniform European passport to be 
issued by each Member State to its nationals, in place of the existing passport of 
varying appearance; the second was the abolition of checks at the internal frontiers of 
the Community on the nationals of both Member States and non-Member States. The 
Commission also considered that a Passport Union would involve two long-term 
objectives: securing equality of treatment outside the Community for those holding a 
uniform passport and, harmonizing the treatment of aliens within the Community.  
 
The adoption of measures related to visas constituted a corollary of the second short 
term objective which the Commission set, the abolition of checks at the internal 
frontiers of the Community. The latter, according to the Commission, was to include 
not only the abolition of passport checks, but also border checks on the ancillary 
documents such as visas and residence and work permits.  
 
However, as the focus of the proposal had been concentrated on the development of 
common passports, there was virtually no debate at this stage on the proposal for the 
abolition of checks at internal frontiers. This first mention of a visa on the European 
level demonstrates several ideas that can be found at the later and more elaborate 
stages of development. 
 
Firstly, common visas are considered, by the authors of the proposal, as a necessary 
measure to be adopted after the possible abolition of internal border controls. In order 
to have full freedom of travel, valid for both EC nationals and third country nationals, 
there should be a common system in place guaranteeing that the persons accepted in 
the common territory are indeed acceptable to all countries involved. The 
Commission proposal draws on some experiences from the already existing areas with 
relaxed formalities for internal travel, such as the Benelux countries, the UK and 
Ireland and the Nordic Union. These existing schemes depend on some degree of 
harmonization of national policies and law on matters such as immigration, 
deportation, and the granting of visas, or on common administrative arrangements.19  
 
                                                        
19  House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1979), Passport Union, 10th 
Report, 24 July 1979. 
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2.2. The preparatory work of inter-governmental groups 
Before the Single European Act, no concrete steps were taken regarding cooperation 
on visa issues among the Member States. However, the goal of accomplishing an area 
without internal frontiers was in the Treaty and concrete action was needed if it was to 
be achieved. The discussions as to exactly what measures were necessary to achieve 
that goal were at the core of the disputes of that time (1970s and early 1980s). 
Cooperation on visas was not considered part of the problem, but rather a 
compensatory measure necessary to ‘flank’ the lifting of the internal border controls.20  
 
The breakthrough came with the Single European Act and its goal of the development 
of an “area without internal frontiers,” however; disagreement remained on the type 
of measures necessary for the achievement of this goal. According to the 
Commission, such a goal inevitably meant the abolition of internal border controls 
and the adoption of flanking measures resulting from such an abolition (including on 
visas). Most Member States agreed, however, the United Kingdom and Denmark 
argued that the free movement of persons could be achieved even without the 
abolition of controls. Their interpretation was that the free movement of persons was 
guaranteed to EC nationals only for economic purposes. Thus internal border controls 
were still necessary in order to distinguish between EC and third country nationals. 
The Single European Act (SEA) became possible when the parties in effect agreed to 
disagree. The UK and Denmark signed up to the SEA but the continental European 
Member States who persisted with their point of view took a different route towards 
free movement.  
 
Two Declarations were made in the Single European Act; one was general regarding 
Articles 13-19 and one was on the free movement of persons. The General 
Declaration on Articles 13 to 19 states:  
 
Nothing in these provisions shall affect the right of Member States to take measures 
as they consider necessary for the purpose of controlling immigration from third 
countries, and to combat terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading in 
works of art and antiques. 
                                                        
20 A detailed historical account can be found in A. MELONI, Visa Policy within the European Union 
Structure, Springer (Berlin, 2006) and R. FUNGUEIRIÑO-LORENZO, Visa-, Asyl- und 
Einwanderungspolitik vor und nach dem Amsterdamer Vertrag : Entwicklung der gemeinschaftlichen 
Kompetenzen in Visa-, Asyl- und Einwanderungspolitik, Peter Lang, (Frankfurt, 2002). 
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While the Political declaration by the Governments of the Member States on the free 
movement of persons stated:  
 
In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member States shall co-
operate, without prejudice to the powers of the Community, in particular as regards 
the entry, movement and residence of nationals of third countries. They shall also co-
operate in the combating of terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading in 
works of art and antiques.21 
 
As there was no agreement at the time on a Community competence in flanking 
measures, Member States started intergovernmental cooperation in this field. The base 
was the already existing structure of the Trevi group on criminal matters (created in 
1976), whose mandate was broadened in view of the 1992 project.22 
 
Thus at this stage the informal cooperation continued among all EC Member States 
through the intergovernmental working groups in the framework of the extended 
Trevi system. Meanwhile, however, another initiative appeared that started as a 
simple bilateral arrangement, the Saarbrücken Agreement between France and 
Germany.  It proved so successful that it constituted the basis of the development of a 
new larger passport-free area in Europe, namely the Schengen area. The Schengen 
Agreement was thus signed in 1985, followed by its implementing Convention in 
1990, both still outside the EC structures as they existed then. The objective of the 
Schengen group of countries was clearly the abolition of the controls on their internal 
borders and the accomplishment of all necessary compensatory measures. The 
Schengen cooperation, whose principles and even some legal acts still form the basis 
of the present visa regulation in the EU, will be studied in detail below. The 
development of the Schengen area would not have been possible without the 
preparatory work of two further intergovernmental groups, whose work will now be 
briefly summarized. 
 
                                                        
21 Single European Act O.J. 1987, L 169 of 29 June, pp. 25-26. 
22 MELONI, op. cit., p. 48. 
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2.2.1. Ad hoc group on Immigration 
Coming back to the intergovernmental cooperation and coordination that preceded 
Schengen, the first notable group of high level immigration officials from the Member 
States was created as a result of the meeting of the Ministers of Justice and Home 
Affairs in London in October 1986, called the Ad Hoc group on Immigration. The 
main objective of this group was to develop cooperation on immigration policy. The 
group included several working groups on issues that were periodically updated when 
necessary. The initial working groups were on asylum, external frontiers, false 
documents, admission, deportation and information exchange, for example. A 
working group on visas was set up at a later stage. Its terms of reference in the visa 
field included the harmonization of the Member States’ visa policies and the effect of 
such action on improving external controls. However, judging by the activities 
undertaken by the group, harmonization was understood as the development of a 
common visa list for countries whose nationals required visas to enter into the 
territory of all Member States; in essence, the core of any visa policy. 
 
The first attempt (at the intergovernmental level) to evaluate the feasibility of 
harmonizing Member States’ visa policies (and the effect of such action on improving 
external controls) was thus made by this Ad Hoc Group on Immigration.23 The first 
visa list prepared by the group was adopted in 1987 and included a list of 50 countries 
whose nationals were required to have a visa to enter the territory of any of the 
Member States. By 1993, the number of countries on the black visa list grew to 73, a 
white visa list appeared and included 19 states, while a still significant number of 92 
states, on which agreement could not be reached, fell into the grey list and thus 
required visas for only some of the EC Member States.24 However, due to the 
intergovernmental character of the cooperation, the lists agreed, in effect, did not go 
any further than what already existed within the framework of other common travel 
areas. The work done amounted to a simple cumulation of the visa lists of individual 
Member States and the inclusion of states on whose position there was already an 
                                                        
23The Group’s mandate was wider than visa policy and included other immigration issues, such as 
asylum, external frontiers, false documents, admissions, deportations and information exchange. For 
more details see D. PAPADEMETRIOU, Coming together or pulling apart? The European Union’s 
Struggle with Immigration and Asylum, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (Washington 
D.C., 1996), p. 28. 
24 For a detailed historical review, see MELONI, op. cit., p. 50. 
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existing policy with a similar effect. No great effort was put into actively negotiating 
the position of states which, after the cumulating exercise, happened to be on the grey 
list. 
 
Thus the activities of the Group support the view of some authors that “the Group’s 
mandate was defined as the coordination of Member States’ visa regulations (at the 
risk of duplicating similar work being done in the EPC at the behest of Foreign 
Ministers)”.25 Another interesting aspect of the work of the Ad Hoc Group is the 
interplay that becomes evident at the European level between the areas typically 
covered previously by the Ministries of Interior and those covered by the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs. As already argued in Chapter 1 of this study, until the 1980s visa 
policy as a foreign policy tool was a typical prerogative of the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs. Thus if a coordination of the policies of the Member States was necessary in 
this field, it was to be carried by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The work of the Ad 
Hoc Group on Immigration is one more example of how this situation changed so that 
visa policy and especially the coordination of the visa lists became an acceptable field 
of activity of the Ministers of the Interior. 
 
Despite its tasks being the ‘harmonization’ of visa policy, what the Group achieved 
was rather alignment among the various national visa policies.  However, the work of 
the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration marked progress in comparison to the three sub-
regional travel areas (Benelux, the Nordic Union and the UK and Ireland) in at least 
attempting the creation of common lists, even if they did not differ greatly from the 
individual national ones. As we have already seen, the predominant previous practice 
in operating areas without internal frontiers was alignment in combination with 
mutual trust and mutual recognition of the visas issued by other parties. 
 
2.2.2. Group of Coordinators on the Free Movement of Persons 
The Ad Hoc Group and the Trevi group were not the only intergovernmental groups 
active in fields with a bearing on the free movement of persons. As the number of 
various intergovernmental groups in the field grew, a need arose to coordinate their 
                                                        
25 S. NUTTAL, European Political Co-operation, Clarendon Press, (Oxford, 1992), p. 301. 
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activities. For that purpose, the European Council in Rhodes in 1988, created the 
Group of Coordinators on Free Movement of Persons. The Group was composed of 
senior officials from the EC Member States and was supposed to coordinate the 
activities of numerous groups with quite diverse agendas: the Ad Hoc Immigration 
Group; the Trevi Group; the Mutual Assistance Group; the Judicial Cooperation 
Group on European Political Cooperation; and the Horizontal Group on Data 
Processing. The European Commission also took part in the work of the Group of 
Coordinators. The objective of the Group was defined as “coordinating, giving 
impetus to, and unblocking the whole complex of intergovernmental and Community 
work in the field of the free movement of persons”.26 
 
The Group prepared the Free Movement of Persons Report which was adopted by the 
European Council in Madrid in June 1989 and became known as the Palma 
Document.27 
 
Having as its starting point the Community initiative for the elimination of internal 
frontier checks, the Palma Document advocated reinforced checks at the 
Community’s external frontiers and then the abolition of internal borders controls.28 
As was demonstrated earlier, this is only one of the possible approaches to achieving 
an area with a sufficient level of free movement. In the case of the Nordic Passport 
Union, the exact opposite happened in fact; first the movement of persons was 
liberalized and only then the drive to strengthen external frontiers did take shape. 
 
The Palma Document reads more like a working plan than a policy document. In each 
of the two areas of cooperation: strengthening external border controls and abolishing 
the internal one, a list of measures was developed. The measures themselves were 
classified in two groups depending on their perceived importance. Those with high 
                                                        
26 PAPADEMETRIOU, op. cit., p.37. 
27 The report was approved by the Group of Coordinators in Palma de Mallorca and thus became 
known as the Palma Document instead of its official name. The text of the document is included as an 
Annex to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 1988-1989, 
22nd Report, 1992: Border Control of People. 
28 For more details on the Palma Document, see PAPADEMETRIOU, op. cit., p. 37. 
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priority were listed as “essential” and had fixed deadlines, while those considered as 
“desirable” could be implemented whenever possible.29  
 
The part of the Palma document dealing with visa policy classified as “essential” the 
following elements of visa policy: 30 
1. the list of countries whose nationals are required by all Member States to have 
visas to cross their external borders (black list), to be updated every six 
months; 
2. harmonized criteria and conditions for issuing visas and the strengthening of 
diplomatic and consular cooperation; 
3. a common list of undesirable persons and a convention establishing a 
procedure for prior notification in the event of a visa being issued by a 
Member State to a person on such a list.  
 
The elements that were only “desirable” were: 
1. a common visa application form to be created by 1989; 
2. a common “European visa” to be introduced by 1992; and 
3. the computerization of the exchange of information needed in visa processing, 
to be completed by 1991. 
 
2.3. Interim conclusions 
The Schengen Agreement was preceded by a long discussion on to what extent the 
internal market implied the abolition of internal control on persons. This disagreement 
was never settled. In the end the two sides agreed to disagree, and a group of 
continental Member States proceeded outside the EC legal framework. However, their 
success would not have been possible without the work of a number of 
intergovernmental groups, which in previous years had discussed and clarified a 
                                                        
29 Ibid., p. 37. 
30 The other essential elements cited in the report were: harmonization of criteria and procedures for 
granting visas, accompanied by diplomatic and consular cooperation and a common list of inadmissible 
persons and elaboration of a convention for this purpose and procedure for prior notification in the 
event of a visa being issued by a Member State to a person on such a list. The “desirable” components 
were (1) common visa application form to be created by 1989; (2) a common “European visa”, to be 
introduced by 1992; and (3) the computerization of the exchange of information needed in visa 
processing, to be completed by 1991. Palma Document, Annex I, Part V, A and B.  
  125
number of practical and legal issues that were to be fundamental to the functioning of 
the Schengen agreement.  
 
3. Schengen31 
3.1. From Schengen Agreement to Schengen Convention 
It is useful to briefly consider the political context of the time as it influenced both the 
choice of legal measures and the legal developments that occurred subsequently. 
 
ANDERSON32 puts forward the idea that the creation of Schengen was the result of 
several political factors. The economic difficulties in France in the mid-1980s resulted 
in a change of priorities and the search for a valuable and symbolic European project 
to confirm the status of France as a leading power in the EC. Such a project was found 
in the area of frontier controls, an issue which proved to be of high symbolic value. 
This French initiative was met with a positive response by Germany and Benelux, 
which for their part wanted to resume the integration process and inevitably 
considered the European Community a vehicle for gaining higher international 
standing. Moreover, there were strong economic motives for the opening of frontiers 
and public opinion was generally favourable towards such a development. 
 
The Fontainebleau summit in June 198433 initiated a programme called “Europe for 
Citizens” including the suppression of all frontier controls between Member States, 
laying the foundations of the future Single European Act. Despite this move at the 
European level, France and Germany proceeded with their bilateral agreement, the 
                                                        
31 For analysis of the Schengen cooperation see MEIJERS ET AL., Schengen: Internationalisation of 
central chapters of the law on aliens, refugees, privacy, security and the police, Kluwer law and 
taxation, (Deventer, 1991); M. DEN BOER (ed.), The Implementation of Schengen: First the Widening, 
Now the Deepening, European Institute of Public Administration, (Maastricht, 1997); A. PAULY (ed.), 
De Schengen à Maastricht: voie royale et course d’obstacles, European Institute of Public 
Administration, (Maastricht, 1996); R. DEDECKER, “L’asile et la libre circulation des personnes dans 
l’accord de Schengen”, Courrier hebdomadaire n° 1393-1394, (1993), Centre de recherche et 
d’information socio-politiques; J.-S. LOUETTE, “Les Etats du Benelux et la France face aux accords de 
Schengen”, Courrier hebdomadaire n° 1586-1587 (1998), Centre de recherche et d’information socio-
politiques. 
32 M. ANDERSON, “Genèse de Schengen, approche historique des objectifs initiaux et des résultats 
atteints”, paper presented at the seminar “Schengen revisité: 20 années d’expérience”, 9-11 March 
2005, organized by the Luxembourg Presidency of the EU. 
33 Fontainebleau European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, 25 and 26 June 1984. 
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Saarbrücken Agreement of 30 July 1984, for the gradual removal of controls at their 
common border.34 The Benelux countries expressed their interest in also joining the 
initiative, given that there was already a functioning travel area among them. The 
participation of the Benelux countries thus brought in the know-how of their 
experience with their trilateral free travel area.  
 
3.1.1. The Schengen Agreement of 1985  
As a result, the 1985 Agreement signed in Schengen among France, Germany and the 
Benelux countries closely followed the provisions of the Benelux agreement on 
frontier controls, extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters. In form, the 
Schengen Agreement followed the Saarbrücken Agreement. It was a relatively short 
document of 33 articles and envisaged measures in two groups: measures applicable 
in the short-term (Title I) and measures applicable in the long term (Title II). The 
Schengen Agreement states the long-term aspiration to abolish all frontier controls 
and listed the areas in which agreement would be necessary. Article 17 states the 
general objective of “abolishing checks at common borders and transferring them to 
their external borders” and foresees two lines of action necessary to achieve this goal: 
1. Harmonization, where necessary the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions concerning the prohibitions and restrictions on which the checks 
are based; 
2. Compensatory measures to safeguard internal security and prevent illegal 
immigration by nationals of states that are not members of the European 
Community.  
 
Rules on visa were present in both the short-term and the long-term measures. In the 
short-term, the agreement foresaw the approximation of the visa policies of the 
parties, in order to “avoid the adverse consequences in the field of immigration and 
security that may result from easing checks at the common border”. As a long-term 
objective, the harmonization of parties’ visa policies and the conditions for entry to 
                                                        
34 According to some authors the agreement was provoked by a series of protest by truck drivers about 
delays and congestion at the German-French border crossing points, resulting from controls there. See 
PAPADEMETRIOU, op.cit., p.26, DEN BOER AND WALLACE, ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, in WALLACE 
AND WALLACE(eds.), Policy-making in the European Union, (Oxford, 2000), p.498. 
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their territories is mentioned. Moreover, it also foresaw the possibility of the 
harmonization of certain aspects of the law on aliens with regard to nationals of states 
that are not members of the European Community.  
 
However, the purpose of the Schengen Agreement had been to give a political signal 
and it stated only the objectives to be reached. The precise measures by which to 
reach them were not specified; a fact that made the Schengen Implementing 
Convention necessary.  
 
There was a debate about the actual legal content and significance of the Schengen 
Agreement, especially considering the provision of Article 32, which states that the 
agreement shall be signed without being subject to ratification.35 While some authors, 
such as MELONI, considered that the Member States treated the agreement as a 
declaration of intent, others (ANDERSON) considered that the inclusion of the 
Agreement in the list of the Schengen acquis integrated into the Community Law36 by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam is sufficient proof of its legal significance. The second 
argument seems more convincing. 
 
There are different views on the precise reasons for proceeding outside of the 
Community structures. MELONI believes that the decisive factor was the inability to 
reach agreement among all Member States on the removal of internal frontier 
controls. Thus, those Member States that shared such an objective, established 
cooperation between themselves; a cooperation that paralleled the cooperation on 
justice and home affairs among all the Member States.37 Others, like ANDERSON38 add 
to the difficulties arising from the opposition of the UK and the unwillingness of the 
European Commission at the time to discuss the issue of frontier controls separately 
from the 1992 project; the distrust felt then towards the Mediterranean countries39 and 
the difficulty with which international law conventions were negotiated when all 
                                                        
35 Only the Netherlands ratified the agreement nonetheless.  
36 Decision 1999/435, O.J. 1999, L 176/1. 
37  MELONI, op. cit. 
38 ANDERSON, op. cit., p.6. 
39 According to Anderson, op. cit., Schengen Technical Inspections, to later become the Schengen 
Evaluation Team (SCHEVAL) were developed following Italy’s application to join Schengen as a way 
for the partners to check the preparedness of a candidate to meet the requirements of the system. 
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Member States were signatories. One example of these compounded difficulties were 
the negotiations for the draft Convention on the External Frontiers, which started soon 
after the Fontainebleau summit in 1984, but the Convention was never signed.40 These 
two views are not mutually exclusive. There were indeed Member States which did 
not give up their sovereignty in this delicate field. Moreover, the level of mutual trust 
necessary for an agreement to lift internal border controls existed only among a core 
group of Member States.  
 
The various steps necessary to achieve the final objective, as declared in the Schengen 
Agreement, were set out in a Convention implementing the Agreement (hereafter the 
Schengen Convention) of 1990.  It was an elaborate document of 142 articles which 
spelled out the “compensatory” measures at the core of the Schengen space. The need 
for these measures was based on the understanding that if frontier controls between 
Member States were to be abolished, internal security could only be guaranteed by 
greater police and judicial cooperation between these states. The main difficulty arose 
over the fact that such cooperation touched on matters that had previously been solely 
within the sovereign jurisdiction of states.  
 
The five original signatories conducted the negotiations in secret for five years.  This 
slow progress was due to several sensitive points (like the right of hot pursuit across 
the border (even if limited), cross-border police surveillance, and the common visa 
policy and visa lists). The problem with visas was that a common visa policy 
inevitably meant having a common regime towards third countries, which would have 
an impact on important historic, cultural and commercial ties, as well as sensitive 
foreign policy and security issues. The progress of the negotiations was slow until the 
Dutch negotiator, Juliaan Schutte, produced an integrated draft at the 1988 Paris 
meeting of the central negotiating group.41 
 
                                                        
40 The Convention was negotiated for almost ten years and its conclusion failed due to a dispute 
between the UK and Spain on the issue of Gibraltar. Later, the Commission proposed a similar text, as 
an annex to a third pillar Council Decision but for similar reasons the Convention was never signed. 
41 Mentioned by ANDERSON, op.cit., p. 7 
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Ultimately, the Schengen Convention was signed by the five states signatory to the 
original Schengen Agreement on 19 June 1990.42  
 
3.2. The Schengen Convention at a glance 
3.2.1. Overview 
The Convention provided for the methods to be used in achieving the objective 
proclaimed by the Schengen Agreement and in doing so went into more detail 
regarding the compensatory measures, also referred to in the agreement but meant to 
compensate (as the name suggests) the security deficit likely to appear after the 
abolition of internal borders. 
The compensatory measures followed two lines, one – towards the strengthening of 
external borders and the other – towards the strengthening of police and judicial 
cooperation between national authorities.  
 
The final text of the Convention was structured along the lines of the working groups 
that had conducted the negotiations. These included: police and security (including 
sub-groups on illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, firearms, illegal immigration 
and exchange of data), movement of people, transport and movement of goods; there 
was no separate treatment of visas.  
 
Consequently, the Convention was also structured in this way. The part dealing with 
the abolition of checks at internal borders and the movement of persons included the 
entry conditions that aliens had to fulfil to enter the Schengen territory;43 conditions 
for the movement of aliens on the Schengen territory; provisions on the harmonization 
of visa policy and accompanying measures aimed at punishing illegal entry.44 It also 
                                                        
42 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, published in O.J. 2000, L 239. For in depth 
analysis see O’KEEFFE, “The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European Integration?” 
Yearbook of European Law 1991, 11, pp. 185-219. ; SCHUTTE, “Schengen: Its Meaning for the Free 
Movement of Persons in Europe”, 28 CML Review 549, (1991). 
43 Articles 5 and 19-20 Schengen Convention. Text published in the OJ L 239, 22.9.2000 
44 Articles 9-17 and 26-27 Schengen Convention. 
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included rules on the responsibility for assessing asylum applications, which were 
later replaced by the rules of the Dublin convention.45 
 
The part dedicated to police and security46 of the Schengen Convention contained 
rules on: 
 
(1) police cooperation for the purpose of preventing and detecting criminal offences, 
cross-border observation and hot pursuit;47 
(2) mutual assistance in criminal matters, the application of the principle ne bis in 
idem, extradition and the transfer of the execution of criminal judgments;48  
(3) the prevention and punishment of illegal trafficking in drugs;49 and  
(4) the acquisition, possession and trading in firearms and ammunition.50 
 
A specific part in the Convention was dedicated to the Schengen Information System 
(SIS) – a joint database containing information on persons and objects used for the 
purpose of maintaining public order and security.51 The system itself recalls the 
practice of the earlier regional free movement areas (Benelux, the Nordic Union), 
where one of the key elements was also an agreement regarding those individuals 
(here it is also extended to objects) who are considered unacceptable by all parties. 
The obvious concerns related to data protection were answered by both a special 
chapter (Chapter 3) in the Title IV dealing with the SIS, but also with a special Title 
VI, dedicated exclusively to the protection of personal data. 
 
A key factor in its future success was that the implementation of the Schengen 
Convention was entrusted to a specially formed body, called the Executive 
                                                        
45 Articles 3-4, 7-8 and 28-38 Schengen Convention 
46 Title III of the Schengen Convention. 
47 Articles 39-47, Schengen Convention. 
48 Articles 48-69, Schengen Convention. 
49 Articles 70-76, Schengen Convention. 
50 Articles 77-91, Schengen Convention. 
51 Articles 95-100 Schengen Convention, made provision for the kind of data which could be stored in 
the SIS. These include data related to persons wanted for arrest for extradition purposes, aliens to be 
refused entry, witness or parties in a judicial proceeding and persons to be kept under discreet 
surveillance for the purpose of prosecuting criminal offences or preventing threats to public safety. 
Article 101 identifies which national authorities were entitled to access the SIS, and Articles 102-118 
provided for a privacy protection regime.  
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Committee, which included a minister from each country responsible for the 
implementation of the Convention at national level and acting unanimously.52 In order 
to support the work of the Executive Committee a system of working parties 
composed of national experts was also set up in order to prepare the work of the 
Executive Committee. The European Commission was present in an observer capacity 
at all levels of preparation and deliberation of decisions. In essence, the core of the 
Schengen acquis when it was later integrated into the European legal order consisted 
of more than 200 decisions of the Executive Committee, a significant part of which 
was never published due to their “confidential” character.53   
 
3.2.2. First reactions 
The system created by the Schengen Convention raised a number of legal and 
political issues. The main points of criticism included the secrecy involved in the 
implementation of the Schengen rules, which lacked parliamentary control54. Judicial 
control was also missing, both at European and national levels. There was therefore 
no possibility to challenge decisions for refusal to issue visas or refusal to allow 
entry.55 A similar problem arose in the case of the SIS, concerning the possible 
grounds for including an individual in the SIS; an action that was also not 
accompanied by adequate (judicial) remedies in cases of wrongful decision.56  
 
An additional point of criticism concerned the carrier sanctions introduced by the 
Schengen Convention, mainly because of the fear that they could interfere with the 
                                                        
52 Articles 131-133 Schengen Convention. 
53 In a Joint Declaration to the Schengen Convention, the contracting parties undertook an obligation to 
inform their national parliaments for the implementation of the Convention.  However, only the Dutch 
government did so when it asked its parliament for ratification. 
54 See among others, Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and 
Criminal Law, Paper regarding the Rules of Procedure of the executive Committee of Schengen, 
CM93-207, Utrecht, 25.8.93, 12 p.,  
55 This situation changed with the integration of the Schengen acquis into the framework of the 
European Union with the Amsterdam Treaty. See, Case C-503/03 Commission v. Spain [2006] ECR I-
1097 concerning SIS and the EC free movement of persons and their family members, discussed 
below. 
56 See O’KEEFFE (1991), op. cit., pp. 188 and 212. For detailed country reports on judicial protection in 
relation to Schengen see FIDE 2004 Report, cited in Chapter 1. 
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possibility of asylum seekers to escape from countries where they feared 
persecution.57 
 
3.2.3. Schengen in action 
The Schengen Convention entered into force on 25 March 1995 for its founding 
countries – Germany, France and the Benelux countries and also for Spain and 
Portugal, which had meanwhile acceded to the Convention. The implementation of 
the Convention was delayed mainly due to the lack of trust on some important policy 
issues between some of the participating states, such as for example the Dutch drugs 
policy.58 In later cases, the delay in the full participation in Schengen was due to 
national particularities, such as the type of borders that needed to be secured. Such 
was the case of Greece, whose participation in Schengen was operational only ten 
years after the signature of its accession treaty to Schengen in 1992, mainly due to 
problems with securing its maritime border.59 The full participation of Italy was also 
delayed, although the accession treaty to Schengen was signed in 1990, due to French 
concerns over Italy’s ability to properly carry out frontier controls and practical and 
legislative problems.60  
  
By 1995-1996 ten of the twelve European Community member states were party to 
the Convention. When Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995 they expressed an 
interest in taking part in Schengen. But this implied the need to find a way to 
accommodate inclusion into the system of states that were not EC members, if the 
existing Nordic Union were to be preserved.  This implied that together with the three 
Scandinavian states, Iceland and Norway also had to join Schengen. The mechanism 
of doing so together with its legal implications will be studied in the next chapter. 
 
                                                        
57 Carriers’ sanctions were also arguably in breach of Annex 9 to the International Convention on Civil 
Aviation. Carriers’ sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom were later found in breach of Article 6 
and Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR by the Court of Appeal in Roth v. Home Secretary [2002] EWCA 
Civ 158 
58 DEN BOER AND WALLACE, op. cit., p. 498; PAPADEMETRIOU, op. cit.; p. 27. 
59 DEN BOER AND WALLACE, op. cit., p. 498. 
60 The main concerns were linked to absence of national laws on protection of personal data, 
difficulties in establishing the Italian national section of the SIS, and difficulties in adapting Italian 
airport structures. According to NASCIMBENE (1997), referred in MELONI, before its entry into 
Schengen, Italy did not have any comprehensive legislation on asylum and immigration.  
  133
3.2.4. Relationship with EU law 
The Preamble to the Convention stated that the aim of the Contracting parties was to 
achieve the objective of establishing an internal market, as provided in the EC Treaty, 
without prejudice to the measures to be taken to implement the provisions of the EC 
Treaty. O’KEEFFE’s interpretation of this text is that the Convention will apply only 
insofar as it was compatible with Community law, and that once the Member States 
concluded conventions “with a view to completion of an area without internal 
frontiers” its relevant provisions were to be amended or replaced accordingly.61  
 
However, even before the Schengen Convention was ratified, its content was being 
hollowed out by regulation at EC level. The few clauses dealing with the free 
movement of goods were made redundant by the 1992 programme. The part dealing 
with the free movement of persons, including control on persons at the internal border 
was being limited by Community legislation. The 1990 directives on students, retired 
persons and economically inactive persons effectively ended the possibility of 
checking those persons at the internal borders62. Moreover, a 1991 ECJ Judgment 
declared illegal the question put to a community national at the German Dutch border 
about the reason for his journey.63 Thus, what remained as a core of regulation for the 
Schengen convention were the issues linked to checks at external borders, refugees 
and third country nationals, including visa policy and police and judicial cooperation.  
 
                                                        
61 For an in-depth analysis see O’KEEFFE (1991), op. cit., pp. 209-211.  
62 Council Directive on the right of residence for students, 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993, Council 
Directive on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased 
their occupation activity, 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990, Council Directive on the right of residence, 
90/364/EEC, of 28 June 1990.  
63 Case C-68/89 Commission v. Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2637. The Commission brought this action 
against The Netherlands for failure to fulfil obligations, by maintaining in force and by applying 
legislation by virtue of which citizens of a Member State may be required to answer questions put by 
border officials regarding the purpose and duration of their journey and the financial means at their 
disposal before being permitted to enter Dutch territory. The Court held that " nationals of the Member 
States of the Community generally have the right to enter the territory of the other Member States in 
the exercise of the various freedoms recognized by the Treaty and in particular the freedom to provide 
services which, according to now settled case-law, is enjoyed both by providers and by recipients of 
services" (paragraph 10). The Court continues that, the only precondition which Member States may 
impose on the right of entry into their territory of the persons covered by the abovementioned 
directives is the production of a valid identity document or passport (paragraph 11). More generally, 
the obligation to answer questions put by frontier officials cannot be a precondition for the entry of a 
national of one Member State into the territory of another (paragraph 13). 
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3.3. Interpretations of the Schengen rules on visas 
In the logic of the Schengen Convention, visa policy forms part of the compensatory 
measures aimed at increasing security once the internal border controls are lifted. As 
such, the visa rules were part of the measures for the harmonization and strengthening 
of the external border controls. 
 
Several interpretations have been put forward to date in an attempt to extract the 
essence of the visa rules in Schengen. 
 
For example, according to GUILD,64 the Schengen system is based on three main 
principles with regards to the free movement of persons: 
1. Exclusion of security risks. This implies that no third-country national 
should gain access to the territory of the Schengen states (with or without a 
short-stay visa) if he or she might constitute a ‘security risk’ for any one of 
those states; 
2. ‘Mutual recognition’. This principle implies that in general entry across one 
Schengen external border constitutes admission to the whole territory and an 
assumption (not as high as presumption in law) that a short-stay visa issued by 
any participating state will be recognized for entry to the common territory for 
the purpose of admission (there are explicit exceptions justifying refusal 
specifically on security grounds); and 
3. Free movement inside Schengen. This principle implies that once within the 
common territory, the person is entitled (subject again to security exceptions) 
to move within the whole of the territory for three months out of every six 
without further control at the internal borders of the participating states. 
 
The main focus of the system is to ensure that persons who are or might be considered 
unwanted by any participating state are not permitted into the territory. Thus the rules 
focus on who must be excluded and provide little guidance on who should be 
admitted. Because the underlying principle of the system is mutual recognition of 
national decisions rather than harmonization, the search for legal mechanisms to 
                                                        
64 The principles were identified in this form by E. GUILD, Moving the Borders of Europe, Inaugural 
lecture, University of Nijmegen, (Nijmegen, 2001), p. 16. 
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achieve this has unexpected implications. The lifting of border controls between the 
states means that positive decisions on the admission of persons are likely to be 
respected by default – the parties have fewer identity checks when crossing the 
borders. 
 
The principles of the Schengen system are achieved through the deployment of four 
tools: 
 
1. The Schengen Information System (SIS), which allows the competent authorities 
of the mentioned states to acquire information regarding persons and property. The 
implication of having one’s name on the SIS list could range from simply having 
one’s documents scrutinized every time one enters the Schengen zone to a blank 
refusal of a visa. Not all Schengen countries feel obliged to offer a reason for refusing 
to issue a visa and this is a policy area that is still governed by the principle of 
sovereignty of each Schengen state. The persons usually included in the SIS database 
are those who either have a criminal record (even simply defined as a threat to public 
order) or have possibly been subject to a criminal act, for example, persons whose 
documents were stolen while visiting or residing in a Schengen country. The Council 
meeting on 28 and 29 May 2001 confirmed the development of the so-called ‘SIS II’ 
by 2006 as a priority. The second generation of the SIS does indeed bring new 
technical and investigation facilities, such as additional, new identification materials 
for the member states. 
2. A common list of countries whose nationals require visas to come into the 
common territory for short stays (visits up to three months) and a common list of 
those excluded from the requirement – the definitive black and white lists were 
achieved in December 1998. 
3. A common format and set of rules on the issue and meaning of short-stay visas, 
which have been established through Council Regulations. 
4. Carrier sanctions, which have also been established. 
These elements will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
MELONI65 considers that the common visa policy is built on three main elements: 
                                                        
65 See MELONI op. cit., p. 55-57. 
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1. Harmonization of the Member States’ visa requirements. 
2. Introduction of a ‘uniform’ visa – implying mutual recognition of visas issued 
by the Member States for the purposes of external border crossing and free 
circulation. This uniform visa was in turn facilitated by: 
a. Establishment of  common entry conditions for aliens, and 
b. Common rules and procedures to be followed by the Member States 
when issuing visas. 
3. Common instructions for the Member States’ diplomatic and consular posts 
and consular cooperation at local level. 
 
Not far from the view of MELONI is BACH66 according to whom the core issues in the 
negotiations in the field of free movement of persons developed around three main 
pillars: 
1. Harmonization of visa policy for a stay not exceeding three months, to precede 
a common policy in the field of visas; 
2. The common uniform visa; and 
3. Common rules for the procedures and conditions for issuing of visas. 
 
Thus the visa policy developed under the Schengen rules was characterized as 
flexible, as it allowed the individual Member States to retain control over who could 
obtain a visa to enter their territory.  
 
3.3.1. Who can enter – the conditions 
The conditions that an alien should meet in order to be granted access to the Schengen 
territory are enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention. It provided that the Contracting 
Parties would grant entry to aliens who: 
(i) possess a valid travel document; 
(ii) can produce documents justifying the purpose and conditions of 
their visit and proving that they had means of support; 
                                                        
66 B. BACH, “L’evolution de l’Acquis Schengen en matière de visa depuis 20 ans et situation actuelle”, 
presented at the seminar “Schengen revisité: 20 années d’expérience”, 9-11 March 2005, organised by 
the Luxembourgish Presidency of the EU.  
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(iii) are not reported on the SIS as persons to be denied entry; 
(iv) are not considered a threat to public policy, national security or 
international relations of any of the Contracting Parties. 
 
Aliens who do not fulfil all these conditions were to be refused visas unless a 
Contracting Party considered it necessary to derogate from this principle on 
humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or because of international 
obligations, in which case it could issue a visa with limited territorial validity, i.e. 
valid only for its own territory.67 
 
Ultimately, it was in the power of each Schengen state to decide to what extent visa 
applicants were meeting the entry conditions enshrined in Article 5, especially as far 
as the fourth condition is concerned. The entry conditions determined who could enter 
Schengen territory and the uniform visa was considered as a way to ensure 
consistency in the checks prior to the presentation at the border of the foreigner and 
whether those entry conditions were in fact met. At the same time, the Schengen 
states still retained the possibility to grant access into their national territories to aliens 
who did not fulfil the common entry conditions through the issuing of limited 
territorial validity visas (i.e. national visas).68 
 
The fact that this last option was kept open (although it might have undermined the 
security of other members of the area),69 can be explained by several considerations: 
the difference among the states in their recognition of foreign passports; their duty to 
honour their international law obligations regarding validity of travel documents or 
access into the national territory and ultimately by the desire of Member States to 
keep an option which could be important for their individual national interests. 
                                                        
67 Article 16 Schengen Convention.  Chapter 1 shows that today this type of visa accounts for only 
about 2 % of all visas issued by Schengen member countries. It seems to be used mainly by Greece 
because of the dispute over the name of Macedonia (or FYROM). 
68 Under Article 18 the Contracting Parties also retained discretion to issue visas for stays exceeding 
thee months in accordance with their national laws. These, since not granted according to common 
criteria, did not carry the right of free circulation but permitted the holder, provided certain conditions 
were satisfied, to transit visa-free though the Schengen states in order to reach the State which issued 
the visa. 
69 In the absence of internal frontier controls, the territorial limitation of limited territorial validity visas 




3.3.2. Who can enter – visa lists 
The legal basis for the adoption of common rules on visas is Article 9 of the Schengen 
Convention which refers to the adoption of the parties of “common arrangements for 
visas” and to “pursue through a common consent the harmonization of their policies 
on visas”. When there was a common position reached as to the visa status of a 
particular country, the agreed position could be changed only following common 
consent. Still the Schengen states kept a certain possibility to derogate from the 
common rules when “overriding reasons of national policy required an urgent 
decision”. However, in such cases, there was a need for a consultation with the other 
states, taking into account their interest and the consequences that such a decision can 
have on them.   
 
With regards to the harmonization of the lists, MELONI claims that the harmonization 
as foreseen in Schengen was to be total and thus any third country was either to be 
included on a black visa list, whereby its nationals were required to have a visa to 
enter Schengen territory, or on a white list, including those countries which were 
exempt from that requirement.70 She links this claim to the fact that complete 
harmonization was a necessary pre-condition for the abolition of internal frontier 
controls. However, there is no clear legal basis in the text of the Schengen 
Convention. In principle such a system could also function on the basis of mutual 
trust and mutual recognition of the visas issued. The fact that actually the Schengen 
system was operational between 1995 (when the Schengen Convention entered into 
force) and 1998 (when full harmonization of visa lists was achieved) confirms this 
view. 
 
Harmonization of visa requirements towards third countries proved to be a difficult 
issue. Thus in order not to cause unnecessary tensions the Executive Committee 
developed three distinct lists, including: 
1. A white visa list, including all countries whose nationals were exempt from 
visa requirements in all Schengen countries; 
                                                        
70 MELONI, op. cit., p.56. 
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2. A black visa list, including all countries whose nationals were subject to visa 
requirements in all Schengen states; and 
3. A grey list, including countries whose nationals were subject to visa 
requirements in one or more Schengen countries. 
 
The three lists presented are essentially a picture of the visa policy of the different 
Schengen states at the time of entry into force of the Convention.  
 
The process of harmonization of the visa policy was laborious, but it continued until 
16 December 1998, the date on which the Executive Committee decided on the 
abolition of the grey list, almost four years after the entry into force of the Convention 
in March 1995. For this period, the countries could exercise discretion in relations 
with the countries on the grey list and had only the obligation to notify the other 
parties to the Convention of their position.  
 
What criteria were used in the construction of the visa list is difficult to judge, as the 
visa list together with the Common Consular Instructions and the Common Manual 
which contained it were secret until 2003 when they were finally published. Still, the 
contents of the list became available at least for those working in this field with the 
first attempts at the development of a common visa list in the Community framework. 
 
Obviously, the construction of a black list, especially if it is not exhaustive, is easier 
than reaching an agreement on the white list. For the countries for which the positions 
of the Schengen states coincide, there is no problem. The problem with the allocation 
of the rest of the countries can generally be decided by employing two approaches. 
One can either use as a criterion, for example, the presence of a visa-free agreement 
with at least one Schengen state, or when there is doubt and no special external 
relations considerations are in place, put the country on the visa black list. 
 
With the Schengen Convention signed in 1990, by 1992 there was a document on the 
Essential criteria for including countries on joint lists of countries whose nationals 
  140
require visas, adopted by the Ministers and State Secretaries in Madrid on 15 
December 1992.71  
 
Ultimately, the result of the exercise was the development of a very extensive black 
visa list, which contained more than 120 countries, compared with the 79 agreed 
under the Palma Document. 
 
Possibly the criteria used gravitated towards considerations of “immigration and 
security risks”, however the evaluation was strictly national and ultimately, the 
inclusion of a country on the visa black list was decided without taking into account 
the potential negative consequences for the bilateral relations of the EU with the 
countries involved, or the consequences for some member states in terms of creating 
obstacles for cross border contacts or tourism. 
 
As a result, countries with a wider network of international links and of special 
relationships (usually based on their colonial history) experienced most of the 
negative effects of the visa list. With the UK missing from the picture, the two 
countries with the most to lose were Spain and France. Of course, the actual impact 
on the individuals from a black list country depended very much on the nationality 
laws in the countries concerned. As in most cases, the colonial states had a simplified 
procedure of acquiring citizenship for persons coming from the colonies.72 
 
Spain had visa-free access for nationals of the Latin-American countries as part of its 
policy of forging an “Ibero-American Community of Nations”. However this situation 
changed after the participation of the country into Schengen and visas were 
                                                        
71 SCH/M (92) 32 rev. 
72 Consider the UK; where apart from British Citizenship, there are different types of semi-British 
citizenship open to persons from its former colonies. These groups include: British overseas territories 
citizens who do not have the right of abode in the United Kingdom, British overseas citizens, British 
subjects who do not have the right of abode in the United Kingdom and British protected persons. See 
Annex I of Council Regulation No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in 




introduced for Peru and the Dominican Republic (and eventually Colombia and 
Ecuador) due to problems linked to drug-trafficking and illegal immigration.73 
 
In that regard the House of Lords stated in its report on Visas and Control on External 
Borders that the negative impact of the common visa policy should have been an even 
more powerful argument against cumulating national visa restrictions based purely on 
reciprocity or political disapproval.74 
 
The development of a common visa policy was considered necessary in the 
framework of the Schengen cooperation as it was an essential element of the 
strengthening of external border controls which, could guarantee security after the 
abolition of internal border controls.  
 
One of the tools deployed to achieve these three principles was a common list of 
countries whose nationals required visas to come to the common territory for short 
stays (visits of up to three months); and a common list of those excluded from the 
requirement.   
 
Short term visas are regulated by Articles 9 to 16 of the Schengen Convention.75 As 
far as visa lists were concerned, the objective was full harmonization, thus all 
countries in the world would have to be included on either the black or the white lists. 
However, reaching an agreement on this point proved difficult even among the small 
number of Schengen countries.  
 
Although the Schengen countries' ministers already decided at their meeting in 
Madrid in mid-December 1992 to develop: (1) basic criteria for the inclusion of third 
countries in a common list of countries from which persons would need a visa; (2) a 
uniform visa label, non-counterfeitable, for three-month visas; and (3) to start drawing 
                                                        
73 CORNELIUS “Spain: the Uneasy Transition from Labour Exporter to Labour Importer” in W. 
CORNELIUS (ed.), Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective, Stanford University Press, (Stanford, 
1994) p.350; PAPADEMETRIOU, op. cit., p. 93-96. 
74 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-1994), Visas and Control of 
External Borders of the Member States, 14th Report, HL Paper 78, para. 71 and 81 of evidence. 
75 Convention implementing the Schengen agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the 
states of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on 
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders.  
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up a provisional list of some 120 countries and their various positions as to visas, 
which would be harmonized as much as possible with the existing list of the Benelux 
countries, final agreement could not be reached for a long time.76 
 
3.3.3. The uniform visa 
The Schengen Convention also introduced the concept of a uniform visa. According 
to Article 10, the uniform visa was valid for the entire Schengen territory for a 
maximum period of three months. It could be either a visa for a stay or for transit. The 
uniform visa, according to Article 19, also entitled its holder to circulate freely in the 
Schengen territory for the period of the visa’s validity, provided s/he continued to 
fulfil the entry conditions.77  
 
For the issuing of a uniform visa, it was necessary for the alien to fulfil the common 
entry conditions, enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention. Moreover, in terms of 
procedure, the uniform visas were issued according to certain criteria and procedures 
provided by the Convention or by decision of the Executive Committee. 
 
3.3.4. Schengen Information System (SIS) 
The negative condition for granting visa and entry based on Article 5 of the Schengen 
Convention is that a person should not be reported in the SIS as a person to be denied 
entry. Thus the SIS contained a common list of persons (aliens) to be denied entry by 
the Schengen countries. 
 
Article 96 of the Schengen Convention provided for some of the criteria on which 
national decisions to include an alien in the SIS were to be based: 
                                                        
76 In the case of the Netherlands, however, the list was made public in an annex to a report by the 
Dutch Government to the Parliament. See D’OLIVEIRA AND ULRICH, “Expanding external and shrinking 
internal borders: Europe’s defence mechanisms in the area of free movement, immigration and 
asylum”, in O’KEEFFE AND TWOMEY, Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chancery Law, (London, 
1999). 
77 Such a right of free circulation was also guaranteed to aliens in possession of a residence permit 
issued by a Contracting party. Such a permit was valid for crossing of the external borders and free 
circulation for a period of up to three months (Article 21 and 25 of the Schengen Convention). 
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2. Decisions may be based on a threat to public policy or public security or to national 
security, which the presence of an alien in national territory may pose. This situation 
may arise in particular in the case of: 
(a) an alien who has been convicted of an offence carrying a penalty involving a 
deprivation of liberty of at least one year; 
(b) an alien in respect of whom there are serious grounds for believing that s/he has 
committed serious criminal offences, including those referred to in Article 71, or in 
respect of whom there is clear evidence of an intention to commit such offences on 
the territory of a Contracting Party. 
 
3. Decisions may also be based on the fact that the alien has been subject to measures 
involving deportation, refusal of entry or removal which have not been rescinded or 
suspended, including or accompanied by a prohibition on entry or, where applicable, 
a prohibition on residence, based on a failure to comply with national regulations on 
the entry or residence of aliens. 
 
The mere fact of using of the word “may” throughout the article to define who could 
be included in the SIS shows that the intention of the authors was rather to give 
guidance to the national authorities than to fix strict criteria to be valid throughout the 
Schengen space. Thus, ultimately, the decision was based on national considerations 
and on the interpretation in each particular country of terms such as “national 
security” or “public order”. 
 
Many of the possible criteria included in Article 96 were based on facts which could 
have a specific national interpretation (like for example convictions carrying a penalty 
of at least one year’s imprisonment). Thus, unlike the visa lists, the chosen approach 
for the SIS was based on mutual recognition of the Member States’ public policy and 
national security concerns, as well as their legislation with regard to denial of entry. 
Such mutual recognition was again subject to the possibility of derogations based on 
humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or on international obligations, 
which resulted in the issue of limited territorial validity visas.78 
  
The creation of the SIS and especially the chosen tool of mutual recognition had the 
effect that an individual who had a particular problem with a specific country, instead 
of being excluded just from its territory, would now be excluded from all of the 
Schengen states’ territories. Considering the harshness of such a measure, one would 
expect that enough safeguards had been foreseen to avoid cases of incorrect inclusion 
in the SIS. 
                                                        
78 See Article 5(2) Schengen Convention 
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A ‘pure’ mutual recognition approach was however refuted by the national courts of 
some Contracting Parties79 and later by the ECJ, upon integration of the Schengen 
acquis into the framework of the European Union.80 The French Conseil d’Etat ruled 
that it could review the legality of an entry in the SIS made by the authorities of 
another Contracting Party by virtue of Article 111 of the Schengen Convention.81 In 
Forabosco, the Conseil d’Etat ruled that the German authorities had made an error by 
including Forabosco in the SIS on the basis that she had been refused asylum in 
Germany. This was held not to be among the grounds laid down in Article 96 of the 
Schengen Convention. 
 
“In this context, it appeared clear that the exclusion of a central judiciary authority 
entrusted with interpreting the Convention could result in a lack of uniformity of 
                                                        
79 See GUILD, op. cit., p. 27. 
80 Case C-503/03 Commission v. Spain [2006] ECR I-1097, The action by the Commission was 
provoked by the situation of two Algerian nationals, both of whom were married to EU nationals and 
both were refused entry into the Schengen territory and a Shengen visa on the sole grounds that they 
were persons who were the subject of an alert entered into the SIS for the purposes of refusing them 
entry. The Court first confirmed that the right of Member State nationals and their spouses to enter and 
remain on the territory of another Member State is not unconditional. Among the limits laid down or 
authorized by Community law, Article 2 of Directive 64/221 enables Member States to prohibit 
nationals of other Member States or their spouses who are nationals of third countries from entering 
their territory on grounds of public policy or public security (paragraph 43). The Community 
legislature provides for strict limits when Member States rely on such grounds. Thus a Contracting 
State may issue an alert for a national of a third country who is the spouse of a Member State national 
only after establishing that the presence of that person constitutes a genuine, present and sufficiently 
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society within the meaning of Directive 
64/221 (paragraphs 50 to 52). The Court held that Spain failed to fulfil its obligations by refusing entry 
and by refusing to issue a visa for the purpose of entry to third country nationals who were the spouses 
of Member State nationals, on the sole grounds that they were persons for whom alerts were entered in 
the Schengen Information System for the purposes of refusing them entry, without first verifying 
whether the presence of those persons constituted a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. 
81 Forabosco, Case 190384, and Hamassaoui, Case 198344, 9 June 1999 (www.legifrance.gouv.fr). In 
both cases the Conseil d’Etat held that the applicants were entitled to sufficient information regarding 
their entry in the SIS to enable the national judge to review the lawfulness of the entry. The Conseil 
d’Etat based these decisions on Article 111(1) of the Schengen Convention which provided that “any 
person may, in the territory of each Contracting Party, bring before the courts or the authority 
competent under national law an action to correct, delete or obtain information or to obtain 
compensation in connection with an alert involving them”. For an in-depth analysis see GORTAZAR, 
“Abolishing Border Controls: Individual Rights and Common Controls of EU External Borders” in 
GUILD AND HARLOW (eds), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, 
Hart Publishing, (Oxford, 2001), p.138. A similar approach was applied by the Tribunale 
amministrativo regionale del Lazio, sentenza n. 13164/2001 Ghadban (www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it). The Tribunale amministrativo held that the consular authority had a duty to inform 
the visa applicant of the national or other Member States’ dispositions from which his assessment as a 
“security threat” derived and of the specific list on which his name was entered, particularly in view of 
the consequences faced by an individual in case of erroneous inclusion in the SIS. 
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national entry conditions, which could undermine the application of mutual 
recognition and thus the functioning of the whole system.”82 
 
3.3.5. The procedure – common conditions and procedures for issuing visas 
Given the development of a uniform visa, there was also a need for common 
conditions and procedures for issuing it. Certain basic rules were included in the text 
of the Schengen Convention itself. As far as the issuing authorities were concerned, it 
provided that the diplomatic and consular authorities of the Contracting Party of the 
main destination or, where this could not be determined, first entry were to be 
responsible for issuing the uniform visa.83 
 
There were also detailed rules for the affixing of uniform visas on travel documents.84 
Their main objective was to regulate the cases in which there was divergence among 
the Schengen states related to the documents they considered as passports and the 
entities they considered capable of issuing them. Thus in cases when a travel 
document was valid only for one or more (but not all Contracting Parties) only a visa 
with limited territorial validity but not a uniform visa could be issued.   
  
 The Executive Committee was to agree, unanimously, the list of passports and travel 
documents to which a visa could be affixed and the list of countries that were not 
recognized. Such lists were without prejudice to the Member States’ recognition of 
countries and entities.85 
 
The Convention left other criteria and procedures to be determined by the Executive 
Committee at a later stage. The Executive Committee was to specify cases where the 
                                                        
82 See STAPLES, “Adjudicating the External Schengen Border” in GROENENDIJK, GUILD AND 
MINDERHOUD (eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders, Kluwer (The Hague, 2003), pp. 246 and 248. 
83 Article 12 Schengen Convention. The Executive Committee also adopted decisions on the criteria for 
determining the state of main destination and on the rights and obligations between representing and 
represented States in the context of visa issue. See Decisions of the Executive Committee of 14 
December 1993 extending the uniform visa (SCH/Com-ex(93) 21) and of 27 June 1996 on the 
principles for issuing Schengen visas in accordance with Article 30(1)(a) of the Schengen Convention 
(SCH/Com-ex(96) 13 rev 1), OJ 2000 L 239/18 and 180. 
84 Articles 13-14 of the Schengen Convention. 
85 See Article 17. See also the Manual of documents to which a visa may be affixed, and Annex 11 
(criteria for travel documents to which a visa may be affixed) of the CCI 
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issue of a uniform visa was subject to prior consultation of the central authorities of 
the issuing Contracting Party or any other Contracting Party. Further rules to be 
agreed within the Executive Committee included rules on the examination of visa 
application, on the issue of visas at borders, and on the visa-issuing authorities.86 
 
The implementation of these latter rules was entrusted to the consular authorities of 
the Schengen states. And in order to ensure uniformity in implementation some 
common rules were adopted in the form of a Common Consular Instruction (CCI) and 
Common Manual (CM). 
 
The first instrument to ensure uniformity was the Common Consular Instructions 
(CCI).87 The CCI contained the Convention articles and the Executive Committee’s 
decisions on the common conditions and procedures for issuing visas. 
 
The CCI was supposed to be the tool through which the consular authorities could 
implement the principle of mutual recognition of conditions for the issuing of visas 
and at the same time to implement the country concerns with regard to national 
security, public order and international relations. 
 
Thus, the CCI naturally contained the black and white lists, the airport transit black 
list, the list of national documents entitling entry without a visa (such as residence 
permits and cards issued by foreign ministries to members of international 
organizations and foreign diplomats), and the Manual of documents to which a visa 
could be affixed.88 
 
Further, they laid down an obligation for the consular authorities to consult the SIS 
before a uniform visa was issued. They also provided a list of nationalities on which 
the central authorities of one or more Contracting Parties had to be consulted before a 
                                                        
86 Article 17 of the Schengen Convention. 
87 The Common Consular Instructions, as contained in Decision of the Executive Committee of 28 
April 1999 “withdrawal of old versions of the Common Manual and the Common Consular 
Instructions and adoption of new versions” (SCH/Com-ex (99)13), were published in the Official 
Journal after the Schengen acquis was incorporated in to the European Union legal order in May 1999 
by virtue of the Protocol “integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union” 
attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam. For consolidated version of the CCI, see O.J. 2002, C 313/1. 
88 Annexes 1,3 and 4 
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uniform visa was issued. This list, contained in Annex 5, was classified as 
“confidential” and not published.89 
 
The CCI also contained certain rules aimed at improving security generally. Thus, 
they laid down some criteria in relation to the examination of visa applications 
including a requirement for consular authorities to be particularly vigilant in relation 
to ‘risk’ categories (unemployed persons or persons with no regular income) and with 
regard to verification of documents.90 They provided that in the case where a visa 
application was lodged with the consular post in a state which was not the applicant’s 
state of residence and a risk of illegal immigration was observed, the uniform visa 
could be issued only after consultation with the consular mission in the applicant’s 
state of residence or with the central authorities.91 
 
The CCI also laid down requirements with regard to the administrative management 
and organization of the visa sections in diplomatic or consular posts, particularly 
security measures on blank visa storage and measures to ensure that the personnel 
responsible for issuing visas was not exposed to local pressure.92 
 
The second instrument to ensure the uniform implementation of the common visa 
policy allowed for the strengthening of consular cooperation at local level.93 Local 
consular cooperation involved an exchange of information considered important for a 
uniform interpretation of the CCI, to ensure that the interests of all the contracting 
states were known and taken into account, and to prevent visa shopping in general (in 
particular through the exchange of information on the use of false documents, illegal 
immigration routes, clearly ill-founded applications and the identification of bona fide 
applicants). 
 
                                                        
89 For example, following events in East Timor, Portugal requested that Indonesia nationals be issued 
only with limited territorial validity visas (excluding the visa validity for Portugal) or, in case the 
applicant for a visa intended to enter or transit Portugal, its central authority was to be consulted before 
a visa could be issued. See Decision of Executive Committee of 5 May 1995 on common visa policy 
(SCH/Com-ex (95)), OJ 2000 L 239. 
90 Parts III and V of Common Consular Instructions. 
91 See Part II and Annex 5 of Common Consular Instructions. 
92 Part VII of Common Consular Instructions. 
93 See Part VIII of Common Consular Instructions. 
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The practical measures to prevent visa shopping also included the regular exchange of 
information on visas issued and refused, through which consular authorities were 
expected to detect trends and shifts in applications from one Contracting Party to 
another and make the necessary recommendations to their central authorities.94 
Further they included the practice of stamping the passports of visa applicants when 
visa applications were lodged in order to prevent multiple or successive 
applications.95 Moreover, document advisers were from time to time sent to selected 
consular posts in order to assist them with the detection of false documents.96 
 
Arrangements for monitoring the implementation of the CCI constituted a further and 
essential instrument to ensure uniformity.97 
 
Such monitoring was the responsibility of a Standing Committee. This was composed 
of one representative for each contracting party as well as the necessary seconded 
experts (the Commission was also included as an observer). With regard to the 
implementation of the CCI, the standing Committee was in particular to evaluate the 
application of the provisions for prior consultation, consultation of the SIS and 
storage of blank visa stickers. In relation to applicant countries, it was also to assess 
whether the conditions governing the issue of visas corresponded to those of the CCI, 
while, with regard to countries already applying the Convention, it was to make an 
assessment on the issue of limited territorial validity visas (quantity, target groups, 
and grounds for issue). 
 
3.4. Interim conclusions 
The five countries which started the Schengen group did so on an intergovernmental 
basis partially because it proved impossible to reach an agreement with the UK and 
                                                        
94 See Decision of the Executive Committee of 21 April 1998 on the exchange of statistics on issued 
visas (SCH/Com-ex (98)12, O.J. 2000, L 239/173. 
95 See Decision of the Executive Committee of 23 June 1998 on the stamping of passports of visa 
applicants (SCH/Com-ex (98) 21), O.J. 2000, L 239/200. 
96 Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 December 1998 on coordinated deployment of document 
advisers ‘SCH-Com-ex (98) 59 rev), O.J. 2000, L 239/308. 
97 See Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on 
the evaluation and implementation of Schengen (SCH-Com-ex (98) 26 def), O.J. 2000, L 239/138. On 
monitoring implementation see Decision of the Executive Committee of 21 April 1998 on the activities 
of the Task Force (SCH-Com-ex (98) 1 rev 2), O.J. 2000, L 239/191. 
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Denmark on the principle of the abolition of internal controls. Another reason for this 
choice was that they did not trust the remaining member countries. By starting with a 
more restricted group outside the EC framework they were able to set the conditions 
on which the others could later join.   
 
However, the Schengen framework did not represent ‘pure intergovernmentalism’.  Its 
success was not based on the initial Schengen agreement with its broad principles, but 
the Implementing Convention with its detailed provisions and the creation of a 
mechanism (the Executive Committee and the secretariat) which allowed them to take 
literally hundreds of detailed decisions that were necessary to make the visa-free 
travel area work. In this sense Schengen resembled more the framework for 
international trade, which also has an institution (the WTO) with a secretariat to take 
many detailed decisions (albeit only by unanimity) that are necessary to make the 
broad principle of multilateral trade work. 
 
The process towards the full communitarization of visa policy via Maastricht to 




The visa list constitutes the core of every national visa policy. As described in 
Chapter 1 it evolved as the embodiment of the ultimate sovereignty of a state – to 
decide on whom to allow onto its territory and whom not to. While the other elements 
of a visa policy, like the format of a visa, the entry conditions, and the procedures for 
the issuing of a visa are also important, it is the fact that a person is or is not on the 
country visa list that ultimately puts in motion the respective provisions of the 
national visa rules. 
 
The importance of the visa lists is further confirmed by the special national 
sensitivities, which ultimately led to the decision on the inclusion or exclusion of a 
particular country from the list. As was demonstrated earlier, the main determining 
factor was foreign policy, based on the one hand on reciprocity and on the other on 
the particular relationships with the country concerned. Those special relationships 
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can vary greatly depending on the historical and economic background of each 
country. Thus, one could assume that attempting a common visa list could be 
successful in cases when those backgrounds are similar if not identical. 
 
An additional aspect influencing the contents of a visa list (now dominant) is the 
security perception of a danger associated with a particular country. This perception is 
also strictly national and what could be perceived as a threat to national security in 
one country would not necessarily be so in another. The alignment of such security 
concerns can also be considered as an additional challenge to attempted development 
of common visa lists. 
 
Now, once it is established that having common visa lists might be considered 
difficult due to the importance attached to them as an expression of state sovereignty  
and the differences resulting from criteria used both in foreign policy and security, the 
question arises as to whether, despite the difficulties, one should attempt such 
‘commonality’. Or in other words, in the context of the free movement of persons and 
abolition of internal frontiers, is it possible to have a passport union, a common travel 
area or other forms of facilitated travel without effectively developing a common visa 
list? 
 
It is not the passport-free movement of own nationals or residents that poses a 
problem. What is problematic is the notion of which third country nationals should be 
allowed visa-free access to the territory. The problem being that once on the territory, 
even though subject to carrying an identity document in case of a control, there is no 
way of preventing and controlling the movement of the third country national unless 
border controls are imposed. And those controls will inevitably also touch upon the 
citizens and residents group, as all persons would need to undergo a check for the 
simple reason of differentiating the various groups of travellers. 
 
Finding a way around such a problem can be achieved either through mutual 
recognition or through the development of common visa lists of the participating 
states. While, as we discussed above, developing a common list might require special 
diplomatic skills and a long decision-making period before the lists are negotiated and 
then put into practice, the mutual recognition option seems to be the obvious solution. 
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Once a certain level of trust is established among the states involved, either based on 
close economic cooperation or common history, the introduction of the mutual 
recognition of visas seems to be the logical path to follow. 
 
The practice on this issue of the three regional travel areas that existed prior to EU 
involvement in this issue is diverse. In the case of the Common Travel Area between 
the United Kingdom and Ireland,98 the intention was to create an area within which 
people can travel without frontier controls and this is achieved through domestic 
legislation in the UK and a parallel one in the Republic of Ireland. Thus, the visa lists 
of both countries are not harmonized but follow the national priorities of both states. 
The lack of harmonization did not prevent the proper functioning of the area.  
 
The approach chosen by the Nordic Passport Union was different. The initial 
provisions were for time-limited exemptions introduced for the citizens of Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden in 1952. However, at this stage the passport-free 
movement was limited only to the citizens of the countries concerned, and thus there 
was no consideration of possible rules on visa requirements. The consequent 
developments led to an expansion of the rights on nationals and the inclusion of third-
country nationals into the groups of persons allowed to travel directly from one 
Nordic country to another without undergoing passport controls. The 1957 Passport 
Control Agreement which introduced this novelty, as a consequence obliged the 
contracting states to establish passport controls at their external borders according to 
common guidelines. However, in the preparatory work towards this agreement it was 
realized that in order to compensate for the absence of systematic border controls, a 
system of flanking measures should be adopted. One of those measures was identified 
as the setting up of identical visa requirements. Thus, the 1957 Passport Control 
Agreement contains in its preamble the intention of the governments to apply 
identical visa requirements. However, this effect was achieved not through the 
creation of a common list, but through consultations.  
 
However, within the much larger and more diverse Schengen group of states, such a 
level of mutual trust did not exist; a common visa list was thus required. Each country 
                                                        
98 The Common Travel Area comprises the United Kingdom (i.e. England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland), the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland. 
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could defend its particular position and make sure that its interests were protected by 
participating in the drawing up of the common list. Thus, parallel to the discussion on 
lifting internal border controls as a way to achieve the free movement of persons, 
discussion on the possible harmonization of the visa lists among the EC Member 
States started as early as 1986. 
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CHAPTER 4 – NATIONAL CONCERNS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
COOPERATION – LIFE BEFORE SUPRANATIONALISM  
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the conditions under which special 
arrangements were allowed in the intergovernmental period of Schengen cooperation, 
based on national concerns linked to visas. 
 
The founding members of Schengen had designed the Convention in such a way that 
it did not necessarily address the concerns of other countries wishing to join at a later 
stage. As the negotiations on accession to the Convention advanced, it became clear 
that some adjustments to the system would be necessary to accommodate the special 
situations in which some of the countries found themselves. The most striking 
example is that of Denmark. It wanted to join the Schengen group but at the same 
time did not want to abandon the achievements of the Nordic Passport Union. This 
consideration pushed the Schengen countries to seek a solution in the form of 
integrating the remaining Nordic countries one way or another into the Schengen 
cooperation. Similar concerns were raised by Spain and Portugal, both of which 
wanted to maintain previously existing special arrangements with third countries. 
 
This chapter will analyze the accessions to the Schengen Convention that took place 
before the final incorporation of the Schengen acquis into EU Law. It will look at the 
relationship between the ‘insiders’ (Schengen members) and ‘outsiders’ (acceding 
Schengen states) and how this relationship changed to accommodate the special links 
to third countries. 
 
1. Accession to Schengen 
1.1 Basic principles 
As an intergovernmental treaty, the Schengen Convention contains rules allowing the 
accession of third parties. In general, these rules follow the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties as a procedure, but they have limitations as far 
as possible parties to the Convention are concerned.  
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Article 140 of the Schengen Convention regulates the procedure for the accession of 
new parties. The possibility to accede to Schengen is only open to the Member States 
of the European Communities and the accession is subject to ratification by both the 
acceding state and the other parties to the Convention. The agreement enters into 
force only after all ratifications have been completed and the final instrument of 
ratification has been registered with the government of Luxembourg; the depository 
of the Convention. 
 
There had been lengthy discussions as to whether the wording of Article 140 implies 
that only countries that are members of the EU can accede to Schengen. It is clear that 
the initial interpretation was such. That was one of the reasons why, when Denmark 
requested the integration of the remaining members of the Nordic Passport Union into 
Schengen, an innovative solution had to be found for Iceland and Norway in the form 
of a special cooperation agreement.1 
 
Almost immediately following the signature of the Convention on 19 June 1990, there 
was a move towards the expansion of its membership. Until the date of the 
incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the framework of the EU, eight countries 
had followed the prescribed accession procedure and joined the Schengen group. The 
table below shows the dates of signature of the agreements, the dates of entry into 
force of the agreements and the dates of accession to the EU. 
 
Table 4.1. Dates of accession to Schengen and the EU of eight EU Member 
States 
Country Date of signature of 
Accession agreement 
to Schengen 
Year of accession 
to the EU 
Italy 27 November 1990 1957 
Spain 25 June 1991 1986 
Portugal 25 June 1991 1986 
Greece 6 November 1992 1981 
                                                        
1 For further details, see L. BAY LARSEN, “Schengen, the Third Pillar and Nordic Cooperation”, in M. 
DEN BOER (ed.), The Implementation of Schengen, First the Widening, Now the Deepening, European 
Institute of Public Administration, (Maastricht, 1997), pp.17-23. 
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Austria 28 April 1995 1995 
Denmark 19 December 1996 1973 
Finland 19 December 1996 1995 
Sweden 19 December 1996 1995 
 
Source: Own compilation based on the Schengen acquis, O.J. L 239, 22.9.2000. 
 
1.2. Structure of the accession agreements 
All accession agreements have a similar structure: they contain the text of the 
agreement itself and the final act and declaration by the ministers and state secretaries. 
The Accession agreement contains six articles: Article 1 declares the accession to the 
1990 Convention; Articles 2 to 4 specify the national authorities that are competent to 
perform duties within the framework of the Convention, mainly in the field of police 
cooperation. These include the officers allowed to continue a surveillance operation 
across the border of a contracting party (Article 2); the officers allowed to perform 
‘hot pursuit’2 across the border (Article 3), including the statement for bilateral 
negotiations of a procedure to govern the hot pursuit; and the competent ministry in 
the field of extradition (Article 4). The following two articles deal with the legal 
procedures for ratification and entry into force of the agreement, as well as the 
addition of an authentic linguistic version of the Convention in the language of the 
acceding state. It is followed by a final act, also with a standard structure containing a 
number of joint or unilateral declarations on aspects of the agreement. Part one of the 
final act includes the subscription of each acceding party to the joint declaration, 
taking note of the unilateral ones, as well as technical information related to the 
effects and language of the final act.  
 
Part two contains the joint declarations to the agreement. It includes three declarations 
common to all agreements: firstly, it is a joint declaration obliging the parties to the 
                                                        
2 The definition of “hot pursuit” and the conditions under which it is allowed is provided in Article 41 
of the Schengen Convention. This situation arises when officers of one of the contracting parties who 
are pursuing in their country an individual caught in the act of committing or of participating in one of 
the offences referred to in paragraph 4 of the same article (e.g. murder, manslaughter, rape, arson, 
extortion, etc.) are authorised to continue pursuit in the territory of another contracting party without 
the latter’s prior authorisation where, given the particular urgency of the situation, it is not possible to 
notify the competent authorities of the other contracting party by one of the means provided by the 
Schengen Convention prior to the entry into that territory or where these authorities are unable to reach 
the scene in time to take over the pursuit.  
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agreement before its entry into force to inform each other of all circumstances that 
could have a significant bearing on the areas covered by the 1990 Convention (it 
refers to different articles of the accession agreement, depending on the country).  
The second joint declaration is on Article 9(2) of the Convention itself, defining the 
meaning of “common visa arrangements”. The third joint declaration is on data 
protection.  
 
In addition to this “minimum content”, some agreements contain additional joint 
declarations: Greece (joint declaration on ‘hot pursuit’3 and joint declaration on 
Mount Athos4); Denmark (joint declaration on the 1996 Convention on extradition5); 
Finland (also a joint declaration on the 1996 Convention on extradition6 but the 
agreement lacks the declaration on the data protection); Sweden (in a similar situation 
to Finland with a joint declaration on the 1996 Convention on extradition7, but lacking 
one on data protection). 
                                                        
3 The Joint Declaration on Article 41 of 1990 Convention relates to the fact that one of the general 
conditions for carrying out “hot pursuit” is that “pursuit shall be solely over land borders” (Article  41 
(5)(b)). As at the time of its accession to the Schengen Convention, Greece did not have land borders 
with any of the other contracting parties, the Joint Declaration states that “in view of the geographical 
situation of the Hellenic Republic, the provisions of Article 41(5)(b) preclude the application of Article 
41 in relations between the Hellenic Republic and the other contracting parties”. Therefore, Greece did 
not designate authorities within the meaning of Article 41 (7) or make a declaration within the meaning 
of Article 41 (9). 
4 The Joint Declaration concerning Mount Athos recognizes that “the special status granted to Mount 
Athos, as guaranteed by Article 105 of the Hellenic Constitution and the Charter of Mount Athos, is 
justified exclusively on grounds of a spiritual and religious nature, the contracting parties will ensure 
that this status is taken into account in the application and subsequent preparation of the provisions of 
the 1985 Agreement and the 1990 Convention.” 
5 The Joint Declaration on the convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty of the 
European Union relating to extradition states that “the States party to the 1990 Convention confirm that 
Article 5(4) of the convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union 
relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union, signed at Dublin on 27 
September 1996, and their respective declarations annexed to the said convention, shall apply within 
the framework of the 1990 Convention.” The aim of the 1996 Convention relating to extradition 
between the Member States of the European Union was to facilitate extradition between the Member 
States in certain cases. It supplemented the other international agreements such as the European 
Convention on Extradition 1957, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 and 
the European Union Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure 1995. Although the Convention 
has been replaced since 1 January 2004 by the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the 
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [Official Journal L 190 
of 18.7.2002], it can still be applied in the few cases where the European arrest warrant cannot be used. 
But it entered into force between only twelve Member States on 29 June 2005. For further information 
on the Convention see: Acquis of the European Union under Title IV of the TEC and Title VI of the 
TEU, Consolidated versions, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/enlargement/acquis/doc_enlarge_acquis_en.htm  
6 The text of the Joint Declaration is equivalent to the joint declaration in the Danish agreement. 
7 The text of the Joint Declaration is equivalent to the joint declaration in the Danish agreement. 
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The third part of the Final Acts of the Accession Agreements contains the unilateral 
declarations of the parties. These reflect the particular case of each country, regarding 
political organization, judicial structure and social and historical sensitivities.  
 
Table 4.2. Declarations in Parts III of the Final acts of the Accession Agreements to 
the Schengen Convention of eight EU Member States 
Country Declarations 
Italy None 
Spain 1. Declaration on the towns of Ceuta and Melilla 
2. Declaration on the application of the European Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the European 
Convention on Extradition 
3. Declaration on Article 121 of the 1990 Convention 
4. Declaration on the accession agreement of the Portuguese Republic 
to the 1990 Convention. 
Portugal 1. Declaration on Brazilian nationals entering Portugal under the Visa 
Waiver Agreement between Portugal and Brazil of 9 August 1960 
2. Declaration on the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters 
3. Declaration on the Missile Technology Control Regime 
4. Declaration on Article 121 of the 1990 Convention 
5. Declaration on the accession agreement of the Kingdom of Spain to 
the 1990 Convention 
Greece 1. Declaration by the Hellenic Republic on the agreements on the 
accession of the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Portuguese Republic 
2. Declaration by the Hellenic Republic on mutual assistance in 
criminal matters 
3. Declaration on Article 121 of the 1990 Convention 
Austria None 
Denmark 1. Declaration by the Kingdom of Denmark on the agreements on 
the accession of the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of 
Sweden to the 1990 Convention 
Finland 1. Declaration by the Republic of Finland on the agreements on the 
accession of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Sweden 
to the 1990 Convention 
2. Declaration by the government of the Republic of Finland on the 
Ǻland Islands 
Sweden 1. Declaration by the Kingdom of Sweden on the accession 
agreements of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of 
Finland to the 1990  
 
Source: Own compilation based on the Schengen acquis, as published in OJ L 239, 22.9.2000 
 
The table above shows that the unilateral declarations can be divided into several 
distinct groups. A first type, the majority, deals with the recognition of the accession 
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of other states to the 1990 Convention. All final acts have such a declaration with the 
exception of Italy (the first acceding country) and Austria (the first country to join 
after the entry into force of the Convention. The second type of declaration can be 
found only in the agreements signed before 1995 and include the declarations on the 
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Spain, Portugal and 
Greece), taking on the obligation to ratify the Convention in question. The third type 
of declaration, typical of all early accession agreements, is linked to Article 121 of the 
1990 Convention, dealing with exceptions to the obligation of waiving the plant 
health checks and requirements. There is also a declaration on the Missile Technology 
Control Regime on the side of Portugal, taking on the obligation to join this regime at 
the latest on the date of entry into force of the 1990 Convention, in the framework of 
Article 123 of the Convention (rules for exports of strategic industrial products).  
 
Thus, we are left with only three declarations related to certain geographical regions: 
Spain – Ceuta and Melilla, Portugal – Brazil (or Brazilian nationals) and Finland 
(Ǻland Islands);8 two of which will be studied below in some detail.  
 
The case of Finland in fact only refers to the Ǻland islands. When Finland joined the 
European Community in 1995, a separate referendum and the consent of the Ǻland 
Parliament was necessary. However, the consent was granted only after agreement 
was reached on the inclusion of a special Protocol to the Accession Treaty.9 Besides 
confirming the Ǻland Islands’ special status under international law, the Protocol also 
provided for special rules related to the purchase of real estate and the right to conduct 
                                                        
8 The Ǻland Islands are an autonomous, demilitarized, Swedish-speaking region of Finland that consist 
of more than 6500 islands, only 65 of which are inhabited, with a total population of 26,200.8 At the 
beginning of the 20th century, after a series of disputes between Finland, Russia and Sweden relating to 
the status of the islands, the so-called “Ǻland question” was referred to the League of Nations. 
According to a compromise presented by the Council of the League in 1921, Finland was granted 
sovereignty over the Ǻland Islands, accompanied by guarantees to the population for their Swedish 
language, culture, local customs and system of self-governance. In order to guarantee the security of 
Sweden, the League proposed an additional agreement on demilitarization and neutralization. Legally, 
the above decisions were shaped into an Autonomy Act of 1920 (later amended in 1922, 1951 and 
1993).8 According to the Act, foreign affairs are not transferred to the Ǻland Government but remain 
the competence of the Finnish State. However, when Finland enters into agreements, containing 
provisions that relate to areas of competence of the Ǻland Islands, the consent of the Ǻland Parliament 
is necessary, to ensure their validity on the territory of the islands.  
9 Protocol 2 to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic 
of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on 
which the European Union is founded, O.J. 1994, C 241. 
  159
business, as well as stating that the islands should be considered as a third territory 
with respect to indirect taxation: 
 
The Republic of Finland hereby declares that the obligations arising from Article 
2 of Protocol 2 to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic 
of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is found relating to the 
Ǻland Islands shall be complied with when implementing the 1990 Convention. 
 
Article 2 of Protocol 2, mentioned in the text above, grants exception to the rules 
governing the taxation and excise duties, and thus is not directly linked to the visa 
policy and border control aspects of the Schengen Convention, which are the focus of 
the present investigation. Therefore, we may conclude that although the Finnish 
Declaration to the Final Act of the Accession Agreement to the Schengen Convention 
contains an exception linked to a particular part of Finnish territory, it does not 
present a deviation to the general Schengen rules on visa and border controls.  
 
When Finland decided to accede to the Schengen Convention one year after accession 
to the EC there was need for an acknowledgement of the special status of the islands. 
This was achieved through a unilateral declaration of the type analyzed in the 
preceding pages. The exception already granted within the framework of the EC 
Accession Treaties was extended to include the application of the 1990 Convention. 
 
1.3. Interim conclusions  
Eight countries joined the Schengen area during the period from 1990, when the 
Convention was signed, to 1997, when the Schengen acquis was incorporated into the 
EU framework. Their accession agreements follow a similar structure and provide for 
the inclusion of unilateral declarations linked to specific concerns of the acceding 
states. Although some of the declarations address similar problems and thus have an 
almost identical text, there are three cases (Spain, Portugal and Finland) in which they 
are specific to the concerns of the individual countries involved. The analysis of the 
case of Finland showed that although it provides for an exception to the general rules 
linked to a part of the state territory, this was not linked to the visa and border control 
aspects of the Schengen Convention.  
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In contrast to the Finnish case, both the Spanish and the Portuguese declarations have 
a clear reference in their texts to the visa and border controls aspects of Schengen, and 
since they have the potential to provide an interesting example of the flexible 
application of the Schengen rules, they will be the object of a more detailed analysis 
in the next two sections. 
 
Since the beginning of the functioning of the Schengen system there was the 
possibility for its flexible application. This flexibility has two general legal sources. 
One is based on the initial inter-governmental character of the Schengen Agreement, 
which allowed for accession to the agreement based on certain country specific 
conditions embodied in declarations to the final acts. The other possibility for flexible 
application stems from the principles on which the system is built, thus, despite the 
setting up of common rules, the means of their application at national level could be 
used to achieve specific national goals. The mechanism of both these means of 
flexible application will be explored in this thesis. 
 
This chapter studies a set of two cases in which some flexible application rules were 
agreed. Based on the Schengen accession agreements,10 two countries are singled out 
– Portugal and Spain. Both case studies follow a similar structure, starting from the 
historical and geographical background of the case in question, to the legal analysis of 
the respective national rules that implement the flexible arrangement. The 
arrangement is evaluated in the framework of the European rules on entry and visas. 
Finally, some conclusions are offered, also based on the practical application of the 
measure. 
 
Chapter 6 studies one further case of the flexible application of the Schengen rules; 
not based on any intergovernmental treaty, but rather based on exploiting certain areas 
of competence that lie between the European and national spheres.11  
 
                                                        
10 See Schengen acquis, O.J. 2000, L 239.  
11 Chapter 6 concentrates on Greece. Greece has been chosen because it was one of the few Member 
States which, at the date of its accession to Schengen, had (and still has) a significant minority in a 
neighbouring non-EU state with a common land border; a situation resembling the one now faced by 
the majority of the ‘new’ Central and East European states. Thus, its experience in finding appropriate 
national legal measures to facilitate contacts with the minority without going against the Schengen 
rules is an interesting example of the flexible application of the Schengen system. 
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2. The case of Portugal and its special relations with Brazil 
The present section will analyze the unilateral declaration attached to Part III of the 
Final Act of the Accession Agreement of Portugal to the 1990 Schengen Convention. 
Starting from the text of the declaration and its historical and legal background, the 
effects of its application and its ultimate usefulness will be assessed. The question this 
section will address is whether, in the case of Portugal, we can speak of a flexible 
application of the Schengen rules, and if so why it was introduced, the effects of this 
flexibility and the conditions under which these effects were achieved.  
 
2.1. The Declaration 
The first unilateral declaration made by Portugal in Part III of the Final Act of the 
Accession Agreement to the Schengen Convention reads as follows: 
Declaration on Brazilian nationals entering Portugal under the Visa Waiver 
Agreement between Portugal and Brazil of 9 August 1960. 
 
The Government of the Portuguese Republic undertakes to readmit to its territory 
Brazilian nationals who, having entered the territories of the Contracting Parties 
via Portugal under the Visa Waiver Agreement between Portugal and Brazil are 
intercepted in the territories of the Contracting Parties after the period referred to 
in Article 20(1) of the 1990 Convention has expired. 
 
The Government of the Portuguese Republic undertakes to admit Brazilian 
nationals only in so far as they fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 5 of the 
1990 Convention and to take all steps to ensure that their travel documents are 
stamped when they cross the external borders. 
 
At first sight, it might seem that the above text does not provide for an exception to 
the general visa rules established under the Schengen Convention. It only refers to a 
bilateral treaty on visas, but does not mention changes in its validity, whether it will 
continue its legal existence or whether it will be denounced once the common visa 
rules are in force. The text would suggest that, notwithstanding any changes in 
bilateral relations on visas between Portugal and Brazil, it aims to create 
safeguards/guarantees for the remaining Schengen members. Such a move recalls the 
compensatory internal measures foreseen in Schengen itself. As the other Schengen 
members do not have any control over the way the Portuguese visa policy is executed 
in the case of Brazilian nationals, the only means of corrective action they have is to 
require the readmission of those who have entered their territory from Portugal and no 
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longer have the right to stay there. However, the exact significance of the Protocol 
cannot be judged without analysis of its legal background.  
 
2.2. The Visa Waiver Agreement between Portugal and Brazil12 
The agreement mentioned in the Protocol is part of a comprehensive system of 
international cooperation, based initially on Portugal’s colonial past and later on the 
Portuguese language. The Constitution of 197613 states in paragraph 4 of Article 7 on 
International Relations that “Portugal maintains special bonds of friendship and 
cooperation with the Portuguese-speaking countries”. This general declaration is 
further developed in the text of Article 15 on Aliens and Stateless persons, in the part 
dealing with Fundamental Rights and Duties. Article 15 (3) states that:  
Citizens of Portuguese-speaking countries may, by international convention and 
subject to reciprocity, be granted rights not otherwise conferred to aliens, except 
the right of access to membership of the organs of supreme authority and the 
organs of self-government of the autonomous regions, service in the armed 
forces, and access to the diplomatic service.  
 
The two underlying themes of the constitutional texts, that of the “special bonds” and 
the “equality” of citizens of Portugal and other Portuguese-speaking countries, can be 
found in earlier legal acts and bilateral agreements. Generally, similar types of 
agreement are signed with all of the countries belonging to the Community of 
Portuguese-speaking countries (CPLP),14 but since it only made a declaration 
referring to the agreement with Brazil when Portugal joined Schengen, the analysis 
will concentrate only on Brazilian-Portuguese relations.  
 
Even before 1976, there was a notable tradition of bilateral agreements between 
Brazil and Portugal.15 The Treaty of Friendship and Consultation of 1953 states that 
each of the two states agreed to allow the establishment of residence on its territory by 
nationals of the other party. More importantly, in the field of ‘equality of treatment’ a 
                                                        
12 Acordo de Supressao de Vistos de 9 Agosto 1960 [Agreement on Abolition of Visas, 9 August 
1960]. 
13 Adopted on 2 April 1976, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/po00000_.html.  
14 Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP). Member States include Angola, Brazil, Cabo 
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tome e Principe and Timor. For more information 
on the status and the activities of the organization, see www.cplp.org  
15 For a more detailed account see: CARDOSA CLAUDIA, “Uma nova era na cooperaçaõ entre Portugal e 
Brasil”, (2000), available at http://portugalbrasil.sapo.pt. 
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special convention was signed in 1971; the Convention on the Equality of Rights and 
Duties of Brazilians and Portuguese. Its Article 1 states that: “The Portuguese in 
Brazil and the Brazilians in Portugal will enjoy equality of rights and respective 
duties as those guaranteed to the nationals of the respective country”. The 
implementation of the convention was further elaborated through a national law16 in 
1972. However, the latest addition to the system of bilateral agreements is the Treaty 
on Friendship, Cooperation and Consultation of the year 2000.17 Apart from providing 
a comprehensive overview of the variety of agreements already in place between the 
two countries, whose provisions the new Treaty incorporates, it is a perfect 
demonstration of the depth of economic and social ties between the two states. The 
new Treaty includes provisions for economic and cultural cooperation, through the 
creation of special consultative bodies to provisions dealing with the protection of the 
environment, social security, judicial and public services cooperation18. More 
importantly for the purposes of the present study, the Status of Equality is again 
confirmed, and those who benefit from it can receive identity documents of equal 
status to those of the respective nationals, mentioning the nationality of the holder 
with a reference to the Treaty of 200019. Moreover, the Treaty has as one of its 
objectives the adoption of a new regime for the entry and residence of the Portuguese 
in Brazil and the Brazilians in Portugal20. 
 
Looking at the scope of the bilateral cooperation between Brazil and Portugal, it is 
without doubt that the intention of both parties was to go beyond the standard 
‘cooperation agreement’ and in reality place their respective citizens on an equal 
footing. Some Portuguese scholars21 evaluate the Treaty as the instrument that 
embodies the accumulated cultural and economic potential over five centuries. Such 
sentiments help explain the insistence of Portugal when acceding to Schengen to keep 
                                                        
16 Decreto-lei n° 126/72 que establece o regime de execução de Convenção sobre Igualidade. 
17 Tratado de Amizade, Cooperação e Consulta entre o Brasil e Portugal, available at: 
http://www2.mre.gov.br/dai/b_port_139_3927.htm  
18 See for example Title III on cultural cooperation, science and technology, Title IV on economic and 
financial cooperation and Title V on cooperation in other areas, among which environment and 
planning, social security, health and justice. 
19 Articles 12 to 22 of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Consultation 
20 Articles 6 to 11 of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Consultation 
21 See, CARDOSA CLAUDIA, “Uma nova era na cooperaçaõ entre Portugal e Brasil”, (2000), available at 
http://portugalbrasil.sapo.pt  
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the special regime of Brazilian nationals with regard to visas and entry, even if that 
meant taking on additional obligations. 
 
2.3. Visas 
Looking specifically at the agreements between Portugal and Brazil in matters of 
visas, it is clear that in this particular field there are a number of agreements over the 
years, starting in the 1950s, which have evolved but kept to the same basic 
philosophy. The two basic agreements preceding the accession to Schengen are: the 
Agreement between the United States of Brazil and Portugal on the waiving of visas 
and the special diplomatic passports of 195122 and the Agreement on Visas and 
Common Passport between Brazil and Portugal of 1960.23  
 
The 1960 Agreement, which is the one mentioned in the Protocol, has two main 
principles that deviate from the general Schengen rules. Firstly, it provides for visa-
free access to the Portuguese territory to all Brazilians for a stay of up to six months 
(while the Schengen short-stay visa allows a stay of only up to 90 days). Secondly, 
access to the territory is granted upon presentation of a Brazilian passport, with no 
need to meet any further requirements (unlike the extensive list to be found in Article 
5 of the Schengen Convention). Considering these substantial differences between the 
Portuguese national regime and the common Schengen one, it is not surprising that 
the other parties to the Schengen Convention insisted on the creation of a 
compensatory mechanism. This was the background to the text of the Declaration to 
the Final Act of the Portuguese Action to Schengen. 
 
2.4.  Legal analysis of the Declaration 
Before discussing the legal characteristics of the declaration, it is necessary to 
mention that at the time of drafting of declaration (1991) none of the Schengen tools 
                                                        
22 Acordo entre os Estados Unidos do Brasil e Portugal para supressão de Vistos e passaportes 
diplomáticos especiais, celebrado em Lisboa, a 15 de Octubro de 1951, por troca de notas. [Agreement 
between the United States of Brazil and Portugal on abolition of visas for diplomatic and special 
passports, signed in Lisbon on 15 October 1951, by exchange of letters]. 
23 Acordo sobre vistos e passaportes comuns entre o Brasil e Portugal, concluído em Lisboa, por troca 
de notas, a 9 de Agosto de 1960. [Agreement on common visa and passports between Brazil and 
Portugal, concluded in Lisbon, by exchange of notes on 9 August 1960]. 
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on which the whole system is based today was in place. There was no common visa 
list, nor any common border control standards and the Convention itself entered into 
force only in 1995. The Declaration is unilateral and thus only Portugal takes on 
obligations while no apparent rights are derived. However, as was demonstrated 
above, the objective of Portugal was to maintain its special visa regime with Brazil. In 
order to be able to do so, Portugal agreed to readmit Brazilian nationals who entered 
the territories of the other contracting parties through Portugal and were intercepted 
after the period referred to in Article 20(1) of the 1990 Convention (the above 
mentioned 90 days after the first entry in the Schengen territory). As can be seen, the 
text contains a clear readmission clause, however, unlike the classic readmission 
agreements where each country, based on the reciprocity principle, undertakes to 
readmit its own nationals; here is a unilateral act that carries no obligations for the 
parties benefiting from the readmission. At first sight this seems to place Portugal in a 
more disadvantaged position (relative to other Schengen states). However, as will 
become clearer below the obligations for Portugal were in reality quite narrowly 
limited. 
 
(i) Conditions for setting the clause in motion 
The Declaration foresees three conditions that need to be met in order for Portugal to 
readmit Brazilians onto its territory. They 
 
(a) need to have entered the territories of the other contracting parties, via 
Portugal and under the Visa Waiver Agreement with Brazil; 
(b) need to have been intercepted on the territories of the other contracting parties 
after the expiry of 90 days following the first date of entry as allowed under 
Schengen; 
(c) need to meet the conditions of Article 5 of the 1990 Convention, namely the 
general conditions for granting access to the Schengen territory. These 
include: possession of a valid travel document, possession of a valid visa, if 
required, documents justifying the purpose, conditions and means of 
subsistence, and two negative conditions: not to be on the list of Schengen 
alerts and not to be considered a threat to public policy, national security or 
international relations.  
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Of all the conditions described above, the most questionable is the first one. It leaves 
the question of proof unanswered. It is not clear, for example, once a Brazilian is 
intercepted, how exactly it can be determined that s/he has entered the territory of 
another Schengen state via Portugal (unless we assume that the passport was stamped, 
something for which Portugal also took on an obligation in the second paragraph of 
the Declaration, but which it is not required to do under the Visa Waiver Agreement).  
 
The situation becomes even more complicated after the entry into force of the 
Convention, which also puts into effect the provisions of the Declaration (1995). 
From that moment, Brazilian nationals who had initially been included on the ‘grey’ 
visa list would have the possibility to enter the Schengen area through Portugal, not 
on the basis of the bilateral treaty, but the Schengen Convention. With this, it is 
virtually impossible to determine whether the first condition of the readmission clause 
is met in any specific case. In reality, the provisions must be interpreted as a general 
obligation to accept all Brazilian nationals intercepted after the allowed 90 day period 
in a country other than that of their first entry (in this case Portugal), regardless of the 
exact grounds on which entry was allowed. Moreover, once the common visa system 
became operational, Brazilian nationals also had the possibility to enter without visas 
and directly onto the territories of the majority of the Schengen states which makes 
the special regime less relevant now. 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding this situation, it is interesting to see whether any 
additional acts were adopted in the Schengen framework clarifying the procedure and 
the means of proof for the application of the provisions of the Declaration. Up until 
the integration of the Schengen acquis into the Treaties, there is only one Decision of 
the Executive Committee,24 dealing with the means of proof in the context of 
readmission agreements between Member States. No reference is made to the 
Portuguese case in the Decision, however; instead there is a reference to Article 23(4) 
of the Schengen Convention which regulates general readmission rules. Such a lack of 
procedural clarification can be explained in several ways. Firstly, it might be assumed 
that it was left to bilateral negotiations between Portugal and the states with a vested 
                                                        
24 Decision of the Executive Committee of 15 December 1997 on the guiding principles for means of 
proof and indicative evidence within the framework of readmission agreements between Schengen 
States (SCH/Com-ex (97) 39 rev). 
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interest in the functioning of the provisions. However, considering the existence of 
Schengen as a multilateral platform of negotiations, it is difficult to see the logic of 
such a decision. Secondly, one can assume that the Declaration was included simply 
for political purposes and as no party has actually envisaged its implementation, no 
further rules have been adopted. This view can be supported by the general feeling of 
mistrust regarding the Declaration. The fact that such a Declaration is necessary at all 
shows that the initial Schengen states did not sufficiently trust Portugal in the 
implementation of the Schengen rules, especially in the case of Brazil. However, this 
interpretation of the Declaration is not compatible with the fact that it was integrated 
with the Schengen acquis into the Treaties. When the Schengen acquis was 
incorporated into the Treaties, many parts of the original Schengen acquis considered 
to have lost their significance (or were incorporated in other legal acts), were left out. 
So, if it had been of purely political importance, the Declaration would have been left 
out. However, this was not the case. Although all remaining Declarations of Part III of 
the Final Act were dropped,25 the Declaration on Brazil was given a proper legal basis 
– Article 62(3) EC.26 Thus, the conclusion can be reached that the intention in the 
drafting of the Declaration was more than political. This leads to the conclusion that 
the Declaration must be considered equal to a (unilateral) readmission obligation 
(rather than an agreement with obligations for all the countries involved).  
 
This interpretation could explain both the lack of reference to Portugal in the 
Executive Committee decision on the means of proof in readmission cases, and the 
lack of any other implementing document, either bilateral or multilateral. Thus, the 
Declaration in Part III of the Final Act on Portuguese Accession to Schengen can be 
considered as a specific form of readmission agreement between Portugal and the 
other Schengen States. 
 
(ii) Limitations 
The above interpretation can also be supported by the lack of any limitation on the 
application of the Declaration clause. One would expect that if the major concern of 
                                                        
25 For the full list, see Table 4.2 in Section 1. 
26 Council Decision of 20 May 1999 determining, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union, the legal basis for 
each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the Schengen acquis , O.J. 1999, L 176/22, p.17. 
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the Schengen partners was the possible influx of Brazilian nationals to Schengen 
territory through Portugal, once the common visa list and common border check rules 
were in place, there would not be any need for additional guarantees on the side of 
Portugal. At that time, Brazilian nationals could enter the entire Schengen territory 
visa-free, not just Portugal. Apparently the need for this guarantee persisted, however, 
and the Declaration continues to be valid as it does not have any temporary 
limitations, or limitations linked to the adoption of a common visa list. Thus the 
provisions of the Declaration remained in force (as we have seen above), even when 
Portugal signed a new Agreement with Brazil in 1996 related to the issuing of visas,27 
which limited the allowed duration of stay with visa-free access to 90 days and 
introduced Schengen-compatible border checks, thus causing temporary problems in 
the bilateral relations with Brazil.  
 
Such a development shows once again that the driving force behind the adoption and 
subsequent guarding of the Declaration was the irreconcilable difference between the 
will of Portugal to be faithful to its tradition of socio-economic links with Brazil and 
the fears of the other Schengen states. Whether those fears materialized and what the 
real impact was of the Declaration will be discussed below. 
 
(iii) The numbers 
Four types of data should facilitate our analysis here. Firstly, the actual link between 
Brazil and Portugal will be evaluated through the number of Brazilian visitors to 
Portugal. Then the actual number of readmissions will be considered and finally, 
looking at the number of legally residing Brazilians and the regularization figures for 
Portugal and other Schengen states, the importance of the Brazilian illegal immigrants 
will be assessed.  
 
Brazil is a huge country with a growing population of over 100 million and a low 
GDP per capita, (comparable to some of the new Member States from Eastern 
Europe).  In the mid 1990s Brazil’s GDP per capita was much lower (less than one 
half) than that of Portugal, which at the time was, together with Greece, the poorest 
                                                        
27 Acordo Cooperação entre o Governo de República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República 
portuguesa relativo à isenção de vistos, celebrado em Brasílía, a de 15 de Abril de 1996. [Cooperation 
Agreement between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the 
Portuguese Republic concerning the exemption of visas, signed in Brazil, 15 April 1996]. 
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Member State.  Brazil was thus then seen as a potentially large source of migrant 
workers. However, it seems that Brazil’s geographical isolation from Europe puts 
certain economic barriers in the way of potential immigrants to Europe. The number 
of visitors from Brazil to Portugal has remained indeed constant over the years.28 
 

































Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatistíca Portugal. 
 
As can be seen, the entry into force of the Schengen Convention (1995) had almost no 
impact on the number of visitors. In the first years of application the numbers fell 
slightly, but in the following years they returned to normal levels. Moreover, if 
compared to the number of visitors from other countries, Brazilian figures are lower. 
Thanks to its military base on the Azores, the United States sends almost twice as 
many visitors to Portugal, for example. 
 
If we look now at the readmission figures from the other Schengen states, it is obvious 
that they are negligible.  
 
                                                        
28 More recently, Brazil seems to have a more dynamic economy and be catching up with Portugal, but 
this was difficult to foresee in the mid-1990s.  The renewed dynamism of the Brazilian economy might 
also be one factor which lead to a reverse situation after 2004 enlargement of the EU when several of 
the new EU Member States found themselves facing visa requirements for Brazil. This lead to the 
negotiations of a EC-Brazil visa waiver agreement (see for further details Chapter 9). 
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Source: Serviço de Extrangeiros e Fronteiras. 
 
The two most significant countries returning third country nationals are France and 
Spain, and even there the numbers of Brazilians are sometimes lower than other 
nationalities (e.g. Eastern European). Thus the feared influx of Brazilians to the other 
Schengen countries through Portugal did not materialize. Although the fears were 
strongest in France29 it has extremely low numbers of returned Brazilians. Of course, 
in order for a readmission to take effect, it is first necessary to intercept the illegal 
immigrants and therefore the readmission figures are not an absolute indication of the 
number of illegal immigrants from a certain nationality. 
 
We therefore need to look at the regularization figures to find an indication of 
potential immigrant numbers. If we compare the regularization data for all Schengen 
states in the latest three regularization campaigns and the first five nationalities by 
number, it is clear that the only country with a significant Brazilian population is 
Portugal.  
 
                                                        
29 France was the country that continued to require visas for Brazilian nationals until 1998, which put 
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Source: Serviço de Extrangeiros e Fronteiras. 
 
If we look at the data on regularizations30 from the OECD, it can also be observed that 
the only country in which Brazilians formed a significant group of regularized 
migrants was Portugal. Neither France, nor Spain – the two main Schengen countries 
engaged in readmissions – had numbers indicating any significance of the Brazilian 
population on their territory.  
                                                        
30 “Trends in International Migration: SOPEMI 2004 edition”, OECD, (2005), p. 100. 
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Table 4.3. Immigrant regularization programmes in Portugal 
(1992-1993) (1996) (2001) 
Angola  Angola 6.9 Ukraine 63.5 
Guinea-Bissau  6.9 Cape Verde 5.0 Brazil 36.6 
Cape Verde 6.8 Guinea-Bissau 4.0 Moldova 12.3 
Brazil 5.3 Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1.2 Romania 10.7 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1.4 Brazil 2.0 Cape Verde 8.3 
Senegal 1.4   Angola 8.1 
Other 4.8 Other 3.7 Other 39.8 
Total 39.2 Total 21.8 Total 179.2 
 
Source: OECD; part of Table I.19 Main regularization programmes of immigrants in an 
irregular situation in selected OECD countries, by nationality. 
 
Moreover, even in Portugal, the Brazilians have recently been overtaken in number by 
Ukrainians. 
 
2.5. Interim conclusions 
This section has shown the flexible application of some Schengen rules in the case of 
Portugal. The preconditions of such an application are the following: 
1. The bilateral visa-waiver agreement – based on close historical, economic 
and social ties between the two countries involved and in force at the time of 
accession to Schengen. 
2. The specificity of the third country – since the country subject to this 
agreement has a large population but is geographically isolated from its 
counterpart; economic considerations can influence the number of persons 
benefiting from the special regime. 
3. A lack of trust among Schengen partners – combined with the fear of a 
possible influx of immigrants due to the liberal provisions of the agreement. 
 
Having all these conditions in place and aiming to maintain its special links with 
Brazil, Portugal made additional concessions. The flexible application of the 
Schengen rules was therefore only possible following agreement on the compensatory 
measures – in the form of a readmission obligation.  
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However, it seems that this readmission clause (a unilateral obligation), while legally 
binding, was needed mainly to reassure other Member States that they would not be 
swamped by immigrants from Brazil. In reality, despite the easy access to Portuguese 
territory, there was no surge in the numbers of Brazilian nationals entering other 
Schengen states, as was feared. Instead, it had only a limited impact on the territory of 
the Schengen states.  
 
We can therefore conclude that in the case of bilateral visa waiver agreements, it is 
possible to maintain their application after accession to Schengen, when 
compensatory measures are offered to the other Schengen partners.  
 
3. The case of Spain and Ceuta and Melilla 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, there are only two countries31 – 
Portugal and Spain, which have included in their agreements on accession to 
Schengen,32 a special declaration meant to maintain an already existing bilateral 
regime, or to somehow integrate it into the newly established Schengen system. 
 
3.1. The Declaration 
In the case of Spain, the declaration in question deals with two Spanish enclaves33 in 
Morocco – the towns of Ceuta and Melilla. The “Declaration on the Towns of Ceuta 
and Melilla” sets out the main elements and the practical construction through which 
the provisions will be applied. The starting point is the exception already granted to 
the two towns through the Protocol No 2 of the Act of Accession of Spain to the 
                                                        
31 If we exclude the case of the Ǻland islands, which is not relevant for this study.  
32 Spain’s agreement on accession to the Schengen Convention was signed on 25 June 1991.  
33 The two towns are usually referred to as enclaves, defined as “a portion of territory surrounded by a 
larger territory whose inhabitants are culturally or ethnically distinct”. The cultural and ethnic 
distinctiveness of the towns in comparison to the surrounding territory can be questioned. Thus, the 
more precise term to be used would be the term “exclaves”, defined as “a portion of territory of one 
state completely surrounded by territory of another or others”.  As can be seen, exclave refers to an 
objective distinction linked to state borders and division of territories, while enclave is linked rather to 
the subjective evaluation of the similarity or distinctiveness of the cultural and ethnic structure of the 
territory. Moreover, the very choice of the term used can have a political significance, as it can 
strengthen a view linked to the distinctiveness of a territory.  
However, for the time being Ceuta and Melilla are referred to in the literature as enclaves, so this term 
will also be used here. 
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European Communities,34 which provided for controls on the goods and travellers 
entering the customs territory of the European Economic Community from the two 
towns.35 Based on the Declaration, Spain is allowed to maintain a special regime as 
regards the movement of persons between, on one side, the towns of Ceuta and 
Melilla and the surrounding Moroccan provinces and on the other between the two 
towns of Ceuta and Melilla and mainland Spain. The arrangement is based on the 
maintenance of two elements: 
 
(1) the specific arrangements for visa exemptions for local border traffic between 
Ceuta and Melilla and the Moroccan provinces of Tetuan and Nador continue 
to apply; and 
(2) Moroccan nationals who are not resident in the provinces of Tetuan or Nador 
and who wish to enter the territory of the towns of Ceuta and Melilla remain 
exclusively subject to visa requirements. The validity of these visas shall be 
limited to these two towns and may permit multiple entries and exits (visado 
limitado multiple) in accordance with the provisions of Article 10(3) and 
Article 11(1)(a) of the 1990 Convention.36 
 
In order to ensure the interests of the other signatories to the 1990 Convention, there 
are two guarantees foreseen as far as border controls are concerned.37  
 
First, Spain agreed to maintain checks (on identity and documents) on sea and air 
connections departing from Ceuta and Melilla and having as their destination any 
other place on the Spanish territory.38 These checks are performed according to the 
national law and with the objective to verify whether the passengers satisfy the 
conditions laid down in Article 5 of the 1990 Convention, on the basis of which they 
                                                        
34 For a recent legal analysis of the status of the two enclaves in the European Union, see 
BERRAMDANE, “Le statut des enclaves espagnoles de Ceuta et Melilla dans l’Union européenne”, 
Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne, 2/2008, (2008), p. 237. 
35 Paragraph (a) of Declaration 1 of Part III of the Final Act of the Agreement on the Accession of the 
Kingdom of Spain to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, The Schengen acquis - 
Agreement on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain to the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their 
common borders signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990, to which the Italian Republic acceded by the 
Agreement signed at Paris on 27 November 1990, O.J. 2000, L 239, p. 69–75. 
36 Paragraphs (b) and (c), Declaration 1 of Part III of the Final Act of the Agreement on the Accession 
of the Kingdom of Spain to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, op. cit. 
37 Paragraph (d), Declaration 1 of Part III of the Final Act of the Agreement on the Accession of the 
Kingdom of Spain to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, op. cit., contains general 
statement for the considerations for the interests of the other contracting parties. 
38 Paragraph (e), Declaration 1 of Part III of the Final Act of the Agreement on the Accession of the 
Kingdom of Spain to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, op. cit. 
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were authorized to enter national territory upon passport control at the external 
border.  
 
Secondly, apart from the travel directed to the Spanish territory, Spain undertakes to 
maintain checks on internal flights and on regular ferry connections departing from 
the towns of Ceuta and Melilla to a destination in another state party to the 
Convention. 
 
Spain was thus allowed to maintain the special regime already in place between its 
enclaves and the surrounding Moroccan territory, while at the same time isolating the 
enclaves from the rest of the Schengen territory by maintaining border controls both 
on the traffic directed to Spain as well as that going to other Member States.  
 
We shall now study in detail these special provisions by looking at the historical and 
geographic background that justified them, the way in which they have been 
implemented at national level, the way they interact with the respective European 
rules and, finally, we will draw some conclusions based on the practice of their 
implementation.  
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3.2. Geographic and historical background39 
 
 
Despite the fact that, due to the special arrangements to which the two towns are 
subject, Ceuta and Melilla are often mentioned together, they are located more than 
300 km apart on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa and border the territory of 
Morocco. The two towns also represent the only two remaining European territories 
in mainland Africa.  
 
Ceuta is located on the southern coast of the Straits of Gibraltar, only 12 miles away 
from mainland Spain, and borders Morocco and its Tetuan province in particular. It 
has a territory of approximately 28 km² and population of about 75.000 (2005 est.). 
Due to its strategic location the town has a dynamic history but was ultimately 
included in the Spanish kingdom following the Treaty of Lisbon of 1 January 1668, 
                                                        
39 For a comprehensive study of the two enclaves in English, see P. GOLD, Europe or Africa? A 
contemporary study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, Liverpool University 
Press, (Liverpool, 2000). 
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through which the Portuguese King Afonso VI formally ceded Ceuta to King Carlos 
II of Spain. 
 
Administratively, until 1995 Ceuta belonged to the autonomous region of Andalucia 
and more precisely to the Cadiz province. Following a reform in 1995, Ceuta, together 
with Melilla, are the only two autonomous cities in Spain. Following the accession of 
Spain to the European Union, Ceuta is considered part of the territory of the European 
Union; however it is subject to special rules as far as customs are concerned.  
 
Melilla is also located on the North African Mediterranean coast around 300 km east 
of Ceuta and borders the Moroccan province of Nador. It has a territory of 20 km² and 
a population of about 65.000 (2005 est.). It was conquered by Spain in 1497 and the 
limits of the Spanish territory around the fortress were fixed by Treaties with 
Morocco in 1859, 1860, 1861 and 1894. These treaties were result of several wars 
fought over the shrinking Spanish presence in Morocco.  
 
Until 1995, Melilla was administratively part of the autonomous region of Andalucia 
and more precisely of the province of Malaga. Like Ceuta, since 1995 Melilla is an 
autonomous city and also forms part of the territory of the European Union, while 
keeping certain special rules in place, especially as far as the customs rules are 
concerned. Thanks to the special rules on border traffic, about 36,000 Moroccans 
enter the city daily to work, shop or sell goods.   
 
After Spain joined the European Union in 1986, the territorial dispute regarding the 
status of Ceuta and Melilla persisted and was repeatedly discussed on a bilateral level 
between Spain and Morocco.40 Meanwhile, the borders between the enclaves and 
Morocco became of EU concern and their management acquired an EU dimension.  
 
                                                        
40 For the dynamics of the relationship see for example: GONZÁLEZ CAMPOS, “Las pretensions de 
Marruecos sobre los territorios españoles en el Norte de África (1956-2002)”, Real Instituto Elcano, 
DT No 15/2004, 16 April 2004, [The claims of Morocco on the Spanish territories in North Africa 
(1956-2002], and TORREJÓN RODRÍGUEZ, “Las Relationes entre España y Marruecos según sus tratados 
internacionales”, Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, 11, (2006), [The relations between 
Spain and Morocco according to their international treaties]. 
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After Spain joined the Schengen Agreement in 1991, tight border controls were soon 
implemented. Visa requirements were imposed on Moroccan citizens in 1991 and this 
had a remarkable impact on Spanish-Moroccan border dynamics.41 The control 
mechanisms were reinforced and the patterns of cross-border mobility were 
significantly altered. From that moment onwards, Moroccan citizens were not allowed 
to cross the new Spanish (now Schengen) border with Morocco without a visa. 
 
Considering that both enclaves are absolutely dependent on cross-border interaction 
with the surrounding Moroccan territory, the special regime acquired by Spain 
through its declaration allowed the cross-border flow of ‘desirable migrants’ to 
continue. 
 
However, Ceuta and Melilla continued to attract many would-be immigrants to the 
EU and thus their land perimeters were readjusted to respond to this potential threat. 
Ceuta and Melilla and the borders of their territory represent external borders of the 
European Union42 but the manner in which they are guarded resemble the époque of 
the Iron Curtain. The construction of barbed-wire border fences erected in Ceuta in 
1993 and Melilla in 1996 marked the first steps towards a stricter control of the whole 
Spanish southern border. The external border of Ceuta (7.8 km of double border 
fence, divided into three sectors)43 is guarded by policemen and officers of the 
Guardia Civil. The external land border at Melilla is characterized by a double border 
fence of approximately 10.5 km divided into three sections. The outer fence has a 
height of 3.5m; the inner fence reaches 6m in some places. Both fences are equipped 
with barbed-wire to prevent illegal immigrants from climbing the fence. Both fences 
are equipped with cameras for video surveillance and infra-red surveillance. This 
militarization of the border was coupled with legal measures such as the 1992 
                                                        
41 FERRER, DE WITTE, KRAMSCH, BOEDELTJE, AND VAN HOUTUM, “Spanish-Moroccan Border: 
Regional Profile”, Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, (Nijmegen, 2009). 
42 See the list of land border crossing points of Spain, attached to the Common Manual and the 
Common Consular Instruction. 
43 The information about the border fences comes from the report of the Commission’s technical 
mission to Morocco. “Visit to Ceuta and Melilla – Mission Report. Technical Mission to Morocco on 
illegal immigration”, MEMO/05/380, Brussels, 19 October 2005. 
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readmission agreement between Spain and Morocco targeting migrants who entered 
Spain ‘illegally’ without a permit.44 
 
Such a situation created difficulties (or at least inconsistencies) for the 
implementation of Spanish migration policy, as on the one hand the continuation of 
the special regime of Ceuta and Melilla was important for economic, political and 
social reasons, and on the other hand, the very same border had to be tightened and 
even militarized in order to prevent illegal immigration. 
 
The strategic location of these enclaves in the North of Morocco at the crossroads of 
Africa and Europe triggered immigration flows from both the Maghreb countries and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. A situation escalated in September and October 2005, when the 
enclaves witnessed large-scale and coordinated attempts by African immigrants to 
cross the border by forcing their way through the barbed-wire fences.45 In the whole 
of 2005, around 11,000 attempted illegal border crossings were registered at this 
border line.46 
 
3.3. Legal provisions in national legislation 
According to Article 149(1) of the Spanish constitution, the central government has 
exclusive competence in the field of immigration, emigration and the issues linked to 
the status of foreigners. Thus, the rules on entry and the conditions for admission form 
part of the Aliens Act 4/2000.47  
 
                                                        
44 Presidencia del Gobierno, “Marruecos accepta la readmission inmediata de los inmigrantes que 
entren ilegalmente en Ceuta and Melilla”, Notas de prensa de Presidencia del Gobierno, 6 October 
2005, [Morocco accepts the immediate readmission of illegal immigrants entering Ceuta and Melilla]. 
45 According to the Spanish and Moroccan authorities, five immigrants died on 29 September 2005 at 
the border of Ceuta when some 700 migrants stormed the fence and 6 died on the border of Melilla on 
6 October 2005 when some 400 stormed the fence there.  
46 For comparison, the annual attempted illegal border crossings on the longest pre-2004 enlargement 
land border between Finland and Russia is around 40, based on data by the Finnish border guard. 
47 Ley organica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su 
intergacion social, en su redaccion dada por las leyes organicas 8/2000, de 22 deciembre, de 29 de 
septiembre, y 14/2003, de 20 de noviembre, available on the website of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs : http://extranjeros.mtas.es/. Law 4 / 2000 of January 11 on the rights and freedoms of 
foreigners in Spain and their social integration, as amended by Organic Laws 8 / 2000 of Dec. 22, from 
September 29 and 14/2003 of November 20. 
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Article 25 of this act deals with the requirements for entry onto Spanish territory and 
is further developed by Article 1 of the Regulation48 implementing the Aliens Act of 
2000: 
 
a) Those granted authorization to cross the border as a consequence of a specific 
need. 
b) Beneficiaries under bilateral agreements to the effect with bordering countries. 
 
Thus, the special rules referred in the Schengen Declaration do not indeed figure 
directly in the Spanish secondary legislation dealing with the entry onto Spanish 
territory, but refer further to “bilateral agreements to that effect with bordering 
countries”. 
 
There are three groups of third country nationals, in particular Moroccan citizens, who 
could claim special treatment as far as Ceuta and Melilla are concerned. The first 
group, those with the most limited rights, includes Moroccan citizens who are not 
resident in the provinces of Tetuan and Nador. In order to visit the two enclaves, a 
member of this group has to apply for a visa but will have the possibility to receive a 
multi-entry one, allowing repeated access to the territory. The second group of 
Moroccan nationals includes residents of the two provinces of Nador and Tetuan. 
They are allowed visa-free access to the two towns based on their Moroccan residence 
cards. However, their access is limited in time. The third group includes those 
Moroccan citizens actually residing in Ceuta and Melilla with a document called 
“tarjeta de estadistica”. A Constitutional Court case of 1994 actually deals with the 
                                                        
48 Royal Decree No 864/2001, of 20 July, passing the Regulations enabling Organic act No 4/2000 of 
11 January on the rights and freedoms of aliens in Spain and their social integration, reformed in 
organic act No 8/2000 of 22 December. 
1. Aliens wishing to enter Spanish territory must, without prejudice of the terms 
of international treaties subscribed by Spain, do so through posts authorized for 
the purposes, and must hold an identifying passport or travel document 
considered valid for the purposes according to international treaties subscribed 
by Spain, they must hold a valid visa when required, and not be subject to 
express prohibitions. They must also present the documents indicated in these 
Regulations which justify the purpose and conditions of stay, and evidence 
sufficient living resources for the time they wish to remain in Spain, or that they 
are in a position to secure such resources, pursuant to the terms of these 
Regulations.  
2. Exceptionally, the authorities or officers responsible for border control may 
authorize border-crossings at other than authorized points or on the days and at 
the times set, to persons in the following circumstances:  
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equality concept in the context of the special residence permits issued to non-
European residents of Ceuta and Melilla.49 
 
3.4. Mechanism of application in the EU 
Spain has always been very consistent in its insistence on maintaining the regime 
agreed when it joined Schengen. Despite the numerous transformations through which 
the visa policy went itself – from its communitarization, through to the integration of 
Schengen into the treaties and to the second generation legislation in this field (being 
developed now), there was always a reference to the special rules applicable to Ceuta 
and Melilla. 
 
Contrary to the Portuguese case discussed earlier, the Council decided that a legal 
basis did not need to be determined in conformity with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties for the Declaration of Spain on the towns of Ceuta and Melilla.50 However, 
this did not prevent the inclusion of references to Ceuta and Melilla in future acts 
related to border controls. 
 
A special article on the Schengen Borders Code51 is also dedicated to Ceuta and 
Melilla. According to Article 36 of the Schengen Borders Code, its provisions should 
not affect the special rules applying to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, as defined in 
the “Declaration by the Kingdom of Spain on the cities of Ceuta and Melilla in the 
Final Act to the Agreement on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain to the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement” of 14 June 1985.  
                                                        
49 See Spanish Constitutional Court Judgment, STC 150/1994, of 23 May 1994 (equality in the right to 
work of Moroccans from Ceuta, holders of “tarjeta de estacística” (statistical card). 
This case deals with the right of employment of the Moroccans residing legally in the two enclaves and 
not about their right or conditions of entry; therefore it will not be discussed further. For an analysis of 
the case in the context of constitutional rights of foreigners in Spain see, MAGDALENA NOGUEIRA 
GUASTAVINO, “Los derechos sociales fundamentals de los extranjeros: las SSTC 236/2007 y 259/2007 
como reconstruccion de una doctrina constitucional confusa”, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, at: 
http://portal.uam.es/portal/page/profesor/epd2_profesores/prof1619/publicaciones/Iustelextranjeros.pdf  
50 Council Decision 1999/436/EC of 20 May 1999 determining, in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union, the 
legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the Schengen acquis, O.J. 1999, L 
176, p. 17–30. 
51 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code), O.J. 2006, L 105, p. 1–32. 
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Identical wording is used also in Article 16 of the Local Border Traffic Regulation, 
also adopted in 2006.52 
3.5. Interim conclusions 
When Spain joined Schengen it wanted to keep its two enclaves in Morocco open to 
people for local movement. However, as Morocco is an important source of migrants 
to a number of Schengen states it is natural that Spain’s Schengen partners insisted on 
measures that would limit the possibility of Moroccan citizens to reach the Schengen 
territory. The solution was simple: to maintain checks on persons travelling between 
these two enclaves and mainland Spain. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter studied the legal acts through which the expansion of the Schengen area 
took place during the 1990s. It concentrated on two specific cases in which the 
acceding states wished to maintain special links with third countries. In the case of 
both Portugal and Spain, this wish to keep the freedom of movement for citizens of 
third countries (Brazil and Morocco, both sources of migrants) clashed with the fears 
of the other Schengen states that it would lead to widespread (potentially illegal) 
immigration. The solutions to the conundrum were quite different in each case: 
Portugal had to accept a unilateral readmission obligation, in effect. In the case of 
Spain, the problem could be isolated geographically and all Spain had to do was to 
maintain checks on the movement of persons between the outlying Spanish territory 
on the North African coast and mainland Spain. In the end, it proved possible in both 
cases to accommodate the special concerns of the acceding states while taking care of 
the concerns of the other members of the Schengen area. 
                                                        
52 Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 
laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and 
amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention (O.J. 2006, L 405). 
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CHAPTER 5 – THE SUPRANATIONAL LIFE OF VISAS 
 
This chapter analyzes the legal basis for visa policy in the Treaties. Section 1 starts 
with a brief description of how visas appeared for the first time in the Maastricht 
Treaty, and then goes on to detail the more complete provisions in the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Sections 2 and 3 then provide an analysis of the differentiation in the field 
under Amsterdam between the Schengen area, the willing outsiders (Norway, Iceland 
and later Switzerland) and the reluctant insiders (Denmark, Ireland and the UK).  
Section 4 deals with legal and institutional developments post Amsterdam (Vienna 
Plan, Tampere and Hague programmes). Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. The Maastricht Treaty 
Visa policy made its debut in the European Treaties within the Treaty of Maastricht 
and an agreement to disagree: 
 
The negotiators of the Treaty on the European Union compromised on the issue 
of whether the European Community was competent to address issues relating to 
visas and border controls, and did not settle the question of whether Article 8a 
EEC (which was renumbered Article 7a EC by the Maastricht Treaty) required 
the abolition of border checks on all persons.1 
 
The provisions on visas were split between the newly created first and third pillar. In 
the first pillar, a new Article 100c EC was inserted which dealt explicitly with the 
procedure for determining the “third countries whose nationals must be in possession 
of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States” and with the 
adoption of “measures relating to a uniform format for visas”. The provisions 
potentially relating to visas included parts of Article K.1 EU, and more precisely 
“rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States 
and the exercise of control thereon” and “conditions of entry and movement by 
nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States”. These two aspects of 
visa policy in the Maastricht Treaty will be studied in detail below. 
 
                                                        
1 S. PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd edition, Oxford Law Library (Oxford, 2006), p. 98. 
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Hailbronner, who looked in some depth at the development of the visa competence of 
the Community, concluded that the division between the first and third pillars 
“underlines the intention of the Member States to transfer only a limited part of their 
sovereign rights. On the other hand, the Community’s powers must be interpreted in 
such a way as to enable the Community to discharge its legislative tasks and functions 
in a rational and effective way.”2 
 
1.1. Article 100c EC 
Article 100c EC conferred on the Community two powers: to adopt “a list of third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external 
borders of the Member States” and to adopt “measures relating to a uniform format 
for visas”. 
 
Article 100c.  
1. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting 
the European Parliament, shall determine the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States. 
2. However, in the event of an emergency situation in a third country posing a threat of a 
sudden inflow of nationals from that country into the Community, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission, may introduce, for a period 
not exceeding six months, a visa requirement for nationals from the country in question. The 
visa requirement established under this paragraph may be extended in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in paragraph 1. 
3. From 1 January 1996, the Council shall act by a qualified majority on the decisions referred 
to in paragraph 1. The Council shall, before that date, acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, adopt measures 
relating to a uniform format for visas. 
4. In the matters referred to in this Article, the Commission shall examine any request made 
by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council. 
5. This Article shall be without prejudice to the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent 
upon the Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security. 
6. This Article shall apply to other matters if so decided pursuant to Article K.9 of the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union which relate to cooperation in the fields of justice 
and home affairs, subject to the voting conditions determined at the same time. 
7. The provisions of the conventions in force between the Member States governing matters 
covered by this Article shall remain in force until their content has been replaced by directives 
or measures adopted pursuant to this Article. 
 
                                                        
2 HAILBRONNER, “Visa Regulations and Third Country Nationals in EC Law”, Common Market Law 
Review, n. 31, (1994), pp 969-995.  
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The right of initiative belonged to the Commission; with an obligation to “examine 
any request made by a Member State” asking it to submit a proposal to the Council. In 
the case of the visa list power, the Council was to act unanimously until 1 January 
1996 and with qualified majority thereafter. In the case of visa formats, the Council 
was to decide with qualified majority from the outset. The procedure also envisaged 
consultation with the European Parliament. The Court of Justice had its normal 
jurisdiction in the Community pillar. 
 
The Article also included several limitations. According to Article 100c (2) in cases of  
an emergency situation in a third country posing a threat of a sudden inflow of 
nationals of that country into the Community, the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission, may introduce, for a period not 
exceeding six months, visa requirements for nationals for the country in 
question.  
 
The extension of visa requirements established under this procedure, however, was 
possible only following a unanimous decision of the Council.3  
 
The second limitation relates to the fact that “this Article shall be without prejudice to 
the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the Member States with regard to 
the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.” 
 
Lastly, the parallel existence of the Schengen rules was confirmed by stating that “the 
provisions of the conventions in force between the Member States governing areas 
covered by this Article shall remain in force until their content has been replaced by 
directives or measures adopted pursuant to this Article.” 
 
Despite the view of some authors that Article 100c TEU has communitarized the visa 
policy of the Member States,4 the communitarization, as will be demonstrated below, 
covers only two, albeit important aspects of the visa policy, namely the uniform 
format for visas and the visa black list. The issue of the exact scope of the Community 
competence under Article 100c was later subject to a case at the ECJ. 
 
                                                        
3 This power was never used according to Peers, op. cit., p. 98. 
4 D’OLIVEIRA AND ULRICH, “Expanding external and shrinking internal borders: Europe’s defence 
mechanisms in the area of free movement, immigration and asylum”, in O’KEEFFE AND TWOMEY, 
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Wiley Chancery Law, (London, 1994). 
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Using the powers of Article 100c EC, the Council adopted a visa format Regulation 
and a visa list Regulation in 1995. The first was rather unproblematic. The Visa 
Format Regulation5 provided that short-term visas (for a stay of up to three months) 
and transit visas issued by the Member States were to be produced in the uniform 
format provided in the Regulation, and were to comply with a number of 
specifications to be adopted by the Commission assisted by the Committee of 
representatives of the Member States.6 The Regulation authorized the Member States 
to also use the uniform format for visas falling outside its scope (i.e. national visas), 
provided differences were incorporated in order to distinguish them from those within 
the scope of the Regulation.7  
 
The exercise of the second power related to the visa lists had a much more difficult 
life and will be studied in detail below. 
 
1.1.1. 1995 Visa Regulation 
Six weeks after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission made a 
Communication to the Council and to the European Parliament concerning (i) a 
Proposal for a decision, based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, 
establishing a convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member 
States, and (ii) a Proposal for a regulation, based on Article 100c of the EC Treaty 
determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when 
crossing the external borders of the Member States8 (the so-called visa list). 
 
The exact scope of the Community competence under Article 100c was subject to 
numerous inter-institutional conflicts and the only undisputed element of it was the 
competence for drawing up the first Community-wide black visa list. 
 
                                                        
5 Council Regulation No 1683/95, O.J. 1995, L 164/1. 
6 Article 1 and 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 laying down a uniform 
format for visas, O.J. 1995, L 164, p. 1–4 (hereafter Visa Format Regulation) 
7 Article 7 of the Visa Format Regulation    
8 Proposal for a regulation, based on Article 100C of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the 
external borders of the Member States, COM(93) 684 final, O.J. 1994, C 11, p. 15. 
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The Commission’s proposal was based on its interpretation of the position of Article 
100c in the Community structure and its link with Article 7a EC. The Commission’s 
understanding of the division of competence for visa policy between the first and third 
pillars, as illustrated by the Commission’s proposals, was ultimately underpinned by 
the Commission’s interpretation of Article 7a.9 Based on this belief, the Commission 
included in the draft Regulation not only rules about the visa black list, but also about 
the visa white list and the principle of mutual recognition of visas among the Member 
States.  
 
According to the Commission, as the provision of Article 100c was placed amongst 
the internal market provisions of the Treaty it is thus designed to contribute towards 
achieving the free movement of persons within the Internal Market, as specified in 
Article 7a EC.10 The Commission considers the purpose of Article 100c to be the 
harmonization of the regulations and practices of the Member States.11 From that it 
follows that in order to achieve full harmonization, it is not sufficient to harmonize 
only the black list but also the white list. Therefore the proposed regulation does not 
only contain a list of 126 countries whose nationals had to be in possession of a visa 
when crossing the external borders, but also an obligation for the Member States to 
include all countries in either the black or the white list by a set deadline (30 June 
1996). If this requirement was met, a full harmonization of visa requirements among 
the Member States would result. 
 
In addition, the proposal considered the mutual recognition by Member States of visas 
issued by the other, as “an essential accompanying measure for the achievement of 
the objective set out in Article 7a as regards free movement of persons”12 and a 
cornerstone of the proposal.13 Article 2 of the Draft Regulation reads “a Member State 
should not be entitled to require a visa of a person who seeks to cross its external 
                                                        
9 HAILBRONNER, op. cit.; and D. O’KEEFFE, “The New Draft External Frontiers Convention and the 
Draft Visa Regulation”, in MONAR AND MORGAN, The Third Pillar of the European Union: 
Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, College of Europe (Bruges, 1994). 
10 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation listing 
the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders 
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, COM (2000) 0027 final, O.J. 2000, C 
177E, p. 66–69. 
11 Preamble of the Commission Proposal for a Regulation, COM (2000) 0027 final, op. cit.  
12 Preamble of the Commission Proposal for a Regulation, COM (2000) 0027 final, op. cit. 
13 See Explanatory memorandum, op. cit.  
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frontiers and who holds a visa issued by another Member State, where that visa is 
valid throughout the Community”. 
 
The view of the Parliament with regards to the scope of Article 100c was even wider 
than that of the Commission. The Parliament considered that the Draft regulation 
should also cover the common conditions and procedures for the issuing of visas and 
the principle of equivalence between a residence permit and a visa (which formed part 
of the proposed Draft Convention).14  
 
The interpretations put forward by the Commission and the Parliament were ignored 
by the Council. The final text of the Regulation was stripped down to the strict text of 
Article 100c, namely the harmonization of the visa black list. The obligation for 
harmonization of the white list and the principle of mutual recognition of visas were 
excluded. To avoid further activism on the side of the Commission, the Council 
expressed its view in the preamble of the Regulation, that: “the Member States will 
constantly endeavour to harmonize their visa policies with regard to third countries 
on the common list” but the principle of mutual recognition and the conditions and 
criteria for issuing visas were matters to be determined within the “appropriate 
framework”, namely the third pillar.15 
 
As a result of the inter-institutional disagreements, the final scope of the Regulation 
was limited to determining the third countries whose nationals shall be required to be 
in possession of a visa when crossing the external frontiers of the Member States. 
However, even this exercise proved problematic. The main discussion points were 
linked to the composition of the list and the criteria for placing a particular country on 
it.  
 
                                                        
14 PEERS, “The Visa Regulation: Free Movement Blocked Indefinitely”, European Law Journal, n. 21, 
(1996), p. 150. 
15 Council Regulation (EC) No 574/1999 of 12 March 1999 determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States, O.J. 
1999, L 72, p. 2–5. 
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1.1.2. Composition 
The black list included 126 countries or territories in an annex to the Draft 
Regulation. The black list proposed by the Commission was based on the Schengen 
black list and the Commission’s objective was to have the shortest possible grey list 
of countries for which national discretion remained. For a third country national from 
the grey list there was the possibility to enter a Member State that did not require a 
visa and then travel to a Member State that did. In composing the list, the 
Commission had not negotiated with the three EU non-Schengen member countries 
(Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom), nor with the non-EU Schengen 
countries, but considered that the composition of the list was to be the main 
negotiating point in the Council. The Commission supported the view that: 
to the extent that imposition of a visa requirement by all twelve Member 
States might be seen as an unfriendly gesture, this would be balanced by 
the advantage to be gained in that access to all the Member States would 
require only a single uniform visa, instead of ten separate visas.16 
 
The composition of the black list presented a particular problem to some of the 
Member States, especially the non-Schengen members. In the case of the United 
Kingdom for example, if it had adhered to the list in the form in which it was 
originally proposed it would have had to impose visas requirements on 45 countries, 
previously visa-exempt (the number of countries on the UK visa list at the time was 
81). An additional concern on the side of the UK was the direct effect the Regulation 
would have in a field that was previously subject to a national Parliamentary 
resolution. The Home Office explained the reasons for these disparities in visa 
practice between the Member States as follows:  
 
The United Kingdom relied heavily on control at frontiers by immigration 
officers and assessed the need for a visa requirement in terms of immigration and 
security risk. There were real differences in the immigration and security threat 
that particular countries were seen to present to different Member States. Some 
Member States were more ready to impose visas to express political disapproval, 
while others attached importance to reciprocity.17 
 
                                                        
16 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-1994), “Visas and Control of 
External Borders of the Member States”, 14th Report, para 73. 
17 Ibid., para 71. 
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The United Kingdom strongly opposed the adoption of the black list, claiming that the 
inclusion of the Commonwealth countries on this list was not justified, either on 
security or on immigration risk grounds. In particular it argued that any immigration 
flow from these countries would be directed primarily to its territory rather than that 
of the other Member States.18 The final list thus excluded twenty-eight countries, 
almost all Commonwealth countries – though nationals of these countries remained 
subject to visa requirements within the Schengen framework.19 
 
1.1.3. Criteria 
Part of the criticism directed towards the Commission was its failure to set out clear 
criteria for inclusion on the black list. There is no reference to the criteria used for the 
composition of the list and the only reference to them is to be found in the preamble 
of the Draft Regulation. Two criteria are identified: (1) the political and economic 
situation in the third countries and (2) their relationship with the Community and the 
Member States. The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
was more successful in developing the criteria as a result of its enquiry. The 
Committee shared the view that the list of countries whose nationals would require 
visas to enter the territory of the Member States was unnecessarily long. The 
Committee identified four reasons for the imposition of visa requirements:  
The first was a threat of an unacceptable level of immigration from that State.  
The second was a risk to internal security from nationals of that State. 
The third was political – visa restrictions are to be imposed as a matter of reprisal or in the 
context of deteriorating bilateral relations. 
The fourth was reciprocity, if the partner country itself imposes visa restrictions.20 
 
The criteria applied by the Schengen states were unknown to the Committee but it is 
obvious that the final black list represented a lower number of countries than would 
end up on the list, if a simple accumulation of the national black lists had been 
applied. The Committee recommended that the twelve Member States should attempt 
                                                        
18 A. MELONI, Visa Policy within the European Union Structure, Springer, (Berlin, 2005), p. 79. 
19 Art. 6 of the 1999 Visa Regulation, op. cit.  
20 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-1994), “Visas and Control of 
External Borders of the Member States”, 14th Report, para 106-108.  
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to formulate coherent criteria common to all before constructing their list, with a view 
to keeping it as short as possible.  
Ultimately, all countries and territories in the world fall into one of four groups: 
 
(1) countries whose nationals were not required to have a visa in any of the 
Member States of the EU; 
(2) countries, whose  nationals needed a visa to enter all countries of the EU e.g. 
Libya and Iraq 
(3) countries whose nationals require visas only to enter certain Member States – 
e.g. Australia; 
(4) countries on the Schengen black list but not on the EU list – 28 in total.21 
 
Despite the fact that the Council made substantial changes to the text proposed by the 
Commission and the Parliament, it did not consult the Parliament again before 
adopting the Regulation. Thus, the Parliament brought proceedings against the 
Council under Article 173 (now 230) for failure to consult. The Court of Justice 
annulled the Regulation on this procedural ground while preserving its effects until a 
replacement was adopted.22 The only question before the Court was whether the text 
as adopted differed in essence from the text on which the Parliament had been 
consulted. This is because the Parliament’s attack was limited to the protection of its 
prerogatives. The Court noted that the Council’s adopted text allowed the Member 
States to maintain, for an indefinite period, their list of third countries not on the 
common list whose nationals were subject to visa requirements. For this reason the 
Court maintained that “those amendments go to the heart of the arrangements 
established and must therefore be described as substantial.” On this ground alone, the 
Court held that it was necessary to anul the Regulation and that other arguments put 
forward by the Parliament need not be considered. 
 
The Council adopted the replacement of the Regulation two years later, in 1999, after 
consulting the Parliament and ignoring its proposed amendments.23 
                                                        
21 B. MELIS, Negotiating Europe’s Immigration Frontiers, Kluwer Law International, (The Hague, 
2001). 
22 Case 392/95 Parliament v. Council [1997] ECR I-3213. 
23 Council Regulation 574/1999, op. cit. 
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Thus, while the Commission proposal was submitted in December 1993, the final 
text, following the judgment of the ECJ, was adopted by the Council only on 12 
March 1999, and only two months before the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. That Treaty resolved all the issues which had proved to be so divisive in the 
field of visas under the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
There was one more case before the Court of Justice in this period, this time related to 
the dividing line between the EC’s first pillar visa powers and the EU’s third pillar 
visa powers. The dispute centred upon airport transit visas. Initially, they were 
included in the Commission proposal for a Visa Regulation but the Council deleted 
these provisions and instead adopted a third pillar Joint Action under Article K.3 EU, 
with a limited list of ten non-EU states whose nationals would need airport transit 
visas even to pass through an airport transit lounge of a Member State.24 The 
objective of the harmonization was security and the control of illegal immigration. 
The Joint Action stipulated that for countries not on the list, the Member States 
retained discretion as to whether or not to require airport transit visas. It did not 
provide for the conditions governing the issuing of airport transit visas but envisaged 
the possibility of criteria being adopted by the Council in the future. 
 
The adoption of the Joint Action was challenged by the Commission through an 
action for annulment25 in which it argued that measures on airport transit visas fell 
under the scope of Article 100c EC, thus linking harmonization in this field to the 
establishment of the internal market. The Council maintained that the measure was 
outside the scope of Article 100c EC, since in the case of airport transit no “crossing 
of the external borders” of the Member States was taking place, as the third country 
nationals would not be legally entering the territory of the Member States.  
 
The Court ruled that persons in an airport transit zone had not yet crossed the legal (as 
distinct from the physical) external borders of the Member States. The Court linked its 
                                                        
24 96/197/JHA: Joint Action of 4 March 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union on airport transit arrangements, O.J. 1996, L 63/8. 
25 Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council [1998] ECR I-2763. 
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interpretation of Article 100c EC to Article 3(d) EC26 and concluded that since 
persons within the airport transit zones could not be considered as participating in the 
‘internal market’, they had not crossed an external border for the purposes of Article 
100c.   
 
2. The Amsterdam Treaty 
The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force in May 199927 and brought about a 
further communitarization of visa policy. 
 
A special Title IV of the EC Treaty addressed issues of visas, asylum, immigration 
and other policies related to free movement of persons. Article 61 (1) holds that: 
 
in order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and justice, the 
Council shall adopt within a period of five years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam [1 May 2004], measures aimed at ensuring the free 
movement of persons in accordance with Article 14, in conjunction with directly 
related flanking measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and 
immigration, in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 (2) and (3) and 
Article 63(1) (a) and (2)(a), and measures to prevent and combat crime in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e) of the Treaty on European 
Union. 
 
The means of accomplishing this objective in the field of visas, which are designated 
as “flanking measures”, are outlined in Article 62 (2) EC and form part of the 
measures on the crossing of the external borders of the Member States. They include: 
 
(i) rules on visas for intended stays of no more than three months, including: 
(ii) the list of third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from 
that requirement; 
(iii) the procedures and conditions for issuing visas by the Member States; 
(iv) a uniform format for visas; 
(v) rules on a uniform visa. 
 
                                                        
26 This article listed the activities of the Community and specified that those activities included 
“measures concerning the entry and movement of persons in the internal market as provided for in 
Article 100c EC”. 
27 The Treaty was agreed in June 1997 and signed on 2 October 1997. 
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Peers noted that the structure of these provisions closely followed the structure of 
Article 1-25 of the Schengen Convention and closely paralleled EC or EU measures 
that have previously been proposed or adopted.28 
 
As far as decision-making is concerned, Article 67 EC provides for a two-stage 
system. Up until 1 May 2004, the EC visa powers were subject to unanimous voting 
in the Council, consultation of the EP, and a shared initiative of the Commission and 
the Member States. An exception to this rule were the powers concerning visa lists 
and visa formats, which were subject to qualified majority voting in the Council, 
consultation of the Parliament and the sole initiative of the Commission immediately 
upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
 
As from 1 May 2004, the Commission gained the sole right of initiative on all visa 
matters, and a set of powers related to the visa conditions, procedures and rules 
automatically became subject to qualified majority voting in the Council and co-
decision with the European Parliament. 
 
As far as implementing measures are concerned, in 2001 the Council adopted two 
regulations with which it reserved for itself (and in some instances for the individual 
Member States) the power to adopt measures amending the Common Consular 
Instructions for visa applications29 and the Common Manual concerning external 
borders.30 The Commission challenged the regulations in an action for annulment and 
lost the case.31 The Court upheld the Council’s decision because, inter alia, in 2001 
the issues had until recently been dealt with pursuant to the third pillar, the 
transitional period for Title IV decision-making was still in force in 2001, the subject 
matter being delegated was clearly circumscribed, and the Council had committed 
                                                        
28 S. PEERS, op. cit., p. 101. 
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 789/2001 of 24 April 2001 reserving to the Council implementing 
powers with regard to certain detailed provisions and practical procedures for examining visa 
applications, OJ L 116, 26.4.2001, p. 2–4 
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 790/2001 of 24 April 2001 reserving to the Council implementing 
powers with regard to certain detailed provisions and practical procedures for carrying out border 
checks and surveillance, OJ L 116, 26.4.2001, p. 5–6 
31 Case C-257/01 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-345, 
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itself to reviewing the delegation to itself by 2004.32 As to the latter argument, the 
planned review took place only in 2006 in the case of borders33 and in 2009 in the 
case of visas,34 when the Council conferred implementing powers in these two fields 
to the Commission. 
 
Title IV EC included a new procedure for a ruling on a question of interpretation of its 
provisions and the acts based upon it.35 In this case, the Council, the Commission, or a 
Member State (but not the European Parliament) can initiate the procedure. However, 
such rulings did not apply to judgments Member State courts or tribunals, which had 
become res judicata. 
 
The normal preliminary ruling procedure also applies to requests coming from 
national courts of last resort. The request can involve the interpretation of Title IV and 
the interpretation and validity of measures adopted under it.36 There has already been 
a case when the ECJ held that it lacked jurisdiction under Article 68(1) EC to interpret 
the Visa Regulation on a preliminary ruling from a national court that was not a Court 
of last resort.37 
 
The provisions related to national safeguards and emergency situations, which formed 
part of the old Article 100c EC transferred to the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 64(1) EC 
provides that Title IV “shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent 
upon the Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security”. Article 64(2) EC provides for emergency 
situations and has already been invoked on numerous occasions.38 If one or more 
                                                        
32 Some authors criticize this approach, in particular since: "the novelty of the subject matter has never 
before been grounds for disapplying the normal rules on implementing measures; Article 67 EC makes 
no exception to the normal ‘comitology rules’; the subject-matter was not clearly circumscribed, but 
very broad; and the Treaty simply does not provide for implementing powers to be conferred upon 
Member States." See S. PEERS “The EU Institutions and Title IV”, in S. PEERS AND N. ROGERS (eds.), 
EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 
33 With the adoption of the Schengen Borders Code, discussed in section 4.2 of this chapter. 
34 With the adoption of the Visa Code, discussed in section 4.2 of this chapter. 
35 Article 68(3) EC. 
36 Article 68(1) EC. 
37 Case C-51/03 Georgescu [2004] ECR 1-3203. 
38 For details, see APAP AND CARRERA, “Maintaining Security within Borders: Towards a Permanent 
State of Emergency in the EU?” CEPS Policy Brief, n. 41, (2003). 
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Member States face an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of third 
country nationals, the Council can, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission (and with no consultation with the European Parliament), adopt 
provisional measures of a duration not exceeding six months for the benefit of the 
Member States concerned. Thus the possibility, which under the Maastricht Treaty 
was applicable only for the imposition of visa requirements, is now applied to the 
entirety of Title IV EC.  
 
3. Differentiation in the system 
3.1. Being in and being out – the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
A differentiation in the field of visa policy resulted from primary law in the case of 
three countries: the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. Their special status was 
regulated by a number of Protocols to the Amsterdam Treaty. What unites them is 
their reluctance to participate in the communitarization of the field of justice and 
home affairs in general, and in the field of visas in particular. An additional element is 
the integration of the Schengen acquis into the institutional and legal framework of 
the European Union; an issue of decisive importance for the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, two non-Schengen countries. All visa measures adopted under the rules of the 
Maastricht Treaty were applicable to all Member States. The situation under the 
Amsterdam Treaty was different. 
 
3.1.1. The United Kingdom and Ireland 
The situation of the United Kingdom and Ireland in the field of visa policy was 
regulated by three protocols: 
- Protocol (No 2) integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the 
European Union (1997) 
- Protocol (No 3) on the application of certain aspects of Article 14 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and to 
Ireland (1997) 
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- Protocol (No 4) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland (1997)39. 
 
First of all, according to Article 4 of Protocol No 2 on Schengen, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom were not bound by the Schengen acquis, but might at any time 
request to take part in (opt-in) some or all of the provisions of this acquis. The 
decision on this participation was to be taken by unanimity of the participating in 
Schengen Member States and of the representatives of the government of the state 
concerned. Pursuant to these rules, the Council accepted the UK’s application for 
partial participation in Schengen in 2000,40 and the parallel Irish application appeared 
in 2002.41 
 
The rules of Protocol No 3 on Article 14 of the EC Treaty, in particular Article 1, 
authorized the United Kingdom to exercise such controls on persons seeking to enter 
its territory as it considers necessary (in the case of citizens entitled to such a right 
based on the EEA rules or other international treaties) and to determine whether or not 
to grant other categories of traveller permission to enter the United Kingdom. This 
right is notwithstanding Article 14 of the EC Treaty, any other provision of that 
Treaty or of the EU Treaty, any measure adopted under those Treaties or international 
agreements. 
 
Article 2 of the Protocol No 3 allowed the United Kingdom and Ireland to maintain 
the “arrangement between them relating to the movement of persons between their 
territories (“the Common Travel Area”)”. As long as they maintain such 
arrangements, the possibilities given to the United Kingdom in Article 1 are also to be 
applied to Ireland. Article 3 also authorizes the other Member States to maintain 
controls on their internal borders with the United Kingdom and Ireland.  
 
Finally, Protocol No 4 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland set out rules 
for the participation of these two countries in the adoption of measures under Title IV 
                                                        
39After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, respectively, Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen 
acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union; Protocol (No 20) on the application of 
certain aspects of Article 26 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union to the United 
Kingdom and to Ireland and Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 
respect of the area of freedom, security and justice.  
40 Decision 2000/365/EC (O.J. 2000, L 131/43). 
41 Decision 2002/192/EC (O.J. 2002, L 64/20). 
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of the EC Treaty. In principle, the two countries did not take part in the adoption of 
such measures.42 As a result: 
none of the provisions of Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, no measure adopted pursuant to that Title, no provision of any 
international agreement concluded by the Community pursuant to that Title, and 
no decision of the Court of Justice interpreting any such provision or measure 
shall be binding upon or applicable in the United Kingdom or Ireland.43 
 
However, there remained the possibility of participation in the negotiations and 
adoption of any measure proposed under Title IV, by notifying the President of the 
Council in writing, within three months of the presentation of the proposal to the 
Council.44 To avoid the danger of possible blockage in the adoption of a measure due 
to the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, paragraph 2 of Article 3 ensured 
that “if after a reasonable period of time” a measure cannot be adopted with the 
United Kingdom and Ireland taking part, the Council may adopt such a measure 
without the participation of these two countries. A possibility also existed for 
participation in measures already adopted, subject to a Commission decision in 
accordance with Article 11 (3) EC.45 Ireland retained the possibility to declare that it 
no longer wished to be covered by the terms of this Protocol, in which case normal 
Treaty provisions would apply.  
 
Article 7 of Protocol No 4 also clarified the relations between the different protocols. 
It holds that “Article 3 and 4 [of Protocol No 4] shall be without prejudice to the 
Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.”  
 
On the basis of these three protocols, the United Kingdom and Ireland participated in 
a number of measures both building on the Schengen acquis and based on Title IV 
EC. For example, in 1999 the United Kingdom applied to participate in the Schengen 
provisions on police and judicial cooperation, drugs and the Schengen Information 
System. The United Kingdom (but not Ireland) also intended to participate in 
Regulation 2252/2004 on biometric features in EU passports and in Regulation 
2007/2004 establishing FRONTEX (classified as measures “building upon the 
                                                        
42 Article 1 of the Protocol.  
43 Article 2 of the Protocol. 
44 Article 3 of the Protocol. 
45 Article 4 of the Protocol. 
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Schengen acquis”) under Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol. The Council, however, 
excluded the United Kingdom’s participation in both regulations on the grounds that 
the right to participation created by Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol relates 
exclusively to measures building on provisions of the Schengen acquis, in which the 
United Kingdom already participates by virtue of the Council Decision governing the 
United Kingdom’s participation in the Schengen acquis adopted pursuant to Article 4 
of the Schengen Protocol. The Council interpretation was supported by the Court of 
Justice. The Court held that: 
 
The second subparagraph of Article 5 (1) of the Protocol integrating the 
Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union must be interpreted 
as being applicable only to proposals and initiatives to build upon an area of the 
Schengen acquis which the United Kingdom and/or Ireland have been authorised 
to take part in pursuant to Article 4 of that protocol.46 
 
As far as participation in the visa field is concerned, the United Kingdom also 
participates in the 2002 regulation on visa formats47 but not in the 2001 Visa 
Regulation defining the visa lists.48 Ireland does not participate in either instrument.49 
 
3.1.2. Denmark 
The situation of Denmark is different because unlike the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
it is one of the Schengen states. To recall, there were no special arrangements for 
Denmark in the field of visa policy in the Maastricht Treaty, so it was bound by all the 
measures adopted during this period. 
 
                                                        
46 Case C-137/05, United Kingdom v. Council [2007] ECR I-11593, para 50 of the judgment; and Case 
C-77/05 United Kingdom v. Council [2007] ECR I-11459, para 68 of the judgment. 
47 Council Regulation (EC) No 334/2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 laying down a 
uniform format for visas, O.J. 2002, L 53. 
48 Meanwhile, a new action for annulment was brought by the United Kingdom and Ireland against the 
Council with regard to the VIS Police Access Decision; on the grounds that the Council wrongly 
considered that the measure constituted a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis in which 
the United Kingdom and Ireland do not take part, namely the common visa policy. See Case C-482/08. 
49 While it is clear that the United Kingdom and Ireland do not participate in the 2001 Visa Regulation 
and its subsequent amendments, their position in relation to the 1999 Visa Regulation raises some 
questions. One possible interpretation is that Regulation 574/1999 still continues to apply to these two 
Member States, because they did not participate in Regulation 539/2001, which repealed the 1999 
measure. Howecer, from a practical point of view, the UK still seems to be in compliance with the 
1999 Regulation, as all countries on the common black list then are still on the UK black list today. 
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However, with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, its situation was 
modified. There are two protocols regulating the position of Denmark. These are: 
 
- Protocol (No 2) integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the 
European Union (1997); and 
- Protocol (No 5) on the position of Denmark (1997)50. 
 
Protocol No 2 provided in its Article 3 that Denmark would continue to be bound by 
the Schengen acquis under international law in its relations with the Member States 
that were signatories to the Schengen convention. Thus, the parts of the Schengen 
acquis integrated in Title IV EC are binding in Denmark but they have an effect as 
international law rules and not Community law rules.  
 
Protocol No 5 established the rule that Denmark shall not take part in the adoption by 
the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV EC.51 However, it can opt-in 
and within six months of their adoption decide whether to be bound by them under 
international law.52 Denmark has consistently applied this option to measures 
concerning visas and border controls.53 
                                                        
50 Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark. 
51 Article 1 of Protocol No 5. 
52 Article 5 of Protocol No 5. 
53 Council document 14241/01, Communication from Denmark concerning implementation in Danish 
law pursuant to Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, 23 November 2001 (concerning 
implementation in Danish law of Council Regulation (EC) No 789/2001, Council Regulation (EC) No 
790/2001, two Council Decisions updating annexes of the Common Manual and the Common Consular 
Instructions);Council doc. 9963/02, Communication from Denmark concerning implementation in 
Danish law pursuant to Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark 20 June 2002, (concerning 
implementation into Danish law of Council Regulation (EC) No 1091/2001, Council Directive 
2001/40/EC, Council Decision 2001/420/EC, Council Decision 2002/44/EC); Council doc. 14807/03, 
Communication from Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law pursuant to Article 5 of the 
Protocol on the position of Denmark, 14 November 2003 (concerning implementation in Danish law of 
Council Decision 2002/586/EC and Council Decision 2002/585/EC); Council doc. 14822/03, 
Communication from Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law pursuant to Article 5 of the 
Protocol on the position of Denmark, 14 November 2003 (concerning implementation in Danish law of 
Council Decision 2002/352/EC and Council Decision 2002/587/EC); Council doc. 14588/03, 
Notification by Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law under Article 5 of the Protocol on 
the position of Denmark, 14 November 2003 (concerning implementation in Danish law of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 693/2003, Council Regulation (EC) No 694/2003, Council Regulation (EC) No 
415/2003 and Council Decision updating Schengen Consultation Network); Council doc. 5096/04, 
Communication from Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law pursuant to Article 5 of the 
Protocol on the position of Denmark, 9 January 2004  (concerning implementation in Denmark of 
Council Decision 2003/454/EC, Council Regulation (EC) No 1295/2003, Council Decision 
2003/585/EC and Council Decision  2003/586/EC); Council doc. 12195/04, Communication from 
Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law pursuant to Article 5 of the Protocol on the 
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As an exception to the above rules, Denmark was fully subject to EC measures 
regarding visa format and the adoption of a list of countries whose nationals are 
subject to a visa requirement when crossing the EC external borders.54 Note that these 
two fields were the only ones falling under the scope of the former Article 100c and 
thus were already communitarized under the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
Thus, the position of Denmark is a clear example of the tensions arising in the transfer 
of sovereignty to the Community. While Denmark expressed its willingness to 
participate in the cooperation under Title IV, it insisted that it was bound by it under 
international law rules and not Community law rules. In some cases this might lead to 
the conclusion of an international agreement between Denmark and the Community.55  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
position of Denmark, 10 September 2004 (concerning implementation in Danish law of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 377/2004, Council Decision 2004/191/EC, Council Decision 2004/466/EC, 
Council Decision 2004/512/EC); Council doc. 12111/04, Communication from Denmark concerning 
implementation in Danish law pursuant to Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, 7 
September 2004  (concerning implementation in Danish law of Council Decision 2004/17/EC); 
Council doc. 12907/04, Communication from Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law 
pursuant to Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, 29 September 2004  (concerning 
implementation in Danish law of Council Decision 2004/574/EC, Council Decision 2004/573/EC, 
Council Decision 2004/581/EC and Council Directive on the obligation of carriers to communicate 
passenger data); Council doc. 10087/05, Notification by Denmark of implementation in Danish law, 
under Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, 14 June 2005 (concerning implementation 
in Danish law of Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 – security features and biometrics in 
passports) ; Council doc. 5420/06, Communication from Denmark concerning implementation in 
Danish law pursuant to Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, 17 January 2006 
(concerning implementation in Danish law of Regulation (EC) No 2046/2005 and Recommendation of 
the European Parliament and the Council 2005/761/EC), Council doc. 7613/07, Communication from 
Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law pursuant to Article 5 of the Protocol on the 
position of Denmark, 16 March 2007 (concerning implementation in Danish law of the Local Border 
Traffic Regulation and Council Decision 2006/684/EC),  Council doc. 11252/07, Notification by 
Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law, under Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of 
Denmark, (concerning implementation in Danish law of Decision No 574/2007/EC ) 26 June 2007, 
Council doc. 13122/07, Notification by Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law, under 
Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, (concerning implementation in Danish law of 
Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 ), 20 September 2007, Council doc. 12641/08, Notification by Denmark 
concerning implementation in Danish law, under Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, 
(concerning implementation in Danish law of Regulation (EC) No 296/2008 – Schengen Borders Code 
and Council Decision 2008/374/EC),  5 September 2008 and Council doc. 8071/09, Notification by 
Denmark concerning implementation in Danish law, under Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of 
Denmark, (concerning implementation in Danish law of Council Decision 2008/859/EC, Council 
Decision 2008/905/EC, Council Decision 2008/910/EC), 26 March 2009. All of the above acts are 
binding upon Denmark under international law.  
54 Article 4 of Protocol No 5. 
55 See, for example, the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. 
2005, L 299. 
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3.2. The willing outsiders 
There is a group of countries which for various reasons have expressed interest in 
joining the Schengen cooperation without necessarily joining the EU. Depending on 
whether such cooperation was established before or after the integration of the 
Schengen acquis into the European Union, the legal mechanisms chosen to implement 
it and the legal effects of it differ.  
 
3.2.1. Iceland and Norway56  
The need to find a way to integrate non-EC Member States into Schengen arose 
already with the accession of the three Nordic Members – Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland. As described in the previous section, due to the existing Nordic Passport 
Union, it was impossible to integrate only some of the Scandinavian countries without 
integrating the rest. Thus, the same date on which the Agreements on the accession to 
Schengen of Denmark, Finland and Sweden were signed, 19 December 1996,57 a Co-
operation Agreement was also concluded between the 13 Schengen partners on one 
side and Norway and Iceland on the other.  
 
The legal effects and the exact position of Iceland and Norway are the subject of 
another discussion. It seems that from the internal point of view of the Schengen 
Member States, the two countries do indeed cooperate but are not full members of the 
group. This fact can be indirectly supported by the lack of cooperation agreement in 
the list of the Schengen acquis. In accordance with the provisions of the Schengen 
protocol of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen acquis was integrated into the 
European legal order; there is an official list of what exactly comprises the acquis at 
the date of incorporation. And on that list (containing the Schengen Agreement, the 
Schengen Convention, all Accession Agreements and most of the decisions of the 
Executive Committee), the Co-operation agreement with Iceland and Norway is 
missing. This would suggest that the agreement itself was not considered part of the 
Schengen acquis but rather an issue of bilateral international relations. 
                                                        
56 An interesting analysis of the participation of the Iceland and Norway can be found in EMERSON, 
VAHL AND WOOLCOCK, Navigating by the Stars: Norway, the European Economic Area and the 
European Union, Centre for European Policy Studies, (Brussels, 2002). 
57 See O.J. 2000, L 239. 
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Maintaining the status of Iceland and Norway following the integration of the 
Schengen acquis into the European legal order proved a particularly complicated legal 
exercise. A system of agreements was put in place, which on one hand had to make 
possible the association of both countries with the Schengen cooperation in the 
framework of the European Union and on the other had to regulate the relations 
between Iceland and Norway and the UK and Ireland, considering the later non-
participation in the further development of Schengen. 
 
The result was two agreements and one institutional innovation. The provisions of 
Article 6 of the Schengen Protocol foresaw that the appropriate procedures for the 
cooperation should be established in an agreement to be concluded with Norway and 
Iceland by the Council. In addition, an agreement had to be concluded in order to 
establish the rights and obligations between Ireland and the UK on one hand, and 
Iceland and Norway on the other.  
 
Norway and Iceland joined the Schengen system as associated members as a 
continuation of the Nordic Passport Union.58 The preamble of the Association 
Agreement refers to the Agreement of Luxembourg of 1996, the purpose of which 
was to “preserve the existing regime” of free movement within the Nordic Union 
following the accession to Schengen of Denmark, Finland and Sweden. However, 
considering the length of the ratification process, by the time the 1996 Luxembourg 
Agreement was ratified,59 there were already new institutional arrangements for 
Schengen and thus the need for the new agreement arose. 
 
The Association Agreement with Norway and Iceland states in its Articles 1 and 2 
that the parties are bound by the provisions of the Schengen acquis.  Only certain, 
minor, provisions are excluded from this (for example the responsibility for 
                                                        
58 Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union, the Kingdom of Norway and the 
Republic of Iceland and concerning the latter’s association with the implementation, application and 
development of the Schengen acquis, O.J. 1999, L 176, pp. 36-40. For an early analysis see, P. 
CULLEN, “The Schengen Agreement with Iceland and Norway: Its Main Features”, ERA Forum, Vo. 2, 
Number 4, December 2001 
59 France, for example, ratified it only in 1999. 
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processing asylum applications).60 Norway and Iceland thus had (and still have) to 
apply the vast bulk of the Schengen acquis which includes also all the measures 
adopted by the Executive Committee, for example the measures associated with the 
abolition of internal frontier controls and the countervailing measures regarding the 
control of external frontiers, notably those connected to police, security and the 
Schengen Information System (SIS).  
 
Within the EEA Norway and Iceland also have to accept all acts by the EU that 
develop the acquis.  But the EEA contains an (unused) opt-out clause.  In this sense 
the obligation under the Schengen Association Agreement for Norway and Iceland to 
accept all acts by the EU which amend or build upon the Schengen acquis is even 
stronger: any refusal to adopt new Schengen acts (even only one) would mean having 
to leave the system. 
 
The need to involve all parties, bound to implement the Schengen acquis, in the 
process of the preparation of new acts is acknowledged by the preamble of the 
Schengen Association Agreement. The preamble refers to the need to “involve all 
parties” in discussions “at all levels” and “in an appropriate fashion” regarding the 
implementation of the agreement. The strcture that ensures this invomvement is the 
so-called “Mixed Committee” (of EU and non-EU states).   
 
The Mixed Committee works legally “outside the institutional structure of the 
Union”61 and can meet at three different levels: at the level of ministers, senior 
officials or experts. The Schengen Association Agreement sets out in detail its 
functions and powers, as well as the the relationship between the committee and the 
EU institutions, in particular the Commission and the Council. 
 
 
The Mixed Committee is considered as a “decision-shaping” body; it is more than a 
mere discussion forum but it is not a decision-making body. Its wider mission, set out 
in Article 4 of the Schengen Association Agreement is to address all matters relating 
to the development of the Schengen acquis, in particular all new acts or measures to 
                                                        
60 However, later an additional agreement dealing with this issue was also signed. 
61 See preamble to the Schengen Association Agreement, op.cit.  
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be adopted by the EU. As far as Schengen-related proposals are concerned, they are 
first drafted by the Commission or the EU Member States. However, the associated 
states are also allowed to “to take suggestions in the Mixed Committee” for initiatives 
or proposals62.  
 
Although the decisions are taken by the respective EU institutions, the Schengen 
Association Agreement imposes some obligations on the Council and on the 
Commission. For example, Article 5 requires the Council to inform the Mixed 
Committee of “preparation within the Council of any acts or measures which may be 
relevant to this Agreement”, while Article 6 requires the Commission to “informally 
seek advice” from experts of Norway and Iceland when drafting new legislation in 
fields covered by the agreement.  
 
Despite of the special place of the Mixed Committee in the Schengen Association 
Agreement, its role is not of a decision-maker but rather of a decision-shaper. This is 
clearly confirmed by the first sentence of Article 8 of the Association Agreement 
clearly states that: “The adoption of new acts or measures … shall be reserved to the 
competent institutions of the European Union”. Thus, the decision-making is reserved 
to the Council alone or to the Council and the European Parliament. However, one 
should not underestimate the fact that the Council in make cases takes decision more 
or less ‘automatically’ on the basis of recommendations of its committees and 
working parties, including the Schengen Mixed Committee. 
 
These Schengen arrangements offer much wider possibilities for participation in the 
legislative process that those set out in the EEA. The fact that Norway and Iceland 
have the possibility to have working sessions with the members of the corresponding 
Council bodies in the Mixed Committee is extremely important. This model of 
participation was also sought by Norway and its EFTA partners for the EEA, but was 
rejected by the EU. That the Schengen associates are able to participate so extensively 
is due to fortuitous historical circumstances, mainly to the existence of the Nordic 
Passport Union and because the Schengen system began as an intergovernmental 
mechanism outside the EU. It is highly unlikely that the EU would extend similar 
                                                        
62 Article 4(4) of the Schengen Association Agreement, op.cit.  
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rights of participation to Norway had its Schengen association been negotiated 
today63.   
 
With regard to implementation at national level, Article 8 of the Schengen 
Association agreement provides that it is for national authorities to “decide 
independently whether to accept [the] contents [of measures building on the 
Schengen acquis] and to implement [them] in their internal legal order.” The article 
recognizes that in order to become binding certain acts may have to be made subject 
to the fulfilment of constitutional procedures. 
 
Norwegian and Icelandic sovereignty is thus protected, at least at face value, in the 
sense of autonomous decision-making according to customary constitutional 
procedures. However, Article 2 (3) of the Agreement states that “the acts and the 
measures taken by the European Union amending or building upon the provisions [of 
the Schengen acquis] to which the procedures set out in this Agreement have been 
applied, shall also, without prejudice to Article 8, be accepted, implemented and 
applied by Iceland and Norway”. Thus, the possibility for “opting out” of individual 
Schengen measures does not exist for Norway and Iceland. What is provided for 
instead is the much more unflexible possibility for termination of the whole Schengen 
Association Agreement, either under a process of “consensual termination”, or under 
“non-consensual termination”.  
 
The “non-consensual termination” can occur in two cases. The first covers the case of 
Article 8(4) whereby Norway or Iceland fail to agree to or to notify a particular 
measure for constitutional or other reasons. When such circustances arise, the 
agreement is deemed terminated with respect to the country concerned “unless the 
Mixed Committee, after a careful examination of ways to continue the agreement, 
decides otherwise…”. The second case of “non-consentual termination” is covered by 
Article 11 and concerns disputes about the implementation of measures in Norway or 
Iceland. This situation can occur if a “substantial difference” in application or 
interpretation of Schengen measures persists between Norwegian and Icelandic courts 
or authorities of the Member States or the European Court of Justice. Before the 
                                                        
63 See EMERSON, VAHL AND WOOLCOCK, op.cit.  
  207
agreement is terminated, Article 11 provides for a set of dispute-resolution procedures 
involving the Mixed Committee. For Schengen disputes, there is no equivalent to the 
EFTA (EEA) Court for EEA. 
 
All EC visa rules are fully applicable to Norway and Iceland, as from March 2001, 
following the Schengen Association Agreement with those states. However, their 
participation in international agreements in this field is somewhat more complicated. 
For example, they do not participate in the visa facilitation agreements concluded by 
the Community, but are encouraged to conclude bilateral agreements to that effect 
with the countries concerned. 
 
3.2.2. Switzerland64 
The decision of Switzerland to participate in Schengen is interesting because, unlike 
the case of Iceland and Norway, there were no legal or institutional factors pushing 
towards this decision. Switzerland was not part of any free movement arrangement 
prior to joining Schengen, so the institutional push factors did not exist. At the same 
time, travel (despite the fact that its territory is completely encircled by Schengen 
states) was not particularly difficult. Thanks to bilateral agreements, most of the EC 
Member States did not require a passport (Swiss citizens had to present only an ID 
card at the Swiss border crossings). This was not the case for the third country 
nationals who had to be checked for possession of a valid travel document and, where 
necessary, a Swiss visa. 
 
Two obvious advantages to joining Schengen could thus be summed up as: the 
externalisation of the border controls (as a Schengen member Switzerland will not 
have an external land border); access to the Schengen Information System and access 
to the police cooperation provisions of the group. It appears that the latter two 
considerations were key. 
 
                                                        
64 For an analysis of the bilateral agreements with Switzerland, see VAHL AND GROLIMUND, Integration 
without Membership: Switzerland’s Bilateral Agreements with the European Union, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, (Brussels, 2006). 
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As all negotiations took place after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, they 
are an example of the functional possibility within the system to accommodate the 
inclusion of outside (non EC) Member States. However, Switzerland benefits from a 
special position geographically, economically and politically in relation to the EU, 
and for this reason it is difficult to find another third country that could follow in its 
steps. 
 
The agreement with Switzerland took a long time to conclude. The authorization to 
start negotiations with Switzerland was given to the Commission on 17 June 2002. 
The agreement was signed on behalf of the European Community on 26 October 
2004. However, the Council Decisions for its conclusion were adopted only on 28 
January 2008. A possible explanation for the delays might be the unusual legal 
framework chosen for the agreement. 
 
Indeed, it is the first time that an agreement is concluded between the European 
Union, the European Community and a third country. Due to the fact that the 
Schengen acquis has two distinct parts – a Community one and a Union one, it was 
deemed necessary to have both the European Union and the European Community as 
parties to the agreement. In fact, it was signed twice by the Presidency of the Council 
(once on behalf of the Union and once on behalf of the Community) and by the 
representative of the Commission (on behalf of the Community).65 
 
Two Council Decisions were also adopted to that end. One – Council Decision 
2008/146/EC66 on the conclusion of the agreement on behalf of the European 
Community, and another – Council Decision 2008/149/JHA67 on the conclusion of the 
agreement on behalf of the European Union. Although the two decisions have 
                                                        
65 See Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation 
on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the 
Schengen acquis, O.J. 2008, L 53/52. 
66 Council Decision 2008/146/EC of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen 
acquis, O.J. 2008, L 53/1. 
67 Council Decision 2008/149/JHA of 28 January 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Union, of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen 
acquis, O.J. 2008, L 53/50. 
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virtually equivalent texts, there are several important differences. Firstly, this is the 
legal basis. The legal basis for the conclusion on behalf of the European Community 
is Article 62, and point 3 of the first subparagraph of Article 63, and Articles 66 and 
95, in conjunction with the second sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300 
(2) and the first subparagraph of Article 300 (3) EC. The legal basis, in the case of 
conclusion on behalf of the European Union, is Article 24 and 38 EU.  Secondly, in 
terms of content, the two Council Decisions refer respectively to the part of the acquis 
having as a legal basis the EC Treaty in the one case, and the EU Treaty – in the 
other. Finally, the special position of the UK and Ireland is acknowledged in both 
Council Decisions but only the one on the conclusion on behalf of the European 
Community contains reference to the special position of Denmark. 
 
As to the substance of the agreement, it closely follows the structure of the agreement 
already concluded with Iceland and Norway; therefore it will not be studied in detail 
here.  
 
3.3. Differentiation in practice – the case of the 2001 Visa Regulation 
The legal basis for the adoption of the EU visa lists was included in Article 62 (2) (b) 
(i) and provided for the adoption by the Council of “the list of third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those 
whose nationals are exempt from that requirement”. In light of the Community 
objective of internal frontier abolition, which Title IV is meant to serve, such black 
and white lists were to be exhaustive (i.e. include all third countries).68  
 
The Council duly adopted the Regulation “listing the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement” (the Visa Regulation) on 15 March 
2001, respecting the five year time limit prescribed by Title IV EC and the further 
restrictions to this time limit envisaged by the Vienna Action Plan.69  
 
                                                        
68 MELONI, op. cit., p. 88. 
69 Regulation 539/2001, O.J. 2001, L 81/1. The Vienna Action Plan listed the Visa Regulation among 
the measures to be taken in two years from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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The way in which the specific rules governing the position of the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Denmark on the one hand and Iceland on Norway on the other were 
applied in the case of the Visa Regulation, will be discussed below. 
 
With regards to the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in the new Visa 
Regulation, the Council considered the measure to be “building upon the Schengen 
acquis” and thus the opt-in was to be regulated by Article 4 of the Protocol on the 
position of the United Kingdom and Ireland. As a result, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland are not taking part in the Community visa regime70 or the visa lists. However, 
the United Kingdom can participate in discussions in the Council when changes to the 
visa lists are discussed.  
 
As far as Denmark is concerned “the measures determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the 
Member States” is one of the two exceptions to the opt-out from Title IV that the 
country was granted.  
 
There are conflicting views as to the exact legal effect of this provision and 
consequently as to the position of Denmark as far as the Visa Regulation is 
concerned. MELONI71 supports the view that the Regulation is binding on Denmark, 
but under international and not under Community law. She starts from the fact that the 
Council treated the Visa Regulation as “a measure building upon the Schengen 
acquis”. Under the Protocol on the position of Denmark, Meloni argues, Denmark is 
not bound by the Regulation under Community law, but could, within six months, 
decide whether to be bound by it under international law. In this case, the direct 
applicability of the Visa Regulation in Denmark and the possibility of infringement 
actions before the Court of Justice would be excluded. 
 
                                                        
70 The only exceptions being Regulation 333/2002 on visa stickers for persons coming from 
unrecognized entities (OJ 2002 L 53/4 and Regulation 334/2002 amending Regulation 1683/95 on 
common visa format (OJ  2002 L 53/7). in which the UK has opted in. For a review and evaluation of 
the opt in in the United Kingdom, see the 7th Report of the House of Lords European Union 
Committee, The United Kingdom opt-in: problems with amendment and codification, 2008-9, available 
at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/55/5503.htm#note19  
71 MELONI, op. cit., p. 94. 
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KUIJPER convincingly arrives at an opposing interpretation by accepting that the 
measures linked to the visa lists, and in particular the black visa list previously based 
on Article 100cm, should remain for Denmark’s Community Law, according to 
Article 4 of the Protocol on Denmark.72 
 
The position of Denmark in this case is similar to that of Iceland and Norway, which 
were introduced to this new area of Community competence as a result of the 
integration of the Schengen acquis into the European legal order. A discussion of the 
legal problems resulting from this integration was provided in Chapter 1, and here 
only the aspects related to visa lists will be underlined. According to the two Council 
Decisions determining the legal basis for each of the provisions, or decisions which 
constitute the Schengen acquis,73 the Schengen Convention provisions on short-term 
visas (Articles 9-17) and some of the Executive Committee Decisions on visas have 
been allocated to Article 62(2)(b) EC Treaty. The fact of allocation transforms the 
previously intergovernmental provisions into secondary Community law in this area 
for the 13 Schengen states, alongside and going beyond the existing Community 
instruments on the list of third countries whose citizens do not require a visa. From 
that moment, all these decisions will have as their legal basis Article 62(2)(b) without 
the procedural requirements for the implementation of measures, on the basis of this 
provision as provided for in Article 67 having been complied with. Moreover, through 
the allocation to Article 62(2)(b), European Community law is created that does not 
apply to the United Kingdom and Ireland (unless they opt-in) and binds Denmark 
under general international law.  
 
Considering that two non-EU states were party to the Schengen Convention, before 
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, their status needed to be regulated 
through a special agreement. The Agreement74 provided that the participation of 
                                                        
72 KUIJPER, “Some legal problems associated with the Communitarization of Policy on visas, asylum 
and immigration under the Amsterdam Treaty and incorporation of the Schengen acquis”, Common 
Market Law Review, 2000, n. 37, pp. 345-366. Article 4 of the Protocol on Denmark reads: “Articles 1, 
2 and 3 shall not apply to measures determining the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, or measures relating to a 
uniform format for visas”. 
73 Decision 1999/436/EC, O.J. 1999, L 176/17. 
74 Agreement with the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ 
association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, O.J. 1999, 
L 176. 
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Iceland and Norway in Schengen aspects of the Union and the Community is 
restricted to decision-shaping and does not extend to decision-making. This is 
procedurally ensured through a Mixed Committee which mirrors the activities of all 
Council bodies but cannot make decisions. The decision-making occurs in the Council 
without Iceland or Norway’s presence. These two countries are also bound to carry 
out the Council’s Decisions and measures in the areas covered by the Agreement. One 
of the areas explicitly identified by the Council is that of visas for short stay and the 
list of countries with a visa exemption.75  
 
As the above indicates, the special arrangements for a number of Member States (the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) and a number of Schengen but non-EU states 
have created a complex system of decision-making in the Council. The examples 
provided by Kuijper illustrate that:  
 
When measures are deemed to build on the Schengen acquis, Norway and 
Iceland may participate in the decision-shaping but outside of the Council in the 
Mixed Committee; the UK and Ireland may participate if they elect to do so, but 
in the Council; and Denmark may implement the measures afterwards. Denmark, 
Iceland and Norway implement the measures as intergovernmental obligations, 
outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Ireland and the UK participate in the 
measures on the normal Community basis. If measures are considered not to be 
binding under Schengen, then the UK and Ireland may still opt in, but Iceland 
and Norway are excluded and probably Denmark too (unless there was 
willingness to grant Denmark either a certain leeway to decide for itself what 
measures “build upon Schengen”, or a broad ad hoc interpretation of the 
possibility for Denmark to decide whether or not to invoke the protocol granting 
it an exception).76  
 
This situation is somewhat altered by the two ECJ judgments77, discussed earlier, which show 
that the UK and Ireland can only opt-in under Article 5 when they are willing to be bound by 
the basic Schengen acquis rule on which the proposed measure builds further (Article 4). 
 
4. Trends in regulation post-Amsterdam 
Following the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty, the adoption of measures in the 
area of freedom, security and justice in general and in the field of visa policy, in 
                                                        
75 Council Decision of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement with 
the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ association with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (Decision 1999/437/EC), O.J. 
1999, L 176/31. 
76 KUIJPER, op. cit. 
77 C-137/05 and C-77/05, op.cit. 
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particular, developed in a systematic manner. Always, the general guidelines and 
political impetus came from the Council or the European Council. On this basis the 
Commission prepared action plans typically covering five years. At the end of the 
period there is an extensive reporting and evaluation both with regard to the 
achievements but also with regard to the concrete instruments adopted during that 
period.  
 
This section will look at the development of the regulation in the field of visa policy 
from two sides. Firstly, through a chronological analysis of the objectives and the 
achievements in the programmes and action plans to date. Secondly, through the 
identification of trends based on reactions to internal or external challenges, namely 
the move towards codification, the measures adopted in relation to terrorism and the 
measures adopted in response to enlargement.  
 
4.1. Chronology 
Vienna Action Plan 1998. The first Action which looked at how best to implement 
the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the creation of an area of freedom, 
security and justice was adopted by the Vienna European Council on 3 December 
200878 (hereafter the Vienna Action Plan). The action plan gives substance and 
defines the three core concepts of freedom, security and justice and on this basis 
defines priorities for the next five years, setting out a timetable of measures necessary 
to achieve the area of freedom, security and justice. Based on Title IV of the EC 
Treaty, Title VI of the Treaty on the European Union and the Schengen acquis 
incorporated into these Treaties, the Plan provides a coherent framework for the 
development of EU action, while guaranteeing tighter judicial and democratic review 
by the Court of Justice and the European Parliament.  
 
The way in which the priorities have been identified by the Council and the 
Commission and the way in which they intended to implement them is based on a 
number of principles. First and foremost, these are the principles of the Amsterdam 
                                                        
78 Council and Commission Action Plan of 3 December 1998 on how best to implement the provisions 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, Council doc. 
13844/98, O.J. 1999, C 19/1.  
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Treaty itself, but in addition: the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity, operational 
efficiency, the principle that responsibility for safeguarding internal security rests 
with the Member States, and finally the realistic approach are mentioned (in that 
order).79  
 
The measures related to visa form part of the section dedicated to “Measures in the 
field of the asylum, external borders and immigration”. The Action Plan sets two 
groups of measures – to be adopted respectively within two years and within five 
years. In the field of visas those measures are: 
 
To be taken within two years:80 
(i) procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member States (resources, 
guarantees of repatriation or accident and health cover) as well as the 
drawing up of a list of countries whose nationals are subject to an airport 
transit visa requirement (abolition of the current grey list); 
(ii) define the rules on a uniform visa (Article 62(iv) of the EC Treaty); 
(iii) draw up a regulation on countries: whose nationals are exempt from any 
visa requirement in the Member States of the European Union, and those 
whose nationals are subject to a visa requirement in the Member States of 
the European Union (Article 62 (2)(b)(i) of the EC Treaty); 
(iv) further harmonizing of Member States’ laws on carrier liability. 
 
The list of short-term measures clearly shows the intention of the Commission to 
propose measures all in the fields which under the Maastricht Treaty system were 
subject to competence disputes (e.g. visa white list, airport transit visas). 
 
To be taken within five years:81 
(i) extension of the Schengen representation mechanisms with regard to visas; 
according to the plan a discussion could be initiated on the possibility of 
establishing an arrangement between the Member States, which will 
improve the possibility of preventing visa applicants from abusing the 
                                                        
79 Paragraph 24 of the Vienna Action Plan, op. cit.  
80 Paragraph 36 (d) of the Vienna Action Plan, op. cit. 
81 Paragraph 38 (d) of the Vienna Action Plan, op. cit. 
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foreign representations of one or more Member States in order to gain 
access to another Member State, which at time of application was the 
actual country of destination; and 
(ii) attention will be given to new technical developments in order to ensure, 
as appropriate, an even better security of the uniform format for visas.  
 
Tampere Programme 1999-2004. One year after the adoption of the Vienna Action 
Plan, The Tampere European Council in October 1999, adopted what later became 
known as the Tampere Programme.82 The Programme took the objective of the 
progressive establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice as a basis and 
then set out policy guidelines and practical objectives, with a timetable for their 
attainment. The Commission, at the request of the European Council, drew up a 
scoreboard to review progress every six months.  
 
Visa policy is mentioned once in the Tampere Programme in the context of the 
management of migration flows. Paragraph 22 of the Council conclusions states: “A 
common active policy on visas and false documents should be further developed, 
including closer cooperation between EU consulates in third countries, and where 
necessary, the establishment of common EU visa issuing offices”. 
 
A special paragraph addresses the potential challenges arising from enlargement but 
as the text clearly states, at that point in time the priority was the protection of the 
external borders and no concern as to the special interests of the then future Member 
States is iterated. Paragraph 25 reads: 
 
25. As a consequence of the integration of the Schengen acquis into the Union, 
the candidate countries must accept in full that acquis and further measures 
building upon it. The European Council stresses the importance of the effective 
control of the Union’s future external borders by specialized trained 
professionals.  
 
The Tampere Programme also invited the Council to conclude readmission 
agreements or to include standard clauses in other agreements between the European 
Community and relevant third countries or groups of countries, based on the powers 
                                                        
82 European Council Tampere, “Council conclusions”, 15-16 October 1999. 
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which the Amsterdam Treaty conferred on the Community in the field of readmission. 
Interestingly enough, the European Council also stressed that “consideration should 
also be given to rules on internal readmission”.  
 
When the Commission reported on the achievements of the Tampere programme in 
2004,83 there was one main instrument referred to: the Visa Regulation adopted in 
2001.84 However, in its orientations for the future five year programme, the 
Commission stresses four elements related to the visa policy:85 
 
(i) in short and medium term, close attention is to be paid to establishing 
the conditions in which internal border checks can be abolished with the 
new Member States; 
(ii) visa policy will have to address serious concerns regarding document 
security and allow for improved consular cooperation. The work started on 
biometric data in travel and identity documents, in particular passports, 
must also continue; 
(iii) The Visa Information System (VIS) and the new Schengen 
Information System (SIS II) must come into operation and their full 
potential should be used; 
(iv) finally, there is a need for greater cooperation with neighbouring 
countries, and in particular countries with which we share borders, 
consistent with the new Union neighbourhood policy.  
 
The Hague Programme 2004-2009.86 This is the first programme to be adopted 
following the Eastern enlargement. Again it states that it is grounded in the general 
principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, solidarity and respect for the different legal 
systems and traditions of the Member States. The programme also states that 
“freedom, justice, control at the external borders, internal security and the prevention 
of terrorism should be considered indivisible within the Union as a whole. 
 
In the field of visa policy, the European Council underlines the need for further 
development of the common visa policy as part of a multi-layered system aimed at 
                                                        
83 Commission Staff Working Paper, “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: assessment of the 
Tampere programme and future orientations – List of the most important instruments adopted”, COM 
(2004) 401 final, SEC (2004) 680, Brussels, 2 June 2004, p. 12. 
84 Council Regulation 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those who are exempt from that requirement.  
85 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations, SEC 
(2004) 680 and SEC (2004) 693, COM (2004) 401 final, Brussels, 2 June 2004. 
86 Annex I to EU Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 November 2004. 
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facilitating legitimate travel and tackling illegal immigration through further 
harmonization of national legislation and handling practices at local consular 
missions. The issue of a common visa issuing office, present already in the Tampere 
programme, is mentioned again here as a long term objective, also in the context of 
the creation of the future European External Action Service. As concrete steps, the 
European Council:  
 
 Invites the Commission, as a first step, to propose the necessary amendments to 
further enhance visa policies and to submit in 2005 a proposal on the establishment of 
common application centres focusing inter alia on possible synergies linked with the 
development of the VIS, to review the Common Consular Instructions and table 
appropriate proposal by early 2006 at the latest; 
 Stresses the importance of swift implementation of the VIS, starting with the 
incorporation of among others alphanumerical data and photographs by the end of 
2006 and biometrics by the end of 2007 at the latest; 
 Invites the Commission to submit without delay the necessary proposal in order to 
comply with the agreed time frame for the implementation of the VIS; 
 Calls on the Commission to continue its efforts to ensure that the citizens of all 
Member States can travel without a short stay visa to all third countries whose 
nationals can travel to the EU without a visa as soon as possible; 
 Invites the Council and the Commission to examine, with a view to developing a 
common approach, whether in the context of the EC readmission policy it would be 
opportune to facilitate, on a case by case basis, the issuance of short stay visas to 
third-country nationals, where possible and on a basis of reciprocity, as part of a real 
partnership in external relations, including migration-related issues.  
 
The Action Plan87 adopted by the Commission takes into account the fact that on 22 
December 2004 the Council was able to adopt a decision applying co-decision and 
qualified majority voting to all Title IV measures, with the exception of legal 
immigration, as of 1 January 2005.88 However, the Council decision does not make 
reference to the measures adopted on the basis of Article 62 (2) (b) covering the rules 
on visa. As explained earlier, for those measures two different sets of procedure apply 
based on Article 67 (2) and (4): 
o for the visa list and the uniform format for visas - the Council acting by 
qualified majority voting on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament (Article 67(2)); 
                                                        
87 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Hague 
Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years: The Partnership for European renewal in the field of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, COM (2005) 184 final, Brussels, 10 May 2005. 
88 Council Decision 2004/927/EC of 22 December 2004 providing for certain areas covered by Title IV 
of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure laid 
down in Article 251 of the Treaty (O.J. 2004, L 396, p. 45) 
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o for procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member States and rules on 
a uniform visa - co-decision automatically following the expiry of the 
transition period. 
 
This is already considered the first success of the Hague Programme. The enhanced 
role of the European Parliament will improve the democratic legitimacy of the process 
while the rate of completion of the work is likely to increase with the abolition of the 
requirement of unanimity. However, the Commission notes with disappointment that 
the Council Decision of 22 December 2004 did not include, as foreseen by Article 67 
of the Treaty, any provision adapting the powers of the Court89.  
 
The concrete priorities in the visa field form part of the heading “Internal borders, 
external borders and visas: developing an integrated management of external borders 
for a safer Union”. The overall objective is the development of an integrated control 
of the access to the territory of the Union, based on an integrated management of the 
external border, a common visa policy and support of new technologies, including the 
use of biometric identifiers. In terms of concrete steps, the forthcoming abolition of 
controls of persons at internal borders with the new Member States are mentioned, as 
are the development of the Visa Information System and common visa application 
centres; the enhancing of document security and the inclusion of biometric identifiers. 
 
The table below presents the list of measures and the timetable for their adoption as 
presented by the Commission. 
 
                                                        
89 For a discussion of the changes in decision-making, see S. PEERS, “Transforming Decision-Making 
on EC Immigration and Asylum Law” (2005) 30 ELR 283. 
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Table 5.1. Visa policy and the development of the Visa Information System (VIS) 
List of measures (2005)90 Status in 200991 
Meetings with third countries of the positive visa list in order to ensure visa-
free travel for citizens of the Member States to all those third countries 
(ongoing, to be combined with the review of the visa list) 
Ongoing, since 2005, 
the Commission 
publishes an annual 
report on reciprocity 
Proposals related to the necessary amendments to further enhance visa 
policies and the establishment of common application centres for visas 
(2005) 
Achieved 
Regular review of the visa list (Regulation 539/2001) (regularly) Achieved 
Proposal on visa facilitation procedures for members of the Olympic Family 
– Turin 2006 (2005) 
Achieved 
Report on the implementation of Regulation 1295/2003 “Visa facilitation 
procedures for members of the Olympic Family – Athens 2004” (2005) 
Achieved 
Proposal amending the Common Consular Instructions on visa fees (2005) Achieved 
ARGO Work Programme (2005 and 2006)  
Proposals on transit: unilateral recognition of Schengen documents by the 
new Member States/recognition of Swiss residence permits by the Member 
States (2005) 
Achieved 
Recommendation for negotiation directives for visa waiver agreements 
between the EC and the third countries on the conditions to move freely  
within the Union for a period between three and six months (2005) 
Delayed due to lack of 
legal basis in the 
current Treaties 
Adoption of a proposal establishing a regime on local border traffic (2005) Achieved 
Report on the operation of the Kaliningrad transit scheme (2005) Achieved 
Kaliningrad facility (2005-2006) Achieved 
Schengen Facility for seven Member States (2005 and 2006) Achieved 
Specific recommendations for negotiating directives on visa facilitation with 
third countries in the context of the EC readmission policy, where possible 
and on the basis of reciprocity, in view of developing a real partnership on 
migration management issues (2005-2009) 
Achieved 
Proposal modifying the Common Consular Instructions on local consular 
cooperation (2006) 
Achieved 
Proposal on the review of Common Consular Instructions (2006) Achieved 
Technical implementation of the VIS, starting with the functionalities for 
processing alphanumeric data and photographs (2006) and adding the 
functionalities for biometric data (2006) 
Delayed 
Proposal on the creation of common consular offices (2007) Achieved 
 
                                                        
90 Based on Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The 
Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years: The Partnership for European renewal in the 
field of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM (2005) 184 final, Brussels, 10 May 2005, pp. 19-20. 
91 Based on Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Justice, Freedom and 
Security in Europe since 2005: An evaluation of The Hague Programme and Action Plan – General 
overview of instruments and deadlines provided in The Hague Programme and Action Plan in the fields 
of justice, freedom and security: Institutional Scoreboard, SEC (2009) 767 final, Brussels, 10 June 
2009, pp. 46-54. 
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4.2. Trends 
The review of the main developments in the visa field since the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty confirms the view of visa policy as a flanking measure to the 
lifting of the internal border controls. This is how the Commission defines the 
objectives of the policy in its evaluation of the Hague Programme:92 
 
The common visa policy is an essential flanking measure which is needed to 
maintain integrity of an area without internal border controls and ensure a high 
level of security at the external borders while facilitating legitimate travel and 
tackling illegal immigration of third country nationals required to hold a visa for 
short stays within the Schengen area. A coherent EU approach and harmonized 
solutions based on biometric identifiers were considered necessary to achieve 
this objective. 
 
The main trends in the development of the regulation in the visa field can be classified 
in three groups: the move towards codification, in response to terrorism and in 
response to enlargement. 
 
The move towards codification. The need for codification was urgent after the entry 
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, due to the incorporation of the Schengen acquis 
into the institutional and legal framework of the European Union. As the Schengen 
acquis, and the Common Consular Instruction, as parts of it, contained a wide range 
of documents that overnight became secondary law regulating visas, there was a need 
to codify the rules into a single document with a clear legal basis. Thus, the Common 
Consular Instructions were recast and incorporated together with all legal instruments 
governing the procedures and conditions for issuing visas into the proposed Code on 
visas.93 This aimed to enhance transparency; clarify existing rules; introduce measures 
                                                        
92 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Justice, Freedom and Security in 
Europe since 2005: An evaluation of the Hague Programme and Action Plan – An extended report on 
the evaluation of The Hague Programme, SEC (2009) 766 final, Brussels, 10 June 2009, pp. 32-34. 
93Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), O.J. 2009, L 243, pp. 1-58. For the proposal see 
COM (2006) 403 final, 19 July 2006 and also SEC (2006) 957 and SEC (2006) 958. The Visa Code is 
based on Article 62(2)(a) and (b)(ii) and  establishes the procedures and conditions for issuing visas for 
transit through or intended stays in the territory of the Member States not exceeding three months in 
any six month period. It includes rules on: airport transit visas, procedures and conditions for issuing 
visas (examination of and decision on a visa application, issuing of the visa, modification of an issued 
visa, visas issued at the external border), administrative management and organisation and local 
Schengen cooperation. For further details, see Chapter 10.   
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to increase the harmonization of procedures; and increase legal certainty and 
procedural guarantees.  
 
The codification in the visa field follows the completion of a similar exercise which 
lead to the adoption of the Schengen Borders Code which provides for the adoption of 
common measures on the crossing of internal borders by persons and border control at 
external borders.94 
 
In response to terrorism. The threat of terrorism increases the number of security 
measures related to the creation of databases and the inclusion of biometric identifiers 
in the databases and identity documents, both passports and visas. It is not by accident 
that more than half of the measures adopted under The Hague Programme relate to 
one of the above groups. A legislative framework for the implementation and 
operation of the Visa Information System was adopted, as a system for the exchange 
of visa data between Member States, aimed at facilitating the checks at external 
border crossings points. Biometric identifiers were introduced for Member States’ 
passports and other travel documents95; their residence permits96; and as a mandatory 
collection of such identifiers (facial image and ten fingerprints) from visa applicants97. 
 
                                                        
94 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code), O.J. 2006, L 105, pp. 1–32. The Schengen Borders Code is based on Article 
62 (1) and (2)(a) and provides for the absence of border control of persons crossing the internal borders 
between the Member States of the European Union and establishes rules governing border control of 
persons crossing the external borders of the Member States. It includes rules on: external borders 
(crossing and conditions of entry, control qt the external borders and refusal of entry, staff and 
resources for border control and cooperation between Member States, specific rules for border checks), 
internal borders (abolition of border control at internal borders, temporary reintroduction of border 
controls).  
The Visa Code and Schengen Borders Code regulate, in principle, different fields (visas and border 
control) with an intersection linked to the fact that one of the conditions for entry is "being in 
possession of a visa", which has to be issued respecting the rules of the Visa Code. 
95 See Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States, OJ L 385 of 29.12.2004, last amended by 
Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2009, OJ L 
142, 6.6.2009, p. 1–4 
96 See Council Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 of 18 April 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals, OJ L 115, 
29.4.2008, p. 1–7 
97 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 
concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on 
short-stay visas (VIS Regulation), OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 60–81 
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In response to enlargement. The final group of measures which will be subject to a 
detailed analysis in the following chapters are those introduced in response to 
enlargement. These include the special arrangements for Kaliningrad; the introduction 
of rules on local border traffic; the development of a “visa reciprocity mechanism” 
and the negotiations on visa facilitation agreements.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The gradual ‘communitarization’ of visa policy began with the Maastricht Treaty. 
Only the visa lists (and visa format) were included in the Community pillar. An 
extensive interpretation of the Article 100c EC by the Commission proposals was 
challenged by the Member States, as they defended their sovereignty in this field. The 
Visa Regulation of 1995 alone resulted in two litigations involving all the institutions. 
But, albeit under limited conditions, all Member States participated in all visa 
measures at this stage. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty resolved most of the uncertainties with regard to the 
competence and transferred all visa powers into the first pillar. However, the resulting 
complete shift of competence from national to European level led to the alienation of 
those Member States whose political preferences and special interests could not be 
accommodated by the new system; either because of their particular situation, as in 
the case of the UK and Ireland, or because of their particular understanding of 
sovereignty. These Member States opted out while other countries outside the EU 
opted in, because their close relations with the EU made it attractive to be part of the 
Schengen area. This implied for them the obligation to adopt Community rules, 
although they did not take part in the decision-making process. 
 
Thus, the shift of sovereignty to the European level led to a system of variable 
geometry, which over time became more and more complex. It included Member 
States that participated fully in all visa measures, Member States that did not but 
could participate, and non-Member States that participated fully in all measures.  
 
Apart from the flexibility given to certain states within the framework of the Treaties, 
the secondary legislation, for the most part inherited from the Schengen era, also 
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allowed a certain functional flexibility, as opposed to the institutional one set out in 





CHAPTER 6 – PROTOCOL MEETS PRAGMATISM - THE CASE OF 
GREECE 
 
There is always a gap between the general rules enshrined in legislation and their 
actual implementation. Even in areas with a considerable degree of harmonization, it 
is possible for European law to set the general objective to be reached by the Member 
States, while leaving a certain amount of discretion as to the means of achieving this 
goal. 
 
The same margin for manoeuvre can also be observed in the visa policy field, where 
despite the fact that it is being gradually taken over by the Community, it is still 
possible for Member States to achieve a certain degree of independence by using parts 
of the field that have not yet been harmonized. 
 
It should be noted that in the field of visa policy, all the major elements have already 
been harmonized. This includes determining the countries whose citizens need visas; 
the format the visas should take and the related entry conditions and requirements. 
However, the types of document used to ascertain the facts on which the decision to 
allow entry is based are still in the hands of the Member States. The present chapter 
will analyze how this ‘loophole’ has been used in a specific case by Greece, whose 
use of special ID cards in effect led to a rather liberal access to the EU and the 
Schengen space, without the need to request any specific geographical or functional 
exemptions or opt-outs.  
 
The case of Greece is particular, because prior to the Eastern enlargement, it was the 
only Schengen state with two specificities that became much more widespread after 
this enlargement. Namely, Greece shared land borders only with third countries that 
were on the Schengen and later the EU visa black list, and it also had a sizeable 
national minority in one of its neighbouring countries: Albania. 
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Section 1 briefly summarizes the general issues that arise when national minorities 
reside across the border. Section 2 provides a general and historical background to the 
case of Greeks in Albania; Section 3 analyzes the national legal framework, in 
particular the type of residence card used by Greece. It identifies its main 
characteristics, compares it to other types of residence card and outlines the basic 
rights it guarantees to its holders, also in comparison with the standard residence card. 
Section 4 places the Greek legal practice in the wider European context, by tracing the 
specific regulation related to residence cards in general and their role in the crossing 
of external borders and the free movement of third country nationals. 
 
1. Cross-border national minorities as grounds for flexibility 
The case of Greece is an interesting illustration of the problems that can arise when a 
country with a significant minority in a neighbouring country wishes to provide 
unhindered access to the territory of the motherland. This phenomenon mainly arises 
in areas with recently established borders, which were either disputed earlier or are 
the result of the exchange of territory after a major war and where the minority is not 
located in a Member State. Cross border minorities within the EU do not raise this 
issue because of the EC free movement rules. 
 
One of the possible reactions of governments in such a situation is to grant citizenship 
to any member of the minority living abroad.1 In many countries, the citizenship 
legislation provides for a fast-track or simplified procedure for people of the ethnic 
origin concerned, in order to acquire the citizenship of their motherland. The benefits 
of this citizenship are unquestionable; not only does it guarantee access to the territory 
with unproblematic entry, it also provides access to numerous services (education, 
health care, unemployment benefits and social services) that would otherwise be more 
difficult to obtain for non-citizens. Despite the obvious benefits of offering citizenship 
to minority members, in fact it is not so widely applied because of a number of 
complications inherent in the practice. These complications are mainly linked to: 
either the status of the third countries in which the minority members reside, or to the 
status of the population in the motherland. 
 
                                                        
1 This is the case in Germany, Bulgaria and Romania, among others. 
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Third country complications mainly arise when the new citizenship is not the only 
citizenship of the minority member. Except in the case of stateless persons (relevant 
only in Estonia)2 even members of a minority normally have the citizenship of their 
country of residence. Considering the worldwide attempt to decrease the number of 
people with multiple citizenships, most countries have provisions prohibiting dual 
citizenship or require the renunciation of the old citizenship when a new one is 
acquired3.  Moreover, in some countries only nationals can own or inherit land.4 This 
creates another obstacle over and above the prohibition of dual citizenship, but it is 
widespread and difficult to regulate in the absence of close cooperation between the 
countries concerned. These obstacles to dual citizenship have been relevant for the 
case in question (the Greek minority in Albania) but also, for example, for the 
Bulgarian or German minorities in the former Soviet Union, who could not acquire 
citizenship of their motherland unless they renounced the citizenship of their country 
of residence.5 
 
The second complication resulting from the granting of citizenship to minority 
members who reside in a third country lies in the attitude of the population in the 
                                                        
2 After regaining independence in 1991, Estonia recognised citizenship of everybody who was a citizen 
prior to the Soviet occupation of 1940 or descended from such a citizen but did not grant any new 
citizenship authomatically. This affected people who have arrived in the country after 1940, the 
majority of whom were ethnic Russians. Knowledge of Estonian language and history were set as 
conditions for naturalization. As a result, according to Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1992 
32% of residents lacked any form of citizenship. For a detailed analysis of the citizenship rules in 
Estonia, see P. JARVE, “Estonian citizenship: Between ethnic preferences and democratic obligations” 
in R. BAUBÖCK, B. PERCHINIG AND W. SIEVERS (eds.) Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, 
Amsterdam University Press, 2009. 
3 See among others ALFRED M. BOLL, Multiple Nationality and International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, 2007, EVA ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN, Dual Citizenship: Policy Trends and Political 
Participation in EU Member States, European Parliament, Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Brussels, 2008, RAINER BAUBÖCK, EVA ERSBØLL, KEES GROENENDIJK AND 
HARALD WALDRAUCH (EDS.) Acquisition and Loss of Nationality. Policies and Trends in 15 European 
States. 2 volumes, Amsterdam University Press, September 2006. Data and additional analyses are 
available at: www.imiscoe.org/natac.  
4 This has been the case especially in post-communist countries, where the issue of the ownership of 
agricultural land by foreigners has been a very contentious issue for a long time. See for further details, 
LYNN M. TESSER, “East-Central Europe’s new security concern: foreign land ownership”, Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 37, Issue 2, June 2004, Pages 213-239 and JOHAN F.M. 
SWINNEN AND SCOTT ROZELLE , From Marx and Mao to the Market: The Economics and Politics of 
Agricultural Transition,  Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. 
5 There is of course a large body of literature on many different aspects of dual citizenship; however, 
for the purposes of this work only the de facto limitations on dual citizenship in Eastern Europe are 
relevant. On this aspect, see LOWELL BARRINGTON, “The Domestic and International Consequences of 
Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 5 (Jul., 1995), pp. 731-
763. The issue of double citizenship has also been a constant source of problems for the large Turkish 
minority living in Germany. 
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motherland. The importance of this consideration grew noticeably after the attempt in 
Hungary to institute a fast-track citizenship procedure for Hungarian minorities in 
neighbouring countries. The referendum held on this issue failed, thereby forcing the 
government to search for alternative forms of regulation to ensure the link with the 
motherland upon accession to the EU.6  
 
In the face of such challenges, the alternative to granting wholesale citizenship is 
often the creation of some kind of document (residence permit, ‘ethnic card’ or a 
special multi-entry visa) to ensure that contacts with the motherland are maintained.7 
Such an approach has obvious shortcomings, especially compared to the citizenship 
option. It grants the right of entry and possibly some access to the labour market but it 
does not provide the full protection of citizenship. Still, for the purposes of studying 
the right of entry and the possibilities of flexible application to ensure contacts 
between Schengen and non-Schengen countries, consideration of the Greek case can 
provide certain insights into the way in which the Schengen acquis on visas and entry 
conditions can be applied, while ensuring the unproblematic entry of minority 
members. 
 
                                                        
6 The situation of Hungary, its ‘Status Law’ and the measures it took to ensure the access to its territory 
for the Hungarian minority members in neighbouring countries is addressed in detail in Chapter 7. In 
brief, on 5 December 2004, Hungary held a referendum on whether it should offer Hungarian 
citizenship to Hungarians living outside the borders of the Hungarian state. The novelty of the proposal 
was not the introduction of the possibility for dual citizenship (as it already existed) but in the waiving 
of all residency requirements as conditions for obtaining a Hungarian second citizenship. The text of 
the referendum question was as follows: “Do you think that Parliament should pass a law allowing 
Hungarian citizenship with preferential naturalization to be granted to those, at their request, who claim 
to have Hungarian nationality, do not live in Hungary and are not Hungarian citizens, and who prove 
their Hungarian nationality by means of a “Hungarian Identity Card” issued pursuant to Article 19 of 
Act LXII of 2001 or in another way to be determined by the law which is to be passed?”. Ultimately 
the referendum failed due to the low participation – 63.33 per cent of the eligible voters stayed away 
from the referendum. The results among those participating were 51.57 per cent in favour of the reform 
and 48.43 per cent against. For the most recent analysis of the issue, see M. KOVACS AND J. TOTH, “ 
Kin-state responsibility and ethnic citizenship: The Hungarian case” in ” in R. BAUBÖCK, B. PERCHINIG 
AND W. SIEVERS (eds.) Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, Amsterdam University Press, 2009 
7 See, for example, the so-called Hungarian Certificate (Magyar Igazolvány), issued by Hungary on the 
basis of the “Status Law” of 2001 or the Card of the Pole (Karta Polaka) issued by Poland since 2008. 
Both cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  
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2. The Greek minority in Albania: Geographic and historical background 
Albania and Greece share a border of 282 km,8 leaving a Greek minority in south-east 
Albania and an Albanian minority in the west of Greece. There is no agreement on the 
exact number of Greeks living in Albania. According to the official Albanian census 
of 1989,9 they number 3% of the total Albanian population, while Greek sources10 
refer to as many as 12%, thus bringing the total number of Greeks in Albania to 
somewhere between 60,000 and 400,000.  
 
The presence of the Greek-speaking minority on Albanian territory has led to 
recurring problems with the right to education in Greek, the right of association, the 
establishment of political parties, etc.; disputes that have been documented by the 
media, human rights protection organizations and scholars.11 The focus here is on the 
possibilities of the Greek minority to maintain contact with the motherland and to 
travel freely from their country of residence to their country of ethnic belonging. The 
Greek minority is referred to in Albania as a “national minority”, unlike some other 
Albanian minority groups who are referred to as “linguistic minorities.”12 
 
The Greek minority members who only hold Albanian citizenship are required to 
meet the criteria for any third country national for the purposes of entry. Since 
                                                        
8 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available at www.cia.gov. See also DE RAPPER, 
“The Greek-Albanian border and its impact on local populations”, Cahiers Parisiens, n. 3, (2007), pp. 
566-575. See also: Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples - Albania: Greeks” (2008), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49749d6531.html 
9 The last census in Albania was in 2001, but matters like ethnicity, religion and language were not 
included, see Council of Europe, COMPENDIUM: Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe:  
http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/albania.php?aid=421); and The Census Online: Internet Census 
Resources for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Michigan State University Libraries, 
available at: http://guides.lib.msu.edu/page.phtml?page_id=1297   
10 See for example, “Greek-Albanian relations overview”, Greece Now, 2001, available at 
http://greecenow.criticalpublics.com/POLITICS/SouthEastEurope/greekalbanianrelations.stm. 
11 See for example, “Albania: The Greek Minority”, Human Rights Watch, 1 February 1995, available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7e58.html.  
12 Albania recognises three national minorities (Greek, Macedonian and Serbian-Montenegrin) and two 
ethno-linguistic minorities (Aromanian and Roma). See Albania 2007 Progress Report, SEC (2007) 
1429, 6.11.2007. The difference between national and ethno-linguistic minorities is that Albania is 
bound to fulfil certain commitments towards national minorities under the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. For further details see also the OSCE 
Report on Albania, from www.osce.org/publications/hcnm, Greek Helsinki Committee, Report on the 
completion of a project “On the status of the minorities in the Republic of Albania”, available at: 
http://www.southeasteurope.org/documents/0009albminorities.pdf.  
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Albania has always13 been on the EU’s black list it follows that, in principle, even 
members of the Greek minority in Albania have to obtain a visa in order to visit 
Greece. 
 
Under these circumstances, faced with the difficulty of providing access to its 
territory through citizenship, Greece developed a new document to facilitate the 
movement of Greeks from Albania to Greece; a special type of residence permit. 
Official data concerning the number of these permits is not publicly available, but 
various estimates put it at 80,000.14 
 
This happened at a time when, as with other southern Member States, Greece 
experienced an increase in immigration during the 1990s. A 2001 census recorded the 
number of residents without Greek citizenship as 672,000, which grew by 2004 to 
940,000 (9% of the population) of which about 100,000 were ethnic Greeks.15  
 
Migrant Greeks from Albania: Official Albanian statistics put the number of ethnic 
Greeks at approximately 60,000, while, as mentioned above, various Greek sources16 
claim that 200,000 – 400,000 ethnic Greeks occupy the regions of southern Albania. 
Greece distinguishes ethnic Greeks with an Albanian passport from other foreign 
nationals.  Only ethnic Greeks from Albania can acquire a special identity card, which 
also serves as an unrestricted work permit.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no official data available on the number of Albanians who 
acquired Greek citizenship, because these data are considered as sensitive to national 
security and are thus confidential.17   
                                                        
13 For the whole period since the creation of the first Schengen black list.  
14 Data and definitions from THEODORIDES AND DIMITRAKOPOULOS, Analytical Report on Legislation, 
RAXEN National Focal Point Greece, Antigone, Information and Documentation Centre, (Athens and 
Vienna, 2004). The official justification for this secrecy is ‘national security’. The Greek government 
apparently does not want the Albanian government to know how many of its citizens have opted for 
this special document. 
15 APOSTOLATOU, “Immigrant and immigration policy-making: A review of the literature of the Greek 
Case”, IMISCOE Working Paper, Country Report, WP 11, available at International Migration,  
Integration and Social Cohesions, http://www.imiscoe.org/publications/workingpapers/. 
16 See for example, “Greek-Albanian relations overview”, op. cit. 
17 M. BALDWIN-EDWARDS, National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime, RAXEN National 
Focal Point Greece, Antigone, Information and Documentation Centre, (Athens and Vienna, (2004), 
available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/CS-RV-NR-EL.pdf.  In reality, the underlying 
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3. The national legislation 
3.1. Background 
In the literature dedicated to citizenship and immigration in Greece, there are several 
terms that need definition before one can proceed with the analysis of the legal texts.18 
The main distinction is based on the term genos (descent) and was transferred from “a 
key element of Greekness”19 to a legal definition distinguishing homogeneis 
(literally, “people of the same lineage”) who are considered Greek regardless of their 
actual citizenship and allogeneis (literally, “people of a different lineage”) who are 
considered non-Greek even if they possess Greek citizenship. The homogeneis group 
is further divided in two main groups.  
 
Repatriated ethnic Greeks (palinnostountes homogeneis) are residents of the New 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union of Greek ethnic descent, who have the 
right to apply for Greek citizenship if their nationality cannot be established by the 
procedures laid down in the Ankara and Lausanne Treaties20. Citizenship is granted 
                                                                                                                                                               
issue of ethnicity is always problematic considering for example the cases of mixed marriages and the 
difficulties of documenting ethnicity in countries with poor public administrations. 
18 The issue of the ethnic Greeks from Albania (but also from other parts of the world and especially 
the former Soviet Union) has been subject to scholarly interest from three different perspectives. One 
of the aspects is linked to the study of the Greek ethnicity, or “Greekness” and the way it has been 
linked to the motherland through political and legal measures. Another approach looks at the issues 
through the prism of immigration, analyzing the political and legal rationale for creating favourable 
conditions for immigration for the ethnic Greeks mainly from Albania or the ex-USSR. The third line 
of study focuses on the problem through the prism of citizenship studies, comparing the conditions 
offered to immigrants and to the various categories of ethnic Greeks.  
19 K. TSITSELIKIS, “Citizenship in Greece: Present challenges for future changes”, University of 
Macedonia, Thessaloniki, draft available at: 
http://www.antigone.gr/project_deliverables/Citizenship_in_Greece___Present_challenges_for_future_
changes.doc.  
20 The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24 July 1923 between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, 
Greece, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on one side and Turkey on the other. 
The Treaty replaced the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 and settled issues of borders, the Turkish Straits, 
trade and various agreements. Its Section II and Articles 30 to 36 determine the rules on nationality of 
the population on the territories which now belonged to a different state. The Treaty also contains 
provisions on minority protection. However, those came after minoroties populations were already 
exchanged based on an agreement of January 1923 for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 
which foresaw compulsory transfer of population. All Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion 
established on Turkish territory (other than Constantinopole) and all Greek nationals of Muslim 
religion established on Greek territory (other than the newly acquired region of Western Thrace) were 
to be forcibly exchanged. The ensuing loss of property in this process was later confirmed by the 
Ankara Treaty of 1930. For details see also M. BALDWIN-EDWARDS, “Migration between Greece and 
Turkey: from the ‘Exchange of Populations’ to the non-recognition of borders”, SEER SouthEast 
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on the findings of a special committee appointed jointly by the Minister of Interior 
and the Foreign Minister, on the basis of an interview and examination of “any 
information submitted thereby providing the said capacity”, i.e. Greek ethnic 
descent.21 
 
Migrant ethnic Greeks (homogeneis) are Albanian citizens of ethnic Greek descent. 
They are entitled to a residence permit of up to ten years’ duration, of a uniform 
format in accordance with Regulation 1030/2002/EC, as well as to the special 
homogeneis identity card, of equal duration. These are issued by the competent 
Aliens’ Department of the Greek Police, after a procedure involving an interview 
before a three-member special committee and the examination of any additional 
evidence that can prove Greek descent.22 
 
3.2. Reforms after the collapse of the Iron Curtain  
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe led to an influx of immigrants from 
the neighbouring countries (mainly Albania), which in turn led to the need to reform 
the regulations of entry, residence and other immigration-related issues by replacing 
an old law from 1929, albeit with numerous amendments. Between the two census of 
1991 and 2001, the resident population with a foreign citizenship increased by about 
600.000, equivalent to about 6% of the total population. Almost two thirds of this 
increase is accounted for by Albanian citizens and most of the remainder comprises 
citizens from the former Soviet Union.23 This dramatic growth in immigration had a 
profound influence on the policy regarding citizenship and residency. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs (SEER SouthEast Europe Review for Labour and Social 
Affairs), issue: 03 / 2006, pages: 115-122 
21 Article 15(2), Law No. 3284 (Government Gazette A 217/10.11.2004, p.5941 – 5947) on the 
ratification of the Code of Greek Citizenship, as replaced by Article 1 of Presidential Decree 92/2006 
(Government Gazette A 95/2006), available at: http://www.ypes.gr/el/Foreigner/Laws/  
22 Greece, Joint Ministerial Decision n° 4000/3/10 δ’/2005 (Government Gazette B 646- 13.5.2005)-A 
French version of the earlier 1998 Joint Ministerial Decision on the Conditions, Duration and 
Procedure for the Delivery of a Special Identity Card to Albanian citizens of Greek origin (Official 
Gazette No234 –B, 15 April 1998). Version in French is available in: European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their 
Kin-State: Collection of Laws, Strasbourg, 15 October 2001, available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL(2001)096-e.pdf.  
23 K. Tsitselikis, “Citizenship in Greece: Present challenges for future changes”, op. cit. 
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A new law was adopted in 1991, the Immigration Law 1975/1991, which regulated 
the “entry and exit, sojourn, employment, expulsion of aliens, determination of aliens 
status and other provisions”.  
 
Another law was adopted in 2001, dealing with the “entry and residence of aliens on 
Greek territory; the acquisition of Greek citizenship by naturalization and other 
provisions”.  
 
The issue of naturalization was once again addressed in the new Code of Greek 
Citizenship, adopted in 2004; the relevant provisions of which replaced the preceding 
legislation. In order to differentiate the criteria valid for foreigners applying for 
naturalization from those valid for applicants of Greek origin, the general rules will be 
explored briefly below.   
 
3.3. Attribution of Greek citizenship 
The general procedure for acquiring Greek citizenship through naturalization is a 
long, expensive and complex process stipulated by the Articles 5-13 of law No. 
3284/2004 on the ratification of the Code of Greek Citizenship (hereinafter Code of 
Greek Citizenship). Applications take several years to be reviewed and apparently 
very few24 are approved. 
 
In order to be eligible for Greek citizenship through naturalization all foreigners (EU 
and non-EU citizens) must be over 18 and have no criminal record.25 Based on law 
3284/2004, applicants also have to fulfil a number of statutory requirements, 
including adequate knowledge of the Greek language, history and culture, as well as a 
total of 10 years’ residency in Greece in the 12 years preceding the date of the 
application. The only exception to the residency requirement (apart from foreigners 
without nationality or refugees) is for foreigners who were born and raised in Greece, 
as well as those who are married to Greeks and have children with Greek spouses. 
                                                        
24 Public authorities do not release data on naturalization and citizenship acquisition, especially 
concerning ethnic Greeks. 
25Also no pending judgements for deportations against them. 
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The application for Greek citizenship through naturalization is submitted to the 
applicant's municipality, accompanied by the following documents: 
 
 A declaration of naturalization signed in the presence of the mayor and two 
witnesses (Greek citizens); 
 A photocopy of the applicant's passport or valid travel document. A translation is 
required if the information on this document is not written in Latin characters; 
 A photocopy of the applicant's residence permit; 
 A photocopy of the applicant's birth certificate;26 
 A photocopy of the applicant's most recent income tax return; 
 A non-refundable processing fee of € 1,470. 
 
The last condition obviously represents a serious obstacle for applicants coming from 
poor countries. 
The application and all the required documents are examined by the local prefecture 
and forwarded for approval to the agency of the Region competent for nationality 
matters. If the application is approved, officials at the regional office request a copy of 
the applicant's Type A criminal record certificate, a certificate of non-deportation and 
any other information deemed useful. The application is then forwarded to the Interior 
Ministry, where officials (Naturalization Committee) hold a personal interview with 
the applicant to assess his/her character and profiency in the Greek language. If the 
applicant fails to appear for interview, his/her absence is only justified on grounds of 
force majeure. If the application is approved, the decision is published in the 
Government Gazette and the applicant must take an oath of allegiance within one 
year.27 If the application is rejected, it is possible to re-apply after one year. 
 
Non-nationals of Greek descent who reside abroad may also acquire Greek 
citizenship. They must submit an application to their local Greek consular office with 
the following documents: 
 
                                                        
26 This is not required for refugees. 
27 “I swear to be true to my homeland, to obey the constitution and the laws of this country and to 
consciously fulfill my duties as a Greek citizen.” 
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 A declaration of naturalization signed in the presence of the consul and two Greek 
citizens who serve as witnesses; 
 A Type A criminal record certificate issued by authorities in his/her country of 
residence. 
 A copy of passport or other travel document 
 A birth certificate. 
The application is then processed by the Interior Ministry. 
 
3.4. Special rules for ethnic Greeks 
Various rules exist to regulate the position of ethnic Greeks who are exclusively 
linked to two geographic regions – the former Soviet Union and Albania. Ethnic 
Greeks are in general treated separately and differently by law and several legal 
provisions facilitate not only their acquisition of Greek citizenship but also the 
availability of special identity cards and further social and educational rights.  
However, as will become clear later, the Greek authorities de facto tried to discourage 
Greeks from Albania from applying for citizenship. 
 
In 1990, on the basis of a Joint Ministerial Decision by the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Ministry of Defense 24755/6-4-1990, repatriated Greeks could enroll in 
municipal registers and remain in Greece indefinitely without providing any further 
documentation other than proof of their ethnic descent.  
 
In 1993, according to Law 2130/1993 the concept of ‘repatriation’ became a legal 
term and ethnic Greeks were distinguished from other foreign nationals in the 
acquisition of Greek citizenship by a special rapid process.  
 
These rules were supplemented by Law 2790 of 2000 and Ministerial Decision 
4864/8/8-y/2000, which offered special rights, support structures and another distinct 
procedure for the rapid granting of Greek citizenship to ethnic Greeks from the former 
Soviet Union. Law 2790/200028 regulated the repatriation of ethnic Greeks, citizens of 
the former Soviet Union to Greece, the conditions for the acquisition of Greek 
                                                        
28 Greece, Law No 2790/2000, op.cit.  
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citizenship and special provisions for their social integration. Subsequently, the new 
Code of Greek Citizenship replaced and largely repealed the provisions of this law. 
According to this law a clear distinction is made between ethnic Greeks and others 
concerning the procedures for naturalization. 
 
According to Article 15 of the Code of Greek Citizenship, an ethnic Greek may 
submit an application to the Greek Consulate in the country of residence. A passport, 
birth certificate, certificate of family status, and any other official document proving 
Greek descent are required. A special three-member committee examines the 
documents, interviews the applicant and reports to the head of the Consulate who then 
forwards the report to the General Secretary of the Region of the future residence of 
the applicant. On the basis of the report, and a second report by a special regional 
committee that re-examines all documents and testimonies verifying the Greek 
descent of the applicant, the General Secretary decides whether to grant citizenship. If 
all is in order, the decision is published in the Government Gazette and the applicant 
acquires Greek citizenship. Within one year the applicant must take an oath of 
allegiance before the Greek Consul. 
 
The key provision of the law of 2000 for the present study, (see paragraph 11 of 
Article 1, which has expressly remained in force according to the Code of Greek 
Citizenship), is the following: in the case that, for a person of Greek origin coming 
from the former Soviet Union, the acquisition of Greek citizenship entails, in 
accordance with the domestic legislation of their country of origin, the loss of the 
nationality of the latter country, or this repatriate does not wish to apply for Greek 
citizenship, or this person has already applied and is expecting the decision of the 
General Secretary of the Region Greek authorities may provide him/her, as well as 
his/her minors, with a “Special Identity Card”. Spouses of Special Identity holders 
automatically receive residence and work permits. For the acquisition of this Card, an 
interview as well as any supporting evidence is required. Moreover, by decision of the 
Interior Minister, special committees may review all documents concerning the 
acquisition either of Greek citizenship or the “Special Identity Card”. The Interior 
Ministry is the competent authority for the planning and implementation of all 
governmental policies related to the reception, social support and incorporation of 
repatriated persons in Greek society. What is interesting in this case is that it is 
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possible to apply for the card even if a person does not reside in Greece. This is 
possible for the ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union but not for the ethnic 
Greeks from Albania, however. Ethnic Greeks (homogeneis) from the former Soviet 
Union are the recipients of special integration measures and rapid naturalization 
procedures; ethnic Greeks from elsewhere are generally denied integration assistance 
and are required to apply through the normal procedures for Greek nationality.  
 
Ethnic Greeks from Albania had de facto great difficulties acquiring Greek nationality 
until 2006. Their applications were not dealt with for years, with the result that few of 
them were able to acquire Greek citizenship. Given this situation, it was more 
important that their position be regulated by Ministerial Decree No. 4000/3/10-/2005 
about “residence and work of Albanian citizens of Greek origin”. The preceding 
decision on the same subject matter, Ministerial Decree No. 4000/3/10-/199829 
defined as one of its considerations: “The need to assure equal prerequisites for 
employment of the Albanian citizens of Greek origin, residing in our country, in 
relation to Greek citizens, aiming at the regular functioning of the labour market.”30 
Article 1 of the 2005 Decision that is now in force provides that the Albanian citizens 
of Greek origin residing in Greece, apart from the residence permit of up to ten years’ 
duration, of a uniform format in accordance with Regulation 1030/2002/EC, a special 
homogeneis identity card valid for the same duration (i.e. up to 10 years) as that of the 
residence permit is given, by the police authorities, which handle foreign citizens’ 
issues (Aliens’ Departments of the Greek Police). The card is renewable and can also 
be issued to spouses and children of homogeneis. It is important to note at this point 
that contrary to the situation of the ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union, the 
ethnic Greeks from Albania can only apply for the special identity card in Greece – 
which implies that they need to obtain a visa to enter Greece lawfully. The conditions 
under which the presence (or residence) in Greece are, however, not subject to any 
limitations or controls. 
 
Article 2 of the Ministerial Decision provides that in order to obtain the special 
identity card, it is sufficient if the applicant presents a valid travel document from his 
                                                        
29 Available in French on the website of the Venice Commission, “Legislation on Kin-minorities”, 
available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL(2001)095-e.asp.  
30 See point 6 of the Ministerial Decision. 
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country of citizenship and a valid consular visa. In addition to these documents, it is 
necessary to prove the ethnic Greek origin of the applicant, both by means of official 
documents and a personal interview before a three-member committee, to which 
additional evidence proving Greek descent may be presented.  
 
Once issued, the card provides its holder with the right to residence and work for the 
period of its validity and, as we will see in the next section, with free movement 
within the Schengen area due to the fact that this special identity card is always given 
together with a residence permit of the same duration. 
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain how many homogeneis cards have been 
issued so far. The number of both types of these special permits, respectively for 
ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union or Albania, is not published by the 
Ministry of Public Order for “reasons of national security”.31 The estimates are that 
since 2000 about 200,000 of these special identity cards have been issued to the two 
groups (2000 was also the year in which Greece became a full member of the 
Schengen group). 
 
3.5. Greece’s integration into Schengen32 
The Schengen Convention was signed in 1990 and entered into force only on 26 
March 1995. Greece was not part of the original group of signatory countries. It 
joined the group through an international agreement. Initially, as of December 1991, 
Greece was considered as an observer, and then signed an accession agreement in 
November 1992. Meanwhile, new legislation dealing with aliens was adopted with the 
199133 Aliens, Immigration and Refugees Act, an act that provided for the legal 
alignment as regards some of the Schengen provisions, especially those dealing with 
                                                        
31 Unfortunately no further explanations are being given as to why these data should have an impact on 
national security. For statistical data on immigrants in Greece, see “An analytical study of available 
data and recommendations for conformity with European Union standards”, Final Report, Migration 
Policy Institute, Greece, 15 November 2004, pp. 2-3, available at 
http://www.mmo.gr/pdf/general/IMEPO_Final_Report_English.pdf.  
32 For a detailed analysis of the Greek implementation of the Schengen agreement and the perceptions 
in society about it, see SAMATAS, “Greece in ‘Schengenland’: blessing or anathema for citizens’ and 
foreigners’ rights?”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 29, No.1, (2003), pp. 141-156. 
33 Greece, Law No 1975/1991 on entry, exit, sojourn, employment, and removal of foreigners, 
recognition procedure of refugees and other stimulations. 
  239
grounds for issuing and refusing a visa, setting up “anti-clandestine immigration 
patrols” and lists of undesirable aliens.34  
 
Despite the initial enthusiasm of Greece at joining the Schengen group of states – 
driven probably by the importance of tourism to the country’s economy – it took five 
years to ratify the Treaty.35 This finally happened on 11 June 1997, following the 
adoption of Bill 2472/97 on 13 March 1997 as a legal precondition for the entry of 
Greece into the Schengen Agreement. Only once these legal pre-conditions were 
fulfilled, could the peer review performed on each new Schengen state begin. This 
peer review took over two years, mainly due to problems related to the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis and the apprehension of the other Schengen 
members about whether Greece would be able to patrol its maritime border properly. 
Greece became a full member of Schengen on 26 March 2000 when border controls 
were lifted, ten years after the entry into force of the Schengen agreement itself. 
 
4. Flexibility within the framework of Schengen  
Given the political aim of Greece to facilitate contact with the national minority living 
in a neighbouring country, a solution might have been the more liberal granting of 
visas. This seems to have happened in the case of Greece. Greek consulates in 
Albania issue about 60 to 70 thousand visas annually (two thirds of which are issued 
in the two Greek consulates in the border region).36 This number is higher than the 
official Albanian figure for the size of the Greek minority (60 thousand as mentioned 
                                                        
34 SAMATAS, op. cit. 
35 The delay was due to internal party disagreements. The Schengen Accession Agreement was signed 
by the government of the New Democracy party. The subsequent PASOK governments were reluctant 
to ratify the Agreement, fearing that national sovereignty would be diluted and personal privacy laws 
would be violated by the SIS. The ratification came after the Greek-Turkish crisis of January 1996 
when the two countries came close to a military confrontation over contested Greek sovereign rights in 
the Aegean Sea. At that point in time, the main government argument in favour of Schangen was that it 
would first shield Greece’s borders against Turkish territorial claims in the Aegean, as it would lead to 
a de facto recognition of all Greek borders as external borders of the European Union. The role of 
Schengen as “necessary crime prevention apparatus” took a secondary place. For more details on the 
political debates, arguments and press coverage see, Samatas, op.cit.  
36 The case of Greece also illustrates other aspects of the use and perhaps misuse of flexibility under 
Schengen. For example, Greece issues close to 100 thousand visas annually with a limited territorial 
validity (VTL).  This amounts to almost one half of the total of around 200,000 issued by all Schengen 
member countries. Almost all of the VTL visas issued by Albania came from the two Greek consulates 
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Latest available data for 2008, see General Secretariat 
of the Council, DG H 1A 8215/08 available on 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st08/st08215.en08.pdf.  
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above) and would still constitute a sizeable proportion of the Greek minority if Greek 
sources are used, which put this minority at about 400 thousand. About one half of the 
visas issued by the Greek consulates in Albania were longer-term national visas. This 
is highly unusual among all other member countries, where Schengen visas 
outnumber national ones by about 5-10 to 1. Thus, it is apparent that Greece was 
liberally granting longer-term (national) visas. But this was perceived as not being 
sufficient. These visas did not include a work permit, although clearly the purpose of 
the migration in most cases was to find a job in Greece in order to support family at 
home. 
 
The importance of the special residence cards issued by the Greek authorities has a 
wider European significance as far as the free movement of third country nationals is 
concerned. While the conditions and procedures under which residence rights are 
granted still fall within the competence of each Member State, the mere fact of 
holding a residence permit from one Member State immediately grants a right towards 
the other Member States, namely the right of entry under Schengen rules. In effect 
this is a strong example of mutual recognition principle. 
 
With the first provisions of the Schengen acquis related to entry conditions, it was 
stated that holding a residence permit from a Schengen state could replace the need 
for a visa for a third-country national.37 Thus, for that category of persons, entry into 
the common space is possible on simple presentation of their travel document (usually 
passport) and their residence permit/card. Having this rule in place explains why the 
granting of residence permits to minority members in third countries who would 
normally be treated as aliens under national legislation, could solve the problem of 
access to the motherland, whenever strict entry rules are applied due to the 
communitarization of visa rules38. 
 
One might argue that the more direct approach of granting citizenship to the group in 
question might be preferable. To start with, citizenship gives access to a much wider 
                                                        
37 Article 5(3) of the Schengen Implementing Convention, O.J. 2000, L 239, p. 19 and Annex IV “List 
of documents entitling holders to entry without a visa” of the Common Consular Instructions, O.J. 
2000, L 239, p. 356. 
38 The widespread application of this possibility in the case of Greece could be considered as against 
the spirit of the Schengen system; however, it was accepted by the other Schengen States.  
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range of rights than a residence permit. Even when taking into consideration the types 
of permit developed in Greece that could amount to quasi-citizenship,39 including the 
unlimited right to work, social payments, acquisition of property limited to nationals 
but open to those with the same ethnic background etc., it still falls short of political 
rights, such as participation in national elections.  
 
Finally, citizenship would by its nature be unlimited in time, which cannot be said for 
residence permits, which in their particular remit are directed at ethnic Greeks and are 
still limited in time. 
 
Granting citizenship to minority members abroad cannot always be carried out on a 
massive scale, however. One key legal obstacle is the prohibition of dual citizenship 
in many countries. Whenever such a prohibition applies, members of the ethnic 
minority are often reluctant to acquire the kin-state (here Greek) citizenship. The 
ensuing loss of citizenship of their country of residence (Albania) could have a 
negative effect on their property rights there as well as on their possibility to own or 
inherit land. However, it might also be the case that dual citizenship is actively 
discouraged by the motherland, as it could lead to a mass exodus and thus decrease 
minority numbers across the border. 
 
In the particular case under discussion here, for many years ethnic Greeks from 
Albania have been seeking Greek citizenship, but successive governments have 
blocked this demand, worried that any such move might compromise the rights of the 
minority group in the neighbouring country.40 On 8 November 2006, the Greek 
Interior Minister declared: “Following talks (with Albania) and a constitutional 
amendment (in that country) we can now begin awarding citizenship”. The 
naturalization will be open to ethnic Greeks from Albania, provided they have the 
special homogeneis identity card certifying their status. According to the Ministry of 
Interior, some 30,000 minority Greeks from Albania have already applied for 
                                                        
39 BAUBÖCK, ERSBOL, GROENENDIJK AND WALDRAUCH (eds), Acquisition and loss of nationality, 
policies and trends in 15 European states; Summary and Recommendations, Institute for European 
Integration Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences, (Vienna, 2006). 
40 “Greek Minority in Albania: 200,000 Ethnic Greeks from Albania to be Naturalized”, UNPO – 
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 9 November 2006, available at: 
http://www.unpo.org/content/view/5796/236/.  
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naturalization, while around 200,000 are believed to possess the required identity 
card. The Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha declared that “Greek Government’s 
decision for granting double citizenship is acceptable for Albania.”41 
 
A significant problem with the present residence permits issued lies in the concept of 
the residence permit as such. In principle, a residence permit is issued only when a 
person does in fact have an address and residence on the territory of the issuing 
state.42  
 
4.1. The residence permit as visa replacement 
In the Schengen acquis. Article 5 of the Schengen Convention defines the conditions 
an alien has to meet to be allowed entry onto the common territory. As a rule, Article 
5(1) requires the alien to be in possession of a valid visa (and obviously a valid 
passport), if required, depending on his country of origin. However, Article 5(3) of 
the Schengen Convention opens the possibility for  
 
aliens who hold residence permits or re-entry visas issued by one of the 
contracting parties, or where required, both documents, shall be authorized entry 
for transit purposes, unless their names are on the national list of alerts of the 
contracting party whose external borders they are seeking to cross. 
 
The wording of Article 5(3) gives the impression that the use of residence permits of 
one of the Schengen countries grants access to the Schengen territory only for the 
purposes of transit. However, Article 21 (1) of the Schengen Convention also 
provides for the right of free movement on the Schengen territory for a period of up to 
three months for the holders of residence permits. The conditions for the exercise of 
that right are: fulfilment of three of the five entry conditions of Article 5 (1) of the 
Schengen Convention (valid travel document, necessary supporting documents and 
                                                        
41 “Greek Minority in Albania: Prime Minister Approved Double Citizenship”, UNPO – Unrepresented 
Nations and Peoples’ Organization, 13 November 2006, available at: 
http://www.unpo.org/content/view/5812/236/.  
42 Moreover, it should be pointed out a more liberal approach to the issue of granting citizenship to 
foreign nationals in general, and not only to those specific groups of ethnic Greek descent and identity, 
is at the time of writing (end 2009) under official consideration: according to declarations made by the 
Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, all children born to migrants from now on will 
automatically acquire Greek citizenship.  See Kathimerini newspaper, November 5, 2009 issue, 
available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_100004_05/11/2009_112154  
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not being considered a threat by the other Schengen states).43 Thus, the combined 
application of Article 5 (3) and Article 21 (1) led to the adoption of an extremely clear 
text in the Common Manual. Point 6.2 of Part II of the Manual entitled “Aliens 
holding a residence permit issued by another Contracting party” holds that “aliens 
holding a residence permit issued by another Contracting party are exempt from the 
visa requirement for entering the territory of the other Contracting Parties”. This text 
is to be found in the version of the Common Manual of 2002,44 but it is impossible to 
determine when the text entered the Common Manual because the latter was classified 
until official publication of most of its text in 2002.  
 
Following the Maastricht Treaty, a Joint Action 97/11/JHA of 16 December 1996 was 
adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union 
concerning a uniform format for residence permits.45 The Joint Action established a 
uniform format for residence permits for third country nationals. A residence permit is 
defined here as “any authorization issued by the authorities of a Member State 
allowing a third country national to stay legally on its territory…” The Joint Action 
does not apply to: visas, permits valid for no more than six months and permits issued 
pending examination of an application for a residence permit or for asylum. Nor does 
it apply to:  members of the families of citizens of the Union exercising their right to 
free movement or nationals of Member States of the European Free Trade Association 
party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, or members of their families 
exercising their right to free movement.  
 
A special Decision of the Schengen Executive Committee of 15 December 1997 on 
the implementation of the joint action concerning a uniform format for residence 
permits46 stated that the “Schengen states shall endeavour to implement the joint 
action of 16 December 1996 concerning a uniform format for residence permits as 
                                                        
43 The requirements to hold a visa and not have an alert issued for the purposes of entry are waived in 
this case. 
44 O.J. 2002, C 313/02. 
45 O.J. 1997, L 7. 
46 The Schengen acquis - Decision of the Executive Committee of 15 December 1997 on the 
implementation of the Joint Action concerning a uniform format for residence permits (SCH/Com-ex 
(97) 34 rev.), (O.J. 2000, L 239, p. 187). 
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soon as possible, if necessary by phasing it in, before the end of the transitional 
period stipulated in the joint action.” 
 
The Common Manual47 specified that  
 
a list for each country, of the documents recognized as valid for the crossing of 
external borders and of those which may bear a visa, in the case of aliens subject 
to the visa requirements, is set out in Annex 4, while a list of, and specimen 
residence permits and return visas, provided for under Article 5(3) of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, are set out in Annex 11.48  
 
And indeed already in the Common Manual, as well as in the Common Consular 
Instructions on visas for the diplomatic missions and consular posts,49 a list of 
documents entitling holders to entry without a visa is included as an annex. And under 
the list of documents for Greece one can find the special cards issued to ethnic Greeks 
and especially “Special identity card for aliens of Greek descent (beige)”. There is a 
clarification attached to the document stating that “this document is issued to 
Albanian nationals of Greek descent; it is valid for three years and the card is also 
issued to their spouses and descendants of Greek origin, regardless of nationality, 
provided there is official documentation of some kind to prove their family ties”. 
 
4.2. Secondary European legislation prior to the Border Code 
In 2002 following the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the Treaties, a new 
Regulation was adopted aimed at communitarizing the issues related to residence 
permits. Thus, a new Council Regulation No 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down 
a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals was adopted and 
replaced the Joint Action 97/11/JHA, and the measures adopted by the Council with a 
view to its application. 
 
A regulation sets out the general characteristics of the uniform format, a copy of 
which is attached to the document. The uniform format can be used as a sticker or a 
                                                        
47 O.J. 2002, C 313/02. The Common Manual as adopted by the Executive Committee established by 
the Convention implementing the Schengen agreement of 14 June 1985 was listed under reference 
SCH/Com-ex (99) 13 in annex A to Council Decision 1999/435/EC O.J. 1999, L 176, p.1. 
48 Common Manual, op. cit. p. 101. 
49 O.J. 2002, C 313/01. Common Manual. 
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stand-alone document. The regulation requires Member States to issue the uniform 
format for residence permits no later than one year after adopting the additional 
security measures. Authorization granted or other types of residence permit issued 
previously continue to be valid unless the Member States decide otherwise. 
 
4.3. The present regulation under the Schengen Borders Code 
In the Schengen Borders Code adopted in 200650 with the aim of codification of the 
rules governing the movement of persons, the issue of residence permits in the place 
of visas receives special treatment. Firstly, the definition of “residence permit” is 
taken from Article 1(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 laying down a uniform 
format for residence permits for third country nationals.51 This definition in turn is 
taken from Article 1 of the Schengen Convention, though to avoid all ambiguity it 
adds a provision that visas are not covered by the definition of “residence permit”.  
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code takes over the uniform entry 
conditions provided for by Article 5(1) of the Schengen Convention. In addition, a 
new condition is introduced, of not representing a threat to public health. However, 
the entry condition related to visas is altered and now includes “being in possession of 
a valid visa … except where they hold a valid residence permit”. In addition, third 
country nationals who do not fulfil all the conditions of Article 5 (1) of the Schengen 
Borders Code can still be authorized entry for transit purposes unless they are 
included in the national alert list of the Member States whose external borders they 
are seeking to cross. 
 
The principle found in paragraph 4 is not explicit in Article 5 of the Schengen 
Convention; it flows from Article 21 (which provides for the possibility for the holder 
of a residence document issued in a Schengen state to travel to other Schengen states 
for three months). It is also mentioned in the current point 6.2 of Part II of the 
Manual. 
                                                        
50 See Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code), O.J. 2006, L 105/1. 
51 O.J. 2002, L 157, p.1. 
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Paragraph 5 takes over Article 5(3) of the Schengen Convention on the admission in 
transit of third-country nationals holding a residence permit or authorization or a re-
entry visa issued by one of the Member States – even if they do not fulfil all the entry 
conditions – unless their names are on the national list of alerts of the Member State 
whose external borders they are seeking to cross. 
 
Paragraph 7 specifies that the residence permits and authorizations referred to in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 cover all residence permits issued by the Member States (on or 
after 12 August 2004) according to the uniform format laid down by the Regulation 
(EC) No 1030/2002, which establishes a uniform format for residence documents, and 
all other residence permits and authorizations and return visas referred to in Annex 4 
of the Common Consular Instructions. 
 
To sum up, the provision of Article 5 (1) of the Schengen Borders Code significantly 
clarifies the situation as regards the use of residence permits as a replacement of a 
visa. While under the previous regime of the Schengen Convention there were two 
legal texts and two rights guaranteeing the right of entry for transit (Art. 5 of the 
Schengen Convention) and the right of movement in the common territory for a 
period of three months, the new Schengen Borders Code clearly states that the holding 
of a residence permit is sufficient grounds for granting entry, regardless of the 
purpose of the transit – entry or stay for up to three months.  
 
As far as transit is concerned, this time the rules on transit are not applicable in all 
cases of third-country nationals wishing to enter with a residence permit, but in cases 
where certain entry conditions in Article 5 are not met, there is still the possibility to 
authorize entry, for the purpose of transit, provided the person seeking to enter is not 
on the national alert list of the country whose border s/he wishes to cross. 
 
As for the types of document recognized for the purposes of crossing, they remain 
valid in an annex to the Common Consular Instruction, and their format is regulated 




The common visa policy was created as a flanking measure to the lifting of internal 
border controls. This was deemed necessary because of the lack of trust among 
Member States. This chapter examined a case in which the Schengen framework 
allowed one Member State to use a specific national legal measure which effectively 
facilitated access for a national minority living in a neighbouring country to its own 
territory. 
There is no reliable data as to the number of special identity cards issued to the 
Albanian citizens of Greek descent but, as mentioned above; the generally estimated 
figure is around 200,000,52 or about 2% of the population of Greece, which shows the 
importance for Greece of this measure. 
 
Greece has communicated both types of special identity card in its list of documents 
entitling holders to entry without a visa.53 Thus, all holders of the special identity 
cards have the possibility to enter Greece, or any other Schengen state, without the 
need to apply for a visa, although as Albanians, they would normally require a 
Schengen visa.  
 
It is difficult to see what would prevent any other EU Member State, especially some 
of the ‘new’ ones with significant minorities in neighbouring countries, from using 
similar measures. In fact, this example was soon to be followed, with slight variations, 
by some of the new Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 (see Chapter 7).  
 
Only the format and the security and biometric features of (national) residence 
permits are harmonized but not the conditions under which they are issued. Thus, in 
this particular field, Member States have the freedom to apply their national priorities. 
A Member State can decide to issue either a special ID card or a special residence 
permit to minority members or persons of the same ethnic origin (as defined by the 
national legislation). The type of document just needs to be communicated to the 
European authorities to be included on the common list, and the problem of access to 
the motherland is solved.  
                                                        
52 See Statistical data on immigrants in Greece, op. cit. 
53 Annex IV of the Common Consular Instruction, op. cit. 
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However, the practicality and sustainability of a widespread adoption of this approach 
is questionable. Among the 15 states that participated in the common list when it was 
incorporated in the Common Consular Instruction, Greece was the only54 one to 
communicate the special residency permits it issued. Greece did not communicate 
one, but three different documents, depending on the country of origin of the ethnic 
Greeks entitled to this document. If other countries were to create a similar number of 
special documents, it would soon become rather difficult to maintain the common list 
 
Although Greece reportedly issued hundreds of thousands of these special identity 
cards, there are no reports of them being misused on a large scale to enter other 
Schengen countries. One reason for this must be Greece’s comparatively isolated 
position relative to the rest of the Schengen territory. But the real reason might be 
quite simply that Albanian Greeks looking for work preferred to stay legally in 
Greece (where they had access to social services, including free health care) rather 
than to migrate to other Schengen countries and stay there illegally. The language 
barrier might also have been another factor in limiting the impact for Greece’s 
Schengen partners. 
 
If this Greek ‘experiment’ had had a significant negative impact on other countries in 
terms of illegal migration or crime, there would have been pressure to establish 
harmonized rules for the issuance of ID cards. This was apparently not the case 
however, in the sense that there is no trace of such pressure from other countries in 
official documents. In the latest update of the Schengen Borders Code the Greek 
identity card is listed without comment.  
                                                        
54 The key reason for this was that Greece was at the time the only Member State with significant 
minorities both in a neighbouring country sharing a common land border and also in other third 
countries (like the countries of the ex-USSR). 
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CHAPTER 7 – THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
AND THEIR DIFFICULTIES WITH SOVEREIGNTY TRANSFER ON VISAS 
 
This chapter looks at how the Member States that joined the EU after the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty reacted to the requirement to transfer part of their 
sovereignty in the visa field.  
 
The particular situation in which each individual accession country found itself due to 
historical links and geographical location had to be channelled through a common set 
of requirements within the negotiations for the membership process. In some 
instances, one could claim that the whole exercise amounted to transforming (not to 
say surrendering) one particular national identity to meet the requirements of a 
common European one. 
 
As the transformation process took more than a decade to complete and was 
influenced by the gradual changes in this policy field within the European Union 
itself, the changes in the legal regulation and implementation in the candidate 
countries also developed gradually. Still, their accession to Schengen takes a clear 
three-step approach, which so far has only been completed for the countries that 
joined the EU in 2004, but is still ongoing for Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus, which 
however, is in a very special situation.  
 
Section 1 of this chapter offers a brief description of the legal framework for the 
accession process, which required compulsory Schengen integration as part of the 
acquis. The candidate countries thus had to accept that the various derogations, opt-
outs and opt-ins of some of the old Member States were not available to them.  
Section 2 then analyzes in more detail the evolution of the accession negotiations in 
the area of visa policy, and Section 3 describes the legal context post EU membership, 
prior to the lifting of internal border controls.  Section 4 turns to the situation after this 
step, i.e. after the new Member States became full Schengen members and documents 
the impact of Schengen membership on actual visa issuance. Section 5 then analyzes 
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the reasons for the difficulties and tensions that arose in this context. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
1. The starting point – compulsory Schengen integration 
One fundamental aspect of the future enlargement of Schengen was regulated through 
the Schengen Protocol of the Amsterdam Treaty.1 According to this Protocol, any 
state acceding to the European Union must accept the totality of Title IV EC on 
accession. No ‘opt-outs’ were to be permitted for the new Member States, following 
Article 8 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the Framework of the 
European Union, which establishes that: 
 
For the purposes of the negotiations for the admission of new Member States 
into the European Union, the Schengen acquis and further measures taken by the 
institutions within its scope shall be regarded as an acquis which must be 
accepted in full by all State candidates for admission.  
 
This provision reflects mainly the general rule made in the last two enlargements 
negotiations that the candidate country has to accept the acquis communautaire in full. 
Once the Schengen acquis had been communitarised it became part of the acquis 
commaunitaire (see part 2.1 of Chapter 2). Thus the Schengen acquis, including the 
part dealing with the free movement of persons and visas in particular, needed to be 
accepted by the candidate countries without the possibility of the opt-outs, opt-ins or 
any other flexible arrangements that were available to ‘older’ Member States (in 
reality only the UK, Ireland and Denmark).  
Moreover, no transition periods were foreseen (and none were granted) in this field. 
This is in sharp contrast to the internal market acquis, in which numerous (important) 
transition periods were granted (e.g. regarding free movement of workers or regarding 
the sale of agricultural land to foreign citizens). One reason for this rigidity was, of 
course, that the process of full Schengen membership already implies a transition 
period. However, the new Member States had to apply most of the Schengen acquis 
from day one of their membership and thus long before full Schengen membership 
was achieved, with the lifting of controls on internal borders.  
 
                                                        
1 Protocol No 2 integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union (1997). 
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1.1. The stages of accession to Schengen post-Amsterdam.  
The Amsterdam Treaty not only communitarized visa policy by moving it from the 
third to the first pillar and integrated the Schengen acquis into the Treaty, but also 
obliged any future member of the EU to adopt the Schengen provisions as such 
without the possibility for negotiations of special derogations, of the type previously 
available to Portugal and Spain.2 This requirement created the necessity for the 
development of a multi-step process to allow the full integration of the new Member 
States in the Union’s “area without internal frontiers”. 
 
In practice, the multi-step approach turned out to consist of three distinct steps, which 
all new Member States had to take before enjoying the freedom of movement without 
passport control throughout the Schengen area. The first step was EU membership. By 
the date of accession, certain binding rules had to be put in place as part of the rules 
on visas, rules on external borders and the acquis on migration, asylum, police co-
operation, customs co-operation and human rights legal instruments. Following EU 
accession, further legal and administrative preparation, and a separate Council 
Decision, the lifting of internal border controls is taking place, thereby completing the 
full integration into Schengen.  
 
In terms of the legal consequences for national visa policy, each stage of integration 
involves a gradual surrender of sovereignty. In the pre-accession stage, a process of 
alignment of visa policy rules takes place, following the negotiating brief on justice 
and home affairs. At this stage, as the new legislation is adopted gradually and as its 
full application can be postponed as long as accession has not taken place, each 
candidate country still has the possibility to maintain certain rules that do not 
necessarily fall into line with EU requirements. The candidate country retains its 
freedom concerning many elements of visa policy e.g. the negative and positive visa 
lists, visa format, the visa information system and border traffic agreements with third 
states.  
 
This freedom however, considerably diminishes after accession to the EU. First and 
foremost, by that date all parts of the Schengen acquis have to be transposed into 
                                                        
2 See Chapter 4 of this thesis for details on the cases of Portugal and Spain. 
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national regulation, even though some of them will not yet have to be implemented. 
However, as long as the new Member States were not issuing Schengen visas, or 
formed part of the common information system, they continue to follow their national 
regulation as far as the issuing of visas is concerned, as well as the procedures and 
requirements for doing so. In practice these provisions mean that despite the fact that 
the new Member States’ borders have been transformed into the external borders of 
the Union, and the fact that there are common rules on whom can be admitted to the 
territory, the new Member States themselves can still decide on a number of issues, 
for example, the procedures for issuing visas, as mentioned above. The security of the 
other Member States is not endangered as the controls on internal borders between 
new and old Member States are still maintained. Such a situation allows the new 
Member States to accommodate the special needs they have towards particular 
neighbours by applying their preferential conditions for issuing visas.  
 
This national room for manoeuvre finishes with the date of full integration into 
Schengen. From this date onwards the new Member State will have to apply the 
common visa policy in full. 
 
The remainder of this chapter analyzes how the different Schengen integration steps 
discussed above affect the problems the new Member States face in relation to the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis in general, and the visa part of it in 
particular.3 
 
                                                        
3 For an overview of the challenges related to the enlargement of the area of freedom, security and 
justice, see, among others, ANDERSON AND APAP, Striking a Balance between Freedom, Security and 
Justice in an Enlarged European Union, Centre for European Policy Studies, (Brussels, 2002); J. APAP 
(ed.) Justice and Home Affairs in the EU: Liberty and Security Issues after Enlargement, Edward 
Elgar, (Cheltenham, 2004), J. MONAR, Enlargement-related diversity in EU Justice and Home Affairs: 
Challenges, Dimensions and Management Instruments, WRR – Scientific Council for Government 
Policy, (The Hague, 2000), APAP, “Transfer of Competence: Between Sovereignty and Supranational”, 
in Anderson and Apap (eds), Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European Borders, Kluwer 
European Monographs, (Leiden, 2002), MITSILEGAS, “The implementation of the EU acquis on illegal 
immigration by the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe: challenges and contradictions”, 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 28, n. 4, pp. 665-682 (2002), E. RIGO, “Implications of 
EU Enlargement for Border Management and Citizenship in Europe”, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS n. 
2005/21, (2005).  
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2. Negotiating membership – the period prior to accession  
The accession process, its legal stages and legal consequences are discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2. To recall, it is based on the Copenhagen criteria established by the 1993 
Copenhagen European Council.4 Since at that time a common visa policy did not exist 
and even the Schengen agreement was not in force yet, obviously there were no 
special criteria related either to justice and home affairs in general, or to a visa policy 
in particular. The provisions on visa formed part of the so-called “third criteria” for 
membership, namely the ability to adopt and apply the acquis. Later when the 
negotiations for membership started, those provisions were part of negotiation 
Chapter 24 (for the countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements), dealing with the 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs.  
 
As most of the candidate countries applied for membership before the Amsterdam 
Treaty was negotiated, let alone entered into force, the Opinion of the Commission on 
the application of membership (most of them dating back to 1997) referred to the 
Maastricht construction of the issue of visas. As the Commission states:  
 
The Justice and Home affairs cooperation acquis principally derives from the 
framework for cooperation set out in Title VI (Article K) of the Treaty of the 
European Union, “the third pillar”, although certain “first pillar” (EC Treaty) 
provisions and legislative measures are also closely linked. The EU JHA 
framework primarily covers: asylum, control of external borders and 
immigration; customs cooperation and police cooperation against serious crime, 
including drug trafficking; and judicial cooperation on criminal and civil matters. 
 
In the Opinion the Commission therefore seeks mainly to outline the existing 
regulation in each Member State, rather than make concrete demands and set 
requirements for their implementation. In effect, in terms of content in this particular 
field, the Opinions can be divided into two main groups. Those that do not foresee the 
possibility of achieving full implementation, even in the medium-term (e.g. Romania) 
and those that are more positive and underline concrete and achievable steps towards 
full implementation. 
 
A detailed analysis of the regular reports dedicated to visa policy across the candidate 
countries for the whole seven year period (nine-year period for Bulgaria and 
                                                        
4 Copenhagen European Council, “EU Presidency Conclusions”, 21-22 June 1993, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf.  
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Romania) shows the influence exercised by the Union over the candidate countries.5 
Apart from the Commission Opinions on membership published in 1997, a time when 
the position of visa policy was still not legally confirmed, the reports in the following 
years tend to get more structured and progressively more detailed, as countries adopt 
more and more of the acquis. Already in 1998, visa policy forms a distinct part of the 
evaluation under the heading of Immigration/Border Controls and as of 2000, visa 
policy is an independent part in the Chapter dedicated to the co-operation in the field 
of justice and home affairs6. 
 
The requirements which the Commission puts forward follow the structure of the EU 
legislation in the visa field and are thus concentrated on five main elements: 
alignment to the EU visa black list; alignment to the EU visa white list; adoption of 
the visa format similar to that of the EU; the introduction of an electronic visa system 
and the abolition of the border traffic agreements previously in force.7 All those 
elements will be studied in turn below in order to identify the issues that proved 
problematic in the accession process and for which country in particular the problem 
was more pronounced. To achieve this, the main criteria used would be the moment of 
full alignment achieved by each specific country. This moment in time proves to be 
important because it is the only liberty left to the countries under scrutiny. In this 
particular negotiation chapter (Chapter 24 on Justice and Home Affairs), there is no 
possibility for transition periods and thus in the year the negotiations are closed, all 
reports contain the key sentence “Negotiations on this chapter have been 
provisionally closed. [The candidate country] has not requested any transitional 
arrangements in this field”. Thus, the only room for manoeuvre left to each country 
was to try to postpone the adoption and entry into force of certain measures up to the 
date of accession, the latest possible date for the implementation of national rules in 
this particular field.  
 
                                                        
5 See Annex 7.2 to Chapter 7 for a comparative table on the evolution of visa requirements as criteria in 
the accession process (based on the regular reports from the Commission). 
6 See for example the 1998 Regular Report on Bulgaria and the 2000 Regular Report on Bulgaria, main 
elements of which are outlined in Annex 7.2.  
7 The border traffic agreements used to be included in the part of the reports dealing with border 
controls, rather than visas, but are included in this comparative study of the regular reports, as these 
kinds of agreements are linked to the recently adopted Regulation on local border traffic.  
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2.1. Alignment with the EU visa black list 
As already demonstrated in Chapter 1, the visa lists, both black and white are 
considered the core of any visa policy, be it national or European. As a result, from 
the very beginning of the accession process, the Commission insisted on the full 
alignment with the EU black visa list at the latest at the date of accession. There were 
considerable differences among the candidate countries in the degree to which they 
wanted to keep their own national list as long as possible.  
 
There are generally four groups that can be identified among all candidate countries. 
Group I comprises those countries such as Latvia and Estonia, which already in 1997 
had adopted the EU black list. 
 
Group II comprises those countries that delayed the introduction of visas to certain 
countries with which they had (and still have) special relations.  However, these 
countries adopted the black list by 2001, when the new Visa Regulation8 was adopted. 
 
Table 7.1. Introduction of visa requirements for third countries (Group II)  
Candidate country Year of introduction 
of visa requirements 
Countries for which visa requirements 
were introduced 
Slovenia 1999 Macedonia, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria9 
Czech Republic 2000 Russia 
Hungary 2001 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine 
Slovakia 2001 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine 
Bulgaria 2001 Russia, Belarus and Georgia 
 
Group III comprises the candidate countries that postponed the introduction of visas 
to certain third countries (possibly due to their close relations with the country 
concerned), well beyond the provisional closure of the negotiations but before the 
actual accession date.  
 
                                                        
8 Council Regulation 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals need visas when crossing the 
external borders and those who are exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2001, L 81. 
9 The introduction of visa requirements for Bulgaria and Romania caused serious political problems 
among the countries involved. Ultimately the EU had to intervene in the negotiation of interim rules 
until the revision of the Visa Regulation in 2001.  
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Table 7.2. Introduction of visa requirements for third countries (Group III) 
Candidate country Year of introduction 
of visa requirements 
Countries for which visa requirements 
were introduced 
Poland October 2003 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine 
Lithuania 2003 Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kaliningrad 
Malta 2003 Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt 
 
Group IV comprises the countries that have used the ultimate possibility, reserved for 
countries with special historical or cultural links, namely the postponement of the full 
alignment to the negative visa list to the accession date. Only three such cases have 
been registered. 
 
Table 7.3. Introduction of visa requirements for third countries (Group IV) 
Candidate country Year of introduction 
of visa requirements 
Countries for which visa requirements 
were introduced 
Malta Upon accession Libya 
Bulgaria Upon accession Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia 
Romania Upon accession Moldova 
 
2.2. Alignment with the EU white list 
The granting of visa-free travel at first sight seems less politically sensitive than the 
introduction of visas; however, it raises some technical difficulties. Due to their 
historical developments and traditions, in 1997 most of the Central and Eastern 
European countries maintained visa requirements for a large number of countries, 
many of which were on the EU white list. Thus, as a result of the accession effort, all 
candidate countries had to negotiate visa exemption agreements with as many as 40 
countries in less than a decade. Most of them, after four or five years of accession 
talks, still had 10 or 15 countries left before reaching the goal of full alignment. Some 
of the candidate states did not manage to complete this task even in the final year 
before accession – 2003.  
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2.3. Adoption of a new visa format 
This and the following criteria were somewhat linked to the administrative capacity 
for reform in each individual country, rather than the speed with which they were able 
to adopt new legislation. Adoption of the new visa format did not raise any political 
questions as there were no disagreements on the substance and foreign policy 
priorities were not called into question either. Most of the countries met the 
requirements related to the common visa format early on in the negotiations (Slovenia 
even had it in place when the Commission Opinion was published in 1997). 
 
2.4. Introduction of a computerised Visa Information System 
As part of the accession process, each country had to introduce a centralized visa 
information system, linking the visa-issuing consulates to the central Consulate 
Directorate in the respective Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The build-up and the 
ultimate functioning of such a complex system took almost the whole accession 
period to complete, but as was the case with the previous requirement, the 
controversies surrounding this issue were mainly of an internal administrative nature 
and thus did not require the adoption of special rules. 
 
2.5. Abolition of agreements on simplified border traffic 
Another sensitive issue in the negotiating process were the agreements on simplified 
border traffic or on facilitated border crossing which existed between some candidate 
states and their Eastern neighbours. Most of the agreements were the result of large 
ethnic minorities living across the border, or communities being separated as a result 
of an intergovernmental agreement. Such agreements were yet another demonstration 
of the specificity of the soon to be EU external land border. Moreover, almost all 





Table 7.4. Candidate countries having local border traffic agreements with neighbours 
and the year the agreements were abolished 
Candidate country Year of abolition of 
bilateral agreement 
Countries with which the agreement was in 
force 
Latvia 2000 Russia and Belarus – agreement on simplified 
border crossing procedure 
Estonia 2000 Russia (especially Narva-Ivangograd) – 
facilitated border crossing formalities 
Poland 2002 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – agreement on 
simplified border traffic 
Hungary 2003 Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Romania – facilitation 
of crossing by ethnic Hungarians from 
neighbouring countries 
Slovakia 2001 Ukraine – simplified border crossing 
procedure for nationals with permanent 
residence in municipalities in the border areas 
 
From the very start of the accession process, the Commission insisted that all those 
agreements not in compliance with the acquis had to be denounced as soon as 
possible. The effect was severe in some cases.  
 
In order to avoid or mitigate this problem, especially for the border population, certain 
attempts were made to find a solution. This could be either a simplified procedure (as 
in the case of Poland) or the introduction of an entirely new type of document (as with 
the special identity card in Greece or the Hungarian certificate). 
 
It is ironic, however, that in almost ten years EU policy on this particular issue has 
come full circle. In 1997, the Commission started pressing the candidate states to 
abolish agreements (in the case of Poland – more than ten years old) that preceded 
their accession negotiations. When those agreements were no longer in force and 
following the laborious process of negotiating a regulation on local border traffic, the 
same Member States were asked to implement the rules in the regulation by local 
border traffic bilateral agreements once more (with the same countries), which they 
had been forced to denounce less than 10 years earlier (and in some cases, less than 
three years earlier)10.  
 
                                                        
10 For more details on the Local Border Traffic Regulation, see Part II of Chapter 8. 
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3. From EU Members to Schengen Members – the period prior to accession 
to Schengen 
The Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and in 2007 had to apply a large part 
of the Schengen acquis and related measures when they joined the EU.11 The list of 
these provisions was included in Annex I to the 2003 Act of Accession and the 2005 
Act of Accession respectively.12 This included the obligation to apply the rules on 
visa lists, the visa format, and external border controls (except for checks in the 
SIS).13  
A second part of the Schengen acquis was to be applied only upon full membership in 
Schengen, following a decision of the Council to that end. In this group fall: the 
abolition of internal border controls, the full application of all Schengen/EC rules on 
the conditions for issuing visas, and the rules on the freedom to travel. In the area of 
visas, the new Member States were immediately subject to the Schengen rules on the 
link between travel documents and visas14 and certain parts of the Common Consular 
Instruction. 
 
As to the measures adopted following the agreement on the Accession Treaty, and 
thus not included in the list of Annex I to the Act of Accession, many of them 
contained explicit provisions indicating that apply immediately to the new Member 
States (such as the visa format Regulation, the proposed Regulation on border traffic; 
the EC border fund; and the two transit proposals of 2005).  In some other cases these 
measures come into force only after a certain delay (the proposed VIS and SIS II 
measures only apply when the Schengen rules fully apply). Other measures have an 
even more complicated set-up, for example, a part of the Borders Code Regulation 
applies immediately in part (external borders) and in part only after a delay (internal 
borders). 15 
                                                        
11 See Article 3 of the Treaty of Accession and Annex 1 to that Treaty (O.J. 2003, L 236). 
12 See Annex I to the 2003 Act of Accession: List of provisions of the Schengen acquis as integrated 
into the framework of the European Union and the acts building upon it or otherwise related to it, to be 
binding on and applicable in the new Member States as from accession (referred to in Article 3 of the 
Act of Accession), O.J. 2003, L 236. 
13 They also had to apply the ARGO Programme and the EC-China ADS treaty immediately upon 
accession, which contains a special Protocol concerning the new Member States.  
14 Article 13 of the Schengen Convention, which set rules linking visas to the validity of the travel 
document and to its recognition by the Member States. 




To sum up, as far as visas were concerned, in the period between the EU accession 
and the Schengen accession, the new Member States had to respect the visa list and 
the visa format but did not have to apply the common rules on the conditions for 
issuing visas. This was one of the possibilities left for the flexible application of EC 
visa rules. Another was the fact that although the new Member States issued visas 
according to the common format, these were national and not Schengen visas.  
 
Not surprisingly, faced with the need to find a legal tool appropriate for the 
maintaining of friendly borders with their neighbouring countries, most ‘new’ 
external border countries opted for a set of flexible application tools. Each of them 
was targeted at a particular group of travellers facing difficulties and thus resulted in 
the creation of various degrees of rights. Also, depending on the foreign relations 
between the countries involved, the changes were either introduced as an overarching 
political priority (as was the case in Poland) or as a simple technical necessity 
required by the geographical location (as is the case with Kaliningrad). 
 
Overall, there are three groups of problems resulting from the change in border 
control regimes. The first arises when there is a large national minority left behind in 
a neighbouring third country. The second relates to the potential disruption of border 
traffic, be it economically motivated or resulting from recent border changes in the 
region (e.g. cemetery visits, etc.). The third group of problems has a peculiar nature, it 
relates to the only enclave in the EU territory, the case of Kaliningrad (as will be 
discussed in detail in Part I of Chapter 8). 
 
The measures employed by the candidate countries to resolve all these problems and 




3.1. Ensuring contact with the motherland for minorities16 
As was previously indicated, most of the countries on the new external border have 
significant diasporas in countries in their neighbourhood. Precise numbers are always 
difficult to obtain, but it is widely estimated that in Ukraine there are approximately 
204,600 Bulgarians, 156,000 Hungarians, 151,000 Romanians, and 144,000 Poles.17 
In Romania there are approximately 1,432,000 Hungarians, 61,000 Ukrainians, 
22,500 Serbs and 17,200 Slovaks.18 In Moldova there are 283,000 Ukrainians and 
90,000 Bulgarians.19 In Serbia there are 293,000 Hungarians, 70,000 Croatians, 
59,000 Slovaks, 35,000 Romanians and 20,000 Bulgarians.20 
 
Most of these minorities have rights (individually or collectively recognized), 
including the right to a cultural link with the motherland. In most instances border 
traffic agreements were in place to guarantee these rights. Faced with the prospect of 
access to the motherland becoming more difficult, the candidate countries had two 
options – either to introduce accelerated procedures for citizenship or to provide some 
other kind of documentation to facilitate the movement of the minority members.21 
 
(i) ‘Fast- track’ citizenship22 
Some, but not all, countries have chosen this legal tool to help their national 
minorities abroad. The key legal aspect in the context of this work is that the choice of 
facilitating the acquisition of citizenship for certain groups remains an exclusively 
national matter under EU law since citizenship laws remain a national competence.   
                                                        
16 See TÓTH, “Kin-minority, Kin-state and Neighbrouhood Policy in the Enlarged Europe”, Central 
European Political Science Review, vol. 5, n. 17 (2004), pp. 14-25, TÓTH, “Relations of Kin-state and 
Kin-minorities in the Shadow of the Schengen Regime, REGIO – Minorities, Politics, Society, vol. 9, 
(2006), pp. 18-46. 
17 Council of Europe, “Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, 10th edition”, Council 
of Europe/ERICarts, (2009), available at: http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/ukraine.php?aid=421.  
18 Romanian Department of Interethnic Relations, 2002, available at: 
http://www.dri.gov.ro/documents/ds_etniesilbmaternamedii.pdf.  
19 Council of Europe, “Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, 10th edition”, op. cit. 
20 Council of Europe, “Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, 10th edition”, op. cit. 
21 For a general overview see HALÁSZ AND MAJTÉNYI, “Constitutional Regulation in Europe on the 
Status of Minorities Living Abroad”, Minority politics and Minorities Right, Minorities Research 4, 
(2002), available at http://epa.oszk.hu/00400/00463/00004/pdf/135_majteny.pdf.  
22 For a recent comparative analysis of the specificities in the citizenship policy of the new EU Member 
States, see A. LIEBICH, “Introduction: Altneulaender or the vicissitudes of citizenship in the new EU 
states”, in R. BAUBÖCK, B. PERCHINIG AND W. SIEVERS (eds.) Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, 
Amsterdam University Press, 2009 
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This approach (granting fast track citizenship) could, in principle, have been used 
without limits and without interference from the EU. However, for a variety of 
political and economic reasons, this approach was not chosen by many countries.  
Bulgaria and Poland provide two contrasting examples 
 
For example, Bulgaria has such a fast-track procedure, which limits the number of 
requirements a foreigner has to fulfil in order to qualify for naturalization and thus 
benefits the applicants of Bulgarian ethnic origin.23 This is not the case in Poland, 
where the conditions for naturalization are quite stringent and the requirement of 
uninterrupted residence of 10 years always applies, even for applicants for citizenship 
of Polish ethnic origin.24 
 
The type of regulation chosen is of course linked to the public perception of the 
problem. While in some cases the naturalization procedure is not questioned and 
rarely discussed (e.g. in Bulgaria and Poland) in other cases, it is a hot political issue 
(as with the status law in Hungary as explained below).  
 
From a legal perspective, the ‘fast-track citizenship’ option involves reducing the 
number of requirements an applicant has to meet before being granted citizenship. 
Usually, it is limited to age (18 years), a clean criminal record (although some limited 
                                                        
23 See Article 15 (1) of the Law for the Bulgarian Citizenship. See also, Tchorbadjiyska, “Bulgarian 
Experiences with Visa Policy in the Accession Process: A Story of Visa Lists, Citizenship and 
Limitations on Citizens’ Rights”, Regio, 1, (2007), pp. 88-105, and more recently, D. Smilov and E. 
Jileva, “The politics of Bulgarian citizenship: National identity, democracy and other uses” in R. 
Bauböck, B. Perchinig and W. Sievers (eds.) Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, Amsterdam 
University Press, 2009 
24 There is five-year residence requirement for naturalization (permanent residence permit). “Although 
the exact period of total legal residence in Poland varies for different groups of foreigners, the 
requirement of permanent residence permit amounts to at least ten years of residency before a foreigner 
can apply for naturalization, because it takes at least five years to obtain a permanent residence 
permit”. See A. GORNY AND D. PUDZIANOWSKA, “Same letter, new spirit: Nationality regulations and 
their implementation in Poland”, in  R. BAUBÖCK, B. PERCHINIG AND W. SIEVERS (eds.) Citizenship 
Policies in the New Europe, Amsterdam University Press, (Amsterdam,  2009), p.129. This 
naturalization procedure is to be distinguished from the process of repatriation based on the 
Repatriation Act of 2000. This latter Act automatically confers Polish nationality upon crossing of the 
border, for holders of a special repatriation visa. The requirement for the latter is Polish descent (which 
is defined as past Polish nationality or ascendants who were ethnic Poles or held Polish nationality.  
Thus, this law uses both an ethnic criterion (Polish descent) and a cultural criterion to determine a 
person’s belonging to the Polish nation. 
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interpretation can apply also here) and ethnic origin25 (proved through a system of 
documents, issued by authorities of the third countries or religious institutions 
abroad). Thus, criteria such as the minimum number of years of residence in the 
country or the command of the official language of the country are usually waived for 
the sake of expedience. 
 
Of course, the citizenship option can only be applied if the country of residence (in 
effect a third country as far as the EU is concerned) tolerates dual citizenship. If this is 
not the case, the incentive of acquiring the citizenship of the motherland decreases 
(see for example the similar case of the Greek minority in Albania discussed in 
Chapter 6) or it leads to migration to the motherland.  
 
Among the ethnically diverse and mixed new Member States and their neighbours, 
mass applications for citizenship have only been witnessed in Bulgaria (mainly from 
Macedonian and Moldovan citizens) and in Romania (from Moldovan) citizens. In the 
case of Bulgaria26 some 11,000 persons of Bulgarian origin living in Moldova were 
granted Bulgarian citizenship between 2001 and 2007 and make up an important part 
of the Bulgarian minority living there. The same is true for Macedonians, 14,000 of 
whom have received Bulgarian citizenship over the same period. In the case of 
Romania27 there are no official statistics’ but estimates show that from 1999 to 2002 
the Romanian state was issuing Romanian passports to Moldovan citizens using a 
                                                        
25 One can of course question the tenability of ethnicity-based discrimination in a 21st century Europe; 
but the existing citizenship laws often hark back to a different era (usually the formation of the nation 
state itself).  De facto ‘ethnicity’ coincides in most cases with the language spoken at home. Many of 
the old Member States also have citizenship laws which are based on the ‘ius sanguinis’.  For the latest 
comparative review and analysis of the citizenship laws in the EU Member States, see BAUBÖCK, 
ERSBOL, GROENENDIJK AND WALDRAUCH (eds), Acquisition and loss of nationality: policies and trends 
in 15 European countries, v. 1 and 2, Amsterdam University Press, (Amsterdam, 2006) and R. 
BAUBÖCK, B. PERCHINIG AND W. SIEVERS (eds.) Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, Amsterdam 
University Press, (Amsterdam, 2009). 
26 See on Bulgaria, TCHORBADJIYSKA, “Bulgarian Experiences with Visa Policy in the Accession 
Process: A Story of Visa Lists, Citizenship and Limitations on Citizens’ Rights”, Regio, 1, (2007), 
p.88-105; E. JILEVA, “Insiders and outsiders in Central and Eastern Europe: The case of Bulgaria”, in 
Groenendijk, Guild and Minderhoud (eds), In Search of Europe's Borders, Kluwer Law International, 
(The Hague, 2002), p.273-287. 
27 See on Romania, DURA, “A tale of two visa regimes: repercussions of Romania’s accession to the 
EU on the freedom of movement of Moldovan citizens”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, n. 10, (2006); 
TOMESCU-HATTO AND HATTO, “Frontières et identités: La Roumanie et la Moldavie dans l’Europe 
élargie”, Études internationales, vol. 36, n. 3, (2005), p. 317-338, [Borders and Identities: Romania and 
Moldova in the Wider Europe] and C. IORDACI, “Politics of citizenship in post-Communist Romania: 
Legal tradition, restitution of nationality and multiple memberships”, in . R. BAUBÖCK, B. PERCHINIG 
AND W. SIEVERS (eds.) Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, Amsterdam University Press, 2009. 
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fast-track application procedure. Romania grants citizenship to Moldovans whose 
parents or grandparents were Romanian citizens before 1940, when Moldova was part 
of Romania. However, the law was altered in 2003 and a residence clause of four 
years was added, which made it very difficult for most Moldovans to become 
Romanian citizens and created a huge backlog of citizenship applications. 
Nevertheless, the estimates are that at present between 200,000 and over half a 
million Moldovan citizens also hold a Romanian passport.28 
 
(ii) Other citizenship replacing measures 
This includes different types of measures designed to facilitate the cross-border 
contacts of minorities, such as ‘nationality cards’ issued according to ethnic origin. 
These cards are not a substitute for visas, but most national visa regimes provide for 
the facilitated issuance of multiple-entry visas or national visas for their holders.  
 
Such measures are used when simplified naturalization procedures are not possible. 
For example, in Hungary, following a failed referendum, the idea of facilitated 
citizenship procedure to their ethnic kin (mainly in Romania and Serbia) was not 
approved.29 Thus, the government was forced to come up with an inventive new form: 
the status law. A special type of ‘certificate’ was created granting access to the 
territory and to the labour market similar to the special ID card developed for the 
Greek minority members in Albania (see Chapter 6).  
 
                                                        
28 DURA, op. cit. 
29 On 5 December 2004, Hungary held a referendum on whether it should offer Hungarian citizenship 
to Hungarians living outside the borders of the Hungarian state. The novelty of the proposal was not 
the introduction of the possibility for dual citizenship (as it already existed) but in the waiving of all 
residency requirements as conditions for obtaining a Hungarian second citizenship. The text of the 
referendum question was as follows: “Do you think that Parliament should pass a law allowing 
Hungarian citizenship with preferential naturalization to be granted to those, at their request, who claim 
to have Hungarian nationality, do not live in Hungary and are not Hungarian citizens, and who prove 
their Hungarian nationality by means of a “Hungarian Identity Card” issued pursuant to Article 19 of 
Act LXII of 2001 or in another way to be determined by the law which is to be passed?”. Ultimately 
the referendum failed due to the low participation – 63.33 per cent of the eligible voters shunned the 
poll. The results among those participating were 51.57 per cent in favour of the reform and 48.43 per 
cent against. For the most recent analysis of the issue, see M. KOVACS AND J. TOTH, “Kin-state 
responsibility and ethnic citizenship: The Hungarian case” in R. BAUBÖCK, B. PERCHINIG AND W. 
SIEVERS (eds.) Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, Amsterdam University Press, 2009. See also 
TÓTH, “Principles and Practice of Nationality Law in Hungary”, REGIO – Minorities, Politics, Society, 
vol. 8, (2005), pp. 21-39; and Halász, “Dual Citizenship as an Instrument of the Hungarian Policy 
Towards the Nation?”, REGIO – Minorities, Politics, Society, vol. 8, (2005), pp. 73-86. 
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The Hungarian “Magyar Igazolvány” or Hungarian Certificate allows its holder to 
acquire a Schengen visa in a facilitated procedure, foregoing the presentation of 
official invitation letters and other proofs of purpose of travel. The certificate also 
provides an exemption from the requirement of documents proving “sufficient means 
of subsistence” when paired with a declaration from the local association of 
Hungarians.30 The Hungarian Parliament adopted the “Act on Hungarians living in 
neighbouring countries” on June 19, 2001,31 which became known as the “status 
law”.32 
 
The Polish “Karta Polaka” (Card of the Pole) introduced on 29 March 200833 (one day 
before the final step for full Schengen integration) not only simplifies the procedure 
of acquiring a multiple-entry national visa valid only in Poland but the holder is also 
eligible for exemption from Schengen visa fees.34 The Card of the Pole is a document 
stating allegiance to the Polish nation. It can be granted to people who do not have 
Polish citizenship or permission to reside in Poland and who are citizens of the former 
                                                        
30 LASTOFKA, “The proliferation and evolution of visa regimes on the Eastern Border of the European 
Union”, Hungarian Association for Migrants, Working Paper n. 7, (2009). 
31 Law LXII/2001 on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. 
32 For more on the “status law” see: KÁNTOR, “Re-institutionalizing the Nation – Status Law and Dual 
Citizenship”, REGIO – Minorities, Politics, Society, vol. 8, (2005), pp. 40-49, KOVÁCS, “The Politics 
of Non-resident Dual Citizenship in Hungary”, REGIO – Minorities, Politics, Society, vol. 8, (2005), p. 
50-72, KÁNTOR, MAKTÉYI, IEDA, VIZI AND HALÁSZ (eds.) The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building 
and/or Minority Protection, Sapporo: Hokkaido University – Slavic Research Center, 2004; IEDA (ed.) 
Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational Citizenship?, Sapporo: Hokkaido University – 
Slavic Research Center, 2006; IEDA, “Ideological Background of the Amendment Status Law 
Controversy in Hungary”, Central European Political Science Review, vol. 5, n. 16, (2004), pp. 7-20; 
SCHÖPFLIN, “Hungary and the EU: the Status Law and After”, Central European Political Science 
Review, vol. 5, n. 16, (2004), pp. 21-28; HALÁSZ, “The Ethnicity and Territory in the Central and 
Eastern European Status Laws”, Central European Political Science Review, vol. 5, n. 16, (2004), pp. 
57-67, MAJTÉNYI, “Utilitarianism in Minority Protection?: Status Law and International 
Organisations”, Central European Political Science Review, vol. 5, n. 16, (2004), pp. 68-77; VÍZI, “The 
Evaluation of the ‘Status Law’ in the European Union”, Central European Political Science Review, 
vol. 5, n. 16, (2004), pp. 78-91. 
33 The card was established by Act on the Pole's Card (Ustawa o Karcie Polaka, Dz. U. 2007 no. 
180/1280) of 7 September 2007. The Act specifies the rights of the holder of the Card, the rules for 
granting, loss of validity and rescission of the Card, and the competencies of the public administration 
bodies and procedures in these cases. The Act entered into force on 29 March 2008, one day before the 
final integration of Poland into the Schengen area on 30 March 2008, when the border controls on 
internal EU flights were lifted. See also, A. GORNY AND D. PUDZIANOWSKA, op.cit. 
34 For details on the card see information of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/Card,of,the,Pole,15832.html; for the reaction of the neighbouring states see 
“Lining up to Prove Polish Descent”, Warsaw Voice, available at 
http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/17583/ and for analysis of the provisions see GORNY AND 
PUDZIANOWSKA, op.cit. 
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Soviet Union states.35 The card-holder is entitled to all the benefits as stated in the 
Parliamentary Bill, passed by the Polish Sejm on 7 September 2007 and these include:  
 
 obtaining a long-term visa enabling a multiple Polish border crossing, 
 taking-up legal employment without having to obtain a work permit, 
 running a business in Poland on the same conditions as the Polish citizens, 
 taking advantage of the Polish education system, free of charge, 
 using the Polish medical services, in emergencies, on the same conditions 
as Polish citizens, 
 applying for financial support from the state budget or from the communal 
authorities devoted to supporting the Polish citizens abroad. 
 
The granting of the Card of the Pole does not imply Polish citizenship, nor does it 
give the right to settle on the territory of the Republic of Poland or cross the Polish 
border without a valid visa. 
3.2. Facilitated conditions and procedures for issuing visas and crossing the 
border36 
 
                                                        
35 The reason why this card was available for citizens of the former Soviet Union is that due to the 
extensive changes of the border of Poland before and after the two World Wars a considerable number 
of persons of Polish descent are still living in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Poland’s borders 
were changed after World War 2, when large a slice of what was then the eastern part of Poland were 
annexed by the Soviet Union (nowadays mainly belonging to Belarus and Ukraine) and most, but by 
far not all, of the Polish inhabitants expelled. These displaced persons were resettled, mainly in parts of 
formerly German territories. These territorial exchanges were ratified in a Polis-FSU treaty of 1947. 
36 For the responses of the different new Member States, see BORATYNSKI ET AL., Monitoring of Polish 
Visa Policy, Report, Stefan Batory Foundation, (Warsaw, 2004); BERANYI, “Short-term Impacts of 
Enlargement in the Romanian and Hingarian Border Crossing”, REGIO – Minorities, Politics, Society, 
vol. 9, (2006), pp. 100-129; VÁRADI, “The Visa in Practice at the Serbian and at the Ukrainian 
borders”, REGIO – Minorities, Politics, Society, vol. 9, (2006), pp. 150-178; BORATYNSKI AND 
SZYMBORSKA, Neighbours and Visas: Recommendations for Friendly European Union Visa Policy, 
Stefan Batory Foundation, (Warsaw, 2006); BILCIK AND DULEBA, Carpathian Euroregion and 
External Borders of the enlarged European Union: confronting the effects of Schengen, Carpathian 
Foundation, (Kosice, 2004); JILEVA, “Visa and free movement of labour: the uneven imposition of the 
EU acquis on the accession states”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 28, n. 4, pp. 683-700, 
(2002); KRYSTYNIAK, “The Schengen Treaty – Its Consequences for Poland”, The Polish Foreign 
Affairs Digest, vol. 4, n. 1 (10), (2004); P. KAZMIERKIEWICZ, Schengen Integration as a Challenge to 
Polish Visa Policy Towards Eastern Neighbours, The Institute of Public Affairs, Analyses & Opinions 
No 42, (Warsaw, 2005); P. KAZMIERKIEWICZ, The Visegard States between Schengen and 
Neighbourhood, The Institute of Public Affairs, (Warsaw, 2005); J. MISINA, “New Developments in 
Visa Regulations in Slovakia”, paper presented at a Workshop “Visa and immigration policies of the 
Visegard countries”, (2006), available at: http://www.visegrad.mtaki.hu/about/.  
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As mentioned earlier, most of the candidate countries had long enjoyed facilitated 
border traffic agreements. These had to be renounced before the accession date. 
Moreover, as of the date of accession the new Member States had to require visas 
from all countries on the EU visa black list. However, national visas and not 
Schengen visas were granted. The main political objective, in Poland for example37 
was to maintain the number of visits (border crossings) despite the introduction of 
visa requirements. In Poland, this objective was achieved through the implementation 
of several tools: 
 
- waiving of the visa fee and granting cost-fee free visas to citizens of selected 
countries; 
- maintaining a long list of exceptions, reasons for which visa-free access is 
granted; 
- granting multiple entry visas. 
 
All these measures obviously required the administrative strengthening of the 
consulates in the third countries, as the newly opened Polish consulate in Lvov had to 
issue almost a million visas a year. 
 
Other countries (Bulgaria) preferred to go for the more general regulation and in the 
process decrease the administrative burden. The law allows for the issuing of visas at 
the border for a stay of up to 10 days, based on a bilateral intergovernmental 
agreement (this measure is used towards Macedonian and Serbian citizens). 
 
Poland introduced a visa regime for its Eastern neighbours in October 2003, only a 
few months before its accession, and after lengthy attempts to find an alternative.38 
Introducing an extremely wide variety of 23 types of visas to suit every anticipated 
purpose of stay and transit, the new Polish visa regime was rather flexible.39 This 
flexibility was motivated by the political imperative of maintaining close links with its 
neighbours on the ‘outside’ even after accession (something which had been widely 
                                                        
37 WEINAR, “The Polish Experiences of Visa Policy in the Context of Securitization”, CHALLENGE 
paper, WP 7, (2005), available at http://www.challenge.mtaki.hu/eng/pdf/5_working_papers/21.pdf.  
38 WEINAR, op. cit. 
39 Act on Aliens of 13 June 2003, Dziennik Ustaw, 2003-07-21, No. 128, pp. 8530-8567, English 
translation available at: http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/6947.  
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discussed during Poland’s accession negotiation process).  As discussed above, the 
old Member States had no reason to object since this flexibility would be only 
temporary (until the full integration of Poland into Schengen) and would any grant 
access only to the territory of Poland until then.  
 
Bilateral talks had been initiated earlier to reach mutually agreeable solutions with 
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Only Ukraine had accepted the offer of the Polish 
government. A bilateral agreement on the principles of the movement of persons was 
signed on 30 July 2003. It granted to Ukrainian citizens the possibility to acquire 
Polish visas free of charge (by contrast citizens of Belarus and Russia – not falling 
into one of the exemption categories provided for in the Polish Aliens Act of 2003 – 
had to continue paying between €10 and €50 for visas). Notwithstanding this waiving 
of fees and other procedural facilitations provided for in the agreement, the new visa 
regime had noticeable consequences for Ukraine. In the first months of its 
implementation, the number of border crossings dropped by 60% on the Ukraine-
Polish border. Even a year later, by which time Poland had acceded, the numbers 
remained 20-25% lower than before.40 
 
Hungary signed an agreement with Ukraine on the conditions of travel between the 
two countries in October 2003. The agreement introduced visa requirements for 
Ukrainian citizens but as with the Polish regime, the visa was free of charge. Apart 
from waiving visa fees, the agreement exempted flight and ship crews as well as 
holders of service travel documents from visa requirements. Those citizens of Ukraine 
who were travelling to EU destinations and holding Schengen visas could transit 
through Hungary visa-free. The visa procedure was relatively simple and quick; the 
agreement provided for a five day period to issue a visa with several exceptions where 
visas should be issued immediately. Based on the number of border crossings, the 
introduction of visas did not affect the opportunities of Ukrainian citizens to travel to 
Hungary. The number of Ukrainian citizens crossing the Hungarian border remained 
stable at around 2.5 million for the years from 2000 to 2005 without significant 
differences between the visa-free 2003 and the first year following the introduction of 
                                                        
40 Stefan Batory Foundation, “Monitoring of Polish Visa Policy – Report Warsaw”, (2004), available at 
http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/monitoring-of-polish-visa-policy-2004.pdf.  
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visas.41 In 2003, Hungary also introduced visa requirement for citizens of Serbia and 
Montenegro, which contains a significant Hungarian minority. The visas were issued 
free of charge and with a very expedient procedure allowing for the issue of the visa 
on the same day, if the application was submitted by noon. However, the general 
requirements for a proof of means of subsistence, hotel reservations, etc. were 
maintained. But ethnic Hungarians wishing to travel to Hungary at the time had the 
possibility to receive a multi-entry visa if the goal of their travel was to visit family 
members. Despite the new restrictions, the number of border crossings by citizens of 
Serbia and Montenegro visiting Hungary remained steady throughout the period at 
around 3.4 million a year.42  
 
A similar approach was followed by Bulgaria and Romania. Both countries delayed 
the introduction of visas to their ‘closest’ neighbours until the date of accession – 1 
January 2007. Romania also negotiated a bilateral agreement with Moldova on the 
facilitation of issuing of visas in early 2006 and when it introduced visa requirements 
on 1 January 2007, two additional consulates were open. Despite these efforts and the 
quick procedure, travel between Moldova and Romania was severely disrupted for 
some time after Romania’s accession to the EU, due to the overwhelming demand for 
visas.43 
 
The situation in Bulgaria was similar. Prior to Bulgaria’s accession to the EU and the 
respective introduction of visas, the considerable number of visitors from the western 
neighbours (Serbia and Montenegro and especially Macedonia) led people to believe 
that unless additional measures were taken, the introduction of visas would cause a 
sharp decrease in visitors and create problems in local and regional economies.44 
Since Macedonia’s capital Skopje is easily accessible, geographical constraints do not 
hinder access to the consulate. There is, however, a human resource problem. While 
the Bulgarian Consulate in Skopje did issue visas to Macedonia nationals until 1 
                                                        
41 LASTOFKA, op. cit. 
42 LASTOFKA, op. cit. 
43 See CONSTANTIN IORDACI, “Politics of citizenship in post-Communist Romania: Legal tradition, 
restitution of nationality and multiple memberships”, in . R. BAUBÖCK, B. PERCHINIG AND W. SIEVERS 
(eds.) Citizenship Policies in the New Europe, Amsterdam University Press, 2009. 
44 V. SHOPOV, Implementation of Schengen – Direct Influence to Socio-economic Reality, European 
Institute, (Sofia, 2001). 
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January 2007, it is now required to issue almost a million visas per year. With only 
one additional consulate opened, it was necessary to increase the number of consulate 
employees in order to maintain the pre-visa levels of contact. Alternatively, an 
extensive list of exceptions to the visa requirements that would be applicable between 
the periods of EU and Schengen accession, as well as a multi-entry visa for the 
business travellers could be introduced. Attempting to avoid possible difficulties, 
Bulgaria initiated a two-fold plan of action prior to its EU accession. On the 
intergovernmental level, the Bulgarian government proposed and concluded 
agreements with Macedonia and Serbia regarding the mutual travel of their citizens, 
and on an administrative level, two more consulates were opened in Bitola 
(Macedonia) and Nis (Serbia) respectively. Both intergovernmental agreements have 
similar structures and content. They provide for certain rules that can facilitate the 
issuing of short-stay visas as well as the travel of citizens of Macedonia and Serbia to 
Bulgaria respectively. The agreement’s main elements include:  
 
1. Visa-free travel for holders of diplomatic and service passports.  
2. Visas are issued for free, without the usual collection of the visa application and 
visa issuing fees.  
3. Certain categories of citizens are released from the visa requirements due to their 
professional duties (airplane or ship crew members, rescue teams).  
4. The possibility for issuing multiple-entry visas for a period of one year (mainly in 
the context of international transport agreements).  
5. The possibility for a fast-track procedure for certain categories of applicants (in the 
context of official visits and administrative cooperation, or in cases of family 
emergencies).  
 
Both agreements became effective on 1 January 2007. Meanwhile, two developments 
at the European level might influence the future existence of these bilateral 
agreements. On the one hand, the Regulation on local border traffic45 has entered into 
force, and the Bulgarian government has expressed its intention to negotiate bilateral 
                                                        
45 Regulation (EC) Nr. 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 
laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and 
amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention (O.J. 2006, L 405). 
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agreements with Macedonia and Serbia on this issue.46 On the other hand, the EU 
negotiated and signed visa facilitation agreements with Macedonia and Serbia which 
over-ride some of the provisions of the bilateral agreements. Whether these activities 
at intergovernmental and EU level will result in better odds for Macedonians and 
Serbians to easily travel to Bulgaria remains to be seen.  
 
However, it is clear that, despite Bulgaria’s efforts, the introduction of visas has led to 
a dramatic decrease in travel. Whether this decrease is only temporary or is a more 
permanent phenomenon is not yet clear. But the data available47 are unequivocal: the 
number of visitors to Bulgaria from Macedonia and from Serbia fell in 2007 
(compared to 2006) by about 70%.48 
 
Finally, an example of what can happen if no special measures are foreseen when a 
visa regime is introduced abruptly can be seen in the case of Slovakia. It introduced a 
strict visa regime for Ukrainian citizens already in June 2000. There was no provision 
for a waiving of visa fees, thus Ukrainian citizens had to pay 24 USD for a single-
entry visa. According to some experts, the introduction of this regime was done 
“without any previous economic and political impact assessment”.49 The termination 
of the visa-free travel regime and the agreement facilitating the border-crossing 
procedures of residents of border municipalities had a dramatic effect on legitimate 
travel between Ukraine and Slovakia, with the number of Ukrainian citizens crossing 
the border to Slovakia dropping from 1,435,000 in 1999 to 291,000 in 2001 – a fall of 
about 80%, increasing very gradually thereafter.50 This situation led to an increase in 
                                                        
46 Such a possibility is explicitly mentioned in Article 16 of both the Agreement between Bulgaria and 
Macedonia regarding the mutual travel of citizens, and the Agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia on 
the mutual travel of citizens. 
47 See data on visitors to Bulgaria in 2007 from the Bulgarian National Statistics Institute, available at: 
http://www.nsi.bg/index_en.htm 
48 See also, Macedonian News: Long Queues for Bulgarian Visas in Macedonia, 8 January 2007, 
http://www.vmacedonianews.com/2007/01/long-queues-for-bulgarian-visas-in.html , Macedonians 
Wait Months for Bulgarian Visas, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 15 February 2007, 
http://birn.eu.com/en/70/10/2301/  
49 MARTIN SIRÁK, “Slovakia in ‘Schengenland’: Political and Governance Issues”, Institute of Public 
Affairs, Report 3 of Migration and Eastern Policy Programme, , Warsaw, (2002), p. 7, available at: 
www.lgi.osi.hu/cimg/0/0/1/8/Sirak_Report03.doc. 
50 Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, “Feasibility Study for Consular and Visa 
Cooperation Among Visegrad States for Residents of Ukraine and Moldova”, (2005) at: 
www.visegrad.mtaki.hu/workingpapers/misina_paper.pdf. Of course, there is no hard data on illegal 
crossings. But the numbers are unlikely to be very high given that the border in question is rather short 
and well guarded. 
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political tensions and even a threat on the side of Ukraine to introduce a visa for 
Slovak citizens, thereby terminating the bilateral readmission agreement. Faced with 
such difficulties, Slovakia proposed a bilateral Agreement on the Liberalisation of the 
Border Regime, which entered into force in March 2001. Some of the simplifications 
regarding visa procedures included the abolition of the requirement of the official 
invitation letter and the abolition of a visa fee for certain categories of traveller. In 
addition, Slovakia introduced further exemptions, providing residents in selected 
villages from the border multiple entry visas free of charge.51 
 
4. When old borders disappear – the post-accession period to Schengen 
The ultimate integration into Schengen of the new Member States takes place 
following a report, individual for each of these states, delivered by SCHEVAL, the 
Schengen evaluation team.52 Despite the guarantees about deciding each case on its 
own merits, due to possible complications at internal borders if one country joined 
Schengen while the others remained outside, there was an understanding that all 
countries of a certain group (say the EU10 and EU2) had to join at the same time. 
This condition, when coupled with the necessity of integrating the countries into the 
new generation Schengen information system (SIS II), in reality had the consequence 
of delaying the actual date of full Schengen integration for the EU10 until all of them 
were declared ready.   
 
                                                        
51 Stefan Batory Foundation, “The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine – New Relations”, Final 
report, (2004), available at: http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/final_rep.pdf  
52 The SCHEVAL was already established under the Schengen Convention and is composed of one 
high-ranking representative from each Schengen state with the Commission participating as an 
observer. SCHEVAL has a dual task: first, the evaluation of candidate states prior to their entry into the 
Schengen system and second, ensuring that the Schengen acquis is properly applied by States already 
implementing it. See, Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a 
Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen (SCH/Com-ex ((98) 26 def).It 
is of course in general difficult for sovereign states to accept a technical evaluation as a basis for a 
decision of the highest political importance; hence, the importance of the composition of the 
SCHEVAL team. This situation is analogous in the area of monetary union where the Commission has 
to prepare a ‘technical’ report on the four Maastricht criteria for accession to the euro area, in both 
cases the Member States wanting to join (Schengen area or euro area) is ‘demandeur’ and thus is not in 
a strong political position to object to the nature of the evaluation or to the composition of the 
evaluation team. See also, the Commission proposal for a Regulation on Schengen evaluation 
(COM(2009) 102, March 2009). 
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On 6 December 20007, the Council took that decision,53 provided for in Article 3(2) 
of the 2003 Act of Accession in relation to the Schengen Convention and the 
Schengen acquis. After verification that the necessary conditions for the application 
of the Schengen acquis had been met in all areas, the Council decided that the 
provisions of the Schengen acquis referred to in Annex I to the decision should apply 
to the Member States concerned (all countries that acceded in 2004 except Cyprus) 
and in their relations with the other Schengen States, as of 21 December 2007. The 
abolition of checks on persons at internal air borders was postponed until 30 March 
2008. Annex I of Council Decision 2007/801/EC contains the acquis whose 
application was postponed in the Act of Accession pending a decision of the Council 
to this effect.54  
 
The actual effects of Schengen integration are numerous but we will concentrate here 
only on the ones linked to visa policy and border controls. First and foremost, after 
the date in question, the body of the Schengen acquis was to be applicable on the 
territory of all of the new Member States. As mentioned earlier, and indicated in the 
Accession Treaty,55 only parts of the acquis applied until that point. 
 
In practice, the greatest effect of full Schengen integration was the lifting of internal 
border controls between the old and new Member States, allowing their citizens to 
benefit fully from the free movement of persons provisions in the EC law. The lifting 
of those internal border controls implied that the controls on the EU’s external border 
were deemed to be sufficiently secure.  
 
                                                        
53 Council Decision 2007/801/EC of 6 December 2007 on the full application of the provisions of the 
Schengen acquis in the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic 
of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, O.J. 2007, L 323/34. 
54 Note that Annex I to the Act of Accession, op.cit., lists only the part of Schengen acquis binding on 
and applicable in the new Member States as from accession, while Annex I of the Council Decision 
2007/801/EC lists the acquis to be rendered applicable following the lifting of the internal border 
controls.  
55 Article 3 of the Treaty of Accession and Annex I to the 2003 Act of Accession: List of provisions of 
the Schengen acquis as integrated into the framework of the European Union and the acts building 
upon it or otherwise related to it, to be binding on and applicable in the new Member States as from 
accession (referred to in Article 3 of the Act of Accession), O.J. 2003, L 236. 
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As far as visas are concerned, from the date of Schengen membership in 2008,56 the 
new Schengen Member States had to stop issuing their national visas and start issuing 
the common Schengen visa. This rule, obviously, applied only to the short-term 
common visas while the long-term visas remained national, as well as the residence 
permits issued by them. Thus, all previously existing arrangements for visas issued 
according to the simplified rules, including free-of-charge visas for specific countries, 
no longer applied. The impact on the ground was substantial. 
 
As chart 7.1 below shows, the number of short-stay visas issued by the countries that 
lifted border controls in 2008 fell by over 35 %. This cannot be due to the recession 
starting that year because the old Schengen-15 issued slightly more short-term visas in 
2008.   
The pattern for other types of visa (D, D+C and LTV) is completely different. The 
new Schengen members issued about twice as many in 2008 as in 2007, whereas the 
increase was only about 10 % in the case of the old Schengen-15. This is a clear 
indication that there was some substitution between short-term and long-term visas. 
Figure 7.1. Change in the number of short-stay visas issued, 2008 in relation to 2007 




























Sub-total for old SHENGEN (15)
New Schengen (class of 2008)
Source: Own elaboration on Council statistics, Council doc. 12493/09, and Council doc. 8215/08, Exchange of 
statistical information on uniform visas issued by Member States' diplomatic missions and consular posts for the 
years 2008 and 2007 respectively. 
                                                        
56 December 25, 2007 for land borders, March 2008 for air travel. 
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These patterns can also be observed in the case of Poland, which accounts for over 
half of the total of the visas issued by the new Schengen States. The impact of 
Schengen accession on visa issuance for Poland was striking. The country issued 41% 
fewer visas in the year following its accession to the travel free area.57 Most of this 
fall was due to a drop of almost two thirds (from over 860 000 to about 300 000, a 
drop of about 63 %) in short-term visas to visitors from its two neighbouring countries 
(Belarus and Ukraine) which accounted for over half of the total in 2007. This is 
exactly what had been anticipated, namely that the additional cost and time delay 
resulting from the application of the Schengen acquis would represent an important 
barrier to cross border movements (about half a million visitors per year less). It is 
difficult to judge whether the availability of local border traffic instruments discussed 
in chapter 8 (part II) could compensate for the drop in the availability of short-term 
visas. 
 
While short-term visa issuance fell markedly, many more long-term (national) D visas 
were issued by Poland in 2008. The number of long-term visas went up by over 300% 
(from about 40 000 to 170 000), but in this case there is an even more pronounced 
difference between the number for the two neighbours (up over 500% for Belarus and 
Ukraine) and the number for all other countries (up only 17%). In 2008 over 90 % of 
all D type visas issued by Poland were issued in Belarus (25% of total) and Ukraine 
(67% of total). However, despite the huge increase in long-term D visas, the total of 
all types of visas issued in the two neighbours fell still by 47%. 
 
Table 7.5 The impact of Schengen on visa issuance in Poland 
Percentage change 2008/7 Short term D Visas All types 
Grand total  -54 334 -41 
Total minus two neighbours -27 17 -23 
Two neighbours (BEL+UKR) -63 503 -47 
Source: Own elaboration on Council statistics, Council doc. 12493/09, and Council doc. 8215/08, 
Exchange of statistical information on uniform visas issued by Member States' diplomatic missions and 
consular posts, respectively for the year 2009 and 2008 own elaboration on the basis of Council 
statistics. 
                                                        
57 Somewhat surprisingly the number of visa issued outside these two neighbouring countries also fell, 
by a lot less, but still by 27 %. The most likely explanation might be that Poland (i.e. its consulates 
abroad) simply had difficulties implementing the new regime. 
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Regarding the use of the long-term visa, a comparison with Germany might be useful 
because that country also has traditional links to Eastern Europe. By 2008 Poland 
issued more long-term visas than Germany (159 000 versus 140 000), but only one 
third as many short-term ones. Moreover, the concentration was completely different.  
In the case of Germany only 5% of its long-term visas were issued in Ukraine and 
even less in Belarus.   
The visa issuing pattern in Poland thus remains heavily skewed towards its immediate 
neighbours. This suggests that the available instruments, such as the special rules for 
local border area were apparently not sufficient (at least in the judgment of the Polish 
authorities) to maintain the desired level of movement across the border. Poland 
apparently used the only instrument still under national control (longer-term visas) to 
compensate for increased difficulties in issuing short-term visas following its full 
accession to Schengen.58 
 
5. Reasons for the tensions 
The previous section has documented that full Schengen membership did have an 
impact on visa issuance and hence the ability of the new member states to maintain 
contact with their neighbours East of the EU (for Poland alone the number of short 
term visa issued in Belarus and Ukraine dropped by half a million).  Hence the 
concerns that the new member states did have in this context were justified. These 
concerns had been the motivation for the specific flexibility measures discussed in 
Chapter 8 (Kaliningrad, local border traffic and visa facilitation) 
 
But there can be many other reasons to explain the tensions arising in the new 
Member States related to the transfer of sovereignty in the visa field. One could be the 
problem of recently acquired sovereignty and the subsequent unwillingness to transfer 
parts of it to a supranational entity. This is mostly valid for countries such as the 
Baltic States or, as might become relevant in the future – the ex-Yugoslavian states, 
                                                        
58 It remains to be seen whether this increased use of long term visas in the new member countries 
leads to pressure for more harmonisation of the rules of longer term visas as well.  EU action would be 
possible under the Lisbon Treaty (which speaks about common visa policy without the qualification of 
visas up to three months validity which had existed previously). 
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which only recently started life as independent states. The problems arising in the 
constitutional law field here have already been analyzed by Albi.59  
 
The new Member States were willing to cede to the EU this key aspect of sovereignty 
(control over persons), but they had specific concerns which they wanted to see 
addressed.  At the same time, the Eastern enlargement also raised new sensitivities in 
the old Member States as will be discussed below. 
 
Another reason for the tensions can be found in the greater sensitivity of the new 
Member States towards issues such as borders and free movement.  
 
Visas are a contentious subject between representatives of the new and the old 
Member States. For the old Member States, visas are a pure technicality hidden 
beneath immigration law provisions, understandable only by pure specialists and in 
any case a subject that poses no intellectual challenge. For them, the passion with 
which the issue is discussed in the new Member States is incomprehensible, even 
more so when it leads to demands to modify a system that has already existed for 
more than twenty years with proven efficiency. The usual argument is that the 
conditions for accession were known in advance and if they did not correspond to the 
beliefs or policy priorities of the new countries, they had the option of not joining the 
Union. Hence, the demands for change, once inside, are perceived as somewhat 
improper. What could be the reason for this mismatch in perceptions? Why, on the 
issue of visas, which are inevitably linked to the free movement of persons, do the old 
and new Europe appear to hail from different worlds? This section will put forward a 
possible explanation of the phenomenon. It is based on two elements: the difference in 
the characteristics of the old and new external borders and the types of checks 
performed there, and the difference in the understanding and value of the principle of 
free movement. 
 
                                                        
59 A. ALBI, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of the Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, (Cambridge, 2005). 
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5.1. Old and New Borders60 
Despite the fact that the movement of the external borders of the EU is an automatic 
exercise; a result of the entry into force of an accession treaty, notably the 2003 and 
2005 Accession Treaties, these border changes are in fact laden with symbolism. 
 
5.1.1. The old external border of the old (Western) Member States 
The external border of the EU and previously of the EC has been subject to frequent 
change, due to the expansion of the Schengen area and consecutive EU enlargements. 
Nevertheless, the concept of a common external border and common rules that apply 
to it was born with the Schengen Agreement of 1985. The Agreement itself was 
concerned only with the removal of internal frontier controls, with the focus being on 
the liberalization of travel within the common Schengen territory. Although at the 
time there was some apprehension that such liberalization might lead to tougher 
external controls and the construction of what was later called a ‘Fortress Europe,’ no 
great consideration was given to this fear. Why? 
 
One possible explanation could be that when the Schengen Agreement was negotiated 
and signed, Europe had a completely different geo-political architecture from today. 
The external border of the Schengen group, which later was to include almost all 
continental EC Member States, was modelled on the East-West Divide. It followed 
the borders set after World War II. What were the characteristics of this border? 
 
As a result of the division of Europe post-World War II, the maps of certain areas, 
notably between East and West Germany, were significantly redrawn, rendering the 
border a symbolic dividing line between two political systems. In the early years after 
World War II, there were huge flows of persons trying either to escape the newly 
                                                        
60 For a general overview of the new Member States’ characteristics, see R.J. CRAMPTON, Eastern 
Europe in the Twentieth Century and After, 2nd edition, Routledge, (London, 2007); and CRAMPTON 
AND CRAMPTON, Atlas of Eastern Europe in the twentieth century, Routledge, (London, 1996). For the 
relationship along the new borders see M. ANDERSON, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the 
Modern World, Polity Press, (Cambridge, 1996); ANDREAS AND SNYDER (eds), The Wall around the 
West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers (Lanham, 2000), J. BATT, The EU’s new borderlands, Centre for European Reform, 
(London, 2003), BLONDEL, “The challenge of integrating East and West in the EU”, in ÁGH AND 
FERENCZ (eds), Overcoming the EU Crisis: EU Perspectives after the Eastern Enlargement, Together 
for Europe Series (Budapest, 2007). 
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established communist system in the East (Germans moving East to West) or, if they 
belonged to minorities, trying to return to their fatherland (Germans moving from 
Konigsberg when it had become Kaliningrad). 
 
Once this displacement process ceased (some time in the late 1950s), the 
reinforcement of the border began in earnest and its characteristics (which remained 
valid for the following half century) were formed. These included: 
 
- complete militarization of the border on the eastern side and on the 
western side, notably in Germany; 
- decrease in the number of border crossing points and heavy controls of 
the existing crossing points; (for example on the more than 400 km 
long border between Bulgaria and Greece, there were only two border 
crossing points); 
- development of certain conditions (like visas or other entry conditions) 
ultimately aimed at decreasing the flow of persons.  
 
Despite all these reinforcements, crossing the border was still possible and followed 
quite uncomplicated rules for West Europeans travelling to the East. This was not the 
case for travels from East to West, however, the reasons for which will be 
demonstrated later.   
 
Meanwhile, within Western Europe itself, the borders did not prove to be a huge 
impediment to travel, especially of persons, and especially for short-term stays. 
Thanks to the various regional arrangements and numerous bilateral agreements, the 
movement of individuals across almost all West European borders proved 
unproblematic. Hence, at the time of signature of the Schengen agreement, there were 
no concerns about developing a friendly external border. The relevant external (land) 
border coincided with the Iron Curtain. 
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5.1.2. The nature of the external border of the new Eastern Member States 
In the period before the transition process, which started at the end of the 1980s and 
gained momentum in the 1990s, the borders of the now new Member States had very 
specific characteristics.  
 
First of all, all of the borders, both to the West and the East, were militarized. There 
was military force both at the border with the West and at the border with the then 
Soviet Union. The borders between the socialist countries themselves were subject to 
low military presence but were still guarded by the military.  
 
The militarization of the border meant that: 
 
- border crossings were only possible at the few available crossing points; 
- huge areas of the actual border were fenced to prevent illegal crossings; 
- there was a zone of about two kilometres around the border area that was 
ploughed daily to show up any footprints made by possible border offenders; 
- as well as the two kilometre zone, there was a border area of 30 km, where, 
despite the presence of villages, a visit was allowed only by special permit; 
- anyone present in the border areas without the necessary permits and 
documents, even without attempting to cross the border, ran the risk of being 
shot by the military guarding the border. 
 
Given these deterrents to border-crossing from the East, it is easy to see that West 
Europeans had a different perspective. Even before the start of the transition process, 
crossing the western border of the socialist block was a privilege reserved only to 
those most loyal to the party. 
 
The borders between the socialist countries themselves had lower thresholds. 
Moreover, as all countries belonged to a common friendly block, there was no serious 
attempt to resolve border disputes or to deal seriously with minority issues. As a 
result, in several places the border cut through areas with common ethnicity and 
separated single communities (as with the Hungarian/Romanian border, 
Polish/Ukrainian border, etc.). This development can explain the sentiments related to 
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the eastern border of the socialist countries, most of which had simplified rules for 
crossing and inevitably the feeling of a ‘friendly border’ was generated. 
 
Moving further east, some of the new Member States, the three coming from within 
the then Soviet Union did not have an external land border, but they were also heavily 
militarized at the coast line. 
 
5.2. The value of free movement 
The second significant difference in perception between the new and the old Member 
States is undoubtedly the value placed on the free movement of persons. 
 
5.2.1. Free movement in the West 
As was demonstrated earlier, since the establishment of the EC, the free movement of 
persons was initially a concept that grew from the free movement of workers. This 
freedom was to be further extended to include various groups of persons. However, in 
essence it is in fact linked more to the residence of nationals of one EC Member State 
wishing to work in another state rather than to a simple procedure to cross borders, 
and was thus a process of entry regulation. 
 
One of the reasons for such a perception of movement is that by the time the EEC 
Treaty was signed, citizens of most of the European countries benefited from some 
kind of simplified access procedure, at least with their neighbours and in most cases 
with a number of other countries. In addition, in three more geographically limited 
areas there was already a process of setting up passport unions, which simplified 
travel procedures even further for citizens of the participating states. To sum up, by 
the beginning of the 1960s, the average Western European citizen could move around 
the continent without encountering too many formalities. Visa requirements among 
most of the countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece excluded) and border crossings 
were allowed only on the basis of a passport or even in some instances on the basis of 
a national identity card.  
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Despite the relative liberty achieved, most of the policy-makers at the time had 
personal memories of the movement limitations imposed by the authoritarian state – 
namely by Nazi Germany during the World War II. This might have been one of the 
reasons for the huge number of initiatives aimed at the further liberalization of travel 
in the 1960s and 1970s (see for example the Passport Union proposed in 1974). Free 
movement carried not only practical but also symbolic value for them, and in 
combination with the growing economy and the need for immigrant workers, an 
environment of liberal immigration policies and movement regulation emerged.  
 
By the mid-1980s this state of affairs had changed significantly.  
 
Fuelled by three interlinked factors, the approach of the EC changed dramatically at 
the beginning of the 1990s. With the fall of the Berlin Wall came the fear of mass 
immigration from the East. There was a period of mass asylum crises, followed by 
economic difficulties in some of the Member States. All these resulted in a move 
towards the closing off of the EU; liberalizing through the Schengen rules inside but 
closing off from outside.  
 
Undoubtedly, the EU’s migration policy in general and the policies linked to border 
controls and visas are considered to be quite restrictive at present. The way in which 
visa lists are composed and visa exemptions are granted is an expression of that fear 
of immigration.  Countries with a tradition of immigration (e.g. US, Canada and 
Australia) usually take a different approach. For them the main focus of visa policy is 
on immigration visa (which by and large do not exist in Europe) and about 
channelling immigration (see also chapter 10.1). 
 
5.2.2. Free movement in the East 
Unlike Western citizens, and unlike the situation before World War II when they 
enjoyed a similar level of free movement throughout Europe, the citizens of Eastern 
Europe had an experience of almost complete control over movement by the state. 
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It was mentioned earlier that any travel abroad was limited by the need for a passport 
and the need for an exit visa. However, the passport for travel abroad (as the internal 
identity documents were also called passports) were issued not to everyone who 
applied but only to those who met certain conditions. Moreover, once the trip for 
which the passport was issued was completed, the passport was supposed to be 
returned to the issuing authority. In addition to having a passport, there was also a 
need for an exit visa, especially for travel to Western Europe. Thus the number of 
trips made was necessarily limited. 
 
Apart from the total regulation of trips abroad, there was also control over movement 
within the country. Every citizen had a permanent residence and did not have the right 
to change it without the permission of the authorities.61   
 
Such total control over population movements led to the development of a special 
attachment and value for the concept of free movement in the East. As it was a right 
refused for decades, there was a natural reaction to defend it, to help it develop further 
and not to refuse it to others. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter analyzed the loss of sovereignty for the new member countries on their 
road to EU membership and then full integration into the Schengen area. The old 
Member States had decided (in the protocol of Amsterdam on the integration of the 
Schengen acquis) that any new members had to take on the full Schengen acquis 
without the possibility of transition periods. This created problems for many new 
Member States, which had sometimes only recently acquired full control over their 
territories and who wished to keep their borders open to stabilize, and in many cases 
to facilitate contact with, minorities living in third countries. The candidate countries 
thus resisted the loss of sovereignty, also because for them sovereignty and the 
freedom to travel within their own part of Europe represented important political 
                                                        
61 For a historical review of the regulation in Bulgaria, see GUENTCHEVA, “From Banishment to 
Ascribed Residence: Controlling Internal Movement in Socialist Bulgaria (1944-1989)”, paper 
presented in the project “Roles, Identities and Hybrids” of the Centre for Advanced Study, Sofia, May 
2006, available at http://v3.cas.bg/cyeds/downloads/From_Banishment_to_Ascribed_Residence.pdf 
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values, which was sometimes poorly understood by the old member countries, whose 
experience of borders had long been unproblematic. 
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CHAPTER 8 – IMPACT AT EU LEVEL I – COMPASSIONATE PARTNERS 
AND THE EU’S REACTION TO CONCERNS OF THE NEW MEMBER 
STATES 
 
Even before the accession date of 2004, there was an understanding on the part of the 
EU of the need to address the concerns of the then candidate countries about possible 
problems with their neighbours upon accession.1 The hope on both sides of the future 
external borders was to achieve visa liberalization, grounded in the visa-free regime 
the neighbours enjoyed with the new Member States, using as a model the experience 
of Bulgaria and Romania in achieving visa-free status.  
 
This was never seriously considered by the European Union, however, despite the 
insistence of both the new Member States and their neighbours at the political level. 
The stance taken by the EU was not influenced by the unilateral measures to abolish 
visas for EU nationals adopted by certain states, most notably Ukraine. Instead, the 
EU pursued a piecemeal approach; trying to tackle each problem individually, thus 
creating additional fragmentation in an already fragmented field.  
 
After 2001 when the new EC visa regulation entered into force, three new specific 
legal tools were developed: i) special travel documents for Kaliningrad, ii) special 
rules for local border traffic and iii) visa facilitation (special procedures for the 
issuance of Schengen visas).  
 
Some temporary measures covering the period between accession to the EU and 
accession to Schengen to ensure the recognition of the Schengen visas for entry onto 
the territory of the new Member states were also adopted (but they are not the subject 
of this study).   
 
The first two are most clearly a response to the problems raised by the Eastern 
enlargement. Both these case proposals were made prior to the 1 May 2004 accession 
                                                        
1 This is documented in detail for each of the cases considered in this chapter. 
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date and were aimed at resolving very specific and technical problems arising at the 
external land border of the EU as a result of the Eastern enlargement. Neither would 
have been necessary if a general visa-free arrangement had been possible to 
accommodate the special relationships of the new Member States. Both have 
important implications for the way in which external competence is exercised and for 
the tensions arising as a result of the transfer of sovereignty in the visa field by the 
new Member States to the EU.  Both also show a tendency towards the generation of 
regulation at community level of issues of special interest to the new Member States, 
but of marginal importance to the old ones. A field that was previously a shared 
competence between the EU and the Member States was transformed into a field of 
exclusive EU competence, thereby limiting the possibilities for action by the 
individual Member States concerned. The background to this was clearly a lack of 
trust among member countries. 
 
Visa facilitation, the third special measure developed in response to enlargement, 
seems destined to become a more general policy tool for the Union, but it is still too 
early to judge its relevance. 
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Part I – KALININGRAD 
 
Among the many cases of special relations with neighbours and the potential 
problems associated with enlargement, the case of the Kaliningrad2 deserves special 
attention. Due to its geographical situation and the fact of it being an enclave 
surrounded by two EU Member States, it poses special challenges quite different from 
concerns in the other regions of the EU external land border. The Commission 
Enlargement Strategy Paper of November 2000 already called for the issues 
concerning Kaliningrad, in co-operation with Russia, Poland and Lithuania to be 
addressed.3 These issues included security, economic and political concerns, and the 
movement of persons, to be addressed in this chapter.  
 
In the following pages an analysis of the arrangements related to enlargement for 
Kaliningrad will be studied, from the point of view of EU visa policy and the 
movement of third-country nationals. The analysis consists of four main parts. In the 
first, the general background of Kaliningrad will be presented. In the second, the main 
problems linked to enlargement will be outlined. An analysis of the legal mechanisms 
chosen to solve the problems then follows. And finally, an analysis of the present 
situation and possible remaining challenges linked to the Schengen accession of the 
neighbouring Kaliningrad to EU Member States will be presented.  
 
                                                        
2 Here and elsewhere in the text Kaliningrad is used to refer to the Kaliningrad Region. References 
made to the city of Kaliningrad are identified as such. 
3 The problems of Kaliningrad, associated with the Eastern enlargement of the EU, gave rise to many 
conferences and publications in the period 2001 – 2003, aiming to elaborate an innovative solution of 
the Kaliningrad problem. Among those, see BAXENDALE, DEWAR AND GOWAN (eds), The EU and 
Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the Impact of EU Enlargement, Federal Trust for Education and 
Research, (London, 2001), 288 p.; FAIRLIE AND SERGOUNIN, Are Borders Barriers?: EU Enlargement 
and the Russian Region of Kaliningrad, Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik, 
(Helsinki and Bonn, 2001), 190 p.; R. J. KRICKUS, The Kaliningrad question, Lanham, Rowman & 
Littlefield , (Oxford, 2002), 221 p.; LAMANDE AND LEFEBVRE, “Un nouveau mur pour Kaliningrad?”, 
Courrier des pays de l'Est, Le Centre, n. 1025, (2002), pp. 39-49; PETERMANN ET MATAGNE, “Cahier 
n° 1 – The EU Enlargement and Russia: The Case of Kaliningrad”, Cahiers de Sciences politiques de 
l’ULg, (2002), available at: http://popups.ulg.ac.be/csp/document.php?id=65; HUISMAN, “A new 
European Union policy for Kaliningrad”, Occassional Papers, n. 33, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, Paris, (2002); TIMMERMANN, “The EU-Russia Minuet over Kaliningrad”, 
Internationale Politik, Volume 4/2003 Spring, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin, 
(2003); and a series of articles on Kaliningrad by EVEGENY VINOKUROV, among which VINOKUROV, 
“Transit is just a part of it: Kaliningrad and the free movement of people”, Association of International 
Experts on the Development of the Kaliningrad Region, (2004), all available on: 
http://www.vinokurov.info.  
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1. General background 
The Kaliningrad Region is a Russian enclave bordered by Poland, Lithuania and the 
Baltic Sea. It is detached from mainland Russia and geographically included in the 
EU while remaining under Russian sovereignty. It has a land surface of 15,100 square 
km and a population of almost one million inhabitants, of whom about 430,000 are 
concentrated in the capital, Kaliningrad. 
 
During the Soviet period, the main concerns of the West towards Kaliningrad were 
linked to security and its role as home port of the Russian Baltic fleet.  Kaliningrad 
became an exclave of Russia, separated from what is called mainland Russia, when in 
1991 the Soviet Union dissolved and Belarus and the Baltic States became 
independent. As of that moment, travel by land between Kaliningrad and mainland 
Russia involves crossing three borders; crossing the borders of Lithuania and Latvia 
or Lithuania and Belarus or Poland and Belarus. In 1999 there were 8.6 million border 
crossings by land to the two neighbouring countries (with a population in Kaliningrad 
of less than 1 million).4 
 
The accession negotiations of Poland and Lithuania would eventually lead to 
Kaliningrad becoming a Russian enclave within the enlarged EU. Considering that the 
acceding states are expected to adopt unconditionally the Schengen acquis and thus 
also introduce visa requirements, the residents of Kaliningrad need a visa to leave the 
region (the Russian term for this administrative unit is oblast) even if they are 
travelling to mainland Russia. The 2000 EU Commission report on Lithuanian 
progress towards EU accession stated: “Lithuanian policy in respect of simplification 
of the visa regime for border residents of Belarus and Kaliningrad is not in line with 
the common visa policy and will need to be revised before accession.”5 
 
                                                        
4 FAIRLIE AND SERGOUNIN, Are Borders Barriers?: EU Enlargement and the Russian Region of 
Kaliningrad, Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik, (Helsinki and Bonn, 2001). 
5 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Lithuania’s progress towards accession, COM (2000) 
707 final, 8 November 2000, page 84. Poland was expected to require visas by the end of 2001 and 
Lithuania by 2003. 
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In 2001, when the EU and Russia finally engaged in a dialogue aiming at finding 
solutions for the Kaliningrad problem, the Commission presented a Communication 
on this issue6 outlining the main challenges.7  
 
Of the neighbours of Kaliningrad, Lithuania is the main trading partner and an 
important investor in the region. It is located on the transit route between the region 
and the Russian mainland. It has the largest share of visitors and transit traffic from 
Kaliningrad and wants to maintain good relations with Russia, to ensure that 
Kaliningrad is not isolated and does not become a source of economic or political 
instability. Lithuania and Russia established an institutional basis for cooperation 
through bilateral agreements on Kaliningrad (1991, 1999). As far as Poland is 
concerned, cooperation exists between certain Polish regions and Kaliningrad. 
Activities mainly consist of partnerships and exchanges at the local level (SMEs, 
academic institutions, administrations), but also cover the preparation of investment 
projects.   
 
During the Soviet period, people from Kaliningrad travelled freely within the USSR. 
Since the break-up of the USSR, they have to travel some 500 km through Lithuania 
and either Latvia or Belarus in order to get to the rest of Russia. The same applies to 
other Russians who want to visit their relatives, friends and business partners in 
Kaliningrad. The Russian authorities estimated that in 2001 the total number of 
crossings between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia was 960,000 by train and 
620,000 by car (Kaliningrad’s population is 950,000). 
 
As far as rules on travel are concerned, Lithuania had a special regime for travel 
related to Kaliningrad. First of all, the transit via the territory of Lithuania was visa-
                                                        
6 Communication from the Commission to the Council, “The EU and Kaliningrad”, COM (2001) 26 
final, 17 January 2001. 
7 The Communication presented the difficult economic realities in Kaliningrad: “The economic data for 
2001 shows that due to the economic problems of transition, Kaliningrad households have come to rely 
increasingly on unregistered economic activities. As a border province, Kaliningrad offers much scope 
for informal activity, estimated to account for more than 50% of GDP. About 10,000 people are 
believed to be involved in regular cross-border shuttle trading. Thirty percent of the population is now 
estimated to live below subsistence level. There is only one regular international flight from 
Kaliningrad, to Copenhagen and thus most of the movement of persons is realised by land and to a 
lesser extent by sea. In 2001 Kaliningrad had 23 international road, rail, air and sea border crossing 
points, on most of which the border crossing formalities are slow and hamper the contacts with 
neighbouring countries.” 
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free and available not only to the inhabitants of Kaliningrad but also to certain 
categories of Russian citizens transiting through Lithuania. Secondly, there was a 
special regulation for the residents of Kaliningrad, allowing them to visit Lithuania 
itself visa-free. And finally, all those movements, although in legal terms taking place 
over international borders, were allowed on the basis of internal identity documents, 
instead of the customarily required valid passport. 
 
Map 8.1. Map of Kaliningrad 
 
Source: The CIA World Fact Book. 
 
2. Main problems linked to enlargement 
The problems linked to the movement of persons from Kaliningrad to the surrounding 
states (Poland and Lithuania) and their transit to Russia have a temporal and 
geographical dimension.  
 
When the EU and Russia started discussing the issue in 2001, there was a need to 
come up with a solution for three time periods, each of them subject to different legal 
rules.  
1) A first period from the introduction of visas for Russian nationals by Poland (in 
2001) and Lithuania (in 2003) until the respective accession of both countries to 
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the EU (2004). During this period, previously existing bilateral visa-free or 
facilitated traffic arrangements would not apply (some of them would have been 
denounced in the process of negotiations for membership) but neither would any 
EU or Schengen rule apply.  
2) A second period spanned from the date of accession to the EU of Poland and 
Lithuania to the date of accession to Schengen of both countries. During this 
period, the new countries would still issue their national visas, following their 
national rules.  Moreover, the internal border controls between their territory 
and the territory of the other Member States would not be lifted.  
3) A third period covered the date of accession to Schengen of Lithuania and 
Poland (2007), leading to the full application of the Schengen rules in the 
countries surrounding Kaliningrad. 
 
The geography of Kaliningrad gives rise to three problems for human mobility. The 
first is the movement of the inhabitants of Kaliningrad towards Poland and Lithuania 
and later towards the Schengen area. The second is the problem of local border traffic, 
where persons living in the border area regularly cross the border for economic, social 
or cultural reasons. The third problem is linked to the transit between Kaliningrad and 
the rest of Russia. Added to this is the complication over travel documents, as under 
any new travel scheme, requiring a valid international passport would necessitate the 
issuing of passports to significant numbers of the Kaliningrad population. 
 
During internal EU discussions on ways to tackle these problems, the argument was 
raised that of all the three problems outlined above, the only one whose situation was 
peculiar to Kaliningrad was the problem of transit to Russia.8 The problems over the 
movement of citizens of neighbouring EU states to Schengen territory and the 
problems of local border traffic were clearly not specific to Kaliningrad as they 
applied across the new external land border. Thus, the legal action at EU level 
concentrated on the development of special measures for the transit of Russian 
nationals both from and to the enclave of Kaliningrad, while the issues of local border 
traffic and how to generally facilitate travel were dealt with later through acts of a 
                                                        
8 For arguments and ideas, see the Note from the French Delegation to the Visa Working Party of 27 
February 2002, Council doc. 6694/02. 
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more general application (see Part II on local border traffic and Part III on visa 
facilitation of this chapter).  
 
3. Legal mechanisms used to address the problem 
3.1. Lithuania and Poland 
A joint statement9 made in the context of the EU-Russia Summit on 3 October 2001 
called for an examination of the special situation of Kaliningrad in the context of 
enlargement, and the official discussions continued through 2002 until February 2003 
when the Commission submitted a proposal for two Council Regulations, meant to 
resolve the issue at least until the expansion of the Schengen area (and the respective 
lifting of controls on the internal borders between Poland and Lithuania and the other 
EU Member States). 
 
By September 2002, the general discussion had gone along the lines of seeking a 
solution related to transit only to and from Kaliningrad to mainland Russia. On 18 
September 2002 the Commission published another communication to the Council, 
this time concentrating exclusively on transit.10 The legal situation surrounding the 
negotiations and the implementation of whatever agreement was reached, was 
additionally complicated by the fact that in effect the EU was negotiating transit 
through a territory that was, at the time, not part of its territory. There were parallel 
negotiations between the EU and Russia and, at the same time between the EU and 
Lithuania and Poland, the latter taking place within the framework of accession 
negotiations. 
 
Once the issue under discussion became confined to transit only, the involvement and 
interest of Poland decreased, as it did not consider itself a transit country between the 
different parts of Russia. Thus, based on its previous practice of allowing only those 
Russian citizens with international passports, it opted for the introduction of visas (for 
Russian citizens) as of 01.7.2003. 
                                                        
9 EU-Russia Summit. Brussels, (2001, October 3) “Joint Statement”, point 9, available at: 
http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/images/pText_pict/238/sum41.doc 
10 Communication from the Commission to the Council, “Kaliningrad: Transit”, COM (2002) 510 
final, 18 September 2002. 
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As for Lithuania, its treatment of Russian citizens in general in 2003 and Kaliningrad 
residents in particular was as follows. Lithuania required visas (normally issued by 
consulates on the basis of international passports) for all car passengers from 
mainland Russia. No visa was required for rail passengers or truck drivers. Visas for 
these categories were introduced as from 1 January 2003 and Kaliningrad residents 
stayed visa-exempt until 1 July 2003. However, the problem of most Kaliningrad 
inhabitants not holding international passports remained. According to the Lithuanian 
legislation of the time, only a passport valid for international travel could be accepted 
for crossing the border, unless an international agreement stipulated otherwise. At the 
time, residents of Kaliningrad (but not Russians from the mainland) could use internal 
Russian passports to cross the border. The Commission’s view on the possible 
continuation of this practice upon accession was positive, as it stated in its 
communication that:  
 
there is nothing in the acquis that would prevent Lithuania from accepting the 
internal passport for crossing its territory (with a visa attached to a separate sheet 
in accordance with Regulation 333/2002) before the lifting of internal border 
controls, if deemed necessary in cases where Russians travelling to and from 
Kaliningrad do not yet have passports valid for international travel.11 
 
3.2. EU level 
On 14 March 2003, the Council adopted two regulations, following the proposal of 
the Commission: Council Regulation (EC) No 693/2003 establishing a specific 
Facilitated Transit Document (FTD), a Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and 
amending the Common Consular Instructions and the Common Manual,12 and 
Council Regulation (EC) No 694/2003 on uniform formats for FTD and FRTD.13 
Both regulations were adopted on the basis of Art. 62(2) following consultation with 
the European Parliament.  
 
                                                        
11 Communication from the Commission to the Council, “Kaliningrad:Transit”, op. cit., para 14. 
12 O.J. 2003, L 099, pp. 8-14. 
13 O.J. 2003, L 099, pp. 15-21. 
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The objective of this measure is clearly stated in paragraph 1 of the Preamble:  
 
in order to prepare accession of new Member States, the Community should take 
into account specific situations, which might occur as a result of the enlargement 
and set out the relevant legislation in order to avoid future problems in relation 
with the crossing of the external borders.  
 
What is meant by “specific situations” here is those third country nationals who need 
to cross the territory of one or several Member States to travel between two parts of 
their own country that are not geographically contiguous. Despite the general wording 
of this part, the preparatory documents clearly indicate that the only case where such 
rule has any practical reference is the case of Kaliningrad. However, both regulations 
have a rather general wording and there is no mention of Kaliningrad at all in their 
text.  
 
As for the wording chosen for the documents: facilitated transit document (FTD) and 
facilitated rail transit document (FRTD), despite their formal titles, they “have the 
value of transit visas authorising their holders to enter in order to pass through the 
territories of Member States in accordance with the provisions of the Schengen acquis 
concerning the crossing of the external borders”.14 Why the term “transit visas” was 
not used became clear during the discussions on the newly proposed Visa Code. It 
seems that during the negotiations, the Russian side was strongly opposed to any 
reference to transit visas when setting up a scheme allowing Russians to travel from 
mainland Russia to Kaliningrad (and vice versa).15 The reason for this sensitivity 
might have been that, according to the EU rules on visas, a transit visa is defined as a 
visa allowing transit through the Schengen territory from the territory of one third 
state to the territory of another, and thus does not cover the cases when the movement 
is from the territory of one state to another part of the same state. 
 
It is interesting that both regulations were drafted in such a way that they did not 
address the points of EU concern at the time. Indeed, the regulations were adopted by 
                                                        
14 Recital 4 of the Preamble of Council Regulation No 693/2003, op.cit. The equivalence to transit 
visas is also mentioned in Article 3(1) of Council Regulation No 693/2003, op.cit. and Article 1 of 
Council Regulation No 694/2003, op.cit. 
15 See Council doc. 13611/06, 6 October 2006, Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a Community Code on Visas, p. 3. 
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the Council the same day as the Council took the decisions on the admission of the ten 
new Member States to the European Union.16  
 
Thus in this period, the EU negotiated special provisions for movement through a 
territory that did not fall under its sovereignty and was unlikely to do so before the 
lifting of the internal border controls between the old and new Member States. 
Paragraph 14 of the preamble of the Council Regulation 693/2003 clearly states that it 
“constitutes an act building on the Schengen acquis or otherwise related to it within 
the meaning of Article 3(2) of the Act of Accession and will therefore only become 
applicable after the lifting of the internal border controls”.  This of course leaves open 
the question of what EU rules were applicable to the transit between Kaliningrad and 
Russia between 2003 and 2007 (the accession of Poland and Lithuania to Schengen). 
In view of the fact that the Regulations were not applicable to Lithuania, who had the 
control over movement while the EU (or rather its Schengen part, to which the 
Regulations are applicable) did not have a territory on which to apply them. 
Moreover, what application did the Commission report on on 22.12.2006?17 
 
In fact, Regulation 693/2003 sets out the basic principles for the functioning of the 
FTD/FRTD scheme. The practical details were established in a bilateral agreement on 
the procedure of issuance of FRTDs between the Russian Federation and Lithuania of 
20.6.2003 and Regulation N 361, adopted by the Russian Federation, on measures 
aimed at the fulfilment of engagements under taken by the Russian Federation under 
the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the EU on transit between the 
Kaliningrad oblast and the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation.18 
 
Article 12 of Council Regulation 693/2003 provides that Member States deciding to 
issue the FTD and the FRTD shall communicate such a decision to the Council and 
the Commission. Such decisions are to be published by the Commission in the 
                                                        
16 Decision of the Council of the European Union of 14 April 2003 on the admission of the Czech 
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of 
Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of 
Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, O.J. 2003, L 236. 
17 Report from the Commission on the functioning of the facilitated transit for persons between the 
Kaliningrad region and the rest of the Russian Federation, COM (2006) 0840 final. 
18 Report from the Commission on the functioning of the facilitated transit for persons between the 
Kaliningrad region and the rest of the Russian Federation, op. cit., part II. 
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Official Journal and enter into force on the date of the publication. After the entry into 
force of the first such decision, the Commission is under obligation to report to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of the facilitated transit 
scheme, at the latest three years after the entry into force of the first decision. 
Following these rules, Lithuania communicated to the Council and to the Commission 
its decision to apply the FTD/FRTD scheme from 1 July 2003, thus putting the 
Commission under obligation to report by 1 July 2006.  
 
However, at the time of the notification, Lithuania was not an EU member state and 
even after it acceded the two Council regulations still did not apply (but the bilateral 
agreement between Russia and Lithuania did apply), until the lifting of internal border 
controls and the full integration of Lithuania in Schengen in 2007.19  
 
It is clear that Lithuania was torn between its desire for EU membership and the need 
to maintain good relations with its neighbours. Both these objectives led to 
agreements containing rules that could have jeopardized the future integration of 
Lithuania in Schengen, however. To counter such fears, a special Protocol No 5 to the 
Accession Treaty was drawn up.20 Article 1 of the Protocol contains a guarantee that 
the agreed rules on transit “shall not in themselves delay or prevent the full 
participation of Lithuania in the Schengen acquis, including the removal of internal 
border controls”. Article 2 contains an obligation on behalf of the Community to 
assist Lithuania in the implementation of the rules and shall “notably bear any 
additional costs incurred by implementing the specific provisions of the acquis 
provided for such transit”.21 And most importantly, Article 3 states that:  
 
Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of Lithuania, any further decision 
concerning the transit of persons between the region of Kaliningrad and other 
parts of the Russian Federation will be only adopted after the accession of 
                                                        
19See Council Decision 2007/801/EC of 6 December 2007 on the full application of the provisions of 
the Schengen acquis in the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the 
Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, O.J. 2007, L 323, p. 34–39. 
In accordance with the Council Decision, the land and sea internal border controls were lifted on 21 
December 2007 and the controls on internal flights on 30 March 2008.  
20 Protocol No 5 on the transit of persons by land between the region of Kaliningrad and other parts of 
the Russian Federation, O.J. 2003, L 236, p. 946. 
21 Indeed a special “Kaliningrad Transit Scheme” is included as a special part of the general 
programme “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” in the Financial Perspective 2007-2013. 
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Lithuania by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission.  
 
Thus the sovereign rights of Lithuania were recognized politically by establishing 
special decision-making rules that deviate from the standard decision-making rules in 
this field that would normally call for a QMV, after 1 May 2004.  Any change of the 
status quo would require the consent of Lithuania.  In this sense, the country could not 
be overruled within the EU decision making mechanism on this matter.22  
 
3.3. Consequences in relation to the two-phase implementation procedure of acts 
building upon the Schengen acquis. 
The accession treaty contains an article stipulating that the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis, the acts building upon it or otherwise related to it, listed in the annex to that 
Article, shall be binding on and applicable in the new Member States as from 
accession. The provisions and acts not referred to in that annex, while binding on the 
new Member States as from accession, will only become applicable in the new 
Member States following a special Council decision to that effect, made in 
accordance with that Article. 
 
The Council Regulation on a uniform format for Facilitated Transit Documents (FTD) 
and Facilitated Rail Transit Documents (FRTD) are added to the annex of the article 
in the Accession Treaty, consistent with the fact that all other acts related to the 
uniform format of travel documents are listed in that annex, and thus become 
applicable upon accession. 
 
The annex to the Article in the Accession Treaty does not contain any acts related to 
the definition, the validity, the issuing procedures, and the conditions for obtaining 
travel documents. The Council Regulation introducing a specific Facilitated Transit 
Document (FTD) and a Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and amending the 
Common Consular Instructions and the Common Manual is not listed in that annex 
and, while binding on all Member States, will only become applicable in the new 
                                                        
22 However, this is not equivalent to full national sovereignty since the EU rules remain in place and 
Lithuania is bound by them even if changing circumstances were to require a change in order to 
safeguard the interests of Lithuania. 
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Member States following a Council decision to that effect. Until such a decision, 
facilitated transit remains a matter for national regulation. As a consequence, the other 
Member States do not have to recognize the facilitated transit documents until the 
adoption of the second Council Decision lifting the internal borders. 
 
4. The substantive rules on FTD and FRTD 
The regime, in place since 1 July 2003, introduced two new types of document needed 
for transiting through Lithuania to and from mainland Russia: the Facilitated Transit 
Document (FTD) and the Facilitated Railway Transit Document (FRTD).23 
 
4.1. Facilitated Transit Document 
The purpose of the FTD is to facilitate the crossing of Lithuania either by car or by 
bus. The FTD is issued by Lithuanian consulates in Russia for a period of one year 
and is free of charge for all Russian citizens.24 The procedures for acquiring an FTD 
are much like normal visa procedures. 
 
Poland is not concerned by the FTDs and applies its normal visa regime for 
Kaliningrad residents. As far as Poland is concerned, it introduced visas for Russian 
citizens on 1 October 2003, as a direct consequence of its forthcoming EU accession. 
Poland initially intended to introduce visas already on 1 July (as Lithuania did), but 
postponed this measure for three months so as “not to disturb the tourist season”. A 
reciprocal visa regime was established with Russia with a specific non-reciprocal 
element for Kaliningrad. According to the agreement, Kaliningrad residents may 
receive Polish visas free of charge, whereas people from mainland Russia have to pay 
                                                        
23 For details on the operation of the regime see the Report from the Commission on the functioning of 
the facilitated transit for persons between the Kaliningrad region and the rest of the Russian Federation, 
COM (2006) 0840 final, Brussels, 22 December 2006, as well as VINOKUROV, “Transit is just a part of 
it: Kaliningrad and the free movement of people”, Association of International Experts on the 
Development of the Kaliningrad Region, (2004); and International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
“Kaliningrad transit: secure borders, free movement”, IOM Lithuania, (2007). 
24 The rules cover citizens and not residents of Russia. The vocabulary used in the texts of the two 
Council Regulations makes that clear. Recital 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 693/2003 speaks about 
“the new situation of third country nationals who must necessarily cross the territory of one or several 
Member States in order to travel between two parts of their own country which are not geographically 
contiguous”. Article 4 of the same Council Regulation lists among the conditions for issuing FTD an 
applicant shall meet, having “valid reasons for frequent travelling between the two parts of the territory 
of his country”.  
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regular consular fees. Polish citizens have to pay for their Russian visas unless they 
are travelling to the Kaliningrad oblast. However, Russians did not need transit visas 
to cross Poland on the way to Germany or further afield, as long as they had a valid 
Schengen visa.25  
 
The FTD is issued to Russian citizens travelling frequently by land from the 
Kaliningrad region to the mainland and vice versa. It allows for multiple-entry transit 
and can be valid for up to several years. The application procedure at the consular 
office is similar to the visa issuing procedure. The FTD is affixed in the international 
passport of the Russian national, and the price is fixed at €5. 
 
4.2. Facilitated Railway Transit Document (FRTD) 
The FRTD was created for rail passengers and is valid for direct transit between 
Kaliningrad and the Russian mainland for a single return transit (entry-return). An 
FRTD is valid for a return trip within three months, which means that there is no need 
to apply for and receive a new document in order to return. A second stamp is put on 
the back of the FRTD. The issuing procedure is facilitated and offered without charge.  
 
The FRTD can be issued to persons going through Lithuania only on Russian transit 
trains. There are two such train routes at present – to Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. 
The procedure is as follows. When buying a ticket, a traveller must submit his/her 
basic passport data, which are then transferred to the Lithuanian consular authorities 
electronically. There is a time limit of 26 hours in which to buy train tickets before 
departure. After boarding the train, a form has to be filled out. Shortly before the 
border, a Lithuanian consular official goes through the train, collects the forms and 
distributes FRTDs to the passengers. 
 
There are various limitations on the issue of FRTDs. For example, citizens of the CIS 
other than Russia need transit visas to travel through Lithuania into Kaliningrad. 
                                                        
25 Based on the Decision No 895/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 
2006 introducing a simplified regime for the control of persons at the external borders based on 
unilateral recognition by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia of certain documents as equivalent to their national visas for the 
purposes of transit through their territories, O.J. 2006, L 167, p. 1. 
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Russian citizens need transit visas in order to transit Lithuania on non-Russian trains. 
These are issued at the Lithuanian embassy in Moscow and in consulates at a cost of 
€10 and require one week to process, or €35 if urgent. Russian citizens must be in 
possession of an international passport in order to obtain this visa. 
 
For those Russian citizens intending to make single or return trips by train through the 
territory of Lithuania, FRTD can be obtained on the basis of personal data submitted 
at the time of ticket purchase. This information is forwarded in electronic form to the 
Lithuanian authorities, who will respond within 24 hours. Tickets are not issued by 
the Russian authorities if Lithuania has objections to the transit of these Russian 
citizens via Lithuanian territory. An FRTD is then delivered by the Lithuanian 
consular authorities to the passenger at, or before, the Lithuanian border once 
Lithuania has checked that the travel documentation carried by the passenger is in 
order.26 
 
According to Regulation 693/2003, a Russian citizen wishing to travel by train with 
an international passport should receive an FRTD affixed to his passport. The bearer 
of Russian internal passports would however receive an FRTD affixed on a separate 
sheet as set out in Regulation 333/2002. From 1 May 2005 Russian nationals were 
required to have an international passport to which the FRTD sticker can be affixed. 
Bearers of an FRTD would not alight in Lithuania and the duration for each transit 
would be limited to 6h per transit. 
 
5. Evaluation of the application of the rules – and remaining challenges27 
By 2006 the number of persons travelling annually from and to Kaliningrad was 
estimated at 1.5 million,28 which is far fewer than before, but still a rather high 
number given that Kaliningrad’s population numbers slightly less than 1 million.  
                                                        
26 Report from the Commission on the functioning of the facilitated transit for persons between the 
Kaliningrad region and the rest of the Russian Federation, COM (2006), Brussels, 22.12.2006, page 3 
27 Several organizations were engaged in the evaluation of the way the transit scheme was working. See 
for example, International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Kaliningrad transit: secure borders, free 
movement”, IOM Lithuania, (2007); and for a more recent assessment see GAENZLE, MUENTEL AND 
VINOKUROV (eds), Adapting to European Integration? The Case of the Russian Exclave Kaliningrad, 
Manchester University Press, (Manchester, 2008). 
28 See the Report from the Commission on the functioning of the facilitated transit for persons between 




The FTDs are mainly used by Russian nationals from mainland Russia. The majority 
of Kaliningrad Russian citizens travel with FRTDs. However, it is more convenient 
for them to obtain a Lithuanian visa that grants the possibility not only to travel in 
transit but also to visit Lithuania. The procedures to obtain these visas and the FTD 
are very similar but the FTD has a €5 fee while the Lithuanian visas for Kaliningrad 
residents were free of charge until 2008. This explains why the number of Lithuanian 
visas issued to Kaliningrad residents was two to three times higher than the FTDs.  
 
The FRTD scheme has so far functioned smoothly. The millionth FRTD was issued 
on 3 March 2006 (after 32 months of operation). By contrast, the FTD has been less 
popular, as people prefer to receive full-scale multi-entry Lithuanian visas, which 
were initially free of charge to Kaliningrad residents. The situation changed however 
with the entry into force of the EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement,29 which sets the 
price at €35 and does not foresee any exception for Kaliningrad residents. Starting in 
2008 the situation changed again when Lithuania joined the Schengen free travel area 
and started to issue Schengen visas.30 
 
The Commission sees the transit regime as an integral part of the Schengen acquis 
and therefore fully Schengen-compatible, so it does not see any major reason to 
change the present FTD/FRTD scheme. 
 
Overall the border and transit issues constitute only part of the ‘Kaliningrad problem’, 
however. For Kaliningrad residents, Lithuanian transit is perhaps a lesser problem 
than travel in and out of the surrounding countries of Poland and Lithuania. Only 
about 1.5 million out of a total of 8.7 million border crossings in 2001 were for 
movement between Kaliningrad and the mainland.31 It appears that the special rules 
for transit did succeed in limiting the impact of EU accession by the surrounding 
countries on the movement between Kaliningrad and Russia. However, the same 
                                                        
29 Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the 
issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation, O.J. 2007, L 129, p. 
27, entered into force on 1 June 2007. 
30 Somewhat surprisingly Lithuania, unlike Poland, did not massively increase the issuance of long 
term visas. 
31 VINOKUROV, “Kaliningrad’s borders and transit to mainland Russia: practicalities and remaining 
bottlenecks”, CEPS Commentary, February, (2004), available at www.ceps.eu. 
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cannot be said of the access of Kaliningrad residents to the surrounding EU territory.  
This problem is not simply specific to Kaliningrad but to the entire new external land 
border. 
 
The question remained: how could there be a more comprehensive solution to the 
problems of transit and visas for Kaliningrad? Clearly, a visa-free regime between 
Russia and the EU states would effectively remove the problem altogether. However, 
this is still a long-term prospect. Another option would have been to simply include 
the whole Kaliningrad region in the local border area of Poland and Lithuania.  
 
As for Russia, the Kaliningrad regional Duma has twice offered to introduce a visa-
free regime for EU nationals unilaterally. This proposal would be feasible technically, 
since Kaliningrad is detached from the mainland, but it was rejected by the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and the 
indivisibility of the Russian state.32 
 
6. Interim conclusions 
The way in which a solution was found to the problems arising from EU enlargement, 
particularly in relation to Kaliningrad, is an interesting illustration of the tensions that 
can arise between a state transferring, or about to transfer, sovereignty and the entity 
that absorbs it. Despite the fact that the issue of transit from Kaliningrad to Russia 
was already subject to certain bilateral arrangements between Lithuania (a candidate 
country for EU membership at the time) and Russia, the EU felt the need to regulate 
the field even before the actual accession date. This constituted a sort of ‘advanced 
loss of sovereignty’ for a prospective member, mitigated, however, by the fact that the 
country concerned was fully involved in the relevant negotiations. 
 
In 2003, before Lithuania became a member, the EU had already adopted two 
Regulations on ‘facilitated transit’, which are clearly applicable only to Kaliningrad.  
These legal acts transformed the conditions for transit into part of the acquis that 
Lithuania had to adopt upon accession (and to implement upon full integration into 
                                                        
32 VINOKUROV, “Kaliningrad Visa and Transit Issues Revisited”, CEPS Commentary, February, (2006), 
available at www.ceps.eu 
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the Schengen area). This action by the EU pre-empted any independent bilateral 
action by Lithuania on an important issue related to its territory, and this despite the 
fact that the country still had full sovereign control over this policy field, as these 
events happened four years before the full integration of the country into the 
Schengen area.  
 
In reality, however, Lithuania’s loss of sovereignty seems to have been limited. 
Had the regulations been negotiated and adopted one year later (i.e. in 200433), 
Lithuania could have participated fully in the process as one of the 25 Member States.  
However, since the issue would have been decided under QMV, Lithuania would not 
have been able to determine the outcome of the negotiations anyway. 
 
Moreover, Protocol 5 of the Accession Treaty provides an additional guarantee for the 
protection of Lithuanian interests in providing for a derogation of the general rules for 
the adoption of such measures (QMV) to unanimity. However, in order to exercise 
this right, a new proposal has to be made by the Commission and the discussion on 
the Regulation has to be opened again. And the interim report of the Commission on 
the implementation of the regime does not show any intention of such a revision. 
 
Finally, the way in which the negotiations were conducted also raises certain 
questions. In effect, there were no trilateral negotiations but a system of bilateral 
negotiations. On the one side the EU was negotiating with Russia (on an issue which 
at the time of negotiation was not an EU concern and on which the EU could not 
guarantee any implementation).34 The issue was then discussed with Lithuania (and to 
a lesser extent with Poland) during the accession negotiations (and in fact one of the 
Council documents only refers to the candidate countries as “being informed”). Also, 
whatever was agreed in the EU – Russian negotiations had to be transformed into a 
bilateral agreement between Russia and Lithuania, without leaving any leeway for 
                                                        
33 Meanwhile the bilateral arrangement between Lithuania and Russia would continue to serve, which 
in any event would still apply until the full Schengen integration of Lithuania. The only other 
temporary factor that could have influenced the decision was the introduction of visas to Russian 
nationals, which was also planned for 1.7.2003. However, this could have easily been postponed to the 
date of accession, as was the case of some other then candidate countries and their neighbours 
(Bulgaria towards Macedonia and Serbia, Romania towards Ukraine, Malta towards Libya). 
34 This is correct from a legal point of view. But politically given the prospect of Lithuania becoming 
an EU Member and a Schengen state, some advance work of the EU was understandable. 
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real negotiations on the Lithuanian side, since the substance had already been agreed 
by the EU and Russia.  
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Part II – LOCAL BORDER TRAFFIC 
 
Another area in which enlargement brought about important legal changes was the 
area of ‘local border traffic’.35  This had been of rather limited concern to the original 
Schengen group as its land border was generally quite open, with only one case 
(Switzerland) in which local border traffic with a non-member state constituted an 
important economic issue. However, enlargement meant a manifold increase in the 
length of the land border of the EU (and that of the Schengen area). Moreover, after 
enlargement the land borders were now with countries that were generally regarded as 
being a source of migrants and criminal activity. Local border traffic in Eastern 
Europe was and is of considerable economic importance and is widely seen as 
contributing to the economic and political stability of the weaker Eastern neighbours 
of the EU (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, FYROM). 
 
This part analyzes the legal developments in this field and shows how competence in 
this area shifted to the EU level, meaning the focus of the rules governing local border 
traffic changed from addressing purely practical issues concerning border crossings to 
the creation of substitutes for visas. 
 
1. The beginning: The Commission proposal of 2003 
The first proposal by the Commission concerning a comprehensive regime on local 
border traffic appeared in 2003.36 Following the changes in the decision-making 
procedure at the end of the five-year period set by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1 May 
                                                        
35 This issue is distinct from the specific Kaliningrad problem. During the discussion about the 
problems of Kaliningrad in 2001-2003, it was generally accepted that the only problem specific to 
Kaliningrad was the transit through Member States to mainland Russia. The remaining two concerns – 
that of the access of the local population to the territory of the surrounding states (and later Schengen) 
under conditions similar to the pre-enlargement regime (visa-free) and the problems of local border 
traffic were considered as problems of general importance as they were relevant also to the rest of the 
external borders of the Union, and thus were to be subject to general rules. Proposals for such rules 
concerning the second issue were not late in coming. 
36 COM (2003)502 – 2003/0193 (CNS), Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a 
regime of local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States, 14 August 2003, and 
COM (2003)502 – 2003/0194 (CNS), Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a 
regime of local border traffic at the temporary external land borders between Member States, 14 March 
2003. 
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2004), a new proposal was submitted in the course of 200537 and finally adopted and 
published in December 2006. 
 
1.1. What is local border traffic? 
Local border traffic is defined38 as “the regular and frequent crossing of the border by 
persons residing in the border area of a neighbouring country”. The term already 
appeared in the Schengen Convention of 1990 in Article 3, paragraph 1, where it is 
stated that exceptions to the obligation of crossing the external border at authorized 
border crossing points and during fixed opening hours can be envisaged in the 
framework of “arrangements for local border traffic” on the basis of rules to be 
“adopted by the Executive Committee”. However for over ten years such rules were 
not adopted, either in the intergovernmental framework of Schengen or after the 
integration of the Schengen acquis into the legal and institutional framework of the 
European Union with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May 1999.  
 
Thus the “Plan for the management of the external borders of the Member States of 
the European Union”, adopted by the JHA Council on 13 June 2002 and subsequently 
endorsed by the Seville European Council of 21 and 22 June 2002 referred to the need 
to “identify principles and adopt common measures on local border traffic, 
particularly with a view to enlargement” and included the measures that needed to 
be taken in the short-term. The Commission outlined the existing situation at the time 
and the possibilities for regulation in a Staff Working Document of September 2002.39 
 
The importance of the issue was recognized from the beginning due to enlargement, 
as cross-border movements between the then candidate countries, as well as between 
candidate countries on the one side and their neighbours on the other, are significant 
                                                        
37 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, laying down rules on 
local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the Schengen 
Convention and the Common Consular Instructions, COM (2005) 56 final, Brussels, 23 February 2005. 
38 See COM (2005) 56 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and 
amending the Schengen Convention and the Common Consular Instructions, Brussels, 23 February 
2005, p. 2.  
39 Commission Staff Working Paper, “Developing the Acquis on ‘Local Border Traffic’”, SEC (2002) 
947, Brussels, 9 September 2002. 
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in number. It was also acknowledged that having common rules could be beneficial 
for economic, social and cultural exchanges, while frontier workers are an important 
element of the economic development of the Member States. Still, the fact that for the 
period from 1990 (when the Schengen Convention was signed) until 2001 when the 
development of rules on “local border traffic” were acknowledged as a short-term 
priority, no common rules were developed and only the rules of bilateral agreements 
applied, suggests that the real impetus to developing this type of regulation was 
provided by the imminent enlargement.  
 
1.2. Local border traffic in the enlarging EU 
One reason was the fact that for the (then) candidate countries, local border traffic 
was for a number of political and economic reasons much more important than for the 
old member countries.  For example, Eastern Europe contains many more instances of 
important cross-border minorities (e.g. Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia 
and Serbia).  
Another element was that all existing agreements until 2001, both involving EU 
Member States and the then candidate countries, were agreements between countries 
that already applied a visa-free regime.40 Thus, the issue of local border traffic was 
much more significant in the context of border controls and was an exception to the 
usual procedure for conducting controls (crossing at places other than the authorized 
border crossing points, or outside the usual opening hours). However, after 
enlargement, the issue changed, as the rules on local border traffic would not only 
impact on border controls but also on visas, as they would provide an exception to the 
conditions citizens of countries on the visa black list should meet. In fact, they were 
designed to exempt border residents who benefited from the local border traffic from 
the visa obligation.41 Even though recital 6 of the Regulation states that “local border 
traffic permits should be issued to border residents whether or not they are subject to 
visa requirements”, the residents who did not need a visa would be able to enter and 
                                                        
40 For a full list of the agreements and their main elements, see Annexes I and II of the Commission 
Staff Working Paper, op. cit. 
41 Recital 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
December 2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member 
States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention, O.J. 2006, L 405, p. 1-22, hereafter 
“Local Border Traffic Regulation”. 
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stay not only in the border area but also on the whole territory. Therefore, the system 
had practical effect only in cases where the neighbouring third country was subject to 
visa requirements.   
 
It was thus not surprising that the Commission also mentioned in its proposals that 
any of the measures adopted in order to facilitate the crossing of the borders for “local 
border traffic” purposes, would have to take into account both the need to prevent 
illegal immigration and the potential threats to security posed by criminal activities. 
These two considerations bear a striking resemblance to two of the three criteria 
mentioned in the preamble of Regulation 539/2001, with relevance to determining the 
position of a third country on the white or black visa list respectively.42 
 
Prior to enlargement certain some Member States and most of the then candidate 
countries had bilateral agreements on local border traffic. All those agreements at the 
time were concluded between countries which had mutual visa exemption 
arrangements; the main purpose of the agreement was thus the practical facilitation of 
crossing the border. Some countries provided for a special document issued to the 
residents in the border area, others accepted a simple identity card.43  
 
Moreover, the Commission Communication on “Wider Europe” (COM(2003) 104 
final, 11.3.2003), clearly stressed that both the EU and its neighbours had a common 
interest in ensuring that the new external border was not a barrier to trade, social and 
cultural interchange or regional cooperation.  
 
2. Development of the proposal 
The Commission introduced two proposals for Council Regulations in August 2003.44 
The two proposals were based on Article 62(2) of the EC Treaty (“measures on the 
                                                        
42 The third criterion is reciprocity.  
43 For details on earlier bilateral local border traffic agreements, see Commission Staff Working Paper, 
“Developing the Acquis on ‘Local Border Traffic’”, SEC (2002) 947, Brussels, 9 September 2002; for 
the role of local border traffic in transfrontier cooperation, see Council of Europe, “Managing old and 
new frontiers of Europe: Transfrontier co-operation in regional/special planning, local border traffic 
and impact assessments”, Transfrontier co-operation, No 7, Strasbourg, (1998), p. 11-12 and p. 18. 
44 COM(2003)502, on the establishment of a regime of local border traffic at the external land borders 
of the Member States, and COM(2003)502, on the establishment of a regime of local border traffic at 
the temporary external land borders between Member States. For details on the negotiations and an 
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crossing of the external borders of the Member States”), covering both “standards and 
procedures to be followed by Member States in carrying out checks on persons 
(Article 62(2)(a)) and the “procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member 
States” (Article 62(2)(b)(ii)), including “rules on a uniform visa” (Article 
62(2)(b)(iv)). In other words, of the three legal bases, one was related to border 
controls and the remaining two to visas. 
 
As the discussions within the Council on these proposals proved very difficult, no 
progress was made before 1 May 2004. As of that date, measures based on Article 
62(2)(b)(ii) and on Article 62(2)(b)(iv) could be adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council in accordance with the co-decision procedure (Article 67(4)) thus 
requiring only QMV, not unanimity. Measures based on Article 62(2)(a) were still to 
be adopted unanimously by the Council after consulting the European Parliament.  
 
According to the Commission, with the two procedures being incompatible, in 
accordance with a well-established case-law of the Court of Justice45, it was no longer 
possible to have in the same proposal provisions relating to checks at the external 
borders, and provisions concerning the establishment of a specific visa issued to 
border residents on the grounds of local border traffic. 
 
Thus, the Commission decided to draft two new proposals, namely: 
 
1) a first proposal for a Council Regulation, based on Article 62(2)(a) (consultation 
procedure), laying down general rules on local border traffic, with the exception 
of the provisions introducing the specific visa; 
2) a second proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation, based on 
Article 62(2)(b), points ii) and iv) (co-decision procedure) establishing a specific 
“L” visa to be issued for the purposes of local border traffic. 
 
Adoption of these new proposals by the College was planned for December 2004. 
However, as a consequence of the adoption of “The Hague Programme” by the 
European Council of 4/5 November 2004, towards the end of 2004, the Council took 
                                                                                                                                                               
assessment, see L. CORRADO, “Negotiating the EU External Border”, in BALZACQ AND CARRERA, 
Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, CEPS and Ashgate, (Aldershot, 2006). 
45 ECJ, Case C 300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I 2867 (‘Titanium dioxide’), paragraphs 17 
to 21, see also, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑164/97 and C‑165/97 Parliament v Council [1999] ECR 
I‑1139, paragraph 14; Case C‑338/01 Commission v Council, paragraph 57; Case C‑94/03 
Commission v Council [2006] ECR I‑1, paragraph 52; and Case C‑178/03 Commission v Parliament 
and Council [2006] ECR I‑107, paragraph 57 
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the decision to extend the co-decision procedure to certain areas covered by Title IV 
of the EC Treaty, including measures related to external borders.46 
 
Consequently from 1.1.2005 both the external borders and the visa-related aspects 
covered by the two proposals on local border traffic (one on border-related aspects 
and a second one on the special ‘L’ visa) could be adopted under the same procedure, 
which allowed the two proposals to be merged into one. The Commission did this 
with its Proposal of February 2005 for a “Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of 
the Member States and amending the Schengen Convention and the Common 
Consular Instructions”.47  
 
3. The main elements of the local border traffic regulation 
After another round of laborious negotiations lasting almost two years, this time also 
involving the European Parliament, Regulation 1931/2006 was adopted on 20 
December 2006. It laid down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders 
of the Member States and amended the provisions of the Schengen Convention.  
 
Finally, the legal basis of the Regulation was limited only to Article 62(2)(a) EC and 
thus to “standards and procedures to be followed by Member States in carrying out 
checks on persons.” The legal basis linked to the visa rules and the special types of 
visa were therefore dropped.  
 
The essence of the regime that is now in force is the following.  
 
                                                        
46 Council Decision 2004/927/EC of 22 December 2004, providing for certain areas covered by Title 
IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure 
laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty (O.J. 2004, L 396, p.45). 
47 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on local 
border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the Schengen 
Convention and the Common Consular Instructions, COM (2005) 56 final, Brussels, 23 February 2005.  
See Annex 8.1 to Chapter 8 for a summary. 
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3.1. Purpose 
The purpose of the Regulation is to establish Community rules on local border traffic 
at the external land border (a field which had hitherto been regulated by bilateral 
agreements and where there were no community rules). In addition, it will authorize 
the Member States to conclude or maintain bilateral agreements for the purpose of 
implementing the common regime. Ultimately, it aims to facilitate border crossing to 
border residents without creating loopholes affecting security. Each of these 
objectives is clearly elaborated in the preamble of the Regulation. Paragraph (1) 
underlines the need to develop rules on local border traffic in order to consolidate the 
Community legal framework on external borders. The second objective, clearly linked 
to enlargement, is outlined in paragraph (2) and states that “it is in the interest of the 
enlarged Community to ensure that the borders with its neighbours are not a barrier to 
trade, social and cultural interchange or regional cooperation” and thus an efficient 
system for local border traffic should consequently be developed.  
 
The local border traffic regime is considered to be in derogation of the general rules 
governing the border control of persons crossing the external borders of the Member 
States, as established by the Schengen Border Code.48 
 
The Regulation is to set criteria and conditions which the beneficiaries of the local 
border traffic are to meet. Such criteria and conditions are meant to ensure a balance 
between, on the one hand, the easing of border crossing for bona fide border residents  
having legitimate reasons to frequently cross an external land border and, on the other 
hand, the need to prevent illegal immigration and potential threats to security posed 
by criminal activities. 
 
Similar language can be found in the agreements dealing with visa facilitation, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
                                                        
48 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, O.J. 
2006, L 105, p. 1. 
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3.2. Definitions 
“External land border” is defined as the common land border between a Member State 
and a neighbouring third country.  
“Border area” is defined as an area that extends no more than 30 km from the border. 
However, under certain conditions it can be extended from 30 to 50 km when the 
administrative borders of a district extend beyond the 30 km and this exception is 
foreseen in a bilateral agreement regulating traffic. 
 
“Local border traffic” is defined as the regular crossing of an external land border by 
border residents in order to stay in a border area, for example for social, cultural or 
substantiated economic reasons, or for family reasons, for a period not exceeding 
three months in every six months (the same as the period allowed for the holders of 
short-stay visas). 
 
“Border residents” are defined as third-country nationals who have been lawfully 
resident in the border area of a country neighbouring a Member State for a period 
defined by a bilateral agreement but which should be at least one year. However, on 
the basis of a bilateral agreement, in certain cases this period can either be extended to 
more than one year or be shortened to less than that period.  
 
3.3. Local border traffic regime 
The regime created by the Regulation sets up specific conditions for the entry and stay 
of border residents. The entry conditions which border residents shall meet are:49 
 
- to be in possession of a local border permit (or also of a valid travel document 
if this is required by a bilateral agreement); 
- not be persons for whom an alert has been issued in the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) for the purposes of refusing entry; and  
- not be considered a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or 
the international relations of any of the Member States, in particular where no 
                                                        
49 Article 4 of the Local Border Traffic Regulation, op. cit. 
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alert has been issued in Member States’ national databases for the purposes of 
refusing entry on the same grounds. 
 
In what way are these different from the entry conditions envisaged in the Schengen 
Borders Code? The Schengen Borders Code provides that in order to be granted entry 
for a stay not exceeding three months per six-month period, third-country nationals 
must: 
- possess a valid travel document; 
- possess a valid visa, if required; 
- justify the purpose of their intended stay, and have sufficient means of 
subsistence; 
- not be a person for whom an alert has been issued in the SIS for the purposes 
of refusing entry; 
- not be considered a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or 
the international relations of the Member States.  
 
A simple comparison shows that in the case of local border traffic, the requirement 
linked to visas is replaced by the requirement for the special local border traffic 
permit; a valid travel document can be requested, but not necessarily, and there is no 
requirement to justify the purpose of the intended stay and sufficient means of 
subsistence. However, this latter condition is partially replaced with the condition for 
being a border resident and thus living in a border area for a period of at least one 
year. The duration of stay in the EU Member State is to be determined in each case by 
the bilateral agreements concluded by the Member States but should not exceed three 
months (a length of stay corresponding to the stay granted to the holders of short-stay 
visas).  
 
The conditions of crossing are facilitated, in that checks on entry and exit are to be 
carried out but no stamping of the local border traffic permit shall take place (contrary 
to the obligation to stamp the passports of third country nationals on entry and exit). 
Article 15 foresees an additional easing of border crossing through: the setting up of 
specific border crossing points open only to border residents; reserving specific lanes 
to border residents at ordinary border crossing points; or taking into account of the 
local circumstances and where, exceptionally, there is a requirement of a special 
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nature to authorize border residents to cross their external land border at defined 
places other than authorized border crossing points and outside the fixed hours. There 
is also the possibility for persons who, due to their regular crossing, are well-known to 
the guards and are subject only to random checks.  
 
3.4. Local Border Traffic Permit 
The special visa type ‘L’ from the original Commission proposal in the final version 
of the Regulation has been transformed into a “local border traffic permit”.  
 
Its territorial validity is limited to the border area of the issuing Member States. In 
effect it resembles an identity document as it contains a photograph, name and 
residence of the holder, the issuing authority and the border area for which it is valid. 
Its characteristics do not resemble a visa. And indeed Article 8 states that as far as 
security and technical specifications are concerned, the local border traffic permit 
should rather follow those specifications related to the uniform format for residence 
permits for third-country nationals than the uniform format for visas. 
 
However, the confusion surrounding the exact nature of this document increases with 
some additional characteristics, as the Regulation reveals.  
 
As far as issuing conditions are concerned, apart from the conditions already 
mentioned in relation to entry, the border residents applying for the permit have to 
produce documents proving their status as border residents and proving the existence 
of legitimate reasons to frequently cross the external land border under the local 
border traffic regime. Thus, if compared to the requirements for the issuing of a visa, 
the need for legitimate reasons persists, but there is no requirement for sufficient 
resources. Possibly due to the proximity to the applicants’ place of residence, s/he 
would not need to stay for longer periods on the territory of the Member States.  
 
The validity of the permit is fixed at a minimum of one and a maximum of five years 
and the fee for its issue is not to exceed the fees charged for processing applications 
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for short-term multiple entry visas. However, there is a possibility to issue permits 
free of charge50. 
 
As far as the issuing authority is concerned, it can either be a consulate or any 
administrative authority of a Member State that has been designated in a bilateral 
agreement for its implementation.  
 
Thus, ultimately the local border traffic permit is not a visa but it can be issued by 
consulates (as visas are); the costs for its issuing are the same as those for visas and it 
allows a duration of stay on the Member States’ territory equal to the maximum stay 
allowed for holders of short-stay visas. 
 
3.5. Implementation 
In terms of the rules of implementation, the text finally adopted remains very close to 
the proposal from the Commission. However, there is one important change and an 
important addition. The change relates to the fact that the Regulation contains rules on 
bilateral agreements only, between Member States and neighbouring third countries. 
In the original Commission proposal, a separate article deals with cases of local 
border traffic agreements between two Member States. But this article does not 
appear in the final version. The important addition relates to readmission. In cases 
where no general readmission agreement is concluded with the third country in 
question, the Member State has to ensure that a readmission clause is included in the 
text of the bilateral local border traffic agreement. 
 
As to the precise rules on the implementation of the Regulation, one should note 
again51 that by adopting the Regulation, the competence related to local border traffic 
has been transformed into implied, exclusive external competence. As long ago as 
1971 and as recently as 12 February 2009, the Court of Justice ruled that: 
 
each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy 
envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever 
form these may take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting 
                                                        
50 Article 11 of the Local Border Traffic Regulation, op.cit. 
51 See points 1 and 3 of Chapter 2.  
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individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations towards non-member 
countries which affect those rules or distort their scope; and that, as and when 
such common rules come into being, the Community alone is in a position to 
assume and carry out contractual obligations towards non-member countries 
affecting the whole sphere of application of the Community legal system.52 
 
Thus the Community's competence to conclude international agreements with third 
States in the areas covered by the Regulation is exclusive. From this it follows that the 
Member States may not, in principle, amend existing bilateral agreements and/or 
conclude new bilateral agreements with third states in these areas to the extent that 
they may affect the existing Community common rules or distort their scope. Where 
Community competence is exclusive, “Member States may not enter into international 
commitments outside the framework of the Community institutions, even if there is 
no contradiction between those commitments and the common rules.”53 
 
In practical terms, however, it proved necessary to delegate the exercise of this 
Community competence to Member States because it became clear that it would be 
politically awkward for the Community to negotiate a local border traffic agreement 
which in the end would impinge on the important interests of only one Member 
State.54 Moreover, the Member State concerned obviously knows the conditions of 
local border traffic much better. This is why it was necessary to find a way to 
distinguish between the existence of exclusive Community competence and its 
implementation.55 In other words, under these exceptional circumstances it was 
necessary to envisage mechanisms for the exercise of the Community exclusive 
competence by the Member States (obviously provided that the uniformity and 
effectiveness of Community law is ensured). Such agreements can be scrutinised by 
ECJ on their compatibility with Community law under Articles 226 to 228 EC 
 
There are a certain number of precedents to international agreements concluded by the 
Member States relating to matters in which the Community has exclusive 
                                                        
52 Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519, para 77; and Case C-45/07 Commission 
v. Greece [2009] ECR I-0000For a general review of the external competence in the field of visa 
policy, see Section 2 of Chapter 2 of this study. 
53 Case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519, para 82. 
54 This leads back to the question of when a matter becomes an issue for the EU as a whole. 
55 P. EECKHOUT, “External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed 
Agreements, International Responsibility and Effects of International Law, General report”, Topic 3, 
22nd FIDE Congress, Limassol, Cyprus, 1-4 November 2006, p.279. 
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competence. One example is Regulation 847/2004 on the negotiation and 
implementation of air service agreements between Member States and third 
countries56. Member States may conclude these agreements under the supervision of 
the Commission. On other occasions, the Council has already, in exceptional 
circumstances57, authorized Members States to conclude international agreements in 
the interest of the Community in areas falling within the Community's exclusive 
competence.58 
 
In this concrete case, the Local Border Traffic Regulation contains explicit provision 
that “Member States shall be authorised” to conclude bilateral agreements with 
neighbouring third countries in accordance with the rules set out in the regulation.59 
There are no detailed provisions as to the procedure that Member States shall follow 
when negotiating and concluding an agreement.60 What is foreseen61 is that before 
concluding or amending any bilateral agreement, the Member State concerned shall 
consult the Commission as to the compatibility of the agreement with the Regulation. 
If the Commission considers that the agreement is incompatible with the Regulation, 
it should notify the Member State concerned and the latter shall take all appropriate 
measures to amend the agreement within a reasonable period in order to eliminate the 
incompatibilities. As the wording of the text shows, the Commission is involved in 
the process only at the very last stage, namely prior to conclusion of the agreement 
                                                        
56 OJ L 2004, 195, p.3 
57 See for example, Council Decision of 24.09.2001 on the conclusion on behalf of the Community of 
the International Coffee Agreement, O.J. 2001, L 326; Council Decision of 19 September 2002 
concerning the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker oil Pollution Damage, O.J. 2002, 
L 256, p.7 
58 For further discussion on the character of the external competence in this field see B. MARTENCZUK, 
“Visa Policy and EU External Relations”, in Martenczuk and van Thiel (eds), Justice, Liberty, 
Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations, VUB Press, (Brussels, 2008), p. 21-52; and S. 
PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2006), p. 176. 
59 Article 13 (1) of the Local Border Traffic Regulation, op. cit. 
60 In contrast, see two proposals in the area of civil law, also authorizing Member States to conclude 
agreements in an area of exclusive Community competence but containing extremely detailed rules on 
the procedure and conclusion of the agreement. See: Proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral 
agreements between Member States and third countries concerning sectoral matters and covering 
applicable law in contractual and non-contractual obligations, COM(2008)893, Brussels, 23 December 
2008 and proposal for a Council regulation establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion 
of bilateral agreements between Member States and third countries concerning sectoral matters and 
covering jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments and decisions in matrimonial matters, 
parental responsibility and maintenance obligations, and applicable law in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations, COM(2008)0894,Brussels, 19 December 2008. 
61 Article 13 (2) of the Local Border Traffic Regulation, op. cit. 
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but not during the preparation and conduct of its negotiations. This is also evident in 
the wording used for the cases when incompatibility with the Regulation is detected. 
In this case, the regulation mentions “amending” the agreement, meaning that it is 
already signed, possibly concluded and even entered into force. In fact, in the case of 
the Polish-Ukraine agreement concluded on the basis of the regulation, the agreement 
was submitted for approval to the Commission after it had been initialled.62 
 
Another interesting element related to the implementation of the agreement is the 
second paragraph of Article 13 (1), concerning cases in which Member States are also 
authorized to maintain existing bilateral agreements after ensuring their compatibility 
with the Regulation – following a procedure similar to the negotiations of new 
agreements. However, this provision could only apply to the ‘old’ Member States, as 
all ‘new’ Member States had already to denounce their existing bilateral local border 
traffic agreements as part of their accession process (mainly in the course of 2003). 
 
However, a link to the ‘old’ Member States is ensured through Article 16 of the 
Regulation, which holds:  
 
The provisions of this Regulation shall not affect the specific arrangements 
applying to the towns of Ceuta and Melilla, as referred to in the Declaration by 
the Kingdom of Spain on the towns of Ceuta and Melilla in the Final Act to the 
Agreement on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain to the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement. 
 
Thus the continuous existence of the special arrangements which Spain negotiated at 
the time of its accession to Schengen is ensured.63 
 
3.6. Reciprocity 
The principle of reciprocity is also mentioned in the Regulation, though under the 
term "comparability of treatment". Article 14 provides: 
 
                                                        
62 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Communiqué on the initialling of the Agreement on the rules of 
local border traffic between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine”, 03 March 2008, available at http://www.msz.gov.pl.  
63 See Chapter 4, in particular 4.3, for more details. 
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In the bilateral Agreements referred to in Article 13, Member States shall ensure 
that third countries grant persons enjoying the Community right of free 
movement and third-country nationals lawfully resident in the border area of the 
Member State concerned treatment at least comparable to that granted to the 
border residents of the third country concerned. 
 
3.7. Easing of border crossing 
Another interesting element of the Regulation is that only a small part of the 
provisions on implementation deal with the easing of the actual physical process of 
crossing the border. This element used to be the raison d'être of all bilateral 
agreements on local border traffic. As the agreements at the time were concluded 
between countries whose citizens enjoyed visa-free travel, the purpose of the 
agreement was not to authorize access to the territory other than in accordance with 
general rules, but to facilitate the already legitimate access by simplifying the 
procedures when actually crossing the border.  
 
This shows how the purpose and nature of the agreements have changed. The purpose 
of the agreements concluded with the Eastern neighbours of the EU is not only 
(perhaps not even mainly) to ensure a smooth border crossing but to make the 
crossing of the border actually possible. This is done by creating special rules that 
deviate from both the general visa rules and the general border crossing rules.64 In 
essence, the new regime should facilitate access to the Eastern border areas of the EU 
for potentially millions of people living in the border regions of the neighbouring 
countries, by creating a quasi-visa document and thereby avoiding the need to discuss 
visa-free travel for all the citizens of the third countries concerned.  
 
This issue is of considerable economic and political importance to the new Member 
States, which had in general allowed simple access to these territories until 2003, but 
this gradually became more and more difficult (procedurally and financially), first 
through the denunciation of the existing local border traffic agreements and the 
introduction of visa requirements to the citizens of the neighbouring countries, then 
through the introduction of Schengen visas for access to these areas.  
                                                        
64 Only one article (Article 15) of 20 deals with the easing of border crossing. 
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3.8. Penalties for abuse  
 
As there are no controls on persons at the limits of the internal local border area, the 
facilitation granted by this Regulation is in principle open to abuse. Holders of the 
local border traffic permit could travel unchecked to the entire Schengen territory.  
This is why the Local Border Traffic Regulation foresees sanctions. Article 17 
provides:  
1. Member States shall ensure that any abuse of the local border traffic regime, as 
established by this Regulation and as implemented by the bilateral Agreements 
referred to in Article 13, is subject to penalties as provided for by national law. 
2. Those penalties shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall include 
the possibility of cancelling and revoking local border traffic permits. 
3. Member States shall keep a record of all cases of abuse of the local border traffic 
regime and of penalties imposed in accordance with paragraph 1. That information 
shall be forwarded every six months to the other Member States and to the 
Commission. 
 
This feature: the explicit inclusion of sanctions of abuse, is unique among the cases of 
facilitated cross border considered in this work. 
 
4. The practice 
According to Article 18 of Local Border Traffic Regulation No 1931/2006, by 19 
January 2009, the Commission had to submit a report to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the implementation and functioning of the local border traffic regime. 
 
The first such report was published by the Commission on 24 July 2009.65 
 
The report shows that by July 2009, seven Member States (Hungary, Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania) had negotiated, or were in the 
process of negotiating local border traffic agreements, while Slovenia gave notice of 
an existing one with Croatia. A simple comparison with Table 7.4 in Chapter 7 shows 
                                                        
65 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and 
functioning of the local border traffic regime introduced by Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land 
borders of the Member States, COM (2009) 383 final, Brussels, 24.7.2009 
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that four of the seven countries mentioned above (Hungary, Poland, Latvia and 
Slovakia) had to denounce their earlier agreements, in some cases with the same third 
countries in the process of accession to the EU between 2000 and 2003. None of the 
EU15 states66 have since shown any interest in the possibility provided by the Local 
Border Traffic Regulation. 
 
The first three agreements to enter into force were the Hungary-Ukraine agreement 
(11 January 2008); the Slovakia-Ukraine agreement (27 September 2008) and the 
Poland-Ukraine agreement (1 July 2009). In all three cases, the Commission found the 
agreements to be in conformity with the Local Border Traffic Regulation, but it 
considered that the definition of the border area in all three agreements was 
incompatible with the Regulation, as it extended to over 50 km (more on this below). 
Despite the Commission opinion, both Hungary and Poland proceeded and concluded 
the agreements without correction of this incompatibility.  
 
The data on the application of the agreements is also instructive. By January 2009, the 
Hungarian consulates in Ukraine had issued 34 000 local border traffic permits (about 
one year after the entry into force of the agreement). Around 80% of the applicants 
possessed a Hungarian visa previously. According to Hungarian sources, those who 
mainly use the possibilities of the agreement are members of the Hungarian minority 
in Ukraine, which, based on the 2001 census, amounts to 156 600 persons; 84% of 
whom live within 20 km of the Hungarian–Ukrainian border and 95% of whom live 
within a 50 km distance. This fact might explain the insistence on the 50 km border 
area on the part of Hungary. 
 
In the case of the Slovakia-Ukraine agreement the numbers are much lower. By June 
2009, (about 9 months after its entry into force) only 466 local border traffic permits 
had been issued. 
 
Seven agreements are under negotiation: Lithuania-Belarus, Lithuania-Russia, Latvia-
Russia, Poland-Belarus, Bulgaria-Serbia, Bulgaria-FYROM and Romania-Ukraine. 
Of these, two agreements (Latvia-Russia and Poland-Belarus) also contain provisions 
                                                        
66 The EU Member States prior to the enlargement of 2004 and 2007.  
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for a border area going beyond the 50 km foreseen by the Local Border Traffic 
Regulation. 
 
The experience to date shows that only a limited number of the facilitation measures 
foreseen in the Local Border Traffic Regulation are used in practice, namely:  
- period of stay in the border area – 90 days within 180 days (equal to the stay 
allowed to the holders of a short term Schengen visa); 
- minimum period of prior residence in the local border area for the granting of 
the local border traffic permit – set by the Regulation at one year but most of 
the agreements foresee a longer period – usually three years 
- charge for issuing of the permit – one agreement provides for a free of charge 
issuance; most of the others foresee a fee of 20 to 35 euro (the latter is equal to 
the price of a visa under the visa facilitation agreements) 
- Local border traffic permits may be issued for a period of validity up to 5 
years – all but one agreement provides for such a possibility, which also exists 
for the short-term Schengen visas for multiple-entry. 
 
The above overview illustrates the point made earlier, namely that the role the current 
local border traffic agreements play is that of a ‘visa-replacing tool’. 
 
The main difficulties encountered by the Commission to date also show the 
sovereignty related tension between the interests of the individual Member States and 
the margin for manoeuvre allowed to them by the Local Border Traffic Regulation. 
During the negotiations preceding the adoption of the Regulation, the new Member 
States favoured a 50 km border zone, precisely because the population they wished to 
cover lived within this range. However, this proposal was not adopted and instead a 
30 km border area now applies. But the Member States are trying to extend that 
definition through the bilateral agreements that they negotiated. It remains to be seen 
whether their disagreement with the Commission (at the moment limited to the 
interpretation of the different linguistic versions of the Regulation) will eventually 
lead to an action before the Court of Justice. Any such case could be an interesting 
insofar as it clarifyies the limits of the authorization for the exercise of an exclusive 
EU competence granted to Member States. 
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The disagreement between the Commission and the Member States about the 
extension of the local border area arises from an ambiguity in Article 3(2) of the 
Local Border Traffic Regulation. This article reads, in English: 
 
“border area” means an area that extends no more than 30 kilometres from 
the border. The local administrative districts that are to be considered as 
the border area shall be specified by the States concerned in their bilateral 
Agreements, as referred to in Article 13. If part of any such district lies 
between 30 and 50 kilometres from the border line, it shall nevertheless be 
considered as part of the border area. 
 
Here it is not clear whether the word "it" in the last line refers to the district chosen or 
to the part of the district within the 50 km line. With the former interpretation the 
local border area would effectively become 50 kilometres.  However, the Commission 
argues that this was clearly not the intention of the legislator, who in principle wanted 
to limit the local border area to 30 kilometres. The Commission supports its line of 
argument with a reference to the French text, whose relevant part reads: "toute partie 
d'une de ces communes située à plus de 30 mais à moins de 50 kilomètres de la ligne 
frontalière est néanmoins considérée comme appartenant à la zone frontalière," which 
makes it clear that only the part of the district within 50 kilometres of the border may 
be regarded as part of the border area.  
 
The arguments of the Commission seem convincing, but it remains to be seen whether 
it will choose to submit this matter to the Court. 
 
5. Interim conclusions  
Local border traffic agreements were a normal part of the legal landscape of Europe 
before 2004. Such agreements existed between EU Member States, as well as between 
acceding states and other third countries. As they were always concluded between 
states with reciprocal visa-free travel agreements, their focus was always on 
simplifying the process of physically crossing the border by providing special 
facilities. 
 
With the intensification of the cooperation related to borders and visas in Europe, first 
through the Schengen agreement and then within the framework of the EU, the legal 
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possibility for common rules on local border traffic agreements were provided for (see 
Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Schengen Convention). However, for the thirteen years 
from 1990 (when the Schengen Convention was signed) to 2003 (when the first 
Commission proposal was presented) there were no initiatives on this subject.  
 
The timing and contents of the first Commission proposal strongly suggests that the 
factor stimulating the development of the acquis in this field was the imminent 
enlargement and its effect on the person-to-person contacts on the EU's future 
external land border. In effect, due to the EU common visa policy and the requirement 
for the compulsory adoption of the Schengen acquis by all acceding states, millions of 
people who had previously benefited from the local border traffic agreements could 
no longer do so. As part of the accession process, all acceding states had to denounce 
their pre-existing local border traffic agreements. What is more, on the accession date 
of 1 May 2004, visa requirements, which did not previously exist, were also imposed 
on the same border population. The practical effect of this measure was that now a 
resident in a Ukrainian border region had to travel several hundred kilometres to Kiev 
in order to obtain a visa to visit the neighbouring Polish region – situated just 30 km 
away.  
 
Thus, the EU had to respond to new realities. Local border traffic was no longer a 
question of simplifying border crossings; it became a question of visa policy. The 
proposal of the Commission had more to do with what document would allow access 
to EU territory of the third country’s border region residents, than the actual 
conditions of crossing. This observation is further strengthened by the fact that from 
the 21 articles of the Regulation, only one deals effectively with the easing of border 
crossings. Instead, what the Regulation does is establish a quasi-visa document for 
access of residents in the border area of the third country to the border area of the EU 
Member State.67 There are, of course, no controls on persons at the limits of the 
relevant border areas within Member States. Hence, as in the other cases of flexible 
application of Schengen visa rules discussed elsewhere in this work, the facilitation 
for local border traffic requires a minimum level of trust. To date no significant abuse 
                                                        
67 The quasi-visa character of the document is confirmed by the position expressed by the Commission 
in its first report on the implementation and functioning of the local border traffic regime, op.cit., 
where it suggest that the visa facilitation agreements can be used as an alternative to the local border 
traffic regime in cases of third country citizens who do not fall in the defined border area. 
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has been reported, but as shown above, the Regulation already foresees penalties and 
a monitoring of abuse by Member States. 
 
Did the Eastern enlargement of the EU have an impact on the proposal and the 
adoption of this Regulation? Undoubtedly, and this fact is stated clearly in the recitals 
of the Regulation with the necessary reference to the Seville European Council 
conclusions. It is doubtful, however, whether such a measure would have been 
proposed without the imminent enlargement and the complications related to the 
access to territory that this implied, especially at the external land border. After all, 
the possibility was there for decades but was never used. 
 
One of the reasons for not adopting common rules in this field could be the effect 
such an adoption would have had on the external competence of the Member States. 
Without the Local Border Traffic Regulation, the competence to conclude such 
agreements belonged to the Member States and they had little interest in 
communitarizing yet another field that could lead to a limitation of their territorial 
sovereignty. However, the enlargement changed this logic, as it made 
communitarization preferable to the status quo. 
 
Local border traffic was of little political importance to the old Member States, as 
with the expansion of the EU and the Schengen area, the external land border moved 
farther and farther away and the only agreements with practical effect remained those 
with Switzerland and even there, the issue was not so much allowing access as 
improving the physical conditions for access, which was in principle granted anyway. 
 
However, the situation of the new Member States was completely different. They had 
to denounce their own agreements already in 2003 (in fact the year when the first 
proposal was made) and still had to ensure access to their territory for their 
neighbours’ citizens, and even in some cases their minorities’ members living in the 
neighbouring third countries.68  
 
                                                        
68 See I. PIORKO, “Justice and Home Affairs aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Wider 
Europe Programme”, Sussex European Institute, (Sussex, 2005), available at http://www.wider-
europe.org/files/UkraineandENPPiorko.pdf.  
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Without common rules, what would have prevented the new Member States from 
concluding new local border traffic agreements? Would those be compatible with the 
Schengen acquis?  
 
Thus, the communitarization of the field of local border traffic through the Local 
Border Traffic Regulation had several important effects on the relations between the 
EU Member States and the Commission, between new and old Member States and 
between the new Member States and the neighbouring states on the external land 
border.  
 
First, the development of a local border traffic regime allowed a field of marginal 
importance for the old Member States but of considerable importance for the new 
ones to fall under the scope of EU law. Probably due to lack of trust, the old Member 
States felt more secure in having the field under the control of the Commission than 
leaving the new Member States the possibility to regulate this area as they saw fit. 
Thus, the Commission played the role of trust-enhancer. 
 
Second, through the communitarization of the field, the role of the Commission 
increased further. Although the Member States are authorized to implement the 
regulation through bilateral agreement, there is nothing to prevent the EU from 
exercising this competence itself. 
 
Thirdly, the development of the Regulation also responded to the demands of the new 
Member States and the new neighbours on the external land border. By creating the 
possibility for a local border traffic movement, it created the impression of resolving 
the existing practical problem of lack of access to EU territory, but in reality this was 
not the case. 
 
The old local border traffic agreements were denounced in 2003. After that, and 
especially after the accession date of 1 May 2004, all third-country citizens of the 
neighbouring countries needed a visa to make local border trips. After the accession to 
Schengen on 25 December 2007, the same persons now needed a Schengen visa to 
make the same trip. At that point in time, there was still not a single local border 
traffic agreement under the new Regulation in force.  
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Once the agreements are in force (or at least the ones that are concluded) they have 
the potential to give local border traffic permits to about 1.5 million Ukrainians based 
on the estimates of the EU Member States that concluded agreements with Ukraine. 
These permits will be valid for up to 5 years and will allow a stay of up to 90 days in 
any 180 and thus will serve as quasi-visas. The only difference with a visa will be the 
territorial validity and the cost. The sanctions for abuse of the system are also the 
same; expulsion and a ban on entry to the territory. 
 
Thus, after six years of EU legislative activity and numerous bilateral negotiations, 
the legal situation of the residents of the border regions of the EU is back to where it 
was in 2003, regulated by bilateral local border traffic agreements. Only that the terms 
of these agreements were not decided by the individual Member States concerned but 
were determined by all Member States and the EP in the framework of the co-
decision. Thus a formerly sovereign right of each Member State was transferred to the 
European level due to the lack of trust between old and new Member states and the 
general fear of illegal immigration from the East following the 2004 enlargement.  
 
The Local Border Traffic Regulation is one of the examples to be found in European 
law of implied external competence of the Community being exercised by the 
Member States.  
 
From the wording of the respective article of the Regulation, it is clear that the 
external competence can be exercised by the Member States through the conclusion of 
bilateral local border traffic agreements. But can it also be exercised by the 
Community itself? 
 
An interesting case could arise when one of the EU Member States (say Estonia) 
proposes an agreement on local border traffic to Russia, which it is reluctant to accept 
due to some unresolved border disputes or simply due to foreign policy 
considerations. Under these circumstances, can the EU conclude an agreement with 
Russia covering all of common borders (respectively with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia and Finland)? In principle, this seems to be legally possible, as by adopting 
the regulation, the competence on issues related to local border traffic has been 
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communitarized. However, although legally possible, it might not be practically 
possible for political reasons (the fact that the EU would be regulating the border 
traffic through its members' borders) or a lack of interest on the EU side (the Russian 
viewpoint in this hypothetical case might be more interested in concluding one instead 
of five local border traffic agreements).  
 
From a practical and political point of view the issues arising here (as well as those in 
the part dealing with Kaliningrad) are similar to those that arose in the case of 
Portugal allowing visa-free access to citizens of Brazil.69 In all these cases the 
interests of other Member States, and hence the EU, are affected only to the extent 
that the facilitation of entry does not spill over into their own territories.  
 
                                                        
69 See chapter 4.2. 
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Part III – VISA FACILITATION AGREEMENTS 
 
The third important legislative development designed to respond to the concerns of 
the new Member States is the rapidly developing field of visa facilitation. It is a field 
that lies at the intersection of three community policies – external relations, justice 
and home affairs and enlargement, and the interaction among them has shaped the 
development of this new tool. 
 
Even before the accession date of 1 May 2004, there were concerns on both sides of 
the new external border about the possible disruption to cross-border contacts as a 
result of the introduction of visa requirements by the new Member States towards 
their neighbours. Visa facilitation was developed to address this concern, but its 
impact seems to have been limited, at least compared to the considerable legal 
apparatus that had been developed.70 However, it appears that this tool (visa 
facilitation) is increasingly used in relation to many other countries, which are neither 
neighbours nor potential members.  
 
1. The context - at the crossroads of three policy fields 
We shall now analyze the development of visa facilitation as it evolved separately in 
three policy fields – external relations (European Neighbourhood Policy), justice and 
home affairs and enlargement. 
 
1.1. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
For a while an acknowledgement of visa liberalization as a possible solution was 
made in the first strategy documents of the European Neighbourhood Policy.71 The 
December 2002 Copenhagen European Council confirmed “the Union’s 
determination to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and 
                                                        
70 Also compared to what had been demanded by the new neighbours, namely a visa-free regime with 
their neighbours, following conditionality similar to the one applied to Bulgaria and Romania before 
their removal from the visa black list in 2001.  
71 For a detailed analysis of visa facilitation agreements in the context of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, see BONIFACE, WESSELING, O’CONNELL, AND RIPOLL SERVENT, “Visa Facilitation versus 
Tightening of Control: Key Aspects of the ENP”, Policy Department External Relations, European 
Parliament, February, (2008). 
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prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union”. In its “Wider Europe” 
Communication72 of 2003, the Commission stated that the EU and the partner 
countries “have a common interest in ensuring the new external border is not a barrier 
to trade, social and cultural interchange or regional cooperation”.73 In the sub-part of 
the Communication entitled “Perspectives for lawful migration and movement of 
persons”, several measures for achieving the aim defined above were outlined. Those 
measures included: 
 
- an efficient and user-friendly system for small border traffic; 
- ways of facilitating the crossing of external borders for bona fide third-country 
nationals living in the border areas that have legitimate and valid grounds for 
regularly crossing the border and do not pose any security threat; 
- facilitating the movement of citizens of neighbouring countries participating in 
EU programmes and activities; 
- granting of visa-free access to holders of diplomatic and service passports; 
- examination of the wider application of visa-free regimes; 
- conclusion of readmission agreements. 
 
This first official document demonstrates the general directions in which possible 
solutions for the emerging visa problem can be found. Although the word 
“facilitation” is already mentioned here, its meaning is not what has finally come to 
be the core of “the visa facilitation agreements”. Here the facilitation is aimed at a 
concrete group of travellers, those living in the border areas and the conditions 
attached to it are ultimately closer to the “local border traffic” arrangement rather than 
to general visa facilitation. There is also an exception for the diplomatic and service 
passports. As far as visa liberalization is concerned, a certain willingness is 
demonstrated in the wording to examine the conditions for that.  
 
                                                        
72 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, COM 
(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003. 
73 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, op. cit., 
p. 11. 
  331
In the Strategy Paper74 on the European Neighbourhood Policy published one year 
after the Communication, in 2004, the idea of visa facilitation is developed further. In 
the sub-part dedicated to Justice and Home Affairs, the Communication states that 
“the ENP aims to avoid new dividing lines at the borders of the enlarged Union.”75 In 
the context of border management, “the goal should be to facilitate movement of 
persons, whilst maintaining or improving a high level of security”. Here the link 
between facilitated movement and security is explicitly established. At that point in 
time the proposal for Regulations on the establishment of local border traffic regime 
was alreadt under discussion. Thus, the mention of visa facilitation is this time more 
general, simply stating that: “the EU may also consider possibilities for visa 
facilitation”. However, the reciprocal element is underlined, as “facilitation by one 
side will need to be matched by effective actions by the other”. In addition, the 
readmission element appears again as “the Action Plans should also reflect the 
Union’s interest in concluding readmission agreements with the partner countries”. 
 
In its next Communication from the Commission on Strengthening the European 
Neighbourhood Policy,76 the Commission acknowledges that:  
 
the ENP has not yet allowed significant progress on improving the movement of 
partner country citizens to the EU.” “The length and cost of procedures for short-
term visas (e.g. business, researchers, students, tourists or even official travel) is 
a highly “visible” disincentive to partner countries, and an obstacle to many of 
the ENP’s underlying objectives.77 
 
How to overcome this weakness is developed further in the proposals to strengthen 
the policy. In Part 3.2 dedicated to Facilitating mobility and managing migration, the 
Commission goes further in its analysis: 
 
The Union cannot fully deliver on many aspects of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy if the ability to undertake legitimate short-term travel is as constrained as 
it is currently. Yet our existing visa policies and practices often impose real 
difficulties and obstacles to legitimate travel…The ability to obtain short-term 
                                                        
74 Communication from the Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy paper”, COM 
(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004. 
75 Communication from the Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy paper”, op. cit., 
p.17. 
76 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
“Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy”, COM (2006) 726 final, Brussels, 4 December 
2006. 
77 COM (2006) 726 final, op. cit., p. 3. 
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visas in reasonable time at reasonable cost will be an indicator of the strength of 
our European Neighbourhood Policy. 
An enhanced ENP will therefore require a very serious examination of how visa 
procedures can be made less of an obstacle to legitimate travel from 
neighbouring countries to the EU (and vice versa)… This can only be addressed 
in the context of broader packages to address related issues such as cooperation 
on illegal immigration, in particular by sea, combating trafficking and smuggling 
in human beings, efficient border management, readmission agreements and 
effective return of illegal migrants, and adequate processing of requests for 
international protection and asylum… But with a solid commitment from our 
partners to work on these prerequisites, it should be possible to offer very 
substantial improvements on the visa side – providing simpler and faster visa 
procedures for certain specific categories of travel, particularly for business, 
official and educational purposes – at the same time as we strengthen our joint 
efforts against illegal immigration.  
Visa facilitation agreements are negotiated back-to-back with readmission 
agreements and are “tailor-made”, responding to the specific needs of the third 
country concerned and provide simplification of the short-term visa issuing 
procedures for certain categories of persons… Taking account of the need for a 
balanced approach and building on the dialogue on migration and visa issues 
foreseen in the ENP Action Plans, the Union should be willing to enter 
negotiations on readmission and visa facilitation with each neighbouring country 
with an Action Plan in force, once the proper preconditions have been met. 78  
 
The action points proposed include “visa facilitation, removing obstacles to legitimate 
travel, e.g. for business, education, tourism, official purposes, as part of a package 
approach ensuing well-managed mobility and migration, addressing readmission, 
cooperation in fighting illegal immigration, and effective and efficient border 
management.”79  
 
1.2. Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
The issue of visa facilitation is addressed from a different angle in the domain of 
justice and home affairs.80  
 
The Hague Programme of 2004 raises the prospect of a wider application of visa 
facilitation but does so explicitly in the context of readmission policy by asking the 
Council and the Commission “to examine, with a view to developing a common 
                                                        
78 COM (2006) 726 final, op. cit, p.5. 
79 COM (2006) 726 final, op. cit. 
80 For an analysis of visa facilitation and readmission agreements see TRAUNER AND KRUSE, “EC Visa 
Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the 
Neighbourhood”, CEPS Working Document, No 290/ April, (2008); and TRAUNER AND KRUSE, “EC 
Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: A New Standard EU Foreign Policy Tool?”, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 10, (2008), pp. 411-438.  
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approach, whether in the context of the EC readmission policy it would be opportune 
to facilitate, on a case by case basis, the issuance of short-stay visas to third country 
nationals, where possible and on the basis of reciprocity, as part of a real partnership 
in external relations, including migration-related issues”.81 The issue is also present in 
the Action Plan of 2-3 June 2005 implementing The Hague Programme, as an item for 
action. 
 
However, one should note that the link between visa facilitation as an incentive for 
the conclusion of a readmission agreement had not been officially established earlier 
and in fact was practised only for specific countries. Negotiations on EC readmission 
agreements began as early as 200182 but progressed slowly, mainly due to the EC 
requirement that the third country should take back not only its own citizens but also 
third country nationals who had entered EU through their territory. It is difficult to 
argue that visa facilitation was designed from the beginning as a ‘bargaining chip’ to 
induce third countries to sign readmission agreements. Of all the countries with which 
negotiations for readmission agreements were started, visa facilitation was coupled 
with readmission only in the cases of Russia, Ukraine and Moldova (from the outset, 
the negotiating mandates for both agreements were presented together), all three of 
which are part of the Eastern dimension of the European neighbourhood policy and 
the Western Balkan countries (also negotiating mandates for both agreements given 
together), all of which are on their way to EU accession. Of the remaining countries 
negotiating readmission agreements (Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, China and Pakistan) 
or having already concluded one (Hong Kong and Macao), none has so far received a 
visa facilitation agreement as an incentive; although some, such as China and Algeria 
have requested it.  
 
This sequence of events suggests that what motivated the visa facilitation agreements 
with the EU Eastern neighbours and the Western Balkan states was not so much the 
                                                        
81 Council of the European Union, “The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice 
in the European Union”, JAI 16054/04, Brussels, 13 December 2004, p.18. 
82 In 2001, negotiations started with Hong Kong, Macao, Russia, Sri Lanka, Morocco and Pakistan, in 
2002, with Ukraine; in 2003 with Albania and Turkey; in 2004, with China; in 2005 with Algeria; in 
2006, with Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia; and in 2007 with Moldova, For an analysis of the 
impact of the readmission agreements, see KRUSE, “EU Readmission Policy and Its Effects in Transit 
Countries – The Case of Albania”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 8(2), (2006), pp. 115-142. 
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desire to conclude readmission agreements but rather to provide a temporary solution 
to the difficulties faced by the neighbours following the EU Eastern enlargement. 
 
This logic might be changing, however, as the idea of linking readmission and visa 
facilitation gains ground for future exports to other regions. For example, this was the 
case for the mandate recently given by the Council for negotiation of visa facilitation 
and readmission agreement with Cape Verde, a country not in line for EU accession, 
nor a member of the ENP group, but a party in the Migration Partnership scheme. 
This intention was stated by the then European Commissioner Franco Frattini in 2006, 
who said that the EU will seek to enhance its internal security “through global visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements aimed in longer term at the Union’s 
neighbourhood countries, on the model currently being developed in the Balkans.” 
 
1.3. Enlargement 
The third policy field engaged in the issue of visa facilitation agreements, especially 
with regard to the Western Balkan countries, is that of enlargement. Following the 
first visa facilitation agreement with Russia, agreements were negotiated and initialled 
with all Balkan countries falling in the groups of candidates or potential candidates.83 
In this context visa facilitation was seen as a concrete step forward along the path set 
out by the Thessaloniki agenda towards a visa-free travel regime, also for the citizens 
of Western Balkan Countries. 
 
On 18 September 2007, the visa facilitation agreements between the European 
Community and the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) were signed and thus the first step on the long 
road toward visa liberalization was taken. As the Commissioner for enlargement, Olli 
Rehn noted: “Now we expect proper implementation of both agreements, so as to 
pave the way for a dialogue on visa-free travel and its conditions with each of the 
countries of the region”.84 
                                                        
83 Croatia is the only country from the region (until December 2009) that benefits from visa-free access 
to the EU.  
84 EU press releases IP/07/1350, “Signature of nine agreements on visa facilitation and readmission 
between the European Community and all Western Balkans Countries”, 18 September 2007. 
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Along with the visa facilitation agreements, readmission agreements with the same 
countries (apart from Albania, which already has such an agreement in place) were 
also signed, outlining clear obligations and procedures as to when and how to take 
back people who are illegally residing on the territories covered by the agreement. 
According to the Commission, the effective implementation of the Visa Facilitation 
and Readmission Agreements will ensure a better management of the migration 
pressure and will make it possible to envisage a structured dialogue along the path set 
out by the Thessaloniki Agenda towards a visa free travel regime also for the citizens 
of Western Balkan countries.85 
 
The Thessaloniki Agenda clearly states86 that the progress towards the liberalization 
of the visa regime is dependent on implementing major reforms in several areas, 
among which are combating illegal migration and strengthening the administrative 
capacity in border control and the security of documents. Moreover, in this process, 
“the EU should also encourage the transfer of the experience” of the acceding and 
candidate countries to their Stabilization and Association Process neighbours”.  
 
Visa facilitation is meant to encourage the Western Balkan countries to implement 
relevant reforms and reinforce their cooperation at regional level and with the EU in 
areas such as strengthening the rule of law, fighting organized crime and corruption, 
and increasing their administrative capacity in border control and security documents, 
by introducing biometric data.  
 
2. The contents  
2.1. The Common Approach on Visa Facilitation87 
In response to the mandate given by The Hague Programme, the High Level Working 
Group on Migration and Asylum (HLWG) prepared a draft for a Common approach 
on visa facilitation, which was submitted to COREPER in November 2005.  
                                                        
85 Ibid. 
86 The General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, “Thessaloniki agenda for the 
Western Balkans: Moving towards European Integration”, 16 June 2003, Annex A, p. 6. 
87 Common approach on visa facilitation, retrieved from www.libertysecurity.org 
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The logic behind the proposal is to “avoid a piecemeal response based exclusively on 
pressure from third countries” and thus to develop a common approach based on 
priorities and differentiation.  
 
Firstly, the common approach defines visa facilitation as a “simplification of visa 
issuing procedures for nationals of third countries who are under visa obligation” and 
thus is quite distinct from visa liberalization, which would entail lifting the visa 
requirements as such.  
 
The range of countries which can potentially benefit from visa facilitation is outlined 
on p.2 of the common approach and includes: candidate countries, countries with 
European perspective (possibly means potential candidates), countries covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and strategic partners (meaning Russia, but could in 
theory include other countries). The decision to open negotiations is based on a “case-
by-case assessment of the third countries”.  
 
The readmission policy is also mentioned as a priority area for the EU. Thus, point 4 
of the common approach states that “in principle, visa facilitation agreement would 
not be concluded if no readmission agreement were in place”. However, this does not 
mean that each country that has concluded a readmission agreement would 
automatically be eligible to open negotiations on visa facilitation agreements. Thus, 
having a readmission agreement with the EU is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the visa facilitation negotiations. The common approach even 
encourages the conclusion of readmission agreements to be linked, not only to visa 
facilitation, but to other instruments of a political, economic, commercial or 
developmental nature, in order to achieve the conclusion and implementation of a 
readmission agreement.  
 
The factors influencing the decision to open negotiations for a visa facilitation 
agreement are enumerated in point 6. However, the list is not exhaustive. The factors 
influencing the decision are: 
- whether a readmission agreement is in place, under negotiation, or is to be 
negotiated; 
  337
- external relations objectives; 
- implementation record of existing bilateral agreements and progress on related 
issues in the area of justice, freedom and security (e.g. border management, 
document security, migration and asylum, fight against terrorism, organized 
crime and corruption); 
- security concerns 
- migratory movements 
- impact of the visa facilitation agreement. 
 
The substance of the agreements is expected to vary, depending on: 
- the visa policy of the country concerned, 
- the introduction of biometric passports, and 
- existing practical problems. 
 
As a result, there is a differentiation in substance meant to ensure that each agreement 
is tailored to the specific situation and requirements of a third country. 
 
The negotiations are also based on the principle of reciprocity. 
 
The relationship between the EU and Member States actions in the field is dealt with 
in point 9, stating that a Community visa facilitation agreement takes precedence over 
any bilateral agreement between one or more Member States and the third country in 
question, in so far as the provisions of the latter cover provisions dealt with by the 
Community agreement.  
 
There is to be an inclusion of a monitoring mechanism and suspension clause in case 
of difficulties in respect of implementation or unexpected political developments. 
 
Before a negotiation mandate is proposed, the Commission is supposed to consult the 
Member States both in JHA and geographical Council groups, and subsequently carry 
out exploratory talks with the third country concerned. These talks are meant to allow 
the Commission to gather the necessary technical information about a third country’s 
visa system in order to elaborate the negotiating directives. To ensure coherence 
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between the JHA concerns and external relations concerns, both JHA and 
geographical working groups should prepare the negotiating directives.  
 
2.2. First results, legal basis and scope of validity 
The mandate for the negotiations of the first visa facilitation agreement, the one with 
Russia, was given in July 2004. By January 2008, there were already eight EC visa 
facilitation agreements in force. 
 







Entry into force 
Russia July 2004 June 2005 May 2006 June 2007 
Ukraine November 2005 November 2005 October 2006 January 2008 
Albania November 2006 November 2006 November 2007 January 2008 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
November 2006 November 2006 November 2007 January 2008 
Macedonia November 2006 November 2006 November 2007 January 2008 
Montenegro November 2006 November 2006 November 2007 January 2008 
Serbia November 2006 November 2006 November 2007 January 2008 
Moldova December 2006 February 2007 November 2007 January 2008 
 
Legal basis. The legal basis for the conclusion of all of these agreements is Article 62 
(2) (b) (i) and (ii); those are the provisions dealing respectively with “the list of third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from this requirement” and “the 
procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member States”.  
 
In terms of procedure, the legal basis is the first sentence of the first subparagraph of 
Article 300(2) (Commission negotiates following a mandate from the Council) and 
the first subparagraph of Article 300 (3) (consultation of the EP).  
 
External competence. The agreement is a Community agreement and not a mixed 
agreement, following the AETR doctrine of external competence and the fact that the 
competences in this field have already been exercised by the Community and thus, by 
occupying the field, it has made the competences exclusive by exercise. Therefore, 
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there was no need to go for a mixed agreement, so the ratification was also performed 
by the Community and not following national procedures. 
 
Of course visa facilitation could only cover short-term visas as the Community 
competence only extends to visas issued for a validity of up to three months, also 
called uniform visas or “Schengen visas”, because these visas allow border-crossing 
and circulation in the whole Schengen area. Long-stay visas, i.e. visas for stays 
exceeding three months are national visas issued by each Member State in accordance 
with its national law.88  
 
The basic rules on the conditions and procedures for issuing Schengen visas are laid 
down in the Common Consular Instructions (CCI).89 The CCI allows for certain 
flexibility when visas are issued, i.e. issuance of multiple-entry visas for a long period 
of validity (up to five years) or reducing checks when the applicant is known to be a 
bona fide person in the framework of local consular cooperation. There is a possibility 
for waiving or reducing the visa fee, in individual cases, when this measure serves the 
promotion of cultural interests, foreign policy, development policy or other areas of 
vital public interest or for humanitarian reasons. The individual Member States can 
make use of this flexibility.  
 
Visa facilitation agreements simply provide a common framework whereby the 
possible flexibility in the existing Schengen system is spelled out in specific 
exceptions, which can be then used by the beneficiaries of the scheme.  
 
Scope. The agreements apply to all Member States with the exception of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.90 All agreements contain two joint declarations 
respectively concerning the United Kingdom and Ireland and Denmark, which take 
note that the agreements do not apply to the procedures for issuing visas by the 
diplomatic and consular posts of these countries, but that it is desirable that the 
                                                        
88 As shown in chapter 1.3 long term visas are issued in much smaller numbers.  The concluding 
chapter comes back to this issue in the context of the Lisbon Treaty, which opens the possibility of EU 
regulation for long term visas as well. 
89 O.J. 2005, C 326, p. 1. 
90 See for example, recital 5 and 6 of the Council Decision 2007/821/EC of 8 November 2007 on the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Albania on the 
facilitation of the issuance of visas.  
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authorities conclude, without delay, a bilateral agreement on the facilitation of the 
issuance of short-stay visas in similar terms to the agreement between the European 
Community and the respective third country. 
 
As far as Iceland and Norway are concerned, in a Joint Declaration present in all 
agreements, note is taken of the close relationship between the European Community 
and Norway and Iceland, particularly by virtue of the Agreement of 18 May 1999 
concerning the association of these countries with the implementation, application and 
development of the Schengen acquis. In terms similar to the Joint Declarations on the 
United Kingdom and Ireland and Denmark, the desirability of conclusion without 
delay of the bilateral agreements on visa facilitation is underlined.  
 
There is another specificity related to the Member States that do not fully apply the 
Schengen rules (at present only Bulgaria and Romania). These countries are bound by 
the Schengen acquis but do not yet issue Schengen visas; they therefore issue national 
visas, the validity of which is limited to their own territory.  
 
2.3. The contents 
The contents of the visa facilitation agreements in force by June 2009 will be briefly 
compared. Those include the agreements with Russia,91 Ukraine92 and Moldova93 in 
the East and five countries in the Western Balkans – Albania,94 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,95 Macedonia,96 Montenegro97 and Serbia.98 As the agreements do not 
                                                        
91 Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the 
issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation, Official Journal L 
129/27, 15 May 2007. 
92 Agreement between the European Community and Ukraine on the facilitation of the issuance of 
visas, O.J. 2007, L 332/68. 
93 Agreement between the European Community and Republic of Moldova on the facilitation of the 
issuance of visas, O.J. 2007, L 334/169. 
94 Agreement between the European Community and Albania on the facilitation of the issuance of 
visas, O.J. 2007, L 334/85. 
95 Agreement between the European Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the facilitation of the 
issuance of visas, O.J. 2007, L 334/97. 
96 Agreement between the European Community and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the 
facilitation of the issuance of visas, O.J. 2007, L 334/125. 
97 Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Montenegro on the facilitation of 
the issuance of visas, O.J. 2007, L 334/109. 
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address the question of who needs a visa, but rather the procedure detailing how this 
visa is issued, the two main questions that visa facilitation agreements address are: 
procedural (how the procedure is simplified) and personal (who can benefit from the 
simplified procedure). An additional political question arises as to the long-term 
objective of the agreement; to what extent it is meant to lead to future visa 
liberalization? However, this political aspect does not have legal implications. 
Therefore, the analysis of the visa facilitation agreements is carried out along these 
three lines: purpose, procedure and persons. 
 
2.3.1. The purpose of the agreement 
The main purpose of the visa facilitation agreements is to facilitate, on the basis of 
reciprocity, the issuance of short-stay visas (90 days per period of 180 days). As was 
mentioned earlier, long-stay visas do not fall under Community competence on visas 
and are thus excluded from the scope of the agreements.  
 
The long-term objective of all agreements is declared as visa liberalization, although 
the level of intensity of this commitment varies. In the case of the Western Balkan 
countries, the agreements state that it is “the first concrete step towards the visa free 
travel regime”99. The wording used in the other three agreements is somewhat 
different. In the case of Russia, where the reciprocity element was strongest due to the 
visa requirements that Russia imposes on EU nationals and the difficulty in obtaining 
them, in the visa facilitation agreement the parties only state their “intention to 
establish visa-free travel”. In the case of Ukraine and Moldova the introduction of a 
visa-free regime is seen as a long-term objective. 
 
2.3.2. Procedure – how is it facilitated? 
In principle, “visa facilitation” means a set of arrangements whereby the issuance of 
visas to special categories of travellers is facilitated or accelerated through 
                                                                                                                                                               
98 Agreement between the European Community and Republic of Serbia on the facilitation of the 
issuance of visas, O.J. 2007, L 334/137. 
99 Third recital of the agreements with the Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia). 
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derogations from the normal procedures set in the Common Consular Instructions. In 
the case of the visa facilitation agreements, these derogations take the following 
forms: 
- decreasing the number and type of supporting documents required for issuing 
of visas; 
- issuing of multiple-entry visas; 
- decreasing or waiving of visa fees; and 
- fixing deadlines for the processing of visa applications.   
 
Each of these derogations can be applied to specific categories of travellers, listed in 
detail in the agreements. 
 
2.3.3. Persons – who can benefit? 
The description of the various categories of travellers who can benefit from the 
facilitated visa procedures forms the main section of the visa facilitation 
agreements.100 It is accompanied by the documentary evidence regarding the purpose 
of the journey that these travellers have to present. For the categories of traveller 
listed in each agreement, the documentary evidence mentioned in the text is sufficient 
for justifying the purpose of the journey. This provision already sufficiently limits the 
discretion of the consular officials of the Member States when they consider the 
purpose of the visit. However, proving the purpose is only one (though the core one) 
element when it comes to granting a visa. Besides the purpose of the visit, each 
applicant still has to prove, for example, that s/he has sufficient financial means, a 
return ticket and health insurance. Thus, the facilitation is limited to only one of the 
documents required in the visa application process.  
 
Facilitated procedure. As far as the categories of persons entitled to facilitation are 
concerned, the agreements vary to a certain degree. The most comprehensive 
approach can be found in the agreements with the Western Balkans, and the group of 
persons benefiting from facilitation is most limited in the agreement with Russia. All 
agreements include the following categories of citizens:  
                                                        
100 See for example, Art. 4 from the Visa Facilitation Agreement with Serbia, O.J. 2007, L 334/137. 
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a) members of official delegations participating in meetings, consultations, 
negotiations, 
exchange programmes and events (in possession of an official invitation); 
b) business people and representatives of business organizations (with a written 
request from a host legal person or company); 
c) drivers of international cargo and passenger transportation services (with 
written request from the national association of carriers); 
d) members of train, refrigerator and locomotive crews in international trains 
(with approval of competent company); 
e) journalists (with certificate); 
f) scientists and persons active in cultural and artistic activities, including 
university and other exchange programmes (with written request from host 
organization); 
g) pupils, students, post-graduate students and accompanying teachers (with 
written request or a certificate of enrolment from the host university); 
h) participants in international sports events and persons accompanying them 
(with written request from the host organization); 
i) participants in official exchange with twin towns (with approval of host 
mayor); 
j) close relatives (spouse, children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren) visiting 
their family legally residing in the EU (with written request); 
k) relatives visiting for military or civil burial grounds (with official document 
confirming the event of death). 
 
One further category is included in the agreement with Ukraine:  
 
l) persons visiting for medical reasons (with official document from host medical 
institution). 
 
The agreement with Moldova adds two more categories:  
 
m) civil society organizations when undertaking trips for the purposes of 
educational training, seminars, conferences (with request from host institution); 
n) professionals who participate in international exhibitions, conferences, 
symposia, seminars or similar events (with written request from host 
organization). 
 
The Western Balkan countries have in their agreements all of the above categories of 
travellers plus:  
 
o) tourists (with certificate or voucher from a travel agency or a tour operator); 
p) religious communities (with approval from registered religious community); 
 
One additional group is included only in the agreement of Albania: 
 
q) persons politically persecuted during the communist regime (with a certificate 
issued by the Institute for the Integration of the Persecuted Persons). 
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Multiple-entry visas. A second list of categories of traveller is included in the part of 
the agreements dealing with the multiple-entry visas.101 The list varies according to 
the different agreements but again the agreements with the Western Balkan States are 
the most complete. There all categories of traveller mentioned above can also be 
eligible for multiple-entry visas, with the sole exception of tourists. However, there 
are two categories of multiple-entry visas.  
 
For members of official delegations, national or regional governments and 
parliaments, and close family members visiting their relatives in the EU (and in some 
agreements also business people and journalists), multiple-entry visas with a term of 
validity of up to five years can be issued. There is no need to prove any additional fact 
beyond that of belonging to one of the three groups defined above.  
 
All other categories of traveller are eligible for multiple-entry visa with a validity of 
up to one year but on the condition of being bona fide travellers. To prove this, the 
travellers have to show that during the previous year they obtained at least one visa, 
made use of it in accordance with the laws on entry and stay of the visited state and 
that there are reasons for requesting a multiple-entry visa.  
 
Decreased or waived visa fees. The fees for processing applications of all citizens of 
the parties to the agreement are fixed at €35 (the normal visa fee for single-entry visa 
is at the moment fixed at €70). However, again there is a list (a third one, see Annex 
8.3 to Chapter 8) of those categories for whom the visa fees are waived. The 
categories are similar but not worded in the exactly the same way as the previously 
mentioned two lists. 
 
The groups of travellers eligible for visa waiver differ from one signatory to another. 
Overall, again the Western Balkan countries have the widest possible scope, while 
Russia has the most limited one. One should also note that the list of persons 
benefiting from “procedural facilitation” does not fully correspond to the list of 
people eligible for a waiver of the visa fee. The groups that are entitled to facilitation 
but will still have to pay visa fee are: 
                                                        
101 See for example Article 5 of the Agreement with Serbia, O.J. 2007, L 334/137. 
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- Business people and representatives of business organisations 
- Persons travelling for tourism 
- Attending the funeral of a close relative 
- Persons visiting for burial ceremonies 
- Visiting military and civil burial grounds 
- Visiting for medical reasons and necessary accompanying persons (although 
this is partially covered by the humanitarian grounds) 
- Visiting a seriously ill close relative. 
 
Fixed deadlines for procession of applications. The agreements foresee that the 
decision on the visa application shall be taken within ten calendar days. There is a 
possibility to further extend this period, but no longer than 30 calendar days, when 
further scrutiny of the applicant is needed.  
 
3. Visa facilitation in action 
The procedures to obtain a Schengen visa, including the length of the application 
procedure and the long list of documents required, were often conceived as 
troublesome and lacking transparency. According to an EU visa policy monitoring 
survey of eight EU Member States in four Eastern European countries conducted by 
the Stefan Batory Foundation,102 the length of procedures differed considerably 
among the EU Member States, ranging on average from two days in the case of 
Poland, over eight days in Germany up to 14 days in the case of the Czech Republic. 
The EC visa facilitation agreement explicitly aims at making these bureaucratic 
problems less cumbersome and more transparent, as well as pushing the Member 
States towards a common practice at least in the countries of the agreements.103 
 
The major disadvantage of the EC visa facilitation agreements is that they have the 
potential to divide society between those who are entitled to easier travel and the rest. 
They could be split into two groups: 
 
                                                        
102 BORATYNSKI, CHAJEWSKI, HERMELINSKI, SZYMBORSKA AND TOKARZ, “Visa Policies of European 
Union Member States – Monitoring Report”, The Stefan Batory Foundation, November, (2006). 
103 TRAUNER AND KRUSE, op. cit. 
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The privileged few who can get a multiple-entry visa, benefit from the simplified 
procedure […], or profit from the waiving of the application fee for the visa, and 
as to the remainder: the vast majority of ordinary citizens who cannot enjoy such 
advantages. This can create a feeling of discrimination and lead to the conclusion 
that the European Union is interested only in the […] elite.104 
 
Most of the visa facilitation agreements entered into force on 1 January 2008 and it is 
perhaps too early to evaluate the effects of the agreements. A study was conducted by 
the European Citizen Action Service105 based on special hotlines for complaints and 
surveys at the exit of the consulates in five Western Balkan countries (Albania, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro) and monitoring the 
consulates of six Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Slovenia and 
Greece.) The main findings are: 
 
 The agreements do not change the relationship between the consular 
administration and the citizen. Many who contacted the hotline or participated in 
the survey complained about being treated in an undignified manner. However, 
the politeness of officials, training and language skills, opening hours or avoiding 
queues just to get an application form are not covered. These are the issues of 
most concern to citizens; 
 Similarly the agreements provide for a reduction to €35 and that visas should be 
processed within 10 days. However these advantages may be offset by the greater 
additional costs and delays before the processing stage is reached - i.e. the costs 
of travel, waiting on the phone at a call centre and the days, even weeks; delay 
involved in arranging an appointment; 
 The overall advantages of visa facilitation have not materialized because of a lack 
of information and also the very diverse ways in which it is implemented, or not 
implemented, by Member States' consulates. 
 
All in all, it appears that the impact of the visa facilitation agreements that are in force 
is somewhat limited. 
 
4. Interim Conclusions 
Visa facilitation evolved from a response to the concern of new Member States to a 
general policy, now being adopted towards many other countries. Most of the existing 
agreements are with European neighbours, but new agreements are being negotiated 
(or soon to be negotiated) with a number of other countries, ranging from Georgia to 
Cape Verde, and countries as far-flung as China have actually requested an 
                                                        
104 BORATYNSKI, GROMADZKI, SUSHKO AND SZYMBORSKA, “Questionable achievement: EC-Ukraine 
Visa Facilitation Agreement”, The Stefan Batory Foundation, November, (2006).  One could argue, 
however, that this is justified because the elite constitutes less of an immigration or security risk. 
105 See documents of the Visa Facilitation Final Conference, organized by ECAS – European Citizen 
Action Service, 10 December 2008, available at: http://www.ecas-citizens.eu/content/view/152/.  
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agreement. The impact of the existing agreements in Europe seems to have been 
limited and will anyway only be temporary, at least for the Western Balkans, which is 
firmly set on the road to visa-free travel. However, the agreements might be more 
useful in the case of countries that are not in this situation and the request by China to 
obtain one indicates that this type of agreement meets a certain demand on the part of 




This chapter dealt with the three legal instruments that were used to address the 
problems arising from EU enlargement; they range from the very specific to the more 
general, whose use is no longer linked to the specific concerns of the new member 
countries.  
 
The first, special travel documents for transit to and from Kaliningrad, concerns 
essentially only one member country (Lithuania) and constitutes an interesting case of 
the tensions arising between a state transferring or about to transfer sovereignty and 
the entity that absorbs it. The EU felt the need to regulate transit from Kaliningrad to 
Russia even before enlargement, despite the fact that it was already subject to a 
certain bilateral arrangement between Lithuania (a candidate country) and Russia.  
 
In 2003, i.e. before Lithuania became a member, the EU had already adopted two 
Regulations on ‘facilitated transit’, which are clearly applicable only to Kaliningrad.  
These legal acts transformed the conditions for transit into part of the acquis which 
Lithuania had to adopt upon accession (and to implement upon full integration in the 
Schengen area). This action by the EU pre-empted any independent bilateral action by 
Lithuania on an important issue related to its territory, and this despite the fact that the 
country still had its full sovereign control over this policy field, as these events took 
place four years before the full integration of the country into the Schengen area. This 
pre-emptive loss of sovereignty was mitigated only by the fact that Protocol 5 of the 
Accession Treaty provides an additional guarantee for the protection of Lithuanian 
interests in stipulating that the measures affecting Kaliningrad can only be changed by 
unanimity (in derogation of the general rules for adoption of such measures which is 
QMV).  
 
The second legal instrument used to address concerns of the new Member States’ 
local border traffic agreements are also specific in that they can de facto be applied 
only to the Eastern (European) land border of the Union. Local border traffic 
agreements had been widely used in Europe prior to 2004, both between Member 
States and between acceding states and other third countries. As they were always 
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concluded between states with visa-free travel among themselves, their focus was 
always on simplifying the process of physically crossing the border by providing 
special facilities. 
 
The legal basis for common rules on the local border traffic agreements were 
provided for early on, (see Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Schengen Convention) 
namely in 1990 (when the Schengen Convention was signed).  However, there were 
no initiatives on this subject until 2003 (presentation of first Commission proposal). 
 
It should be noted that the nature of the local border traffic agreements contemplated 
by the EU is quite different from the pre-existing agreement, since the problem 
became one of facilitating local border traffic between countries which had visa 
requirements. Without a local border agreement, a resident in a Ukrainian border 
region might have to travel several hundred kilometres to Kiev to obtain a visa to visit 
the neighbouring Polish region just 30 km away.  
 
Thus the Commission proposal had to meet new requirements. Local border traffic 
was no longer about simplifying border crossings but about how to allow for travel 
without a visa, hence it became an issue of visa policy. The regulations on local 
border traffic agreements effectively create a quasi-visa document for access to the 
border regions of the EU. 
 
The communitarization of the field of local border traffic through the Local Border 
Traffic Regulation constitutes another example of the need for Member States to 
accept a loss of sovereignty when they have full freedom of movement among 
themselves, but do not fully trust each other’s standards in guarding the external 
frontier. The insistence of the new Member States on the need to keep their Eastern 
borders open might have actually increased the impression in ‘old Europe’ that the 
new Member States would put more emphasis on this aspect than their security 
concerns. In practical terms it proved necessary to delegate the exercise of this 
Community competence to the Member States. But since they did so under the control 
of the Commission, the role of the latter was clearly reinforced. 
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The third instrument developed in response to the concerns of the new Member 
States, namely visa facilitation, follows a somewhat different pattern. Here the lack of 
trust did not prevail, also because visa facilitation would affect the issuance of visas 
by all member countries. Moreover, this legal instrument evolved from a response to 
the concern of new Member States to a general policy, now being adopted towards 
many other countries. 
 
Visa facilitation is also of a different nature to the other two cases studied in this 
chapter, as it does not create substitutes for (Schengen) visas but only regulates the 
practical modalities of issuing Schengen visas. This is a much less delicate issue, from 
both a legal and political point of view. 
 
Through the three legal instruments discussed in this chapter, the EU tried to appear 
as a compassionate partner, taking into account the concerns of the new Member 
States in its legal framework. The impact of these instruments on the ground appears 
to have been limited, and what will remain is a significant degree of legal 
fragmentation with one area (Kaliningrad) actually covered by all three instruments. 
Straight visa liberalization would have avoided this legal fragmentation and achieved 
better conditions for the free movement of people, but this proved impossible, 
probably because Member States were not willing to ease access to this extent. 
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CHAPTER 9 – IMPACT ON EU LEVEL II – RECIPROCITY 
 
The principle of reciprocity is widely used in international relations and treaties and 
states that favours, benefits or penalties granted from one state to the citizens or legal 
entities of another should be returned in kind.1 This is different within the EU because 
EC law differs from traditional International Public Law by explicitly discarding 
reciprocity as a condition for equal treatment of EC citizens from other Member 
States.2 This work will deal only with the concept of reciprocity outside the EU, i.e. 
vis-à-vis third states. 
 
Reciprocity (in this sense) has been used in the field of trade agreements, the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of judgments, extradition agreements and agreements on 
the relaxation of travel restrictions and visa requirements.   There are networks of 
bilateral visa exemption agreements which are based on the principle of reciprocity.3 
 
In practice, the mechanism means that the unilateral (re)imposition of the visa 
requirement by one of the parties to such an agreement generally entails the 
(re)imposition of that same requirement by the other party to the agreement. Such a 
response is implemented by invoking the suspension or denunciation clauses.4 
 
Thus, reciprocity naturally entered the realm of European regulation together with the 
visa policy rules. While the first proposals for regulations setting up the common visa 
lists, submitted by the Commission in 1995 and 1999, do not mention the issue of 
                                                        
1 For a detailed analysis of reciprocity in international relations, see KEOHANE, “Reciprocity in 
international relations”, International Organisation, Vol.40, No.1, (1986). 
2 See Cowan case. There is a fundamental difference between reciprocity and mutual recognition: in 
reciprocity certain rights are recognized to another state only if the same rights are given in return.  
Under mutual recognition Member States recognize the decisions/regulations of each other and cannot 
suspend this even if one Member State does not comply with this principle.  Instead, the remedy is 
recourse to the court. 
3 For examples of bilateral agreements on the abolition or simplification of visa requirements, see LEE 
AND QUIGLEY, Consular Law and Practice, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2008), p. 
222 . 
4 The functioning of this mechanism in a bilateral setting is also explained in an Explanatory 
memorandum to the Commission proposal for Council Regulation determining the common visa lists, 
see COM (2000) 577 final/2, Brussels, 01 October 2000, p. 3. 
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reciprocity, the first proposal submitted after the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, in this case in 2000, contains an elaborate procedure to take into account the 
possible application of the principle. That the Eastern enlargement constituted a 
strong catalyst for the elaboration of clear reciprocity rules will be demonstrated 
below. 
 
The principle of reciprocity in EU visa policy has important implications. Firstly, it 
provides for a concrete solidarity mechanism among Member States. This particularly 
benefits the smaller Member States who can rely on the negotiating power of the 
entire group when they seek the abolition of visas from third states.  
The second implication is linked to the first one. Would they be willing to recognize 
the European competence in the negotiation of visa-free status, if it did not bring the 
benefit of increased negotiating power to all of them?  
 
The third implication is linked to the role of the Commission. Its power and standing 
increases because it is responsible for the negotiation of visa-free agreements on 
behalf of the EU (as opposed to fixing visa requirements for third country nationals). 
 
This chapter will first trace the genesis of reciprocity in EU visa policy. Against this 
background, it will analyze two issues in particular: 
- to what extent did the Eastern enlargement influence the introduction and 
development of the reciprocity mechanism in the framework of the common 
visa policy? 
- what were the implications of this process for the scope of exclusive 
Community competence in this field, as well as for the role of the European 
Commission? 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first will follow the origins of the 
principle of reciprocity in European regulations; it will assess its mechanisms and the 
evaluation of its application. The second will follow the development of the principle 
following the Eastern enlargement; it will study the proposal presented by the 
Commission and the reactions to it up to its final adoption and implementation. The 
third section will study the application of the principle through analysis of the reports 
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presented by the Commission. The final section is dedicated to the challenge to the 
system posed by the US Visa Waiver Program. 
 
The case of the US is particularly interesting because the principle of reciprocity 
works of course mainly between countries of a similar level of economic development 
(and not too dissimilar political power). As discussed in Chapter 1, this explains why 
the richest OECD countries today have far fewer visa restrictions imposed on them 
than the visa requirements that they impose.5  The US is of course one of them. The 
EU presents a complex issue for the US because its Member States comprise (after 
enlargement) countries of widely differing levels of development. The US is naturally 
tempted to treat different member countries differently, but this is not acceptable on 
the EU side because of the combination of the principles of solidarity and reciprocity. 
 
Throughout this chapter the analysis is carried through the three prisms defined 
earlier: solidarity between Member States, the protection of their sovereignty (defined 
through the exclusive or shared character of the competence in question) and the role 
of the European Commission.  
 
1. The original reciprocity mechanism 
The first two visa regulations: that of 19956 and of 1999,7 did not mention the 
principle of reciprocity. The reasons for this could be several, the major one being that 
Article 100c EC brought only two aspects of visa policy within the Community 
framework – the determination of the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States (the so-
called black list or negative list) and the establishment of a standard model visa. Thus, 
both regulations contained only the negative visa list and Member States were still 
                                                        
5 See NEUMAYER, “Unequal Access to Foreign Spaces: How States Use Visa Restrictions to Regulate 
Mobility in a Globalised World”, Transactions of the British Institute of Geographers, 31 (1), (2006), 
pp. 72-84. 
6 Council Regulation (EC) No 2317/95 of 25 September 1995 determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States, O.J. 
1995, L 234, pp. 1–3 (hereafter Regulation 2317/1995). 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 574/1999 of 12 March 1999 determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States, O.J. 
1999, L 72, pp. 2–5 (hereafter Regulation 574/1999). 
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free to “determine the visa requirements for nationals of third countries not on the 
common list.”8  
 
Another reason why reciprocity was not mentioned in the 1990s is that the EU visa 
system existed then only as a supplement to the Schengen system (or vice versa) 
which brought together only some of the Member States. Article 6 of both regulations 
states that the regulations are “without prejudice to any further harmonisation between 
individual Member States, going beyond the common list, determining the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing their external 
borders”. At that time the EC ‘black’ list constituted only a sort of minimum 
harmonisation in the sense that for any country which was not on the EC black list 
Member States were free to decide whether to require visa from the citizens of this 
state.  However, the Schengen States proceeded to further harmonisation among 
themselves regarding the treatment of the countries which were not on the EC black 
list – resulting in a separate Schengen black list. (See Table 10.1 in Chapter 10 for a 
comparison between the EC and Schengen black lists.) 
 
In such a legal framework, Member States' rights to use the principle of reciprocity in 
their bilateral relations with third countries was not limited, as they still held the 
power to determine their own white visa list, as well as their policy towards every 
country that was not on the common list. 
 
This situation changed with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, which 
brought all other aspects of visa policy into the Community framework, integrating 
them in the new Title IV EC (visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to 
free movement of persons), having as an objective the establishment of an area of 
freedom, security and justice (see Chapter 5). In addition, the Protocol annexed to the 
Amsterdam Treaty integrated the Schengen acquis into the framework of the Union. 
This was also extended to a range of harmonization measures regarding visas which 
the Schengen states have introduced.  
 
                                                        
8 Article 2 (1) of Regulation 2317/1995 and also of Regulation 574/1999.  
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The Commission moved in January 20009 with a proposal for a new regulation aiming 
at the full harmonization of the list of non-member countries. The proposed regulation 
satisfied Article 62(2) (b) EC and its Annexes contained two lists of countries. Thus a 
country could be listed either in Annex I (and thus be subject to visa requirements) or 
Annex II (and be exempted). Having the two lists fully harmonized would preclude 
the Member States from unilaterally determining the visa rules for any third country 
at all.  
 
The consequences of this full harmonization for the application of the principle of 
reciprocity were not considered in the initial Commission proposal, and reciprocity 
was not mentioned in the proposal of 26 January 2000. Reciprocity is not mentioned 
in the main body of the regulation, but a small reference is made in recital 2, which 
sets out the criteria used for placing countries on one or the other visa list. The recital 
reads: 
The determination of those third countries whose nationals are subject to the visa 
requirement, and those exempt from it, is governed by a considered, case-by-case 
assessment of a variety of criteria relating to illegal immigration, public policy and 
security, and to the European Union's external relations with third countries, 
consideration also being given to the implications of regional coherence and 
reciprocity.10  
 
Beyond this brief mention, no elaboration as to the meaning or even possible 
application of ‘reciprocity’ was presented. The European Parliament also expressed 
no concerns about the absence of the reciprocity in the proposed Regulation.11 The 
Council, however, insisted on this issue and to reflect the Member States’ desire to 
give “an operational dimension to reciprocity”, the Commission added a paragraph 4 
to Article 1 in its amended proposal of 21 September 200l.12 
 
                                                        
9 Proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, 
(COM (2000) 27 final, Brussels, 26 January 2000), O.J. 2000, C 177E, pp. 66–69. 
10 Recital 2 of original Commission proposal, COM (2000) 27 final, Brussels, 26 January 2000, op. cit. 
p. 11. 
11 No mention of it is made in the report adopted by the LIBE Committee on 21 June 2000, See: A5-
0179/2000 final 
12 Amended proposal for a Council Regulation determining the list of third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
exempt from that requirement (presented by the Commission pursuant to Article 250(2) of the EC 
Treaty) Corrigendum (COM (2000) 577 final/2, Brussels, 01 October 2000), O.J. 2000, C 376E, p. 1. 
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The discussions in the Council highlighted the fact that the Regulation is silent on the 
question of how to react in situations where response mechanisms were laid down in 
bilateral visa exemption agreements concluded by Member States with various third 
countries. The purpose of the introduction of this principle in the regulation is to make 
it possible to react to any third country that is exempted from the EU visa 
requirements but which imposes a visa requirement on nationals of a Member State.13 
Prior to the regulation, such protection was given by the reciprocity mechanisms set 
out in the bilateral visa exemption agreements that the Member States had in force. 
But how are the interests of EU citizens to be protected, when the visa lists are 
common and the right to retaliate is no longer held by the Member States themselves? 
 
Under the rules of the Amsterdam Treaty, such retaliation would fall within the 
context of Article 62(2)(b)(i) EC. Determining the countries whose nationals are 
exempt from the visa requirement is a matter of exclusive Community competence 
and therefore, in the words of the Commission: 
pending the conclusion of future agreements between the Community and third 
countries on exemption from the visa requirement, suspending any such exemption 
must now be done by means of a Community mechanism.14 
 
The amended proposal now included an additional subparagraph to Article 1 of the 
proposed Regulation and an extension of one of the recitals to take account of the     
new parts concerning reciprocity. The Commission acknowledged that the proposed 
subparagraph is based on work done by the Council on this issue.15 
 
1.1. The Commission’s proposal 
The proposal made by the Commission16 was presented as a temporary measure 
“pending the conclusion of agreements on exemption from the visa requirement 
                                                        
13 The EU-15, as group of relatively rich countries did not face the prospect of its citizens being moved 
on a black by third countries (see also below).  This changed with enlargement to EU-27.  The case of 
Canada, which re-imposed in 2009 visa requirements on citizens from the Czech Republic is a case in 
point. 
14 See page 3 of Explanatory Memorandum of COM (2000) 577 final/2, Brussels, 01 October 2000, op. 
cit. 
15 See p.3 of Explanatory Memorandum of COM (2000) 577 final/2, Brussels, 01 October 2000, op. cit.  
16 See the amended proposal of the Commission, page 8, COM (2000) 577 final/2, Brussels, 01 
October 2000, op. cit. 
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between the Community and the third countries listed in Annex II”. Two procedures, 
both with similar automatic mechanisms were foreseen. The first, in case a third 
country exempted from visa requirements imposes a visa requirement on nationals of 
a Member State includes:  
- notification in writing by the Member State concerned to the Commission and 
the Council (the Member State may notify however, it is not obliged to do it),  
- no later than two months after this notification, the Commission shall publish 
a notice on the measure in the Official Journal and 
- suspension of the exemption of visa requirements for nationals of that third 
country – five days after publication of the notice. 
 
The second procedure is to be applied when a third country revokes the measure 
imposing the visa requirement for nationals of a Member State and it includes similar 
steps: 
- notification in writing by the Member State concerned to the Commission and 
the Council (in this case, the Member State shall notify) ; 
- on receiving the notification, the Commission shall publish a notice in the 
Official Journal and 
- five days after the publication of the notice, the exemption from the visa 
requirements for nationals of the third country shall be restored.  
 
The way the proposal is worded implies that the reciprocity procedures can be used in 
cases when a third country already on one of the two EU lists changes its position 
towards the citizens of one of the EU Member States. The case in which there is 
already divergent treatment of EU citizens is not addressed. One should also note that 
suspension and restoration of the visa exemption towards the third country takes 
effect without the need for an amendment of either of the annexes to the Visa 
Regulation.  
 
Thus, the main characteristics of the Commission proposal can be summarized as 
follows: in terms of procedure, the start of the mechanism is voluntary but the 
consequences are automatically imposed; in terms of institutional involvement the 
mechanism is seen as temporary, pending the conclusion of Community visa 
exemption agreements; the Commission is a major player in the operation of the 
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mechanism. The mechanism is voluntary, the ‘victim’ Member State may set the 
procedure in motion by notifying the Commission and the Council but it is not 
obliged to do so. However, once the notification is made, the rest of the procedure 
follows automatically with a set of fixed deadlines with no possibility for the re-
evaluation of the case or any emergency brake. The publication in the Official Journal 
and the suspension of the visa exemption are actions that the Commission shall take. 
The Commission also plays an important role in the process, as it is the institution 
responsible for the publication of the notices in the Official Journal, despite the fact 
that the Council is also notified.  
 
1.2. How the mechanism was meant to function 
Many of these elements were altered in the text finally adopted by the Council, which 
differs from the Commission’s proposal in several important aspects.  
 
First of all, the certainty of the conclusion in the future of agreements on exemption 
from the visa requirement between the Community and third countries is absent17 and 
leaves room for other outcomes. In the final text, the establishment of visa 
requirements for nationals of Member States by a country on the EU white list shall 
give rise to the application of the reciprocity provisions “without prejudice to the 
provisions of any agreement which the Community may have concluded with that 
third country granting exemption from the visa requirement”. Thus, the reciprocity 
mechanism will be operational without a direct temporal link to the conclusion of 
Community agreements.   
 
The voluntary character of the first phase of the procedure is maintained. The ‘victim’ 
Member State may notify the Commission and the Council about the establishment of 
visa requirements but is not obliged to so.18 However, once the notification is made, 
the automatic character of the retaliation is maintained. The retaliation in the form of 
subjecting the nationals of the third country concerned to visa requirements is 
                                                        
17 See Article 1 (4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those 
whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2001, L 81, pp. 1–7. 
18 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op.cit., Article 1 (4) (a). 
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considered as “Member States’ obligation” and underlines the solidarity element of 
the mechanism.19 The European Parliament insisted on an even stronger formulation 
by using the expression “an obligation on the part of all the Member States covered 
by the Regulation”,20 instead of the formula “Member States’ obligation” which was 
ultimately adopted by the Council.  
 
Thirty days after notification, visa requirements for citizens of the third country shall 
be established provisionally and the provisional introduction of visa requirements 
shall be published in the Official Journal before it takes effect.21 However, the 
responsibility for the publication here is entrusted to the Council instead of the 
Commission.  
 
Unlike the Commission’s proposal, the procedure finally adopted does indeed contain 
a possibility for the interruption of the process. The power is given to the Council 
which can decide, acting by qualified majority, within the 30 days following the 
notification not to establish the provisional visa requirements.22 
 
It is not clear from the text how long the provisional application can be. The European 
Parliament insisted that “the provisional application of the visa requirement shall be 
limited to six months”23 but this proposal was not taken on board by the Council. 
There is no indication on its exact length, but there is a procedure for the 
transformation of the provisional application into a permanent measure, forming part 
of the annexes to the Visa Regulation. The Commission is obliged to examine any 
request made by the Council or a Member State to submit a proposal for amendment 
to the Visa Regulation. However, there is no indication as to a deadline for the 
submission of a proposal. But, if prior to the adoption by the Council of such an 
amendment, the third country repeals its decision to establish a visa requirement, the 
                                                        
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op.cit., Article 1 (4) (b). 
20 See Amendment 3 to the Draft Council Regulation, European Parliament document, Report on the 
Draft Council Regulation listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, 
Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, A5-0056/2001, 8 February 
2001, p. 6. 
21 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op.cit., Article 1 (4) (c). 
22 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op.cit., Article 1 (4) (b). 
23 See Amendment 3 to the Draft Council Regulation, A5-0056/2001, op.cit., p. 6. 
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Member State concerned shall immediately notify the Council and the Commission. 
The notification is published in the Official Journal by the Council and the provisional 
introduction of visa requirements for nationals of the third country is to be repealed 
seven days after the date of publication.  
 
The automatic character of the provisional introduction of visa requirements and the 
lack of deadline for their transformation into permanent measures through 
amendments to the Annexes of the Visa Regulation, indicates that the provisional 
application is conceived more as an incentive measure for the third country to 
reconsider its decision than as a retaliatory and irreversible measure meant to restrict 
access of third country citizens to the EU. 
 
In this final version of the reciprocity mechanism, it is still designed to be forward-
looking and there are no special rules to tackle a situation in which the citizens of a 
Member State are already subject to visa requirements prior to the entry into force of 
the Visa Regulation.  
 
To sum up, the reciprocity mechanism in the form adopted by Council Regulation No 
539/2001 provides, at the request of the ‘victim’ Member State, for a joint response 
consisting of successive stages: 
- notification by the Member State whose nationals are concerned by the visa 
requirement, 
- introduction provisionally by the Member States, unless the Council decides 
otherwise, of a visa requirement for nationals of the third country in question 
- announcement in the Official Journal of the provisional introduction of the 
visa requirement,  
- examination by the Commission of any request from the Council or a Member 
State to transfer the third country from the Regulation’s positive list to the 
negative one.  
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1.3. The first three years: evaluation 
In the three years following the entry into force of Regulation EC No 539/2001, the 
reciprocity mechanism was never applied. Meanwhile, on the 27 November 2002 the 
Commission submitted a new proposal for the amendment of Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001; one of the objectives of which was to embark on a process of reflection on 
the reciprocity principle and its implications.24 The replies to the Commission’s 
questionnaire, sent to the Member States on the 23 July 2002, revealed that certain 
Member States’ nationals were subject to the visa requirement in certain Annex II 
countries. In addition, certain Annex II countries were exempting certain Member 
States’ nationals from the visa requirements but for a period shorter than the period 
for which the Member States exempted those countries’ nationals. Therefore, the 
Commission considered that “an in-depth review of the meaning and scope of 
reciprocity”, in conjunction with the mechanism provided for by Article 1(4) is 
necessary. Thus, Article 2 of the amending Regulation25 stated: “The Commission 
shall report to the European Parliament and the Council no later than 30 June 2003 on 
the implications of reciprocity and, if necessary, shall present appropriate proposals.”  
 
However, such a report was never presented. Instead, the Commission prepared a 
Commission staff working document, almost a year later, when enlargement became 
imminent.  
 
Another interesting aspect of this amending Regulation with regard to reciprocity is 
related to the external competence of the Community to conclude visa exemption 
agreements. To recall, this was an important issue during the negotiations of 
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, whereby the Commission considered that the full 
harmonization of EU visa requirements would mean that the Commission would be 
responsible for negotiating Community visa exemption agreements to replace the 
bilateral ones negotiated by the Member States. However, the clarity of the 
                                                        
24 The other two objectives were:  follow-up to the conclusions of the Seville European Council, which 
gave top priority to reviewing the Visa Regulation and a number of technical adjustments needed to 
respond to the evolution of the international and European legal context. See COM (2002) 679 final, 
Brussels, 28 November 2002. 
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 453/2003 of 6 March 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 
15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing 
the external borders and those whose nationals are exempted from that requirement, O.J. 2003, L 069, 
pp. 10-11. 
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Commission intentions was lost in the final text of the Regulation and the issue 
remained ambiguous. 
 
The amending Regulation of 2003 was the first test of how exactly this would be 
applied in practice. One of the proposals in the amending regulation was for the 
moving of Ecuador from Annex II (visa exemption) to Annex I (visa requirements). 
The Explanatory memorandum reads: 
 
The decision to transfer Ecuador to Annex I to Regulation No 539/2001 must reflect 
the bilateral visa exemption agreements between Ecuador and the Member States. 
The date for implementation of the visa requirement in relation to Ecuadorian 
nationals must therefore be set in such a way that they can abide by the time-limits set 
for denunciation of these agreements.26  
 
This explanation of the Commission is clearly based on the fact that at this point the 
(bilateral) visa exemption agreements of Member States were still in force and 
making changes in the EU visa lists required denunciation of these bilateral 
agreements.  
 
1.4. The impact of enlargement  
The key reason why the reciprocity mechanism was effectively not applied until 2004 
must have been the fact that only a few countries found themselves in the situation 
described by the reciprocity mechanism and that the movement of persons between 
the countries involved was not that significant.   
 









                                                        
26 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of Member States 
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (COM (2002) 679 final, Brussels, 28 
November 2002, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2. 
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Table 9.1. Visa requirements imposed by third countries on EU Member States 
(February 2004) 
Third country on the positive visa list Member State or associated states whose 
citizens are subject to visa requirement 
Brunei Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Iceland 
Guatemala Iceland 
United States Greece 
Venezuela Finland 
Source: Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 as regards the reciprocity mechanism, COM (2004) 437 final/2, page 2. 
 
The Commission also tried to examine other possible reasons for this in a 
Commission staff working paper completed in February 2004.27 Overall, the 
Commission concluded that there were two main problems with the existing 
mechanism: its voluntary nature and its rigidity due to its virtually automatic effect. 
The Commission observed that whereas the nationals of some Member States or 
associated states were subject to a visa requirement by certain third countries on the 
positive visa list, the states concerned had refrained from initiating the reciprocity 
mechanism. And as has been outlined earlier, the Member States had the possibility 
but not the obligation to give notice of the situation and put the reciprocity mechanism 
in motion.  
 
A possible reason for the reluctance of Member States could have been the virtually 
automatic nature of the mechanism, whereby invoking it could spark a major crisis 
either in external relations with the third country concerned or internally, according to 
the Commission. Moreover, once set in motion, the procedure could only be blocked 
by a qualified majority decision by the Council, a decision that could be regarded as a 
refusal by the Member States to act in solidarity with the Member State concerned, 
and was thus unlikely. 
 
According to the Commission, the inadequacy of the reciprocity mechanism could 
only increase after enlargement: 
 
After 1 May 2004, the situation described in Article 1 (4) of Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 may be invoked by the new Member States with regard to third countries 
that continue to subject their nationals to a visa requirement. All the new Member 
States are legally entitled to invoke the reciprocity mechanism with regard to several 
                                                        
27 Document JAI-B-1 (2004) 1372, 18 February 2004. 
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third countries. The inadequacies and risks associated with the reciprocity mechanism 
observed since 2001 are thus enhanced by enlargement and make it even more 
necessary to review the mechanism.28 
 
Apart from the possible diplomatic complications of the new Member States deciding 
to use the reciprocity mechanism, the scope of the application of the reciprocity 
mechanism changed dramatically with the 2004 enlargement. Instead of the handful 
of cases illustrated in the table above, for which the mechanism was relevant prior to 
1 May 2004, dozens of cases could be expected. On the basis of informal information 
collected by the Commission, among the 33 third countries that appeared on Annex II 
of Council Regulation 539/2001 in 2004 and were thus exempted from visa 
requirements, 22 countries required visas from one or more new Member States. 
Altogether there were 112 cases of non-reciprocity towards new Member States as of 
1 May 2004.29  
 
Based on these two considerations, the Commission presented a proposal for the 
amendment of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 as regards the reciprocity mechanism on 
19 July 2004, two and a half months after the 2004 Eastern enlargement of the EU. 
 
2. New momentum 
2.1. The Commission submits a new proposal 
In its justification, the Commission stressed that the proposed review was not 
intended to weaken the solidarity that characterised the common visa policy and the 
place of reciprocity as a fundamental principle of visa policy is maintained. The 
proposals were intended as an introduction of an operational mechanism that was 
“more flexible and more realistic.”30 And the mechanism then in force was judged as 
failing to recognize the political dimension of reciprocity by being too maximalist and 
too fraught with political risk, and by emphasizing reprisal and completely ignoring 
the diplomatic approach. 
 
                                                        
28 Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 as regards the reciprocity mechanism, COM (2004) 437 final/2, Brussels, 19 July 2004, p. 3. 
29 Report from the Commission to the Council on visa waiver reciprocity with certain third countries, 
COM (2006) 3 final, Brussels, 10 January 2006, p. 4 and Annex 1A. 
30 COM (2004) 437 final/2, Brussels, 19 July 2004, op.cit.  
  365
The changes proposed by the Commission were also meant to remedy what was seen 
as a fundamental defect in the previous system, namely that the initiation of the 
procedure depended only on the actions of the Member State affected by a third 
country’s introduction of a visa requirement. What the Commission proposed is that 
the principle to guide the common visa policy was reciprocity, based on solidarity 
among all the Member States with regard to measures taken against them. To ensure 
this solidarity and to protect Community interests, the Commission insisted that the 
new mechanism should give the Commission a real, effective negotiating instrument, 
which had to be consistent with the Union’s overall external relations policy.  
 
Thus, with the overall objective of ensuring a more effective observance of the 
principle of reciprocity, the Commission proposed several changes to the reciprocity 
mechanism. Solidarity was the key word there and the Commission considered that 
solidarity with the Member States experiencing situations of non-reciprocity required 
that the existing system be adapted so as to make it effective. The changes proposed 
by the Commission were the following: 
 
1. Abolition of the voluntary character of notification by Member States.  
While previously the Member States could choose whether to notify cases of non-
reciprocity, now they are obliged to do so. Whenever a third country listed in 
Annex II introduces a visa requirement for nationals of a Member State, the 
Member State concerned shall notify in writing this fact to the Council and the 
Commission within ten days. The notification, as with the previous system, will 
be published in the Official Journal.31 
 
Having the notification system established as an obligation is meant to give the 
Commission an overview of the non-reciprocity affecting all Member States.32 
Thus, when the Commission undertakes bilateral contacts in order to remedy the 
situation, it would be able to speak for all Member States and thus strengthen the 
solidarity among them once again.  
 
2. Transitional arrangements, especially relevant for the new Member States.  
The act that puts into effect the EU reciprocity mechanism, according to the 
Commission proposal is "the introduction" of visa requirements for nationals of a 
certain Member State. This indicates that a new situation has arisen, thus 
clarifying the temporal limits of the implementation of the mechanism; a point 
which was not clearly elaborated in the original reciprocity mechanism. Now, the 
wording of the text clearly indicates that the principle of the reciprocity 
mechanism applies in the case of newly arisen situations.   
                                                        
31 Article 1 of the Commission proposal modifying Article 4 (a) of Regulation EC No 539/2001, COM 
(2004) 437final/2, Brussels, 19 July 2004, op. cit, p. 7. 
32 Note that in this context Member State is understood to mean all Member States (except Ireland and 
the UK) as well as Iceland and Norway.  
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However, in order to cover the situation of the new Member States, transitional 
arrangements are introduced in Article 2 of the Commission proposal. As a result, 
Member States whose nationals, at the date of entry into force of the Regulation, 
are subject to a visa requirement by a third country listed in Annex II of 
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 shall notify the Commission (note that the Council 
is not mentioned in this notification) in writing and within ten days of entry into 
force of the Regulation (the same deadline as the notification of new situations). 
The notification is also published in the Official Journal.33  
 
3. Abolition of the automatic character of the procedure. The original reciprocity 
mechanism foresaw that once the notification by a Member State was made, a 
series of automatic steps followed that over-emphasized the reprisal aspect by 
making it the ‘normal’ response, from which the Council can derogate.  
 
In its proposal, the Commission proposed a mechanism that combined measures of 
variable levels and intensities that could be rapidly carried out. Those measures 
consist of the following steps: 
- Negotiations by the Commission (or other appropriate steps). Once the 
notification is published, the Commission shall immediately take steps with the 
authorities of the third countries to restore visa-free travel. This process can take 
up to six months, and at the latest within six months of the publication of the 
notification, the Commission should report on those procedures to the Council.  
 
- Imposition of provisional measures on the temporary restoration of the visa 
requirement for nationals of the third country in question. Such provisional 
measures can only be proposed by the Commission and are not directly linked to 
the report on the negotiations. The Commission can propose them at any moment 
even if it has not previously submitted a report to the Council. The only 
institution that can decide on those measures is the Council, which acts with 
qualified majority.34  
 
- Amendment of the Visa Regulation and transfer of the third country in question 
from Annex II to Annex I of the Regulation. Such a proposal can again only be 
made by the Commission and it is not linked directly to the earlier stages of the 
process. The only limitation is that when provisional measures have already been 
decided, the proposal amending the Regulation shall be presented by the 
Commission at the latest six months after the entry into force of the provisional 
measures. 
 
- Restoration of visa-free travel with the third state. In the cases when a third 
country abolishes the visa requirement, the Member State has to notify the 
Commission only (not the Council) and the notification is then published in the 
Official Journal. As a result, any provisional visa restoration decided in the earlier 
stages of the procedure shall automatically terminate on the date of entry into 
force of the abolition of the visa requirement by the third country concerned.  
 
                                                        
33 Article 2 of the Commission proposal, COM (2004) 437final/2, Brussels, 19 July 2004, op. cit., p. 8. 
34 Article 1 of the Commission proposal modifying Article 4 (a) of Regulation EC No 539/2001, COM 
(2004) 437final/2, Brussels, 19 July 2004, op. cit, p. 8. 
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What is not clear from the text here is what happens when the procedure has moved 
beyond the provisional measures and the amendment of the Visa Regulation becomes 
fact together with the move of the third country concerned from Annex II to Annex I. 
Undoubtedly, the procedure to change this situation will be longer and more 
complicated than the reversal of the provisional measures.  
 
2.2. Increased role for the Commission  
The role of the Commission in the new mechanism is strengthened. With the abolition 
of the automatic character of the procedure following notification, every stage now 
would depend on an action by the Commission. As one of the addressees of the 
notification, it takes steps to restore visa-free travel, it can make proposals both for 
provisional measures and for the modification of the Visa Regulation and finally, it is 
the body to be notified once the visa requirements to a Member State are lifted, and 
the visa-reciprocity can be restored. 
 
The Commission, in its Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal, insists that its role 
is consistent with the fact that the Community has exclusive powers to take external 
action with regard to visa requirement/visa-free travel. Moreover, it also states that the 
proposed wording reflects the desire that the mechanism should follow the customary 
decision-making pattern in the visa field.  
 
The European Parliament took a great interest in the proposal, even though the 
procedure in this case was, at the time, consultation and not co-decision. Overall it 
agreed with the philosophy and the main elements of the proposal. Its main concerns 
were related to the second phase of the mechanism, so it proposed that the concept of 
reciprocity be understood in a wider sense; to include conditions and procedures 
which constitute an obstacle to free travel.35 
 
As far as the proposed mechanism is concerned, it is acknowledged that the main 
objective of the EU's action needs to be visa-free travel for all citizens to those 
countries that benefit from visa-free access to the EU.  
                                                        
35 Report on the proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 as regards 
the reciprocity mechanism, A6-0065/2005 FINAL, 21 March 2005. 
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A weakness in the system is considered to be the fact that at the end of the six months 
period in which the Commission is undertaking efforts to re-establish visa-free travel, 
the Commission has to report to the Council, and may propose measures but is under 
no obligation to do so. So a situation may arise whereby after the six month period, 
the Commission simply reports to the Council but does not propose any concrete 
retaliatory measures, thus leaving the Member State concerned still subject to visa 
requirements.  
 
This is particularly important in the context of enlargement. The purpose of the 
procedure is to reinforce the solidarity of the Member States; it is important to stress 
that in the area where there is exclusive Community competence, the individual 
Member States are reprieved of the power to act unilaterally. This is particularly valid 
for the new Member States, which can find themselves in a situation whereby they are 
bound to respect Regulation No 539/2001 and accept nationals of third countries 
without a visa, while their citizens need a visa to visit the same third countries. The 
report of the LIBE Committee therefore states in its Explanatory Memorandum: 
 
This particular situation following enlargement requires that the criteria of reciprocity 
as one of the criteria to determine those third countries whose nationals are subject to 
the visa requirement by the EU should be strengthened in comparison to the other 
criteria.36  
 
The European Parliament also supported a reinforced role for the European 
Commission. Such a reinforcement can be achieved if the Commission has not only 
the power but also the obligation to propose a concrete action at the end of the period 
of informal contacts or negotiations, in the form of the establishment of visa 
obligations for nationals of the third country concerned or any other measure. In fact, 
measures outside the visa field but in the realm of external relations are also 
mentioned, such as the re-examination of co-operation agreements; the temporary 
suspension of political dialogue; the exclusion of the country from the EU's system of 
generalized preferences; and the freezing of financial assistance or trade sanctions.37 
                                                        
36 op., cit (EC) No 539/2001, p. 14. 
37 Report on the proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op. cit., p. 
14. See also the Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 15 March 2005 for the Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, on the proposal for a Council Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 as regards the reciprocity mechanism.  
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Another element highlighted by the European Parliament is the definition of the 
concept of reciprocity in too narrow a manner. The Commission proposals address 
reciprocity only as a question of whether a third country introduces or keeps a visa 
requirement. However, there might be cases where reciprocity can be also sought in 
relation to the conditions and procedures for issuing visas (an issue which was later 
addressed in the negotiations on the visa facilitations agreements, notably with 
Russia). To that effect, the European Parliament proposed the inclusion of a new 
procedure in the proposal, meant to specifically treat the cases of reciprocity in 
procedures.38  
 
As to the timeframe of the reciprocity procedure proposed by the Commission, the 
European Parliament agreed with it in principle but suggested that the initial 
notification should be given within 90 days rather than within the 10 days proposed 
by the Commission, following the introduction of the visa requirements in order to 
give the Member State concerned the possibility to negotiate on a bilateral basis with 
the third country concerned.  
 
The European Parliament also invited the Commission "to focus more attention on 
visa questions in general that developed after the recent treaty revisions and in 
particular after EU enlargement", as the whole area is of great concern to citizens and 
to third country nationals wishing to travel to the EU.  
 
Moreover, the rapporteur, Mr. HENRIK LAX, underlined that the EU should also 
clarify and itself abolish its own disproportionate requirements for granting visas to 
third country nationals.  
 
2.3. The final text 
The final text broadly followed the procedure proposed by the Commission. The three 
main changes were linked to the involvement of the Council and the Member States in 
the procedure, the deadlines for action and the reporting requirements.  
                                                        
38 Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, op. cit., Amendment 9, p. 10. 
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1. Involvement of Council and the Member States. While in the Commission proposal 
the Commission was the main actor in the operation of the reciprocity mechanism: 
receiving the notifications, acting on them and reporting, in the final proposal the role 
of the Council and the Member States appears to be strengthened. The Council also 
becomes an addressee of all notifications, both for the imposition of visa requirements 
on EU Member States and for the lifting of such. The Council has the possibility, 
through deliberation, to influence the imposition of temporary measures.39 A role for 
the Member State concerned, in each individual case going beyond the notification, is 
also outlined. When the Commission takes steps with the authorities of the third 
country to restore visa-free travel, it has to do so in consultation with the Member 
State concerned. The latter may also state whether it wishes the Commission to refrain 
from the temporary restoration of visa requirements (without a prior report).40 
2. Deadlines for action. The deadlines for action originally proposed by the 
Commission were for the most part prolonged, with one exception. The deadlines for 
Member States’ notification were prolonged, as well as the deadline for the possible 
amendment of Annex II of the Visa Regulation, thus giving the Commission more 
time to negotiate the restoration of visa-free travel. However, the deadline for the first 
report from the Commission on the steps taken to restore visa-free travel was cut from 
6 months to 90 days.  
 
Table 9.2. Deadlines for the actions foreseen in the framework of the reciprocity 
mechanism: comparative table between the Commission proposal and final text 
Action Commission Proposal Final text 
Notification for introduction of 
visa requirements 
10 days  
(from introduction or its 
announcement) 
90 days 
(from introduction of its 
announcement 
Report from the Commission on 
steps taken to restore visa-free 
travel 
Within 6 months 
(of publication of the 
notification) 
Within 90 days 
(from the publication of the 
notification) 
Temporary restoration of visa 





Temporary restoration of visa Within 3 months Within 3 months 
                                                        
39 The exact wording of the amended paragraph 4 (c) of Article 1 is “The Commission may also present 
this proposal [for temporary restoration of visa requirements] after deliberations in Council on its 
report”.  
40 Amended para 4(d) of Art. 1.  
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requirements – Council action  
Amendment of Annex II of the 
Visa Regulation –  
proposal by the Commission 
At the latest 6 months 
(after entry into force of the 
provisional/temporary measure) 
At the latest 9 months (after the 
entry into force of the temporary 
measure) 
Termination of the temporary 
measures 
The date of entry into force of 
the abolition of visa requirement 
by the third country concerned. 
7 days after the publication in 
the Official Journal 
Notification in cases of existing 
non-reciprocity (new Member 
States) 
Within 10 days (of entry into 
force of the Regulation) 
Fixed date  - 24 July 2005 
(= 1 month after the entry into 
force of the Regulation) 
Source: own compilation based on the text of the Commission proposal and the final text of 
the Council Regulation.  
 
3. The reporting requirements.  The original Commission proposal imposed on the 
Commission the obligation to produce a report in the framework of the reciprocity 
procedure, namely the report on the steps taken to restore visa-free travel, following 
the initial notification by a Member State. However there was no direct link between 
the contents of the report and the proposal for future action made by the Commission, 
as such proposals were to be made even without a prior report. In any event, such a 
report was country specific and was linked to a concrete notification by a Member 
State. 
The final proposal contains the obligation for an overall report addressing reciprocity 
for all Member States. A new paragraph 5 is added to the amended Article 1 of 
Regulation No 539/2001 which reads: 
 
As long as visa exemption reciprocity continues not to exist with any third country 
listed in Annex II in relation to any of the Member States, the Commission shall 
report to the European Parliament and the Council before the 1 July of every even-
numbered year on the situation of no-reciprocity and shall, if necessary, submit 
appropriate proposal. 
 
Interestingly enough, although this text provides for more information for the 
European Parliament, it was not proposed by the Parliament itself. 
 
With all the above-mentioned alterations, the new procedure which entered into force 
on 24 June 2005 was designed to work as follows. 
 
- Notification. Where a third country listed in Annex II introduces visa requirements 
for nationals of a Member State, the Member State concerned is obliged to notify the 
Council and the Commission in writing. Such a notification is published in the C 
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series of the Official Journal. The notification also has specific contents, which 
include the date of implementation of the measure and the type of travel documents 
and visas concerned (e.g. ordinary passport, service passport, diplomatic passport and 
short-stay or long-stay visas). The deadline is fixed at 90 days from the introduction, 
or its announcement, thereby giving the Member State concerned some time to 
conduct bilateral negotiations. If the third country decides to lift the visa obligation 
before the expiry of the deadline, the notification is considered superfluous.41 
 
There are also transitional measures, mainly aimed at the new Member States, but 
also of relevance to the old ones. Article 2 of Council regulation (EC) No 851/2005 
holds that all Member States whose nationals are subject to visa requirements by 
countries on Annex II of the Visa Regulation, shall notify the Council and the 
Commission in writing at the latest one month after the entry into force of the 
Regulation; the objective being to establish a comprehensive list of the existing visa 
non-reciprocity. It was not possible to establish such a list earlier as there was no 
obligation to give notice of the non-reciprocity. 
 
- Negotiations by the Commission. Immediately after the publication of the 
notification, the Commission is to take steps with the authorities of the third country 
concerned. However, it is does not do this alone but in consultation with the Member 
State concerned. Within 90 days of publication of the notification, the Commission, in 
consultation with the Member State shall report to the Council. Such a report may or 
may not be accompanied by a proposal providing for the temporary restoration of the 
visa requirement for nationals of the third country concerned.42 
 
- Imposition of temporary measures. The Commission may make a proposal to the 
Council for the temporary restoration of the visa requirement for the nationals of the 
third country concerned. Such a proposal can be made following a report or even 
without a prior report. In both cases, the Member State concerned is involved, either 
as ‘co-author’ of the Commission report, or in the case of proposal without a prior 
report, it may state if it wishes the Commission to refrain from such an action. 
                                                        
41 Paragraph 4 (a) and (c) of the amended Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op. cit. 
42 Paragraph 4 (b) of the amended Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op. cit.  
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If a proposal is made, the Council acts on it by qualified majority and within a strict 
deadline of three months.43 
 
- Imposition of permanent measures – amendment of the Visa Regulation. The first 
two stages of the procedure do not affect the Commission’s right to present a proposal 
amending the Visa Regulation in order to transfer the third country concerned to 
Annex I, and thus make the restoration of visa requirement permanent. When there 
are already temporary measures in place, there is a strict deadline for the submission 
of the proposal for permanent measures, and at the latest it is nine months after the 
entry into force of the temporary measures. Such a proposal shall also include 
provisions for the lifting of the temporary measures previously introduced. While this 
procedure is ongoing, the Commission is expected to continue its efforts in order to 
induce the authorities of the third country in question to reinstate visa-free travel for 
the nationals of the Member State concerned.44 
 
- Restoration of visa-free travel with the third state.  Where the third country in 
question abolishes the visa requirement, the Member State concerned shall 
immediately notify the Council and the Commission. The notification is published 
again in series C of the Official Journal and any temporary measures imposed on the 
third state terminate seven days after publication of the notification. The only case 
where the temporary measures continue to have effect is when two or more Member 
States are subject to visa requirements. Then the temporary measures terminate only 
after the last publication.45 
 
- Regular reporting. As regards the entry into force of the regulation and until full visa 
reciprocity is achieved with the countries on the EU positive visa list, the Commission 
is to report to the European Parliament and to the Council every two years on the 
situation of non-reciprocity and to submit proposals if necessary.46  
 
                                                        
43 Paragraph 4 (c) and (d) of the amended Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op. cit. 
44 Paragraph 4 (e) of the amended Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op. cit. 
45 Paragraph  4(f) of the amended Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op. cit. 
46 New paragarph 5 of the amended Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, op. cit. 
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3. Reciprocity in practice 
3.1. The practice of reciprocity  
On 4 June 2005, Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 was published 
in the Official Journal.47 The Member States had to notify the cases of non-reciprocity 
by 24 July 2005. Due to the flexible arrangements in the visa field, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland were not bound by Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 and 
so were not part of the reciprocity mechanism. However, Iceland and Norway 
participated in the mechanism, and they are bound by the Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 due to their association with the Schengen acquis.48 According to the 
Commission, the follow-up of the notifications by Iceland and Norway is ensured in 
the same procedure as the non-reciprocity cases notified by Member States; there are 
certain legal constraints on the external representation of Norway and Iceland by the 
Commission, however.  
 
Notifications of non-reciprocity situations existing at the time of entry into force of 
the new Regulation (24 June 2005) were made by 18 Member States49 and Iceland 
and Norway. The first notifications were published in the Official Journal of the 11th 
October 2005,50 which started the 90 day period within which the Commission was to 
take steps with the authorities of the third countries concerned to convince them to 
abolish the visa obligation they still imposed on nationals of certain Member States 
and to report to the Council.  
 
                                                        
47 See Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005, amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, 
listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement as regards the reciprocity 
mechanism, O.J. 2005, L 141, p. 3. 
48 Iceland and Norway informed the Council in accordance with Art (2a) of the Agreement concluded 
by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway 
concerning the latter’s association with the implementation, application and development of the 
Schengen acquis that they accept the content of Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005, op. cit.  
49 Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden.  
50 All notifications were published as follows: O.J. 2005, C 163 (Czech Republic), O.J. 2005, C 251 
(Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Germany, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Portugal, 
Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Italy and Finland, in the order of the publication), O.J. 2005, C 277 (Austria, 
Denmark and Sweden) and O.J. 2005, C 310 (Iceland and Norway).  
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Meanwhile, the Council and the Commission also made a statement referring to the 
possibility of taking other provisional measures towards the third countries concerned, 
particularly in the political, economic and commercial fields. In this, they followed 
the recommendation made by the European Parliament during the consultation on the 
revision of the reciprocity mechanism.51 Moreover, the danger of retaliatory measures 
in fields other than that of visas could also work as an incentive for the 
reconsideration of the visa non-reciprocity by the third countries concerned. The 
statement stresses that the reciprocity mechanism and the provisional introduction of 
visa requirements foreseen by it for the third countries concerned:  
 
in no way prevents the application of other provisional measures to such a third 
country in one or more other fields (particularly political, economic or commercial 
fields) in accordance with the relevant legal basis or bases in the Treaties if such 
measures would be deemed an advisable part of the strategy to be implemented to 
induce the third country to restore visa-free travel for nationals from the Member 
State or States concerned.52 
 
Having the notifications in place and the formal ‘stick’ of the common statement, the 
Commission could proceed with its responsibilities under the reciprocity mechanism. 
Following the notification, the additional information received from the Member 
States and the consultations held with them, the Commission delivered verbal notes to 
the third countries concerned and held a series of bilateral meetings with their 
authorities.  
 
The results of these Commission activities are described in the first Report of the 
Commission to the Council on visa waiver reciprocity with certain third countries.53 
Overall, the Commission distinguishes three categories of third countries according to 
the level of achievement: 
- third countries with which a positive outcome has already been achieved;54 
                                                        
51 See Report on the proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, as 
regards the reciprocity mechanism (final A6-0065/2005), op. cit. 
52 O.J. 2005, C 172, p. 1. 
53 Report from the Commission to the Council on visa waiver reciprocity with certain third countries in 
accordance with Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement as 
regards the reciprocity mechanism, COM (2006) 3 final, Brussels, 10 January 2006.  
54 Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil. 
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- third countries with which a solution of the non-reciprocity problems has 
already been announced, but needs further implementation and/or 
verification,55 and 
- third countries with which a solution is significantly far-removed in time.56 
In view of the progress achieved, the Commission concluded that there was no need at 
that stage to include in the report a proposal for the temporary restoration of the visa 
requirement, or for measures such as those contained in the Council and Commission 
joint statement. In its conclusions of 21st February 2006, the Council endorsed the 
Commission’s analysis and urged the Commission to strengthen its efforts with the 
United States, Canada and Australia, and to monitor progress with the other third 
countries concerned.  
 
The assessment of the Commission about the efficiency of the new mechanism is very 
positive and it is not hard to see why. Even before the first round of notifications and 
negotiations carried out by the Commission, the number of countries with visa non-
reciprocity started to decrease.  
 
Table 9.3. Number of third countries on Annex II of Council Regulation 539/2001 for 
which non-reciprocity exists (February 2004 – October 2006) 
Date Number of third countries on 
Annex II for which non-
reciprocity exists 
Total number of third 
countries on Annex II 
February 2004 
Commission proposals 
4  33 
1 May 2004 
Accession EU 10 
22  33 
24 June 2005 
Entry into force of the 
reciprocity mechanism 
13 33 
3 October 2006 
Second report on 
reciprocity 
8 33 
Source: own compilation based on the reciprocity reports from the Commission. 
 
The second report on reciprocity was delivered by the Commission on the 3 October 
2006.57 In it the Commission concluded: 
                                                        
55 Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Uruguay. 
56 Australia, United States of America and Canada. 
57 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on cases where visa 
waiver non-reciprocity is maintained by certain third countries in accordance with Article 1(5) of 
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The Commission considers that the dialogue with third countries under the new 
reciprocity mechanism has already proven effective. The steady and significant 
fall in the number of “non-reciprocity situations” (cases where a third country 
maintains a visa requirement for nationals of a Member State) is a remarkable 
success in the Commission’s opinion. 
 
However, progress remains stalled with one third country (United States) while 
the situation is evolving with regard to Australia, Canada and Brunei. The future 
developments with these countries will determine the reflection on the 
appropriate approach that would allow for further and concrete progress towards 
the realisation of reciprocity. 
 
In its conclusions of 5-6 October 2006, the Council endorsed the Community’s need 
to continue to work towards achieving full visa reciprocity with those third countries 
for which it had not yet been achieved.  
 
The third report on reciprocity followed the accession of Bulgaria and Romania and 
was delivered on 13 September 2007.58 The situation of these two countries could be 
used as a test case of the efficiency of the reciprocity mechanism.  
 
Table 9.4. Number of third countries on Annex II of Council Regulation 539/2001 for 
which non-reciprocity exists towards Bulgaria and Romania (February – September 
2007) 
Date Number of countries on Annex II for which non-reciprocity exists 
Bulgaria Romania 
February 2007 13 10 
September 2007 9 9 
Source: own compilation based on the Third Reciprocity Report of the Commission.  
 
In this report, the Commission concluded that dialogue with third countries under the 
new reciprocity mechanism had proven effective. Full reciprocity was achieved with 
New Zealand and Mexico. Significant progress was achieved in dialogue with 
Australia. Furthermore, a comprehensive visa-waiver agreement was soon to be 
negotiated with Brazil. However, with regard to Canada and the United States of 
                                                                                                                                                               
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, listing the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 as regards the reciprocity mechanism, 
COM (2006) 568 final, Brussels, 3 October 2006. 
58 Third Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on certain third 
countries' maintenance of visa requirements in breach of the principle of reciprocity in accordance with 
Article 1(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt 
from that requirement, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 as regards the reciprocity 
mechanism, COM (2007) 533 final, Brussels, 13 September 2007. 
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America, it was concluded that little progress had been made. If this continued to be 
the case, appropriate retaliatory measures would have to be considered. This showed 
the willingness of old Member States to stand by the new ones. 
  
In its conclusions of 18 September 2007, the Council took note of the Commission’s 
report and indicated that the competent Council bodies would continue the discussion.  
 
3.2. Legal issues brought by the application of the reciprocity mechanism 
The success of the reciprocity principle in its first three years of application (2005-
2008) is beyond doubt. The numbers are clear: following the compulsory notification 
of the cases of non-reciprocity their numbers significantly decreased. The mere fact of 
accession to the EU affected visa requirements towards the new Member States. And 
visa requirements towards their citizens were lifted by some countries even before the 
Commission took any steps. Between the date of the accession of EU 10, the 1st May 
2004, and the date on which the notification of visa non-reciprocity became 
compulsory, the number of countries requesting visa from EU citizens decreased from   
22 to 13. After one year of application of the reciprocity mechanism, this number 
further decreased to 8 third countries. The effect of the EU membership and the 
potential retaliatory measures was also demonstrated in the case of the accession of 
the EU 2 – Bulgaria and Romania. Nine months after their accession, the number of 
countries requiring visas from their citizens decreased from 12 to 9, in the case of 
Bulgaria and from 10 to 9 in the case of Romania, thus bringing them into line with 
the situation of the other Member States. 
 
The operation of the principle also showed the willingness of the Member States to let 
the Commission handle the negotiations. The Commission reports show the 
mechanism worked in practice. The Commission exchanges information and holds 
coordination meetings with the representatives of the Member States but then 
negotiates alone with the third countries concerned. This method of operation and the 
threat of possible retaliatory measures that go beyond the visa policy managed to 
induce most of the third countries maintaining visa non-reciprocity to change their 
rules. There were two exceptions however, both with legal implications. The first had 
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to do with the need to base the visa exemption on an international agreement in some 
cases, due to the fact that the third country concerned could not change the rules 
unilaterally (the case of Brazil and to a certain extent Singapore). The second case had 
to do with three countries: Australia, Canada and the USA, for which a combination 
of several factors impeded progress for almost the whole of the period of operation of 
the reciprocity mechanism. They had strict visa requirements and no particular 
incentives based on economy or international relations were going to hold sway, since 
they had a relatively equal standing with the EU itself. These two cases will be 
studied further. 
 
3.2.1. Community visa exemption agreements 
The need for the first ever Community visa exemption agreement arose in relation to 
Brazil. Let us recall that Brazil was the country for which, when acceding to 
Schengen, Portugal insisted on maintaining its bilateral visa exemption agreement 
(see Chapter 4). Up until 1998, Brazil was still on the so-called ‘grey’ list of countries 
for which some Member States required visas but others did not. In any event, since 
the first positive common list was drawn up in 2001, Brazil was consistently on it. 
However, the exemption from visas for EU citizens visiting Brazil was based on 
bilateral agreements.  
 
When the first report on reciprocity was drafted by the Commission in 2006, Brazil 
was notified by seven Member States,59 of which only Austria was an old Member 
State. Following contacts with the Commission, the Brazilian authorities expressed 
and formally confirmed a political willingness to exempt from visa requirements the 
citizens of the Member States concerned. However, there was a legal problem. 
 
According to the Brazilian constitution, since a visa exemption entails a loss of fiscal 
revenue, it requires the approval of the Brazilian Parliament. Therefore, from the 
                                                        
59 Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. See the Report from the 
Commission to the Council on visa waiver reciprocity with certain third countries in accordance with 
Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing 
the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement as regards the 
reciprocity mechanism, COM (2006) 3 final, Brussels, 10 January 2006, p. 6. 
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Brazilian side there was a need to negotiate an international agreement. Thus, Brazil 
informed the Commission of the difficulties, from a political point of view, of 
replacing or amending the existing bilateral agreements with other Member States. 
These agreements have the advantage of allowing a stay of up to six months,60 
compared to only three months under the rules of Regulation 539/2001. Moreover, 
according to Article 20 (2) of the Schengen Convention,61 the agreements are not 
affected by the Schengen Rules, and can therefore continue to apply.62  
 
Instead, in July 2005 Brazil sent to the Commission a draft agreement with the 
European Community concerning nationals of those Member States still required to 
hold a visa to enter Brazil, stating that it would exempt them from this requirement, 
leaving the existing bilateral agreements with other Member States unaffected. The 
legal difficulties with this proposal are clearly stated in the Commission report: 
 
Given the exclusive external competence of the Community in this area, the 
conclusion of a visa waiver agreement between the EC and Brazil, which would be 
applicable only to a limited number of Member States, is not possible. When the 
Community exercises its external competence, it exercises this competence for the 
whole Community, subject to the opt-out provisions concerning Ireland and the 
United Kingdom.63  
 
Taking this into account, the Commission instead decided to present a 
recommendation to the Council aiming at obtaining negotiating directives for a visa 
waiver agreement between the European Community and Brazil covering all Member 
States, which would replace the existing bilateral visa-waiver agreements with 
Member States. This would be the first time a bilateral visa-waiver agreement had 
been negotiated between the Community and a third country.  
 
                                                        
60 As in the case of the bilateral agreement between Brazil and Portugal prior to the later accession to 
Schengen.  
61 Article 20 of the Schengen Convention holds: 
“1. Aliens not subject to a visa requirement may move freely within the territory of the contracting 
parties for a maximum period of three months during the six months following the date of first entry, 
provided that they fulfil the entry conditions referred to in Article 5(1)(a), (c), (d) and (e). 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not affect each contracting party’s right to extend beyond three months an alien’s 
stay in its territory in exceptional circumstances or in accordance with a bilateral agreement concluded 
before the entry into force of this convention.” 
62 PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd edition, Oxford EC Law, (Oxford, 2006), p.177-178. 
63 See COM (2006) 3 final, Brussels, 10 January 2006, p. 7. 
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It took one a half years to solve “a number of problems relating to complications 
arising from the Community’s legal order” and on 9 July 2007, the Commission 
adopted a Recommendation to the Council to open negotiations with Brazil on a visa-
waiver agreement between the European Community and Brazil.64  
 
Meanwhile, bilateral agreements for visa exemption already concluded by the 
Member States continued to enter into force. The Czech Republic informed the 
Council and the Commission that the agreement concluded with Brazil on 29 April 
2004 on abolishing the visa requirement had come into force on 3 October 2005. On 7 
November 2007 Romania informed the Commission that, following the entry into 
force of the Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Brazil concerning the abolition of the visa system, as of 11 
November 2007, Romanian citizens would be exempt from the visa obligation for 
transit and journeys of short duration.  
 
On 18 April 2008, the Council adopted a decision authorizing the Commission to 
open negotiations on the conclusion of a short-stay visa-waiver agreement between 
the European Community and Brazil. The negotiations were opened on 2 July 2008.  
 
What the negotiations guidelines of the Commission are is not clear, as neither the 
Commission Recommendation nor the Council Decision have been made public. It is 
therefore not possible to say at this stage what the scope of the agreement will be and 
how the existing complex competence issues will be addressed. Following several 
rounds of negotiations, by January 2010, the parties succeeded to agree to a draft text 
of the short-stay visa waiver agreement for holders of ordinary passports.65  
 
It seems that this problem is only specific to Brazil, since in the meantime the 
Community has signed agreements with several small countries from the Caribbean 
                                                        
64 Unfortunately, the document is not considered public and is thus not available on the Council 
website, or on Eur-lex. The Commission reference is SEC (2007) 927 final, and the Council reference 
is 11599/07. 
65 Fifth Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on certain third 
countries' maintenance of visa requirements in breach of the principle of reciprocity in accordance with 
Article 1(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt 
from that requirement, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 as regards the reciprocity 
mechanism, COM (2009) 560 final, Brussels, 19 October 2009, pages 10-11. 
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on short-stay visa-waivers. Six agreements were signed with Antigua and Barbuda, 
the Bahamas, Barbados, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Seychelles on 29 
May 2009. In this case the negotiations were relatively quick as they started on 18 
July 2008 and were concluded on 16 October of the same year. The difference might 
be that the conclusion of such agreements was one of the conditions for removing 
those states from the visa black list. Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1932/2006 states 
that for these six countries, the exemption from the visa requirement is to be applied 
only from the date of entry into force of an agreement on visa exemption, which is to 
be concluded by the European Community with the countries in question.  
 
The new visa regime provides for visa-free travel for EU citizens when travelling to 
the territory to these six states and for citizens of those countries when travelling to 
the EU, for a period of stay not exceeding three months during a six month period.66  
 
The legal basis used is Article 62, point 2(b)(i) of the EC Treaty, in conjunction with 
the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300 (2). Interestingly, the 
agreement contains a special article on the relation between the Agreement and 
existing bilateral visa-waiver agreements between the Member States and the other 
states. Thus Article 7 of the Agreement with Antigua and Barbuda holds:  
 
This Agreement shall take precedence over the provisions of any bilateral 
agreements or arrangements concluded between individual Member States and 
Antigua and Barbuda, in so far as their provisions cover issues falling within the 
scope of this Agreement.67 
 
3.2.2. Defining the visa requirements – being on the other side 
As from the first Commission report on reciprocity, there were three countries with 
which progress was slow and with which the extension of visa-waivers to all EU 
Member States was not in sight – Australia, Canada and the United States. The 
                                                        
66 Council doc. 10442/09 (Presse 156), EU signs visa-waiver agreements with Antigua and Barbuda, 
the Bahamas, Barbados, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Seychelles, Brussels, 28 May 2009; 
for the beginning of the negotiations see: EU/JHA: Commission hopes to open negotiations on visa 
waiver agreements with six countries (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9603 – 16 February 2008). 
67 Council doc. 7514/09, Council Decision on the signing and provisional application of the Agreement 
between the European Community and Antigua and Barbuda on the short-stay visa-waiver, 30 March 
2009. 
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process of negotiations with these countries showed the limits of the objective criteria 
for visa-free travel and the difficulty negotiating when such criteria are not well 
defined. Usually, such shortcomings are mentioned by third countries subject to visa 
requirements by the EU, when they qualify the EU visa system. In the case of 
Australia, Canada and the USA, the European Commission could experience first 
hand the problems third countries face when trying to get on the EU white list.  
 
The conditions required to qualify for visa-free travel of each of the three countries 
are quite different, especially in the way in which they are fixed or not in national 
legislation. However, in all cases the conditions are mainly meant to address concerns 
about illegal immigration, organized crime, document security and in some cases 
terrorism. 
 
Australia. Australia was the country with which the progress made was most 
noticeable. As a rule, to travel to Australia, all non-citizens must obtain a visa. 
Depending on the nationality of the person concerned, the visa application must be 
made electronically – either an Electronic Travel Authority (ETA) or an eVisa, or at a 
diplomatic mission. 
The ETA is a system of automatic notification of travellers, whereby the traveller’s 
details, such as name and passport details are sent electronically to the relevant 
Australian authorities to check against the list of undesirable foreigners. The response 
is almost immediate. The eVisa requires an application to be submitted via internet for 
processing in Australia. Depending on the risk assessment level, the authorities can 
require further supporting documents from the applicant. If the risk is low, the eVisas 
are granted automatically.  
 
Compared with the European Union, Australian visa policy is not focused on a short 
stay of three months, but offers a more generous approach for stays of up to twelve 
months including generous and facilitated entry and stay conditions.68 
 
                                                        
68 Such conditions include on-line visa applications for visas valid for up to twelve months as of July 
2005, working holiday arrangements, on the basis of which travel funds can be supplemented through 
incidental employment, visa facilitation for students and simplification through issuance of permits 
covering both residence and work.  
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Among the criteria used as to whether to require from citizens of a country ETA or 
eVisa are: the level of overstay rate, the possibility to distinguish online between 
travel documents issued to citizens and to resident non-citizens, the use of fraudulent 
supporting documents, visa cancellation rates and visa refusal rates.69  
 
The Commission efforts concentrated precisely on those conditions and the reasons 
put forward by the Australian authorities to justify maintaining their electronic visa 
system. Detailed reports explaining how some of the reference rates, such as overstay 
rate, visa refusal rate, visa cancellation rate are calculated.70 This step made the 
process more transparent, as it allowed the Commission to use the data provided in 
order to make its own evaluation. What is more, the Australian Minister for 
Immigration and Multiculturalism Affairs informed the Commission71 that the 
Australian Government had developed “a strategy for implementation of a number of 
measures over the next few years to achieve uniformity of visa requirements for all 
EU Member States.”72 
 
Canada. The progress with Canada was initially slow. Canada evaluates each 
country’s visa exemption individually and clear criteria as to the preconditions for a 
visa waiver are not legally defined.  
 
The Canadian visa review is an administrative process founded on an objective 
assessment of the risks and benefits associated with the movement of a specific 
country’s citizens. The Canadian authorities take into consideration the complex push 
and pull factors that trigger migration movements, from broad socio-economic 
conditions to specific regional issues.73 The assessment of risk and benefits includes 
many factors, such as (but not limited to):  
 
- immigration issues (i.e. non bona fide refugee claimants and clandestine or 
undocumented migrants), 
                                                        
69 COM (2006) 3 final, Brussels, 10 January 2006, op. cit. p. 10. 
70 COM (2006) 568 final, Brussels, 3 January 2006, op. cit. p. 11. 
71 In a letter dated 28 August 2006. 
72 For the specific steps, see COM (2006) 568 final, Brussels, 3 October 2006, op. cit., p. 12. 
73 For general visa requirements see http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/index.asp. For detailed rules in 
relation to reciprocity with the EU see the reports on reciprocity from the Commission to the Council.  
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- public safety and security issues (i.e. organized crime and counter terrorism, 
the trafficking and smuggling of persons and goods, serious criminal activity, 
health risks and concerns), 
- the stability of government and public institutions (level of public confidence 
in institutions, legal system, police and security agencies, immigration and 
asylum systems, protection of human rights), 
- the health and stability of the economy, such as unemployment rates and 
regional disparities, 
- the social and human rights environment, 
- the trends and patterns related to incidents of application fraud, passport fraud 
and visa refusal rates. 
 
Factors are reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with the Canadian immigration 
programme and the broader mandate: the objectives and priorities of the government 
of Canada. Decisions to change the visa status of a given country are well-informed 
and are made after a comprehensive review of key considerations and upon extensive 
internal consultation.  
 
In the context of the reciprocity dialogue between the government of Canada and the 
European Commission, more concrete criteria in relation to the EU Member States 
under review were defined, including looking at: 
 
- consistently low rates of refusal of requests for Canadian visas over an 
extended period from nationals of the country under review; 
- cooperation and information-sharing by the country under review on migration 
and law enforcement issues such as removals and police investigations; 
- low levels of organized crime in Canada linked to the source country; 
- low levels of passport abuse or evidence of corruption in the issuance of the 
country’s documents; and 
- no influx of non-bona fide asylum seekers from the source country or 
travelling on the source country’s documents. 
 
The Commission made the comment that although dialogue with Canada had been 
initiated, it was important that it become result-oriented. The main demand on the side 
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of the Commission was for a “transparent process establishing clear benchmarks that 
led to a visa waiver for the citizens of all Member States.”74 In the established 
dialogue, the Canadian authorities expressed their willingness to clarify further the 
relevant criteria and conditions to be met. Moreover, the Canadian authorities made a 
statement in a letter to the Commission:  
 
Canada is committed to making its visa review process more transparent and to 
providing the European Commission and the new Member States with more 
information on the thresholds related to visa exemption and imposition.75  
 
By November 2006, the Canadian authorities provided explanations of the main 
thresholds used with regard to the possibility of lifting the visa requirement: visa 
refusal rates, immigration violation rates, passport security, the passport issuing 
system, information on lost and stolen passports, security and refugee claims.  
 
By the third Commission report on reciprocity, the Commission concluded that 
Canada had made its visa review process more transparent and provided more 
information on the thresholds and their implementation.  
 
Thus, in the case of both Australia and Canada, the negotiations in the framework of 
the EU reciprocity mechanism led to more transparency on the criteria for visa-free 
travel and even to the development of special national measures and programmes to 
guide the developments towards visa-free travel for the EU Member States. The 
situation with the third state in this group – USA, however, was much more 
problematic.  
 
USA. Visa-free travel to the USA for short stays is based on the US Visa Waiver 
Program (VWP). The US Visa Waiver Program76 allows nationals from the 
participating countries to enter the US as temporary visitors for business or leisure 
                                                        
74 COM (2006) 568 final, Brussels, 3 October 2006, op. cit., p. 8. 
75 Letter sent by the Canadian authorities to the Commission on 28 June 2006, cited in COM (2006) 
568 final, Brussels, 3 October 2006, op. cit. p. 9. 
76 The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was established as a temporary programme by the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603). Congress periodically enacted legislation to extend the 
programmes’ authorisation. Finally, the programme gained permanent status on 30 October 2000, by 
the adoption of the Visa Waiver Permanent Act (P.L. 106-396). 
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without first obtaining a visa from a US consulate abroad. The countries participating 
in the programme are designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security in 
consultation with the Secretary of State. The conditions for participation are 
established by US law77 and are described briefly below. 
 
To qualify for VWP, a country must:78 
 
- offer reciprocal privileges to United States citizens; 
- have had non-immigrant refusal rates of less than 3% for the previous year; 
- certify that the country issues machine-readable passports; 
- have a programme to incorporate biometric identifiers into the passports; 
- certify that it reports the theft of blank passports on a timely basis to the US 
authorities. 
- All these criteria are set in the US immigration law and changes in them 
require legislative amendment. 
 
In addition, the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary 
of State, has to prepare an evaluation report on the effect that a country’s designation 
as a VWP participant would have on the law enforcement and security interests of the 
United States, including interests related to the enforcement of immigration laws and 
the existence and effectiveness of extradition agreements and procedures. In order for 
the country to be designated as a VWP participant, a determination must be made that 
such interests would not be compromised by the designation of the country. 
 
Furthermore there are specific factors that are considered but are not established in the 
legislation:  
 
- the security of a country’s passport application,  
- the production and issuing process, 
                                                        
77 The conditions are set by the Immigration and Nationality Act (U.S.C. 1187), the Border Security 
Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act.  
78 For details on the programme see http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html. See 
also the reports on visa reciprocity from the Commission to the Council, COM (2006) 3 final, Brussels, 
10 January 2006, COM (2006) 568 final, Brussels, 3 October 2006, COM (2007) 533 final, Brussels, 
13 September 2007, COM (2008) 486 final/2, Brussels, 9 September 2008. 
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- the security of passports and other documents used to demonstrate identity and 
citizenship, and incidence of fraud or misuse involving such documents 
- the nationality and citizenship laws and their implementation, 
- the existence of security and law enforcement threats in the country (terrorist 
activities, organized crime, money laundering, human and drug trafficking, 
etc. ), and efforts to address such threats, 
- the immigration controls and alien smuggling activities in the country, and 
efforts to address such threats 
- the stability of the government politically and economically 
- the degree of cooperation with the US and other international partners on law 
enforcement issues, including extradition.  
 
However, ultimately, the designation as a VWP country is at the discretion of the 
government of the United States. Meeting the objective requirements of the VWP 
does not guarantee a successful candidacy for VWP membership.  
 
In practice, the way the system works can be illustrated by the treatment of the 
different Member States that are still not part of VWP. The rule is that countries 
wishing to participate in the Visa Waiver Program must individually satisfy all these 
criteria. In February 2005, President Bush proposed a ‘roadmap’ framework to focus 
and guide the efforts for a future participation in the Visa Waiver Program. The 
roadmaps are shaped to the circumstances of each country but contain a number of 
common elements, including: 
 
- a US agreement to look at the visa application review process; 
- removing all pre-1989 cases from overstays calculations; 
- the need for the government concerned to meet the well-established technical 
requirements of US legislation (e.g. overstay and non-immigrant visa refusal 
rates, biometrics, lost and stolen passport reporting, etc.) 
- the need for governments to promote public awareness campaigns to increase 




However, such roadmaps are not comprehensive (i.e. they do not cover all the criteria 
which are applied to a judgment on a country’s VWP eligibility) and in some cases 
the criteria are subjective.  
 
The reciprocity dialogue led the Commission to conclude in one of its reports that: 
 
although the criteria established by Congress are acceptable, the manner in which 
they are applied is not: visa refusal rates are, by definition, a matter for the United 
States consular authorities; yet the Member States concerned receive no 
information on the reasons for refusing visas; on the subject of overstay rates, the 
United States does not currently possess a system for recording entries and exits 
from its territory and therefore has no reliable factual data.79 
 
Of all the countries with which the European Commission negotiated in the 
framework of the reciprocity mechanism, the negotiations with the USA were the 
most difficult and the least productive. The US kept its visa requirements in place for 
twelve Member States.   
 
After two reports on reciprocity, the Commission stated in the report of 2007: 
 
Although no tangible progress has been achieved with the USA on visa 
reciprocity, the Commission is encouraged that the USA had committed itself to 
reforming its VWP and has effectively done so.80  
 
And indeed, on 3 April 2007 President BUSH signed into law the “H.R. 1 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007”. Section 711 
of this Act covers: 
 
- the Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) system for which a fee may be 
charged; 
- flexibility on the non-immigrant visa refusal rate by waiving the 3% rate up to 
10% under certain conditions or using a maximum overstay rate, still to be 
determined; 
- setting up a biometric air exit system, that can verify the departure of no less 
than 97% of foreign nationals that exit through US airports; 
                                                        
79 COM (2006) 568 final, Brussels, 3 October 2006, op. cit., p.13. 
80 COM (2007) 533 final, Brussels, 13 September 2007, op.cit., p. 11. 
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- the eligibility of travelling to the USA under the VWP is not a determination 
that the person is admissible to the USA; 
- reporting lost and stolen passports either through Interpol or other means; 
- third countries should accept the repatriation of any citizen, former citizen or 
national against whom a final executable order of removal is issued, and 
- bilateral agreements on passenger information exchange.  
 
The proposed law was considered an important step by the Commission and the 
Member States, as some of the amended criteria (e.g. non-immigrant visa refusal rate) 
could allow some of the Member States subject to visa requirements to join the VWP. 
However, this positive development was to be followed by another US initiative 
which upset the balance that had been achieved between the Community and its 
Member States in the field of visa policy.  
 
4. A Challenge to the System – the case of the USA 
By 2008, the revised reciprocity mechanism had already been operational for three 
years. In this period, the Commission enjoyed an unchallenged role as ‘main 
negotiator’ and interlocutor between the Member States and third states who 
subjected them to visa requirements. While the Member States still had to conduct 
some bilateral technical consultations and to ensure the implementation of measures 
to meet the criteria of the third countries, the role of the Commission and more 
importantly the exclusive character of the Community competence in the field were 
not challenged. Such a situation also led to the negotiations of the first Community 
agreement on visa-waiver reciprocity with Brazil and to the conclusion of several 
other agreements between the European Community and third states on short-stay 
visa-waiver. The European Parliament also stressed that: 
 
the Community's competence in visa matters must ensure equal treatment for all 
EU citizens, not only in the granting or refusal of visa-free status per se, but also 
when it comes to the terms and conditions under which such status is granted to, 
or withheld from, different member States by third countries.81 
 
                                                        
81 See Motion for a resolution pursuant to Rule 108 (5) of the Rules of Procedure on the debate of the 
23rd of April: "Negotiations between the European Union and the United States with regard to visa 
exemptions (Visa Waiver), B6-0000/2008, 8 May 2008. 
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Against this background, on 30 January 2008 the US authorities gave the Commission 
two draft Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) which the US intended to sign 
respectively with Visa Waiver Program (VWP) candidate countries and those 
countries already in the VWP.82 The draft MoU contained several elements of EC 
responsibility, e.g. the Electronic System for Travel Authorisation (ESTA), enhanced 
standards for travel documents and the provision of information generated by 
Schengen rules. 
 
The MoU are a type of non-binding agreement between the Ministry of the Interior of 
the respective country and the Department of Homeland Security of the USA. The 
general commitments under the MoU include the waiver of the three percent visa 
refusal rate requirement, on the side of the USA, in exchange for the implementation 
of security commitments on the side of the Member State concerned. These security 
commitments include: measures related to the American Electronic Travel 
Authorisation (ETA) System, information exchange (including PNR), reporting of 
lost and stolen passports, repatriation, enhanced standards for travel documents, 
airport security and air marshals. Clearly some of the above issues fall under 
Community competence. As to the effects of the MoU, it is clearly stated that it is not 
intended to be legally binding. 
 
With the enactment of Section 711 on “Secure Travel and Counterterrorism 
Partnership Act of 2007”83 on 3 August 2007, the USA reformed their visa waiver 
regime by adding seven security enhancements84 so that all the Member States 
                                                        
82 Fourth Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on certain third 
countries' maintenance of visa requirements in breach of the principle of reciprocity in accordance with 
Article 1(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt 
from that requirement, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 as regards the reciprocity 
mechanism, COM (2008) 486 final/2, Brussels, 9 September 2008. 
83 The "Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11" is accessible at: 
http://www.ise.gov/docs/nsis/Implementing911_Act.pdf. The Section 711 should be cited as the 
"Secure Travel and Counterterrorism Partnership Act of 2007". Signed into law on August 3rd by the 
US President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070803-1.html.  
84 Four of them are mandatory such as: (1) an Electronic System Travel Authorization System (ESTA) 
system; (2) more robust security data sharing efforts; (3) requirements for timely reporting of blank as 
well as issued lost and stolen passports; and (4) guarantees that VWP countries accept the repatriation 
of their nationals ordered removed from the United States. There are also three discretionary enhanced 
security factors to be taken into consideration when determining whether the 3% visa denial rate 
requirement can be waived: (1) airport security standards; (2) air marshals programs; and (3) standards 
for national travel documents. 
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wishing to be part of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) should agree to sign a bilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and its binding "implementing rules". 
However, some of the new "security enhancements" fall under: 
 
- Community competence (such as the one on visa delivery or the ESTA); 
- EU competence (such as stolen passports,85 PNR data or Schengen crime- 
related data); 
- the remaining reinforcements fall under the exclusive competence of each 
Member State (such as those linked to the criminal records of its own 
nationals or those providing for the presence of air marshals on transatlantic 
flights). 
 
On 27 February 2008, the Czech Republic became the first Member State to sign such 
a Memorandum.86 In the ensuing storm87 as to whether the Czech Republic could 
actually do this or not, the Commission took the view that as the general context of 
the discussion was the agreement on a visa waiver programme, the Commission 
should negotiate these alone. Member States, meeting at the level of Ambassadors, 
were of a different view. To avoid further disagreement, the Mixed Committee agreed 
on a common approach for the purpose of discussion on the issue.88 In essence, an 
annex to the document tries to set the delimitation line of the Community and the 
Member States’ competence in the context of the MoU.  
                                                        
85 See Common Position 2005/69/JHA on exchanging certain data with INTERPOL, O.J. 2005, L 27, 
p. 61 
86 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic and the 
Department of Homeland Security of the USA regarding the US Visa Waiver Program and related 
enhanced security measures, 27 February 2008. For first draft text, see  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/mar/us-czech-mou-visas-etc.pdf. 
87 For a chronology of events see the reports of Agence Europe : 08/02/2008: EU/JHA: Washington 
could soon scrap visa requirements for Greek, Czechs and Estonians (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9598); 
11/02/2008: EU/JHA: Washington’s new security demands puts EU in quandary (Bulletin Quotidien 
Europe 9599); 27 February 2008: EU/JHA: Ministers at JHA Council will try to stand united against 
American security demands (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9611); 28 February 2008: EU/JHA: EU 
momentarily renounces battle against Czech Republic over UIS security demands (Bulletin Quotidien 
Europe 9612); 06 March 2008: EU/JHA: EU establishes common line of defence to face Washington’s 
security demands (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9617); 07 March 2008: EU/JHA: Commission to present 
negotiation mandate on American visa waiver programme this Tuesday (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 
9618); 11 March 2008: EU/JHA: EU to try to persuade United States to negotiate visa exemptions with 
it (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9620); 11 March 2008: EU/JHA: Commission determined that EU law 
will be upheld in visa discussions with Washington (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9620); 12 March 2008: 
EU/JHA: EU and US ready to undo visa regime (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9621); 13 March 2008: 
EU/JHA: EU and US to continue discussions on visa system (Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9622).  
88 Council doc. 7338/08, Brussels, 5 March 2008. 
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On 12 March 2008, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) agreed 
to pursue a twin track approach:  
 
In order to enable the designation of all EU Member States in the US VWP, there 
was common agreement that Member States may initiate or develop bilateral 
commitments with the USA. In this context, it is being understood that EC law 
will be respected and that the Commission will be kept fully informed. The EC 
track to be negotiated by the Commission will follow the common approach 
agreed on 5 March 2008.89 
 
The common approach of 5 March 2008 stated clearly that: “Common Visa Policy is 
a matter of Community competence.”90 Furthermore, the obligation of the Member 
States to respect the principle of solidarity in accordance with Article 10 (2) EC 
Treaty was also recalled. The common approach accepted that:  
 
the aim of the Community, with regard to the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 
is to have all EU Member States participating as quickly as possible in order to 
ensure full reciprocal visa free travel and equal treatment for all our citizens. 
 
The Ambassadors of the Mixed Committee acknowledged that the new US VWP 
legislation and its implementation had the potential to impact on several other matters 
which the US connects with the participation in the VWP but which fall within the 
competence of EC/EU, and on which the EC/EU may already have adopted internal 
legislation or concluded agreements with the USA, in respect of which the Member 
States are therefore constrained as regards their freedom to act. It was agreed that the 
EU and its Member States take a common approach for the purpose of discussions 
with the US in relation to the VWP and its implementation. Meanwhile, this common 
approach also gives guidelines to the Member States which they have to respect in 
their contacts with the US on these matters. The guidelines are interesting insofar as 
they delimit the line between the EC and Member State competence in several fields 
contained in the MoU, but not directly linked to visa policy.91 
                                                        
89 COM (2008) 486 final/2, Brussels, 9 September 2008, p. 8. 
90 A reference to the non participation of the United Kingdom and Ireland was made. Also, as a 
reference for the Community competence was included Article 1(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001, op.cit., listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (O.J. 2001, L 81, 
p. 1) as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 851/2005 as regards the reciprocity mechanism (O.J. 
2005, L 141, p. 3). 
91 The guidelines read: 
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A statement to follow such a twin-track approach was made during the EU-US Justice 
and Home Affairs Ministerial Troika meeting on 12-13 March 2008:  
 
Those matters that fall within national responsibilities will be discussed with 
national authorities while those that fall within EU responsibility will be 
discussed with EU authorities. 92  
 
The European Parliament also welcomed the fact that:  
 
for the first time the US have recognized the Community's competence to 
negotiate international visa agreements during the JHA Ministerial Troika on 13 
March 2008 by agreeing in a joint statement to follow a "twin-track" approach.93  
 
The Parliament’s understanding is that under such a statement, the US should from 
now on negotiate: 
 
- with the Commission visa matters, as they did for air transport (see Open 
Skies agreement) 
                                                                                                                                                               
"a. Regarding passenger record data, the recently signed EU-US PNR Agreement should suffice and no 
additional requirements should be added as compared with that Agreement 
b. No commitments as to access for the US to EU/EC data bases or information systems. 
c. Concerning the exchange of data on lost and stolen passports, Common Position 2005/69/JHA on 
exchanging certain data with Interpol should be sufficient. Any extension of reporting data to Interpol 
should be agreed commonly by the EU. 
d. Airport security in accordance with ICAO standards is sufficiently guaranteed by existing EC rules 
(US inspections might be agreed to, if there are direct flights between those airports and the US). 
e. Participation in the VWP should eventually create the same rights for all citizens of EU member 
States as regards the status of their passports. 
f. It may be recognized as a principle of international law that a State should take back its own citizens 
and permanent residents expelled by the US. Any formal agreement on this would only be acceptable 
on the basis of reciprocity, to be negotiated and concluded between the EC and the US. 
g. Information sharing with the US of PNR data obtained from third countries should be consistent with 
the EU/US PNR agreement; 
h. The issue of allowing US Air Marshals onboard US air vessels landing in, or departing from 
Member States falls under the competence of each Member State. 
i. The possibility for the EC/EU to impose obligations on Member States which they will have to 
comply with (including obligations relating to the possible introduction of electronic system for travel 
authorisation for US citizens travelling to the EU) should be recognized.", Council doc. 7338, Brussels, 
5 March 2008. 
92 See European Parliament, Motion for a resolution pursuant to Rule 108(5) of the Rules of Procedure 
by Gérard Deprez on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the 
debate of 23 April: “Negotiations between the European Union and the United States with regard to 
visa exemptions (Visa Waiver)”, B6-0000/2008, 8 May 2008. 
93 See EP resolution, op. cit.  
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- with the Council on the EU policies on security related matters (PNR 
agreement or EU-US Agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance); 
and 
- with the Member States on the presence of air marshals on transatlantic flights 
and on the security related issues concerning their own nationals. 
 
As regards the EC-US track of this twin approach, on 18 April 2008, the Council 
adopted a mandate for the Commission to negotiate an agreement between the 
European Community and the USA regarding certain conditions for access to the US 
VWP in accordance with Section 711 of the “Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007,”94 while at the same time adopting the ‘red lines’ that 
the Member States shall respect in their dialogue with the US before the conclusion of 
the EC/US negotiations. In line with this mandate, the Commission drafted an EC-US 
agreement, endorsed by the Member States. The purpose of this agreement was to 
record satisfaction of US legal requirements which fall under EC competence for 
entry or continued participation in the VWP. This draft agreement served as the basis 
for the negotiations on the EC track. The European Parliament endorsed the Council 
mandate given to the Commission to negotiate an agreement with the US. Especially 
the fact that the mandate stipulated that: 
  
the agreement should contain a clause whereby, from its entry into force, its 
provisions shall take precedence over the provisions of any bilateral agreements 
or arrangements concluded between individual Member States and the USA, 
insofar, as the provisions of those bilateral agreements and arrangements cover 
issues dealt with by this agreement.95  
 
Of particular importance to the US authorities within the EC track is the issue of 
information exchange. However, the Commission and the Member States do not 
                                                        
94 The recommendation from the Commission on this issue was made on 11 March 2008, but it is not 
considered public document, together with the mandate adopted by the Council. The document number 
is known but not the text. See Council doc. 7512/08, Recommendation from the Commission to the 
Council to authorise the Commission to open negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement with the 
United States of America regarding certain conditions for access to the United States' visa waiver 
program in accordance with section 711 of the "Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007. However, a version of the document can be found on Statewatch, see: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/apr/us-germany-terr-data-sharing.pdf.  
95 Council doc. 8089, Draft Council Decision authorising the Commission to open negotiations for the 
conclusion of an agreement between the European Community and the United States of America 
regarding certain conditions for access to the United States' Visa Waiver Program in accordance with 
Section 711 of the “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007”, Brussels, 
14 April 2008. 
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consider it possible to exchange information from EU databases (e.g. Eurodac and 
SIS) with third countries due to legal constraints. Nevertheless, the Commission is 
committed to exploring further the possibilities for information sharing with in 
parallel the US authorities. In the view of the Commission, the parts of the US legal 
requirement which fall under EC responsibility include repatriation, enhanced travel 
documents and airport security.96  
 
As part of the EC track, the Commission also needs to assess whether the travel 
authorization under the ESTA is tantamount to a visa requirement or not. On 9 June 
2008, the Interim Final Rule for the ESTA was published in the Federal Register. The 
Commission will provide its preliminary assessment on the basis of this Interim Final 
Rule as to whether the ESTA is tantamount to the Schengen visa application process 
as defined in the Common Consular Instructions or not, together with an analysis of 
the implications of ESTA for the protection of personal data.  
 
As regards bilateral arrangements, seven Member States had signed (by September 
2008) a MoU with the USA: the Czech Republic on 27 February 2008, Estonia97 and 
Latvia98 on 12 March 2008, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia on 17 March 2008, and 
Malta on 11 April 2008. Furthermore, Bulgaria signed an interim declaration 
outlining the security requirements of the VWP with the USA on 17 June 2008. 
Moreover, in order to improve the cooperation in combating terrorism, including 
cooperation between intelligence communities in sharing information regarding 
terrorist threats, the US is clearly seeking bilateral agreements with other Member 
States as well. For instance, Germany signed an agreement on enhanced cooperation 
in preventing and combating serious crime on 11 March 200899 and Hungary signed 
on 20 May 2008 an agreement with the USA on the exchange of screening 
information concerning known or suspected terrorists. 
 
                                                        
96 See letter from Vice-President BARROT sent to Secretary CHERTOFF on 25 June 2008. 
97 See for full text: http://www.siseministeerium.ee/public/MEMORANDUM_ENG.doc.  
98 See full text: http://www.am.gov.lv/data/file/memorands-eng-13-03-2008.doc.  
99 For details see, US Department of Justice, “United States and Germany Agree to Share Fingerprint 
Databases and Information on Known and Suspected Terrorists”, 11 March 2008, available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/apr/us-germany-terr-data-sharing.pdf. 
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As the negotiations dragged on with no concrete outcome in sight the Commission 
took the ultimate step and threatened to propose retaliatory measures, in the 
conclusions to its Fourth report on reciprocity from 9 September 2008, notably a 
temporary restoration of the visa requirement for US nationals holding diplomatic and 
service/official passports, as from 1 January 2009, unless additional EU Member 
States had been brought into the VWP by the end of 2008.  
 
This brought about an almost immediate reaction: on 17 November 2008 six new 
Member States were brought into the VWP: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia.  These were also the countries which had signed the 
MoU.  It is thus not clear what role the pressure from the Commission had played in 
this context.  It is likely that the thread by the Commission to impose sanctions on the 
US accelerated the US decision to put these countries into the VWP.  Moreover, the 
common guidelines mentioned above might have helped Member States in their 
negotiations with the US on the MoUs on issue such as data exchange.  However, the 
fact that the conclusion of an MoU remained a necessary condition for participation in 
the VWP also shows the limits of reciprocity: a powerful third country which 
perceives important (and sometimes vital security) interests at stake cannot be forced 
by the EU to treat citizens from all Member States the same way. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Reciprocity became an important issue only when it was combined with the principle 
of solidarity. But in principle reciprocity was an immediate corollary of the 
Communitarization of visa policy. De facto the field developed very dynamically only 
after the 2004 enlargement because until then reciprocity did not prove to be 
particularly problematic. The Member States which could have triggered the pre-2004 
mechanism chose not to do so. 
 
The situation changed radically with the 2004 enlargement, which brought a huge 
increase in cases of non-reciprocity. Moreover, shortly after 2004 the reciprocity 
mechanism was changed from being a combination of voluntary notification coupled 
with automatic retaliatory measures by the EC, to a combination of mandatory 
notification, which, however, no longer needs to lead automatically to retaliatory 
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measures by the EC. The reason was that the strict (pre-2004) application of the 
principle of reciprocity would have led to serious political problems.  
 
Given the nature of the issue there is a need to present a united EU front to the rest of 
the world if the application of reciprocity as a political tool to extract concessions 
from a third country is to work. This line of argument was used to create an additional 
exclusive competence of the Community (to conclude visa-waiver agreements) 
through the principle of pre-emption.   
 
Up until the US case the Commission had been negotiating relatively straightforward 
visa-waiver agreements with some other countries (six small island states and later 
Brazil). However, this did not work in the case of the US. 
 
The exercise of this competence was thus challenged by the US, which for national 
security reasons was not willing to treat citizens from all Member States equally. The 
US was willing to apply its rules and standards equally to all Member States, but it 
judged that some did not meet their (US) standards. What was the reaction of the EU 
to this hurdle? The new Member States were willing to use the Commission to 
negotiate de facto on their behalf. The Commission naturally defended their position 
and the exclusive character of the competence. Given the political difficulties that a 
strict application of reciprocity would have created (i.e. a clash with the US) Member 
States agreed on a compromise; the ‘twin-track approach’ under which the 
Commission negotiated certain aspects and Member States the remainder. From a 
strictly legal point of view this approach seems to be correct. However, in practice it 
seems to have defeated the purpose of the reciprocity mechanism. 
 
The most important lesson100 to be drawn from the clash with the US, however, is that 
clearly the rest of the world does not automatically recognize any internal transfer of 
sovereignty. The external recognition of this internal transfer must be earned through 
diplomatic means.  
                                                        
100 A further lesson from the conflict over the exclusive competence of the EU caused by the behaviour 
of the US was that it challenged the EU to act on another aspect of reciprocity: namely to develop its 
own criteria for visa-free travel that should be as transparent and objective as those of its biggest 
partner, the US. 
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CHAPTER 10 – VISA LIST(S), CRITERIA AND ROAD MAPS 
 
The list of countries whose citizens need visas to enter the national territory of the 
Schengen area constitutes the central element of visa policy. Agreement on a common 
list1 was reached early on in the process of Europeanization of visa policy because it 
was seen as a necessary ‘flanking’ measure of the abolition of internal border 
controls. This transfer of sovereignty was difficult at first, but in the end agreement on 
the black list proved relatively easy on the basis of the general rule that the common 
black list was essentially the intersection of the national black lists. Cases of special 
relationships where individual Member States had a particular interest in maintaining 
visa-free travel with an important partner were taken care of through a variety of ad 
hoc measures involving different legal forms. 
 
For acceding states the loss of sovereignty came generally even before (full) 
membership, partially already during the negotiations, when they had to adopt the 
EU’s black list and partially by the time of their accession, when they had to take over 
the Schengen acquis.  
 
This chapter therefore analyzes the transfer of sovereignty from the other side, i.e. the 
non-EU states, including those that have become members over the last years (mainly 
Bulgaria and Romania), those that are on a membership track (Western Balkan 
countries and Turkey), those covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
and the rest of the world.   
 
The chapter starts with a brief analysis of what criteria, if any, are used to establish 
the list of countries whose citizens need a visa to enter the Schengen space. These 
criteria then define the steps that partner countries have to undertake to be taken off 
the black list.  
 
                                                        
1 But as discussed in chapter 3 the first Schengen list itself was not published for some time; no 
information was given on how it had been put together. 
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The last chapter looked at what happens when the visa list of the EU meets that of its 
partners. It demonstrated that some partner countries, suc as the USA, have objective 
criteria for visa-free travel enshrined in their national legislation. Other countries, 
such as Canada, have criteria similar in substance but not explicitly fixed in a legal 
form. In fact in both cases, the reciprocity dialogue between these countries and the 
EU induced them to rethink and clarify their own criteria, and in both cases detailed 
‘road maps’ were developed for each individual EU country wishing to be accorded 
visa-waiver status.  
 
This raises the question of whether the criteria of the EU are as transparent, detailed 
and objective as the EU’s own partners expect them to be – which will be another 
theme dealt with in this chapter. While the EU is clearly establishing a political link 
there is no indication that it is moving towards establishing a (conditional) 
fundamental right to travel. Instead, the position of the EU remains that visa-free 
travel constitutes a favour that can be granted or refused ad libitum (or rather solely in 
function of the EU’s own interests). 
  
Section one analyzes the criteria identified by Regulation 539/2001 (Visa Regulation) 
for the allocation of countries to either the white or black visa lists respectively. 
Section two provides an overview of the adjustments of the lists so far (transfers from 
the white to the black list and vice versa). Section three analyzes those cases in which 
the adjustment was the result of a detailed assessment, namely the cases of Bulgaria, 
Romania and the Western Balkans. Section four analyzes the impact of the EU’s visa 
list on its new neighbours. Section five looks at the specific case of Turkey in the light 
of the Soysal judgment of the ECJ. Section six concludes with some considerations 
about the concept of a “visa liberalization” road map. 
 
1. Criteria for the composition of visa lists in the EU 
The EU (or rather Schengen) visa lists are now fixed by a Council Regulation 
“determining the third country whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement”,2 referred to hereafter as the Visa Regulation.3 
                                                        
2 O.J. 2001, L 81/1. 
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This Visa Regulation exhaustively harmonizes the visa requirements of the Member 
States4 by including all third countries and entities on either the black list, (whose 
nationals are required to have visas when entering Schengen territory), or a white list 
(whose nationals are exempt from this requirement).5 The resulting black list is 
widely considered as extremely restrictive6 as it contains 131 countries (and the 
Schengen white list thus contains 36 countries and territories).7 
 
However, one has to admit that the US is even more restrictive since it currently has 
only 35 countries on their visa-waiver programme.8 Of these more than half are EU 
Member States, implying that only less than twenty countries outside Europe benefit 
from visa free travel to the US. Within Europe, the UK appears the more liberal as it 
requires visas from the citizens of 110 countries.9 The UK’s black list corresponds to 
the common list agreed under the Maastricht rules10 and also includes the 
Commonwealth countries, which previously benefited from visa exemption under the 
1995 Visa Regulation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
3 When the need arises to refer to the regulations adopted earlier, they will be referred to as 1995 Visa 
Regulation and 1999 Visa Regulation. 
4 The Visa Regulation applies to all EU Member States with the exception of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland. It also applies to Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.  
5 The legal texts always refer to the visa lists (plural) although there is only one list that matters, 
namely the black list since the countries not on the black list are automatically on the white list as the 
two lists must be exhaustive. This can be clearly deduced from the text of Article 62 (2)(b) EC. 
6 A. MELONI, Visa Policy within the European Union Structure, Springer, (Berlin, 2006) p. 100, E. 
GUILD, “Moving the Borders of Europe”, Inaugural lecture, University of Nijmegen, (2001), p. 33-37; 
and BEAUDU, “La politique européenne des visas de court séjour”, Cultures & Conflicts, n. 50, vol. 2, 
(2003), pp. 5-30. 
7 As of June 2009.  
8 US State Department, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html.  
9 Information for the situation in June 2009, UK Border Agency, available at 
http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/doineedvisa/visadatvnationals.  
10 See Council Regulation No 2317/95 (O.J. 1995, L 234) and Council Regulation No 574/1999 (O.J. 
1999, L 72). 
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Table 10.1. The evolution of the European black list 










territories on the 
visa black list 






Source: Own compilation. 
 
The criteria used to determine whether a country should be on the black or on the 
white list are outlined in the preamble of the Visa Regulation. These are said to relate 
to “illegal immigration, public policy and security and to the Union’s external 
relations with third countries, consideration also being given to the implications of 
regional coherence and reciprocity”.11 The comparison of the evolution of the criteria 
summarized in Table 10.2 shows a certain persistence of the main themes (migration, 
public order and foreign policy considerations).  
 
Table 10.2. Evolution of criteria for determining the countries on the visa black list 
Period of validity Criteria for determining the countries on the visa black list 
Prior to 1995 1. Threat of an unacceptable level of immigrants from that state.  
2. Risk to internal security from nationals of that State. 
3. Political – visa restrictions are imposed as a matter of reprisal 
or in the context of deteriorating bilateral relations. 
4. Reciprocity which itself imposes visa restrictions.12 
Schengen (1995 to 1999) Not disclosed 
Regulations under Maastricht 
(1995 to 2001) 
1. Political and economic situation 
 
2. Relationships with the Community and its Members 
Visa Regulation (from 2001 
onwards) 
1. Illegal immigration 
2. Public policy 
3. International relations 
Additional Regional coherence and reciprocity 
Source: own compilation. 
 
What has changed with respect to the past is that the criteria are now much more 
clearly spelled out. The Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum to its original 
proposal13 considered each of these criteria in turn:14 
                                                        
11 Recital 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders 
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2001, L 81, pp. 1–7. 
12 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-1994) Visas and Control of 
External Borders of the Member States, 14th Report, para 106-108. 
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To determine whether nationals of a third country are subject to the visa 
requirement or exempted from it, regard should be had to a set of criteria that can 
be grouped under three main headings: 
 
- illegal immigration: the visas rules constitute an essential instrument for 
controlling migratory flows. Here, reference can be made to a number of relevant 
sources of statistical information and indicators to assess the risk of illegal 
migratory flows (such as information and/or statistics on illegal residence, cases 
of refusal of admission to the territory, expulsion measures, and clandestine 
immigration and labour networks), to assess the reliability of travel documents 
issued by the relevant third country and to consider the impact of readmission 
agreements with those countries; 
 
- public policy: conclusions reached in the policy cooperation context among 
others may highlight specific salient features of certain types of crime. Depending 
on the seriousness, regularity, and territorial extent of the relevant forms of crime, 
imposing the visa requirement could be a possible response worth considering. 
Threats to public order may in some cases be so serious as even to jeopardize 
domestic security in one or more Member States. If the visa requirement was 
imposed in a show of solidarity by the other Member States, this could again be 
an appropriate response; 
 
- international relations: the option for or against imposing the visa requirement in 
respect of a given third country can be a means of underlining the type of 
relations which the Union is intending to establish or maintain with it. But the 
Union’s relations with a single country in isolation are rarely at stake here. Most 
commonly it is the relationship with a group of countries, and the option in favour 
of a given visa regime also has implications in terms of regional coherence. The 
choice of visa regime can also reflect the specific position of a Member State in 
relation to a third country, to which the other Member States adhere in a spirit of 
solidarity. The reciprocity criterion applied by States individually and separately 
in the traditional form of relations under public international law, now has to be 
used by reason of the constraints of the Union’s external relations with third 
countries.  
 
Given the extreme diversity of situations in third countries and their relations with the 
European Union and the Member States, the criteria set out here cannot be applied 
automatically by means of coefficients fixed in advance. They must be seen as 
decision-making instruments to be used flexibly and pragmatically, being weighted 
variably on a case-by- case basis. 
 
The different criteria mentioned above are now examined in more detail: 
                                                                                                                                                               
13 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those 
whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, COM (2000) 27 final, Brussels, 26 January 2000. 
14 A detailed analysis of the criteria is provided in E.  GUILD, “Moving the Borders of Europe”, 
Inaugural lecture, University of Nijmegen, (2001), p. 33-37; and BEAUDU, “La politique européenne 
des visas de court séjour”, Cultures & Conflicts, n. 50, vol. 2, (2003), pp. 5-30. 
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1.1. Illegal immigration 
The perceived threat of illegal immigration was reported to be an important factor 
also at the national level15 and was also present in the regulations adopted under 
Maastricht. However, the present Visa Regulation does much to delve further in 
trying to develop objective and measurable criteria. Moreover, for the first time in the 
history of visa regulations, the role of visas as an “essential instrument for controlling 
migratory flows”, is explicitly confirmed, thus completing the metamorphosis from a 
foreign policy tool to a migration policy tool; a metamorphosis that was initiated by 
the start of intergovernmental cooperation among the Ministries of Interior in the mid-
1980s. 
 
The evaluation of whether a country presents a risk of illegal immigration is 
performed on the basis of three elements: assessment of statistical information; 
assessment of the reliability of the travel documents issued by that country and 
assessment of the impact of readmission agreements. 
 
(i) Assessment of statistical information 
The Explanatory Memorandum seems to suggest that the assessment of the risk of 
illegal immigration can be made based on some objective statistical data. It even 
enumerates several possible sources and types of data to be used. Those include 
information and statistics on illegal residence, cases of refusal of admission to the 
territory,16 expulsion measures, clandestine immigration and labour networks and 
finally the apprehension of illegal immigrants and the applications for regularization 
within the context of national regularization programmes.17  
 
                                                        
15 See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-1994) Visas and Control 
of External Borders of the Member States, 14th Report. 
16 This criterion resembles one of the conditions used by the USA for the lifting of visa requirements, 
namely that the consulates in the country concerned should have a visa refusal rate below 3%. 
17 The latter two criteria, although not present in the Explanatory Memorandum, were used as grounds 
for the introduction of visa requirements for citizens of Ecuador in one of the modifications of the Visa 
Regulation. 
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The objective set out in the Explanatory Memorandum is clearly the objective 
assessment of the threat of illegal immigration based on objective indicators such as 
statistics. But it provides no indication as to what is the acceptable level of this risk. In 
other words, there is no determination of where the border line lies between 
acceptable and excessive illegal immigration. Obviously, it is impossible to envision a 
situation where there is not one single illegal immigrant from a particular country. 
Thus, once the data based on the above criteria is obtained, it is not clear what the 
threshold is after which the need for visa requirements arises. Would the number of 
illegal immigrants be calculated as a percentage of the population of their country of 
origin, or in absolute terms on the territory of the EU Member States; on the territory 
of the whole Union or on the territory of an individual state; is it enough to have a 
significant number of illegal immigrants in one country or in the majority of the 
countries of the Union?  Unfortunately, the only two cases under the Visa Regulation 
where two countries were added to the visa black list do not provide a clear answer. 
What seems to be a possible answer is that the evaluation is performed at the national 
level and each Member State makes its own assessment of whether a country 
constitutes a risk or not.18 A country is thus de facto put on the black list if at least 
some member countries consider that it does not satisfy this criterion. 
 
The second problem is linked to the possibility to collect the type of data identified by 
the Commission. Some of it seems quite straightforward and a system for its 
calculation exists, e.g. refusal rates, expulsion measures, and apprehension and 
regularization data, although the latter can only represent a fraction of the real cases. 
At the same time, the statistics on illegal residence, clandestine immigration and 
labour networks are by nature imprecise and the way in which they are collected at 
the national level varies greatly. 
 
MELONI identifies as a possible positive development in this field several initiatives 
aimed at the harmonization of the criteria for collection and analysis of this type of 
information,19 which could add a European dimension. Despite the potential 
usefulness of such a development, it is difficult to see how exactly such initiatives 
                                                        
18 In the case of inclusion of Ecuador on the visa black list, four countries have mentioned it in their 
response to the questionnaire sent by the Commission. 
19 MELONI, op. cit., p. 101. 
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could support the objectivity of the decisions taken. The creation of various 
coordination groups and observatories will play a role in providing a Europe-wide 
pool of information on migration and can possibly also lower the cost of producing 
the statistics in the Member States themselves but, ultimately, the assessment of the 
illegal immigration risk will be always performed at the national level and will 
correspond more to the specific perception in each country rather than the objective 
Europe-wide risk. 
 
GUILD puts forward an interesting idea as to the effect of the criteria on illegal 
immigration on the triangle of actors – EU, state of origin and individual.20 She 
considers this particular criterion (illegal migration) to be linked to the behaviour of 
the individual as such, and not of their state of origin. In this perspective it would 
appear logical to look at visa policy from the perspective of individual who might 
acquire a (conditional) right to (visa free) travel.  This would change visa policy from 
an interstate matter to one with the individual as legal subject.  However, there is no 
sign of this happening so far.  In this sense there is a fundamental difference between 
the internal legal order of the EU, which accords rights to individuals (free 
movement) and the legal order of the EU’s external relations, which does not. 
 
It remains true, however, that by establishing a link between the EU’s policy and the 
individual, the Union penetrates the sovereign sphere of the state of origin. The cases 
of Bulgaria and Romania, which are discussed later in this chapter, provide an 
illustration of this view; and of the fact that there is very little a democratic state can 
do to control emigration towards areas of higher economic development.21  
 
(ii) Reliability of travel documents 
Although the Commission did not elaborate further on this criterion, the practice of its 
implementation22 shows that what is meant generally is that a country should have 
passports with a sufficient level of protection in order to avoid forgery on a massive 
                                                        
20 GUILD, op. cit., p.34. 
21 What is not acknowledged in this view is the fact that while the state of origin cannot control 
outwards migratory movements, it can still influence the root causes of the phenomenon and thus 
decrease the incentives for migration. 
22 Especially in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania. 
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scale, which in turn can fuel further illegal migration flows. It still remains to be seen 
whether, following the US example, the Commission will extend the meaning of 
“reliability” to include certain technical aspects, e.g. machine readability of the 
passports and certain bio-metric elements. If such a move is taken, this will further 
enforce the security aspects of a visa and will involve further interference in the 
domestic legal order of a country wishing to be removed from the visa black list. It is 
difficult to determine whether improving technical aspects of the reliability of travel 
documents has strong benefits in terms of the official aim of visa policy.  One could 
argue, however, that fighting crime is made much easier if individuals can be reliably 
indentified.  
 
(iii) Assessment of the impact of readmission agreements 
As has been stated on several occasions, the impact of the few existing Community 
readmission agreements23 is difficult to assess and, based on the experience of the 
Dublin convention, will most probably be negligible.24 The bilateral readmission 
agreements, amounting to some 20-30 per Member State, have had a substantial 
impact, however.25 
 
Apart from the concrete numbers, the readmission agreements also carry a substantial 
symbolic weight. Even if they are not effectively enforced, they signal to societies the 
possibility of enforcement and thus are meant, purely psychologically, to counter 
migration fears among the Member States. The readmission agreements represent a 
kind of insurance policy that in case of problems with illegal immigration, there are 
always legal means of redress. 
 
Thus, from the list in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission, we can 
conclude that as far as illegal immigration is concerned, in order not to be on the visa 
black list, a country must meet three conditions: 1) not be the state of origin of a 
significant number of illegal immigrants towards the Member States, 2) have reliable 
                                                        
23 I.e. readmission agreements of the EC with third countries. 
24 For the first comprehensive analysis of the readmission agreements see N. COLEMAN, European 
Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights, Immigration and Asylum Law and 
Policy in Europe Series, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (Leiden, 2009). 
25 See the following title for the number of readmitted nationals of Bulgaria and Romania. 
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passports and 3) have signed a readmission agreement with the Community, or the 
Member States, taking on the obligation to readmit its nationals (and in some cases 
even third country nationals)26 who happened to be illegal immigrants in the Member 
States. 
 
1.2. Public policy 
The criteria linked to public policy can generally be categorized in two groups: those 
linked to crime and those linked to domestic security in general. 
 
On crime, the Commission uses the definitions agreed in the context of police 
cooperation. The judgment as to whether the imposition of visa requirements could be 
considered an appropriate measure is then made on the basis of the seriousness, 
regularity and territorial extent of the relevant forms of crime. The wording used by 
the Commission is quite general and thus open to various interpretations. Meloni, for 
example, seems to accept that a Common European Approach in this field is restricted 
to the objective of combating criminal networks concerned with the smuggling of 
migrants and trafficking in human beings, and terrorism.27 The importance of these 
particular types of crimes can further be supported by the legislative measures deemed 
important by the Commission when proposing the removal of Bulgaria and Romania 
from the visa black list. 
 
The second element of the public policy condition relates to threats to public order 
and simultaneously introduces the concept of solidarity in this field. Thus, in the 
presence of a threat to domestic security of such magnitude as to jeopardize domestic 
security in one of the Member States, visa requirements can be imposed. At the same 
time, the rest of the Member States are supposed to support such an action in the spirit 
of solidarity, despite the fact that their domestic security is not threatened and that 
their concept of threat might differ from that applied by the state concerned. 
 
                                                        
26 More detailed analysis of the readmission agreements is provided in Chapter 6 of the present work. 
27 She bases this view on the Comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration, para 82-85. 
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Thus, as far as public policy criteria is concerned, in order not to be on the visa black 
list, a country and its nationals should not be considered a source of serious crime or a 
threat to public order, according to the definitions of police cooperation. 
 
1.3. International relations 
The conditions linked to international relations only come third on the list of 
considerations for the visa status of third countries. This is one more example of the 
major shift in visa policy that occurred in the mid-1980s. While initially visas were a 
typical foreign policy tool, and their imposition or lifting were an expression of the 
foreign policy of the country concerned, now this type of consideration is 
overshadowed and replaced by the migration tool function of the visa – control of 
illegal immigration and crime. 
 
As regards international relations, there are three main principles worth considering: 
the principle of regional coherence, the reciprocity principle and the solidarity 
principle. 
 
First of all, “foreign policy considerations of the Union and the Member States” are 
taken into account when adopting rules on short-term visas, and in particular on visa 
lists. This is explicitly stated in the Declaration on Article 62(2)(b) EC to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam.28 However, under the principle of solidarity it is possible that the visa 
regime reflects the specific position of a Member State in relation to a third country 
and the other Member States adhere to it. However, reaching an agreement as to 
whose special relationship should have priority over others' migration fears for 
example, is a complicated exercise. The experience of the drafting of the visa lists 
shows that when in doubt and facing a disagreement, the Member States tended to put 
the disputed country on the visa black list rather than on the white list. Thus, the UK 
preferred not to participate in this policy field when it was not able to convince the 
other Member States to put the Commonwealth countries on the white list. 
                                                        
28 Declaration No 16, which is attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam, and states that “the Conference 
agrees that foreign policy considerations of the Union and the Member States shall be taken into 
account in the application of Article 62 (2)(b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community”. To 
recall that, Article 62 (2)(b) EC was the legal basis for EC visa policy.  
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Unfortunately, this option is not available to the new Member States, so they might 
need to rely on the solidarity principle enshrined in the Explanatory Memorandum. 
 
The second element introduced by the Explanatory Memorandum in the field of 
international relations was the principle of regional coherence. There is no detailed 
explanation linked to that statement, other than that the decisions will not be taken 
merely on the basis of individual assessment but will consider regional coherence. 
Obviously, this argument was used in the proposal for the removal of Bulgaria and 
Romania from the negative visa list, as well as in the case of the Western Balkan 
countries. However, it will be interesting to study how this “regional coherence” 
criterion in visa policy plays into the various agreements signed with different groups 
of countries. This question will be answered further in this study. 
 
The final element linked to international relations is the classic one of visa 
requirements, namely reciprocity. On the positive side, one could assume that the fact 
that a country does not impose visa requirements on citizens of the Member States 
should be a consideration for the removal of a country from the visa black list. This 
was at least the case for Bulgaria and Romania and was also explicitly mentioned in 
the case of all Western Balkan countries, even those for which the removal from the 
negative visa list was postponed. However, this is only a necessary, not a sufficient 
condition since there are a number of countries on the visa black list which have 
unilaterally removed visa requirements as a show of good faith (e.g. Ukraine). All 
these countries hope for a reciprocal gesture from the Union. 
 
Chapter 9 provides a more detailed account of cases of the negative application of the 
reciprocity principle, namely those in which one or more of the Member States are 
subject to visa requirements by a third country. Initially, under the Regulation, if a 
country on the white list imposed visa requirements on nationals of a Member State, 
all Member States had to introduce visa requirements on nationals of such a third 
country, as a provisional measure, after the Member State on whose nationals visa 
requirements were imposed had notified the Council and the Commission.29 This 
                                                        
29 Article 1(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2001, L 81, pp. 1–7. 
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reciprocity mechanism was reviewed by the Commission.30 The review was prompted 
by the fact that the United States maintained visa requirements on Greek nationals, 
but Greece never triggered the “solidarity mechanism”, which would have caused the 
whole Community to introduce visa requirements for US nationals. This problem was 
exacerbated after the accession of the new Member States, some of which were also 
subject to visa requirements by the United States. 
 
Thus, based on the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum, we can conclude that 
there are several criteria that a country should meet in order to be placed on the white 
visa list. The country should not be a source of illegal immigration or crime, should 
have reliable passports and should sign readmission agreements with the Community 
or the Member States. In addition, it is preferable that the country does not require 
visas from citizens of the Member States, belongs to a block of countries with which 
the Union has an extended relationship and/or has special links to one or more of the 
Member States. 
 
But how were these elements applied in practice, and what does this practice tell us 
about the actual meaning of the criteria?  This will be discussed below, looking both 
at cases of removals and additions to the black list. 
 
2. Adjusting the lists 
With the adoption of the 2001 Visa Regulation,31 the first one adopted under the rules 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, began a process of modifications in the common list of the 
1999 Visa Regulation. Major changes in the countries included respectively on the 
white or black list were introduced in 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
                                                        
30 Article 2 of Regulation 453/2003 Council Regulation (EC) No 453/2003 of 6 March 2003 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, O.J. 
2003, L 69, pp. 10–11.  
31 The different visa list regulations discussed here are respectively: 
‘1999 Visa Regulation’ which is Council Regulation (EC) No 574/1999 of 12 March 1999 determining 
the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of 
the Member States, O.J. 1999, L 72/2; and ‘2001 Visa Regulation’ which is Council Regulation (EC) 
No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, 
O.J. 2001, L 81/1. Subsequent amendments to the latter regulation are referred to as “the 2003 
amendment” and “the 2006 amendment”. 
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Table 10.3. Changes to the visa lists 2001-2009 
Year Legal basis White to black list Black to white list 
2001 Council Regulation 
539/2001 
35 countries that were not on the list 
of Council Regulation 574/1999 but 
were on the Schengen black list, 
among which: 
- 26 Commonwealth countries32 
- 5 micro nation islands in the 
Pacific33 and  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Colombia  
and the entities  






2003 Council Regulation 
453/2003 
Ecuador  
2006 Council Regulation 
1932/2006 
Bolivia 
British citizens34 who are not 
nationals of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
for the purposes of Community law: 
- British overseas territories citizens 
who do not have the right to abode 
in the United Kingdom 
- British overseas citizens 
- British subjects who do not have 
the right to abode in the United 
Kingdom 
- British protected persons 




Saint Kiits and Nevis 
Seychelles 
British citizens who are 
not nationals of the 
United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland for the 









* only for holders of 
biometric passport 
 
The way in which the criteria analyzed in the previous section are applied in each of 
the above mentioned cases will be studied in three groups: countries moved from the 
white to the black list and countries moved from the black to the white list. The 
special cases of Bulgaria, Romania and the Western Balkans will be studied in section 
3. These are of special interest as prior to the removal of those countries from the visa 
                                                        
32 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Nauru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe (at the time Zimbabwe was still a member of the Commonwealth). 
33 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Northern Marianas, Palau, Western Samoa. 
34 The case of the British citizens who are not nationals of the UK for the purposes of Community law 
will not be studied, as it is more a reflection of the special qualities of the individual rather than country 
specific issues. 
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black list, the Commission prepared detailed reports (Bulgaria and Romania) or 
roadmaps (the countries of the Western Balkans) listing the measures these countries 
took and evaluating them against the criteria. No such reports were prepared in the 
other cases of transfer from the black to the white list, or at least their existence is not 
public and no similar supporting material is mentioned in the Explanatory 
Memoranda to the Commission proposals.  
 
2.1. From white to black list 
The changes of 2001 are the most dramatic as 35 third countries that were not on the 
black list of the 1999 Visa Regulation, found themselves in a need of visa. The only 
explanation provided by the Commission is: “following the integration of the 
Schengen acquis into the Community framework and the criteria mentioned above”. 
Of the 35 countries concerned, the majority (26) are members of the 
Commonwealth and their inclusion in the list reflects the non-participation of the UK 
in the EC visa policy. The UK was still involved in the adoption of the 1999 Visa 
Regulation, including the list of countries requiring visas, but did not participate in the 
adoption of the 2001 Visa Regulation.35 
 
Of the remaining countries moved to the black list, only the case of Colombia 
triggered political tensions due to the special relations of this country with Spain. 
Colombia was the only country on which the Schengen states had not reached an 
agreement by the time the Schengen acquis was incorporated into the European Union 
legal order.36 However, there is no way to judge which criteria were used for placing 
it on the black list, unless there is a Commission report that sheds more light on the 
issue; and such a report was not produced in the case of Colombia. The 2001 Visa 
Regulation does not have a requirement to justify the treatment of each country 
separately37 and the Council typically does not publish its proceedings. After a heated 
discussion in the Council, Spain abstained from voting on the 2001 Visa Regulation, a 
document widely criticized in Latin America. Apparently, the Commission did not 
provide any official justification on this proposal. There is no justification in the 
                                                        
35 See Chapter 5 for more details.  
36 The following countries required visas for Colombia at that moment in time: Benelux, France, 
Greece and Portugal. 
37 GUILD, op. cit., p. 38. 
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Explanatory Memorandum, or in any other document. The Colombian consulates in 
the Member States were not provided with any explanation as to the reasons for 
inclusion of their country on the visa black list. It is suggested that the reason was 
because of the risk of illegal immigration and crime in the form of drugs.38 
 
The 2003 amendment to the 2001 Visa Regulation provided for the inclusion of 
Ecuador in the EU visa black list. The second case of transfer of a country from the 
white to the black list occurred through an amendment in the Visa Regulation in 
2003.39 The review of the 2001 Visa Regulation was not a result of specific 
complaints about Ecuador, but of a general review of the black and white lists. The 
review was mandated by the Seville European Council of 21-22 June 2002, which 
urged the Council and the Commission to accord high priority to the issue and review 
the lists by the end of 2002 in the context of the Union’s fight against illegal 
immigration.40  
 
The way the Commission proceeded to gather the information necessary for 
reviewing the visa lists was to send a questionnaire to the Member States (including 
the United Kingdom and Ireland for information only) asking for a fresh evaluation of 
third countries in the light of the criteria for the determination of the visa lists. 
Evaluation of the replies led to the proposal to include Ecuador on the black list. Only 
four Member States requested the inclusion of Ecuador on the black list on the 
grounds that recent regularization programmes had shown that a large number of 
Ecuadorian nationals were illegally present on their territories, and because of 
political and public order considerations.41 
 
The Commission confirmed that each Member State was in a position to evaluate the 
visa requirements perceived as necessary on a national level, as long as the general 
criteria outlined in the Visa Regulation were respected. 
 
                                                        
38 Migration News Sheet, April 2001, p.3, cited in GUILD, op. cit. 
39 Council Regulation 453/2003, op. cit. 
40 Seville European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, 21-22 June 2002, para 30.  
41 MELONI, op. cit., p. 106. 
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A date was also prescribed by which the Member States had to bring the visa 
requirements for nationals of Ecuador into effect.42 This appeared necessary in the 
light of past experiences: Spain implemented the visa requirements for nationals of 
Colombia six months after Regulation 539/2001 had entered into force. In this 
context, the Commission underlined that a correct and timely implementation of 
amendments of the black list by all Member States was essential for the common visa 
policy’s success as an instrument to combat illegal immigration.43 
 
The 2006 amendment of the 2001 Visa Regulation added one more Latin-American 
country to the EU visa black list - Bolivia. Based on the information received by the 
Member States,44 the Commission reached a three-fold assessment. Firstly, in line 
with the first criteria “illegal immigration” the Commission concluded that “there is 
persistent and intense migratory pressure from Bolivia”. This conclusion was reached 
on the basis of the large number of refoulements at the external borders and 
expulsions from several Member States. Secondly, as far as the criteria “public 
policy” is concerned, the Commission noted that the detention orders and convictions 
of Bolivians for criminal offences and illegal immigration were also rising. The third 
factor was the fact that nationals of Latin American countries subject to the visa 
requirement were seeking to circumvent the requirement by fraudulently acquiring a 
Bolivian passport.   
 
Based on these findings but without elaborating further on the concrete finding (at 
least not in the publicly available documents), the Commission declared that it 
believes that “there are good grounds, in view of the criteria in recital 5 to Regulation 
539/2001, for proposing the imposition of visa requirements to Bolivia”. Similarly to 
the 2003 amending regulation, the 2006 amending regulation also fixes the date on 
which the visa requirement for Bolivian nationals will come into effect 
                                                        
42 Article 3 (2) of Council Regulation 453/2003, op. cit.  
43 Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament on a common policy 
on illegal immigration [COM(2001) 672 final, Brussels, 15 November 2001. 
44 The procedure repeated the procedure of the previous review. The Commission has gathered the 
information by approaching directly the Member States and checking whether the annexes as they 
stand still correspond to the criteria determined by the 2001 Visa Regulation. Then the Commission 
cross-checked the information received by the Member States against other information and statistics 
supplied under the CIREFI (Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of 
Frontiers and Immigration). See p. 2 of the Commission Proposal for the 2006 amendment, COM 
(2006) 84 final, Brussels, 13 July 2006. 
  416
(approximately six months after the entry into force of the regulation). This time, 
however, the reasons adduced include the need to give some member States time to 
denounce their bilateral agreements with Bolivia.45 
 
2.2. From black to white list 
 
Apart from Bulgaria and Romania, in 2001 there are two more countries (or rather 
territories) moved from the black to the white visa list – Hong Kong and Macao 
(while China remained in the visa black list). The objective was to reflect the “one 
country, two systems” approach, as well as the Commission’s assessment of the two 
entities in relation to the various criteria set.  
 
Thus, the Commission took into account the stable economic and legal situation and 
the satisfactory provisions relating to immigration, border controls and security of 
travel and identity documents in these two territories by proposing a visa exemption 
for holders of passports issued by the Hong Kong and Macao SARs (Special 
Administrative Regions).46 
 
The other big move from the black to the white visa list took place in 2006 and 
involved a group of six countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Seychelles) which had been on the visa list 
only since 2001. No special report is cited in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Commission proposal but two groups of justification are outlined. The first is linked 
to the criteria of recital 5 of the 2001 Visa Regulation. The Commission concludes 
that the imposition of the visa requirements for those states is no longer justified on 
several grounds: statistics or other information confirming that the countries do not 
represent a risk in terms of illegal immigration and public policy, regional coherence 
                                                        
45 Possibly these are visa exemption agreements, but no further information is provided. 
46 See p.10 of the initial proposal of the Commission, Commission of the European Communities, 
Proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, 
COM (2000) 27 final, Brussels, 26 January 2000 and p. 5 of the amended proposal, Commission of the 
European Communities, Amended proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals 
are exempt from that requirement, COM (2000) 577 final/2, Brussels, 01 October 2000. 
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and the Union’s international relations. In addition to this assessment, the 
Commission also looked at the visa policy of Ireland, the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland, which apparently had drawn similar conclusions regarding illegal 
immigration and public policy criteria.   
 
Thus the Commission proposed the move of these six countries from the back to the 
white list. However, the visa exemption was to apply not as from the date of the entry 
into force of the 2006 amending regulation but as from the date of entry of a visa 
exemption agreement with these countries aimed at ensuring reciprocity and the 
benefit of the visa exemption for nationals of all Member States. After three years of 
negotiations, the Council adopted a Decision on the signing and provisional 
application of the six agreements, on 30 March 2009. 
 
3. Applying the criteria in practice: Bulgaria, Romania and the Western 
Balkans 
3.1. The case of Bulgaria and Romania 
Bulgaria and Romania were the first two countries to be removed from the visa black 
list (after its full communitarization in 2001) and for which there exists abundant 
material on the reasons for the decision in the form of public reports drafted by the 
Commission.47 Therefore, they represent cases of special interest. The Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Commission enumerates and comments the set of measures 
deemed essential for the removal of a country from the visa black list. This set of 
measures was also used for other countries and became a de facto ‘road map’ towards 
visa liberalization. The generalization of this approach will be discussed in more 
detail below.  
 
The objective here is to identify the potential elements of such a road map and to link 
them to the criteria previously identified by the Commission. In order to do this, a 
detailed analysis of the two reports will first be offered, followed by some reflections 
on the disadvantages of some elements of the approach taken by the EU. 
                                                        
47 In 2001 Hong Kong and Macao were also moved from the black to the white visa list. However, as 
mentioned above, in these cases the Commission did not make any analysis of the reasons but simply 
stated that this action is in response to “the legal situation and the provisions relating to immigration, 
border controls and security of travel and identity documents”. 
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3.1.1. 1995: The imposition of visa requirements 
Following a unanimous decision in September 1995 by the Justice and Interior Affairs 
Ministers of the European Union, the citizens of two candidate countries, Bulgaria 
and Romania, were subjected to visa requirements when wishing to enter the Union. 
The main factors that influenced the decision were security and illegal immigration 
but they were documented in detail.48 However, while defending the decision, the 
European Commission and Council representatives underlined that the position of the 
two countries could be changed following positive developments in their security 
conditions. Some idea of what those security conditions might be became clear in 
March 1996, at the joint meeting between the EU Justice/Internal Affairs Council and 
the Justice and Interior Ministers of the associated countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. According to the Bulgarian Minister of Interior at the time, what was 
recommended in a report by the European Commission envoy to ten of the associated 
countries was: “tightened border controls, streamlined immigration policy and 
interdiction of the traffic in stolen cars, guns and strategic raw materials and of illegal 
emigration”.49  
 
The decision placed Bulgaria and Romania in a particularly unusual situation in 
relation to the other accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe, which 
remained on the white list. Over the next six years the European Union demanded 
substantial concessions only from Bulgaria and Romania on a wide variety of issues 
relating to borders and movement of persons as the price for removing the visa 
requirement.50 
 
                                                        
48 “European Dialogue”, Politics and Current Affairs, January-February 1996. 
49 “Bulgaria’s Position on the visa black list meets understanding”, Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 2 
March 1996, available at http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-03/mar22.bta.  
50 E. GUILD, op. cit., p. 38. 
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3.1.2. 2000/2001: lifting of visa requirements 
On 1 December 2000,51 the Justice and Home Affairs Council reached a political 
agreement on the Commission’s proposal for a “Council Regulation listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders, and those whose nationals are exempt from this requirement.” The agreement 
also included the removal of Bulgaria and Romania from the visa black list. However, 
while Bulgaria was included unconditionally on the white list (following a report by 
the Commission), for Romanian nationals the visa exemption was to come into force 
at a later date to be decided by the Council, following reports by the Commission 
setting out the information Romania was prepared to give in relation to illegal 
immigration and residence, including arrangements for repatriation.52 The 
Commission submitted three reports in total, related to the measures taken by 
Bulgaria and Romania (one report on Bulgaria53 and two reports on Romania).54  
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2001 Visa Regulation, the Commission 
identified two reasons for its Proposal to remove the two countries from the visa black 
list. These were: 
 
- in recent years, both have paid special attention to a number of matters that 
are particularly important for the visa rules (e.g. border controls, security of 
travel documents, new readmission agreements and a review of existing 
agreements) and have achieved what can be regarded as generally satisfactory 
progress, albeit at different rates; 
 
- the enlargement process is now entering a decisive phase since the Helsinki 
European Council on 10 and 11 December 1999, and acting on a Commission 
recommendation, has decided to open negotiations with, among others, Bulgaria 
and Romania. This new situation which reflects the qualitative leap forward in 
the relations between Bulgaria and Romania and the European Union, is a new 
factor in terms of international relations.55 
                                                        
51 The Commission Proposal was submitted on 26 January 2000. 
52 Art. 8 (2) of Council Regulation No 539/2001, op. cit. 
53 Report from the Commission to the Council regarding Bulgaria in the perspective of the adoption of 
the regulation determining the list of third countries whose nationals must be in a possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt of that requirement 
COM(2001) 61 final, 02 February 2001. 
54 Intermediate report on visa issues (Romania), COM(2001) 61 final of 2 February 2001 and Report 
from the Commission to the Council, “Exemption of Romanian Citizens from Visa Requirements”, 
COM (2001) 361 final of 29 June 2001. 
55 Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Regulation listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals 
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The Commission also states that in this proposal it follows the recommendation by the 
European Parliament (Resolution of November 199556 and Legislative Resolution of 
February 1999 in the context of re-consultation on the Visa Regulation).57 
 
The justification offered by the Commission attaches equal importance to both the 
measures adopted by the two countries and the development in the status of the 
countries themselves in their relations with the EU. Both these elements are studied 
separately for the two countries in an annex to this chapter. The fact that both 
elements have equal weighting is in contrast to the criteria offered in the 2000 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission, which clearly puts less emphasis on 
international relations. This shows that for the EU foreign policy is generally of 
secondary importance unless the country concerned has a clear membership 
perspective. The case of the Western Balkan countries, which were moved to the 
white list in 2009, confirms this pattern.  
 
3.1.3. The key role of the membership perspective 
As was demonstrated above, sometimes the candidate countries for membership were 
faced with accommodating conflicting demands on the side of EU. One key conflict 
was between the adoption of a restrictive migration policy and human rights 
protection. However, other areas of conflict can also be identified. One of them was 
the conflict between stricter border controls and minority rights protection across the 
border (as already discussed for the case of Greece in Chapter 6.)  
 
In assessing the concessions that Bulgaria and Romania were willing to make with 
their sovereign rights and policies, one should not forget their status as candidate 
countries. Especially after the decision in 1999 on the start of membership 
negotiations, there were a number of measures which the countries needed to adopt as 
part of the process of the adoption of the acquis.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
are exempt from that requirement, COM (2000) 27 final, Brussels, 26 January 2000, O.J. 2000, C 
177E, pp. 66–69. 
56 In which the Parliament opposed the imposing of visa requirements on Bulgaria and Romania 
57 What the Commission refers to is the 1999 Visa Regulation. 
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For example, in the case of Bulgaria, within the EU accession negotiations process 
Bulgaria submitted Negotiation Position on Chapter 24 “Co-operation in the fields of 
Justice and Home Affairs”58 on 20 February 2001 and opened negotiations on 1 July 
2001. Bulgaria accepted the acquis in full under Chapter 24 and did not consider it 
necessary to request any derogations and transitional periods in the field of JHA. 
Bulgaria presented its Schengen Action Plan59 to the European Union in November 
2001.   
 
Thus, the effect of the efforts toward the removal from the visa black list was simply 
the earlier adoption of some of the measures – aligning the visa lists, border controls, 
readmission agreements, measures on asylum and immigration. In these particular 
fields it is even possible that Bulgaria and Romania, despite their delay in the 
accession process, were effectively front-runners in the application of the acquis.  
 
3.1.4. Elements of a road map? 
On the basis of the experience of Bulgaria and Romania, it would seem that the 
following elements could constitute a ‘road map’ to the removal from the visa black 
lists: 
 
1. Unilateral abolition of visas for citizens of the European Union; 
2. Signing of readmission agreements with the Community;  
3. Alignment of visa policy, especially the black visa list; 
4. Changes in the legal regulation of migration policy. 
5. Improving the quality of the passports; 
6. Strengthening border controls. 
 
But did the Commission indeed use such road maps as a form of visa conditionality 
resembling the accession conditionality? Indeed, in the relations with the Western 
Balkan countries, such road maps were developed with very precise benchmarks, 
possibly leading to visa liberalization or at least to its political feasibility. 
 
                                                        
58 Negotiation Position of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Chapter 24 “Justice and 
Home Affairs”, CONF-BG 9/01, 20 February 2001. 
59 Action Plan for the Adoption of the Schengen Acquis, CONF-BG 73/01, 21 November 2001. The 
Plan is updated annually and the latest version is available on the website of the Ministry of Interior 
(www.mvr.bg).  
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3.2. The case of the Western Balkans60 
 
In the case of the Western Balkans the issue of short-term visas had a clear political 
framework. The conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki 
on 21 June 2003 confirmed that the perspective of visa liberalization for the Western 
Balkan countries was a goal linked to the progress of the countries concerned in 
implementing major reforms in areas such as the strengthening of the rule of law; 
combating organized crime; corruption and illegal migration and the strengthening of 
their administrative capacity in border control and security of documents. This 
political commitment was followed by the negotiations and conclusion in 2007 of visa 
facilitation agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Montenegro 
and Serbia and simultaneously of readmission agreements, which, in the words of the 
Commission61 put in place “clear rules for combating illegal immigration”.  
 
The tool used by the Commission for its final assessment is called “visa liberalization 
dialogue”. In order to set up the methodology of the process, the following elements 
were taken into consideration: 
- the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries 
- the political commitment made on the liberalization of short-term visas,  
- the conclusion by all five countries of a Community readmission agreement 
- the visa exemption granted to all EU citizens by the countries concerned.  
The Commission further outlined the process in its Communication on enhancing the 
European perspective for the Western Balkan countries of 5 March 200862 and noted 
                                                        
60 For an overview of the problems with visas of the Western Balkan countries, see International Crisis 
Group, “EU Visas and the Western Balkans”, Europe Report, n. 168, (2005); BALDWIN-EDWARDS, 
“Visa policies in South Eastern Europe: a hindrance or a stepping stone to European integration?”, East 
West Institute Policy Brief, November, (2006); and TRAUNER, “EU Justice and Home Affairs Strategy 
in the Western Balkans: Conflicting Objectives in the Pre-Accession Strategy”, CEPS Working 
Document, n. 259, (2007).  
61 See Explanatory memorandum of the Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 
No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing 
the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, COM (2009) 366 
final, Brussels, 15.7.2009 
62 COM (2008) 127, 5.3.2008 
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again that “moving towards a visa-free regime is, for all the countries of the region, 
part of their preparations for EU membership”. 
Following the launch of the visa dialogues63 with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in early 2008, the European Commission 
formulated close to 50 requirements that it wanted the countries to meet in order to 
qualify for visa-free travel. These are listed in the so-called ‘visa road maps’. Serbia 
was the first country to receive its road map on 7 May 2008, and Bosnia the last on 5 
June 2008. 
 
Roadmaps for each of the five countries concerned were established by the 
Commission in agreement with the Member States and in consultation with the 
respective country. The objective was for the roadmaps to identify all the measures to 
be adopted and implemented by each of the Western Balkan countries and to set out 
clear requirements to be achieved. The roadmaps were divided into four sets of issues: 
document security; illegal immigration; public order and security and external 
relations items linked to the movement of persons. 
 
The visa road maps are almost identical, but they take into account the specific 
situation in each country, in terms of existing legislation and practice. The conditions 
range from purely technical matters, such as the issuance of machine-readable 
passports with a gradual introduction of biometric data (including fingerprints), to the 
adoption and implementation of a raft of laws and international conventions, to very 
broad matters such as progress in the fight against organized crime, corruption and 
illegal migration. Most of the requirements are part of the acquis on Justice and Home 
Affairs, which candidate countries have to implement before they can accede to the 
EU. However, there are a few additional conditions, mainly concerning human rights 
issues and the visa facilitation and readmission agreement.64 
 
The visa road maps are divided into two parts: requirements related to the 
implementation of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements; and requirements 
                                                        
63 See for example RAPID, “EU Commission Vice-President Franco Frattini in Tirana to launch visa 
free travel dialogue with Albania”, EU press release, 6 March 2008, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/398&guiLanguage=en.  
64 For details on the visa facilitation agreements, see Chapter 8. 
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on document security, illegal migration, public order and security and external 
relations. The second part loosely follows the issues that 2001 Visa Regulation 
mentions in its recital (5): 
 
The determination of those third countries whose nationals are subject to the visa 
requirement, and those exempt from it, is governed by a considered, case-by-case 
assessment of a variety of criteria relating inter alia to illegal immigration, public 
policy and security, and to the European Union's external relations with third 
countries, consideration also being given to the implications of regional 
coherence and reciprocity. 
 
The Western Balkan countries concerned submitted their “readiness reports” in the 
autumn of 2008. They were followed by a Commission assessment. A second round 
of exchange of information took place in the spring of 2009 and the Commission 
presented its final assessment in May 2009. The Commission assessment allows the 
evaluation of the extent to which the countries have achieved the benchmarks of the 
road map and, respectively, the criteria for a visa-free regime.  
 
On the basis of the assessment reports presented to the Western Balkan countries in 
June 2009, the Commission concluded that FYROM had met all the benchmarks set 
out in the road map. For two countries, Montenegro and Serbia, important progress 
had also been achieved with only a limited number of benchmarks remaining open,65 
while for two other countries, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the 
considerable progress made, a series of benchmarks were still open. 
 
When the Commission made its legislative proposal for the amendment of the Visa 
List Regulation (Council Regulation 539/2001) and the transfer of FYROM, 
Montenegro and Serbia from the negative to the positive list, it confirmed that the 
proposal reflected the outcome of the process of visa liberalization dialogue and took 
                                                        
65 Those included in the case of Montenegro – effective implementation of the Law on foreigners, in 
force since January 2009, the definition of sustainable solution regarding the status of displaced 
persons and internally displaced persons, including access to identity documents and the strengthening 
of capacities in the area of law enforcement and the effective implementation of the legal framework 
for the fight against organized crime and corruption, including through allocation of adequate financial, 
human and technical resources. For Serbia, the remaining benchmarks included: the improvement of 
cross-border/boundary surveillance, which includes in particular the exchange of information with 
EULEX/Kosovo police; the effective implementation of the Law on Foreigners in force since April 
2009 and the adoption of the Migration Management Strategy; the effective implementation of the 
legal framework for the fight against organised crime and corruption, including through allocation of 
adequate financial and human resources; the integrity and security of the procedures followed in 
issuing new biometric passports to persons residing in Kosovo. See COM (2009) 366, op.cit. 
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into account, on the one hand, that the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements 
with the countries concerned were implemented in a satisfactory way and, on the 
other hand, the respective visa and entry refusal rates for their citizens. The 
Commission thus introduced new criteria into its assessment which were not 
explicitly mentioned among those of recital 5 of Council Regulation 539/2001 - 
criteria that resembled those used by USA and Canada when determining the visa 
status of a country.   
 
Moreover, the visa liberation liberalization to the above mentioned three countries is 
in a way limited by a technical requirement, as the visa waiver applies only to those 
citizens holding the new biometric passports issued by each of these states. 
 
When the Commission submitted its official proposal in the summer of 2009, it used 
the “road map process,” thereby possibly creating a precedent that was applicable not 
only to EU candidate countries but also to other countries from the EU 
neighbourhood. Therefore, the next section will explore the actual position of the 
various neighbours of the EC in relation to these criteria. 
 
4. The visa list and the new neighbours 
The main groups of countries which could feel adverse effects upon accession have 
already been identified. They can be divided into three main groups: candidates for 
membership or in the process of becoming candidates (Croatia, Turkey, countries of 
the Western Balkans); countries on the eastern external border of the Union (Ukraine, 
Moldova, Belarus and Russia) and countries on the southern external border of the 
Union (South Mediterranean countries). 
4.1. Current visa status of the neighbours 
All neighbouring countries of the EU, with the exception of one, Croatia, were subject 
to visa requirements until December 2009. Croatia avoided being put on the visa 
black list during the Balkan wars of the 1990s mainly due to its close relations with 
Italy and Germany. Three other Balkan countries were taken off the black list as of 
December 2009: Serbia, FYROM and Montenegro.   
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The group of candidate states and those in the process of becoming candidates have a 
clear perspective of joining the Union, even if the prospective accession dates might 
be in the distant future. They either negotiate (as Croatia and Turkey), are party to 
Stabilization and Association Agreements or are in a process of negotiating such an 
agreement. Thus, as part of the obligations they need to undertake on the way to 
accession, several measures are linked to the conditions for visa-free status, e.g. 
alignment of visa policy; readmission agreements; strengthening of border controls 
and changes in the national migration policy. Such requirements place these countries 
in a position similar to that of Bulgaria and Romania at the time of their removal from 
the visa black list. 
 
The second group of countries includes all other European countries and is quite 
diverse. One subgroup includes Ukraine, Moldova and possibly Georgia, which have 
stated their intention to pursue the goal of membership but so far have not obtained a 
concrete and positive reaction from the EU. However, these countries are already 
members of the Council of Europe and can thus be considered as sharing the basic 
values on which the European Union is built. Thus, if they need to apply some of the 
measures identified as necessary for the removal from the visa black list, one would 
consider that it should not be particularly difficult.  
 
Russia is a special case and is the only country that insists on having a special 
relationship with the Union, outside of the general framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy to which the remaining countries belong. However, such 
cooperation could include aspects related to visa policy, especially considering the 
special status of Kaliningrad.  As for Belarus, at the present time it is difficult to 
imagine any positive development.   
 
The third group of countries consists of the southern Mediterranean, countries which 
also form part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, are seen mainly as partners 
without any perspective or expressed wish for EU membership. With some of them, 
such as Morocco, there is a long history of association agreements; however those 
have never included any provisions related to visas. Moreover, not being party to the 
Council of Europe, their incentive to adopt specific legislative measures with a link to 
possible removal from the visa black list is significantly smaller. Their position has 
  427
also not changed substantially as a result of the enlargement process, as the latest 
enlargement was mainly towards the east.  
4.2. Demands for visa-free travel 
Most of the countries mentioned above have expressed their dissatisfaction at the 
political level at being on the visa black list; some are more explicit than others but at 
almost every bilateral or multilateral meeting between the EU and the countries 
concerned, the issue of visas is raised. Usually the demands are two-fold; as a first 
option a removal of the country from the visa black list is demanded; as an alternative, 
demands about the facilitation of travel of certain groups of persons is requested. 
 
Nowhere is this approach more visible than in the case of the first group of countries 
(Western Balkans, Croatia and Turkey). Aside from the official statement and request 
on a governmental level, the issue of visas has found its place in a report by an 
independent International Commission on the Balkans, chaired by Giuliano Amato. 
This report66 recommends a two-track approach. On one level, the report advocates 
that: “the EU should announce that the four Western Balkan countries will be exempt 
from visa requirements once they have met specific conditions”. At a second level the 
Balkans Commission proposes a preferential regime for certain social groups. Special 
attention is paid to students, possibly through a special Balkan Student Visa 
Programme, especially in light of the finding by the Balkans Commission that 70% of 
the students in Serbia have never travelled abroad. 
4.3. What does the EU offer? 
What is the response of the EU to these demands? Despite the fact that the 
Commission has the competence to propose modifications to the visa black list, it has 
stated on several occasions that this is not considered a realistic option at the 
moment.67 Instead the Commission prefers to concentrate on relatively marginal 
policy tools, the most significant of which is “visa facilitation,”68 which is analyzed in 
detail in Chapter 8. 
                                                        
66 International Commission on the Balkans, “The Balkans in Europe’s Future”, (2005), p.34, available 
at www.balkan-commission.org 
67 Commission Communication on a common policy on illegal immigration, COM(2001) 672 final, 15 
November 2001, para 4.1.1; and The Hague Programme. 
68 Others include initiatives for facilitation of local border traffic. 
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4.4. The role of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
One should not forget that some of these developments now occur in the framework 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The original Commission Communication69 
stated as one of its aims the inclusion of the neighbours in the internal market, 
including the free movement of persons. The Commission stated that:  
Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should 
be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further 
integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, 
services and capital (four freedoms).70 
 
Among the eight measures contained in the Communication with regard to free 
movement of persons, three deal with short-stay visas: facilitating the movement of 
citizens of neighbouring countries participating in EU programmes and activities; 
visa-free access to holders of diplomatic and service passports and ultimately the 
wider application of visa free regimes. 
 
These measures are further translated into the Action Plans for specific countries, 
where the covered field is defined as “visas for short stay”.71 
 
Table 10.4. Specific Action on Visa Facilitation and Readmission in ENP Action Plan 
Country ENP Action Plan Specific action on visa facilitation in ENP Action Plan 
Algeria No  
Armenia Yes “exchange views on visa issues” 
Azerbaijan  “exchange views on visa issues” 
Belarus No  
Egypt Yes “Cooperate in the field of improving the movement of 
persons, including to facilitate the uniform visa issuing 
procedures for certain agreed categories of persons” 
Georgia Yes “exchange information on visa issues” 
Israel Yes No short-stay visa requirements 
Jordan Yes “In order to facilitate the circulation of persons, 
examine… possibilities of facilitation visa issuing 
(simplified and accelerated procedures in conformity with 
the acquis)” 
                                                        
69 Commission Communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New framework for Relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, COM (2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003. 
70 Ibid., p.4. 
71 For an analysis on the provisions of the Action Plans see TRAUNER AND KRUSE, “EC Visa 
Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the 
Neighbourhood”, CEPS Working Documents, n. 290, (2008), available at 
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1646.  
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Lebanon Yes “Cooperate on facilitating the movement of persons…in 
particular examining the scope for facilitating visa 
procedures for short stay for some categories of persons” 
Libya No  
Moldova Yes “Initiate a dialogue on the possibilities of visa 
facilitation” 
Morocco Yes “constructive dialogue…including examination of visa 
facilitation” 
Palestinian authority Yes No specific action 
Syria No  
Tunisia Yes “facilitating the movement of persons…by looking in 
particular at possibilities of relaxing short-stay visa 
formalities for certain categories of persons” 
Ukraine  “establish constructive dialogue on visa facilitation” 
Source: Trauner and Kruse, “EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: 
Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the Neighbourhood”, CEPS Working 
Document, n. 290, (2008). 
 
The table shows that concrete actions in this field differ from country to country, 
despite the fact that in principle, each neighbouring state is equal in that all are 
eligible to conclude an EC visa facilitation (and readmission agreement). The clauses 
used for the domain of visas are rather general, such as “establishing constructive 
dialogue” or “exchange views”. The factors taken into account for the decision to 
open negotiations are outlines in the “Common approach on visa facilitation”72 of 
December 2005 stating: 
 
The EC should take account of the following factors inter alia in deciding 
whether to open negotiations on visa facilitation with third countries: whether a 
readmission agreement is in place or under active negotiations; external relations 
objectives; implementation record of existing bilateral agreements and progress 
on related issues in the area of justice, freedom and security (e.g. border 
management, document security, migration and asylum, fight against terrorism, 
according to the standard counterterrorism clause agreed by COREPER on 6 
March 2002, organized crime and corruption); and security concerns, migratory 
movements and the impact of the visa facilitation agreement.73 
 
Based on the above criteria, the Commission suggested that three countries in 
particular meet these pre-conditions: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 
 
                                                        
72 See Chapter 8 for a detailed analysis. 
73 Cited in the European Commission Non-paper, “Expanding on the Proposals contained in the 
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on ‘Strengthening the ENP’, COM (2006) 
726 final of 4 December 2006: ENP – Visa Facilitation”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non_papr_visa_facilitation.pdf.  
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Among the countries of the ENP, one can thus distinguish several groups in relation 
to their status on visa policy. A first group includes countries which have visa 
facilitation agreements in force and already started a dialogue with the EU on the 
liberalization of the visa regime. This group includes Ukraine74 and Moldova. From 
the Eastern neighbours which are not part to the ENP, Russia75 is also conducting 
such a dialogue. One should also note that Russia is the only country officially 
negotiating a visa-free regime with the EU on symmetrical terms – EU citizens still 
need visas in order to enter the territory of Russia while other countries holding “visa 
dialogue” including Ukraine unilaterally lifted visa obligations for EU citizens. 
 
A second group includes ENP countries which are in the process of negotiations of 
visa facilitation agreement; in this group fall Georgia76 and potentially Azerbaijan.  
 
Interestingly enough, all the above-mentioned countries form part of the Eastern 
Dimension of the ENP while the Mediterranean countries are underrepresented. 
 
4.5. Beyond the neighbourhood 
The cooperation on visas is also spreading beyond the EU neighbourhood, although 
only in the form of visa facilitation – readmission agreement form. This is occurring 
in the framework of the “global approach on migration’. The Commission is 
elaborating the latter concept through a whole set of new measures on irregular and 
legal migration, focusing in geographic terms on Africa and the Mediterranean region. 
Under the heading “Legal Migration”, the establishment of “mobility packages” with 
a range of interested third countries was recommended: 
 
There is a clear need to better organize the various forms of legal movement between 
the EU and third countries. Mobility packages would provide the overall framework 
                                                        
74 See “Visa Dialogue between Ukraine and EU: Models and Perspectives”, Європейський простір: 
портал проєвропейського громадянського суспільства України  [European space: portal of the pro-
European civil society in Ukraine], 07 April 2009, available at http://eu.prostir.ua/library/233920.html.  
75 The dialogue on visa free regime introduction between Russia and EU was launched during the 
meeting of EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on freedom, security and justice on April 23-24, 
2007 in Moscow when “The Visa Dialogue Procedure to Examine the Conditions for Visa-free Travel 
as a Long Term Perspective” was approved. 
76 RAPID, “Commission recommends the negotiation of Visa Facilitation and Readmission 




for managing such movements and would bring together the possibilities offered by 
the Member States and the European Community, while respecting the division of 
competences as provided by the Treaty.77 
 
This mobility packages, or “migration partnerships”, would then be designed to 
manage legal migration flows with selected third countries, particularly from the 
neighbourhood, provided that they prove willing to cooperate on readmission, 
irregular migration and border management. Facilitated travel is only one element of 
the packages, which also include ideas on promoting circular migration (temporary or 
seasonal migration) and legal migration based on the labour needs of interested EU 
Member States. Inevitably, the negotiations of such agreements will also bring to the 
fore certain problems of competence as their scope encompasses both EC and 
Member State competence. 
 
Thus, the visa facilitation and readmission agreements (which do not mention visa 
liberalization even as a long-term objective), will be only part of a comprehensive 
cooperation on migration issues. However, in exchange for receiving new 
opportunities for legal migration, the third countries concerned will have to agree on 
far-reaching, but probably meaningless commitments including measures “to promote 
productive employment and decent work, and more generally to improve the 
economic and social framework conditions […] as they may contribute to reducing 
the incentives for irregular migration”.78 
 
So far, the approach with regard to visa facilitation has been applied only once in 
relation to the Cape Verde. The Commission was given a mandate to negotiate a visa 
facilitation and readmission agreement with this country in June 2009. 
 
5. Turkey and the effect of prior commitments: The Soysal case 
The case of Turkey has not yet been mentioned. Similarly to the Western Balkan 
states, it is both a neighbour sharing a land border with the EU (since 1980 with 
                                                        
77 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “The Global 
Approach on Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration policy”, COM 
(2006) 735 final, Brussels, 30 November 2006. 
78 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
regions “On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the EU and third countries”, COM 
(2007) 248 final, 16 May 2007, p. 4, cited in TRAUNER AND KRUSE, op. cit. 
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Greece and now also with Bulgaria) and a candidate country for EU membership (for 
even longer than the some of the current EU members). In terms of its visa status, 
Turkey has been on the common visa ‘black’ list since its first drafting in the 
Maastricht era79 and remains there to date.80 However, this situation has recently been 
challenged by the Soysel judgment81 of the European Court of Justice. 
5.1. The case 
The case, a reference for a preliminary ruling from a German administrative court, 
concerns the interpretation of the “standstill clause” of Article 41 (1) of the Additional 
Protocol to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement82. In particular, it raises the 
question of whether this “standstill clause” precludes the visa requirement established 
by the German national law and “Article 1(1) of Regulation No 539/2001 even though 
that visa requirement did not exist when the EC-Turkey Protocol first came into force 
in Germany”. The German court asks whether the “standstill clause” should be 
interpreted to mean that the Turkish nationals in the main proceedings (Turkish 
nationals working for a Turkish undertaking and providing services in Germany) 
should not be required to have a visa to enter Germany.  
The Additional Protocol of 1970,83 in its Article 41 (1) provides that “the contracting 
parties shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services”84. 
The question arose in the context of proceedings brought by two Turkish nationals 
(Mr. Soysal and Mr. Savatli), against Germany in respect of the requirement for 
                                                        
79 Council Regulation 2317/95, op.cit., later replaced by Council Regulation 574/99, op.cit.  
80 Council Regulation 539/2001, op.cit., and its subsequent amendments. 
81 Case C-228/06 Soysal [2009] ECR I-0000. For an analysis in the context of EC immigration law, see 
S. PEERS, “EC immigration law and EC association agreements: fragmentation or integration” 
European Law Review (2009) 34, p. 628-638. For an analysis in the framework of the jurisprudence of 
ECJ on the EC-Turkey Association Agreement, see N. TEZCAN/IDRIZ, “Free movement of persons 
between Turkey and the EU: to move or not to move? The Response of the Judiciary” Common Market 
Law Review 46: 1621-1665, 2009. For an earlier review of the impact of the agreement on migrant 
workers, see E. GUILD, “EC law from migrants’ perspective”, op.cit.  
82 The agreement, also known as the Ankara Agreement, was signed on 23 November 1970 at Brussels 
and concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2760/72 of 19 December 1972, OJ 1977 L 361, p. 600.  
83 OJ 1977 L 361, p. 600. 
84 The Court of Justice has already confirmed that the “standstill clause” has direct effect (see among 
others Case C-37/98 Savas [2000] ECR I-2927, paragraphs 46 to 54 and 71, second indent) and that it 
applies to entry controls 
Case C-16/05 Tum und Dari [2007] ECR I-7415, paragraph 69). 
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Turkish lorry drivers to obtain visas in order to provide services consisting in the 
international transport of goods by road. The case was brought when the German 
authorities refused to issue a visa when these Turkish nationals (working in an 
international transport for a Turkish undertaking) were supposed to drive a lorry 
registered in Germany.   
The ECJ ruled that Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol is to be interpreted as 
meaning that it precludes the introduction, as from the entry into force of that 
protocol, of a requirement that Turkish nationals must have a visa to enter the territory 
of a Member State in order to provide services there on behalf of an undertaking 
established in Turkey, since, on that date, such a visa was not required. 
5.2. Specific issues  
5.2.1. Admissibility 
The German government challenged the admissibility of the case on the grounds that 
the reference is not made by a final court, as required in the field of Title IV EC by 
Article 68(1) EC even though the questions referred concern the validity of a Council 
regulation adopted on the basis of Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty (paragraph 
38).85 
The Court responded that “the wording of the questions referred … shows, in and of 
itself, that the questions concern, explicitly and exclusively, the interpretation of the 
law governing the association between the EEC and Turkey.” (paragraph 40). The 
Court took that position, despite the fact that the Community secondary legislation 
(Council Regulation No 539/2001) was explicitly mentioned in its question by the 
national court. The decision on admissibility is criticized by Peers and its possible 
wider impact is considered in his case note, cited above. 
                                                        
85 The admissibility issue is no longer relevant in this particular field, as under the Lisbon Treaty the 
limitation on lower courts to ask for a preliminary ruling in the field of visas does not exit. 
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5.2.2. The visa requirement 
After reviewing the earlier case law on the “standstill clause”, the Court focused on 
whether national legislation that introduced substantive and/or procedural conditions 
for Turkish nationals wishing to gain access to the territory of a Member State or to a 
professional activity, which were stricter than those that had applied to them in the 
relevant Member State at the time of the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, 
could be considered to be new restrictions within the meaning of Article 41 (1) of that 
protocol (paragraph 50). 
The Court accepted the Commission’s argument that Schengen visas have “certain 
advantages compared with the conditions that applied in Germany, at the time of the 
entry into force of the Additional Protocol in that Member State.” Whereas 
beforehand the right of access was limited only to the German territory, now the 
Schengen visa gives access to the entirety of the Schengen space (paragraph 54).  
Despite this, the Court ruled that national legislation that makes the exercise of the 
right of freedom to provide services conditional upon issuing a visa was liable to 
interfere with the actual exercise of that freedom, particularly because of the 
additional and recurrent administrative and financial burdens involved in obtaining a 
visa, which was valid only for a limited time. In addition, where a visa is denied, the 
exercise of that freedom is prevented entirely (paragraph 55). Thus, the Court 
concluded that legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a 
“new restriction”, within the meaning of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol, of 
the right of Turkish nationals resident in Turkey to freely provide services in 
Germany (paragraph 57). 
5.2.3. The link international agreements-EU secondary law  
The German Court noted in its reasoning for asking the questions that the wording of 
Article 41 (1) of the Additional Protocol, refers to the “Contracting Parties” and thus 
could support the argument that the “standstill clause” in that provision applies not 
only to the rules of the Member States but also to those under secondary Community 
legislation. The ECJ has not yet ruled on the matter (paragraph 36).  
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After finding that legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a 
“new restriction” within the meaning of Article 41 (1) of the Additional Protocol, the 
Court states that this conclusion cannot be called into question by the fact that the 
legislation currently in force in Germany merely implements a provision of secondary 
Community legislation (paragraph 58). To that end, the Court recalls that: “the 
primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of 
secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is 
possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements. 
5.3. Consequences of the judgment 
The judgment is, in principle, clear on the issue of who should benefit from the 
standstill clause and should thus be exempted from visa requirements; namely service 
providers (a group that can further be limited by the application of additional 
conditions, e.g. employed by a Turkish company).  In practice, however, it is not clear 
how this category can be identified. It seems difficult for somebody who appears 
directly at a border crossing point to prove to the border guard that he/she is a service 
provider.86 Moreover, within the EU the rights of service providers have also often 
been applied by analogy to service recipients, for example tourists, patients, etc.87 88 
The geographical scope of the judgment is also clear, in principle: Member States 
which are bound by the Protocol and which on the date it entered into force for them 
did not have visa requirements for Turkey. According to the Commission89only 
Germany and Denmark are in this situation. New Member States are excluded a 
priori, as they had to impose visas prior to accession while the protocol applies to 
them as of the date of accession (see Chapters 2 and 7 for further details on this). 
                                                        
86 The Commission addresses this issue in the Guidelines to border guards, which are being prepared.  
However, these guidelines are not public. 
87 Not surprisingly Turkish scholars argue that everybodyy should benefit from this judgment (see 
TEZCAN/IDRIZ, op. cit. However, this would be warranted only if one could argue that the visa 
requirement is also an obstacle to the free provision of services by German (or in general EU) service 
providers to Turkish citizens coming as tourists.  See also: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/professor-visas-turkish-citizens-spirit-eu-integration/article-
186844.  
88 The Court did not elaborate whether its finding also applies other conditions (fees, support 
documents requested).  
89 Answer to a written question by Commissioner Barrot, see:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2009-3747&language=DE#def3 
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Another interesting issue raised by this judgment is the position of the Community. 
The Community itself is a contracting party to the EC-Turkey Association 
Agreement; and hence it should also be bound by the standstill clause. One could thus 
argue that putting Turkey on the EC visa black list in 1995 constituted a breach of this 
standstill clause. The same argument would of course apply to the subsequent 
versions of the black list, including the 2001 Visa Regulation. However, the EC did 
not even have a common visa policy at the time the standstill clause came into force 
(1970).  But it does not follow from this that the standstill clause does not apply to the 
EC as well, since the purpose of this clause is clearly to prevent the contracting parties 
from introducing any new measures which could hamper the freedom to provide 
services across the EC-Turkey border. 
However, the Court did not address this issue as the question of the validity of the 
2001 Visa Regulation with respect to Turkey was not directly raised by the German 
court. 
After this judgment, it will be difficult to make the visa black list consistent with the 
EC-Turkey standstill clause unless Turkey is put on the visa white list of the EU. In 
effect the German authorities are in a difficult situation: on the one had the ECJ has 
ruled that their visa requirements for Turkish nationals (at least for service providers) 
are not compatible with a prior international commitment of Germany. On the other 
hand, Germany is also bound by the common visa policy, under which Turkey is on 
the black list. The primacy of international agreements over internal secondary 
legislation implies that Germany (and Denmark) have no choice but to change their 
visa requirements for at least some categories of Turkish citizens. Germany’s visa 
requirements will thus be different from those of other Member States.  
German sovereignty to determine its own visa policy was thus constrained from two 
sides: its obligations under the common visa policy of the EU and the EC-Turkey 
Agreement. However, Germany had agreed to limit its sovereignty in both cases. In 
1970, when it agreed to become a contracting party to the Additional Protocol to the 
EC-Turkey Association Agreement and later when it agreed to the creation of the 
common visa policy with its black list. The problem highlighted by this ruling is that 
these two transfers of sovereignty can lead to conflicting obligations. 
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The practical consequence of this ruling seems to be that following the initial 
guidelines from the Commission, it will be implemented in its narrowest possible 
sense, namely that the 2001 visa black list is “interpreted in a manner that is 
consistent with” 90 the EC-Turkey Association Agreement. In practice, the Border 
Manual will thus have to specify that Turkish citizens who intend to provide services 
can lawfully enter Germany (and Denmark) if the purpose of the visit is to provide 
services (for a Turkish undertaking). This is another example of the fragmentation of 
the common visa policy in practice that has been illustrated in previous chapters. 
 
6. Conclusions  
This chapter has illustrated the evolution of the common visa lists (both positive and 
negative). Initially they were not even made public, then their composition was 
published, but the criteria for putting countries on one or the other list were not 
specified until 2001 when these criteria were also published and explained. Since 
2001, these criteria have been refined and one can see how they have been applied in 
practice. Through the publication and elaboration of the criteria, a potential was 
created for the development of ‘road maps’ for visa liberalization under which 
neighbouring countries know what steps they have to undertake in order to achieve 
visa-free travel within the EU. This approach seems to have worked in the case of 
Bulgaria, Romania and the Western Balkans. 
 
Why was this early loss of sovereignty accepted by the EU’s partners?  One factor is 
simply that visa policy is highly asymmetrical: rich countries, like the EU, use visas to 
limit inward movement. By contrast, poorer countries are interested in widening the 
possibility of their citizens to travel, to their neighbours, but especially to large and 
rich countries. The way in which the EU can use its visa policy to induce 
neighbouring countries to undertake a host of internal measures (introduce new 
passports, align to the EU’s black list, etc.) is a good example of how the pooling of 
                                                        
90 The necessity to do this is clearly stated in paragraph 59 of the judgment, which recites “In this 
respect, it is sufficient to recall that the primacy of international agreements concluded by the 
Community over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so 
far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements (see Case C‑61/94 
Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I‑3989, paragraph 52).” 
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sovereignty within the EU gives the Community much more political leverage than 
they would have had if visa policy had remained a national competence. 
 
But can ‘road maps’ be used more generally? As mentioned above the key driver in 
the case of Bulgaria and Romania and the Western Balkans leading them to accept a 
long list of intrusive requirements was not only the desire to obtain visa-free travel, 
but also the perspective of membership. What countries in the neighbourhood (or 
further afield) have to do to open up this perspective is a fundamental decision the EU 
has to take. A road map for visa-free travel alone is unlikely to be enough. 
 
Through the enlargement process the EU has achieved comprehensive political and 
economic stabilization for much of Europe. The challenge that remains is to obtain 
similar results with countries for which accession is a more distant prospect, or may 
not even be on the agenda. 
 
The renewed emphasis on visa-free travel also came about also because the legal 
instruments explored in Chapter 8 proved to have only a limited effect. More recently, 
the ECJ Judgment in the Soysal case has drawn attention to another means of 
achieving at least partial visa-free travel, namely jurisprudence.  More generally, this 
judgment shows that the EU has to be careful in issuing new regulations in fields that 
are newly communitarized, but in which there are pre-existing obligations for 
Member States and/or the Union itself.   
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CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND OUTLOOK 
Visa policy has been one of the most dynamic fields of European integration over the 
last decade. Member States decided to pool together the essential elements of this 
field, albeit in a rather piecemeal way, once they recognized the need for an external 
dimension to an area of free movement of persons that consisted of a large and 
disparate group of countries with only limited trust in each other. This study shows 
that the Europeanization of visa policy was strongly influenced by enlargement, and 
this brought with it a number of problems not previously experienced by the early 
Schengen group. 
 
The analysis of the interaction between enlargement and the Europeanization of visa 
policy shows that in a visa-free travel area, one type of conflict is bound to arise 
repeatedly: on the one side, the collective interests of the majority of Schengen states 
to secure their common external borders against illegal immigration and crime, and, 
on the other, the interest of an individual Member State to maintain the free 
movement of persons with the countries with which it has an important relationship. 
Member States have been quite pragmatic in allowing 'breaches' in the external visa 
'frontier' (Portugal, Spain, Greece, Kaliningrad, local border traffic): different legal 
instruments were accepted as long as there were no significant 'spill-overs' for other 
MS (few repatriations of Brazilians, or Albanians; little abuse of local border traffic) 
 
Various approaches were used within the legal framework of the Schengen acquis to 
address this problem (see Chapters 3 and 6). They range from special travel or 
national identity documents at the national level, to area-wide regulations concerning 
local border traffic and visa facilitation (see Chapter 8). The result of efforts to 
reconcile these conflicting interests has been an increasing fragmentation of the legal 
space. The most acute effect of this fragmentation can be seen in the case of 
Kaliningrad, whose residents could benefit from at least three different legal 
frameworks before leaving the country: special transit travel documents, local border 
traffic and visa facilitation.  
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This fragmentation is now part of the acquis and could possibly be addressed through 
codification. However, this seems unlikely as the scope of regulation of the different 
instruments is quite diverse.  
 
Enlargement has also had positive effects, however. Countries such as Bulgaria and 
Romania, which not so long ago were on the black list of the EU, were able to obtain 
visa-free travel, then join the EU and may soon become full members of Schengen.   
 
This concluding section starts with a summary of the lessons learnt from enlargement. 
It then turns to certain aspects of the decision-making process on visa lists that require 
reform, and closes with an outlook for the external recognition of the internal shift of 
competence in visa policy. 
 
1. Lessons learnt from enlargement: a road map to visa-free travel? 
The enlargement process seems to have been the best ‘road map’ to visa-free travel. 
The examples of Bulgaria, Romania and the Western Balkans shows that the 
perspective of membership works on both sides: the EU is willing to state the 
conditions for visa-free travel and prospective members are willing to fulfil them, 
although they curtail their sovereignty because they have the perspective of 
membership (see Chapter 10). Moreover, since the Western Balkans are now 
surrounded by EU members, they do not face the problems of the earlier candidates 
mentioned above. 
 
Turkey seems to constitute a special case because its membership application is 
effectively still on hold. Moreover, it has a long-standing association agreement with 
the EU, which gives at least a certain group of its citizens a derived right to visa-free 
travel to at least some of the Member States (see the Soysal judgment discussed in 
Chapter 10). This judgment raises two broad issues: 
 
The liberty of the EU (and of Member States) to impose visas can be limited by other 
(previous) international commitments.1  This also applies more generally when a new 
policy field is Europeanized; that process can be constrained by previous 
                                                        
1 See also Article 2(1)(b) of the Visa Code. 
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commitments stemming from different fields (in this case economic integration 
through a long-standing association agreement). 
 
The second issue raised by the Soysal judgment is the compatibility of visa 
requirements with the freedom to provide services. Within the EU the freedom to 
provide services has been interpreted widely as applying not only to service providers, 
but also to recipients of services, e.g. tourists.2  Will this wide interpretation also be 
applied in the case of Turkey? This issue is potentially significant as the EU tries to 
open markets for goods and services in general and with its neighbourhood in 
particular. 
 
One open question is whether the ‘road map’ approach can also work for neighbours 
without a membership perspective.  The basic criteria for removing a country from the 
black list were set out in the 2001 Visa Regulation and essentially concern three 
elements: illegal immigration, public policy and international relations. In practice, 
the elements were applied in different ways in the case of Bulgaria and Romania and 
the Western Balkans. The contribution of the Commission to the Stockholm 
Programme3 includes elements already used before, such as security of travel 
documents and the quality of border controls, but also adds further, more fluid 
requirements, such as the effectiveness of the fight against organized crime and 
respect for human rights. 
 
The strong emphasis placed by the EU on the threat of illegal immigration (of 
Bulgarian and Romanian citizens to the EU) induced both countries to introduce 
administrative measures that meant that their citizens could be prevented from leaving 
the country if they had infringed foreign immigration or residency rules. 
 
The numerical importance of these preventive measures was limited, and they did 
include the right to judicial review. Nevertheless, they must be questioned, as in effect 
they interfered with the fundamental rights of citizens of Bulgaria and Romania to 
                                                        
2 ECJ, Joint cases C-286/82 and C-26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, Case C-186/87 Cowan 
[1989] ECR 195 and Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11. 
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - An area of 
freedom, security and justice serving the citizen, COM (2009) 262 final, Brussels, 10.06.2009. 
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emigrate.4 The right to leave one’s country is guaranteed by the constitutions of both 
countries and by the European Convention on Human Rights. The protection of 
fundamental rights has always been a cornerstone of EU principles. But it seems that 
in this case the EU was de facto encouraging candidate countries to systematically 
infringe one fundamental right. This aspect of the experience of Bulgaria and 
Romania is thus certainly not to be replicated in other cases. 
 
The use of a ‘road map to visa-free travel’ does not have to be limited to European or 
ENP countries. It could be applied to any third country, regardless of the character of 
its relations with the EU. However, inevitably, the incentives of countries not on the 
enlargement track to meet the criteria will be much weaker. Thus, the main difficulty 
in developing a set of criteria for visa liberalization is to find the minimum 
requirements necessary under the criteria of the Visa Regulation (illegal immigration, 
public policy, international relations) that are acceptable to all the EU partners at the 
same time.  
 
However, one fundamental problem will always remain: in reality a road map can 
only lay out the necessary conditions a country has to fulfil to become eligible for 
visa-free travel.  It is entirely possible that a country fulfils most conditions of a road 
map, but the EU might still refuse to accord it visa-free travel because illegal 
immigration could still be (or perceived to be) a problem.  
 
In a democratic society governments only have limited powers over the tendency of 
their citizens to emigrate. If the local economy does not offer employment prospects, 
then no national administrative measure will be able to effectively limit illegal 
emigration. In the end, the decisive criterion for the EU remains its perception of the 
threat of illegal immigration. Ultimately, the key element of any comprehensive road 
map must thus be a certain minimum level of prosperity and economic stability. If this 
condition is not fulfilled, a limited set of legal and administrative measures 
concerning visas and migration will not be sufficient to induce the EU to offer visa-
free travel.  
 
                                                        
4 See Chapter 10.5 for a discussion of the limited jurisprudence on this issue. 
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Comprehensive economic and political stabilization is the underlying condition for 
the free movement of persons. It is unlikely that this can be achieved for countries 
over which the EU has little leverage, since for them accession is a more distant 
prospect, or possibly not even on the agenda.  
 
The EU is now considering migration partnerships and visa liberalization road maps 
with many countries, most of which are not even prospective candidates for 
enlargement. The prospects of success in these cases must be much more limited than 
they were for the countries that had a clear membership perspective. 
 
Visa facilitation, as opposed to visa-free travel seems a much more realistic goal, 
especially since this type of agreement is now being demanded by countries as far- 
flung and as important as China. 
 
2. The decision-making process regarding visa lists: policy recommendations 
A key element of sovereignty is the control over the movement of persons crossing 
the border. The establishment of lists of countries whose nationals need visas to enter 
the territory of a country is thus considered to be a key element of sovereignty. This 
element has now been fully communitarized.5 But the way in which this has been 
done raises two issues that have so far not been fully researched: 
 
1) What is the nature of the internal decision-making process? 
2)  Does the rest of the world recognize the transfer of sovereignty? 
 
We now briefly discuss these internal and external aspects separately: 
2.1. The internal decision-making process 
In principle, the internal decision-making process was determined in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (and changed under the Lisbon Treaty): the visa list(s) are determined by 
the Council deciding by QMV after having consulted Parliament. Under the Lisbon 
Treaty, this will be done with QMV in the Council and under the ordinary legislative 
                                                        
5 For short-stay visas (allowing for a stay of up to three months); Member States can still decide on 
their own the conditions under which they issue long stay visas. However, short-stay visas constitute 
the bulk (around 90 %) of all visas issued by Schengen countries (see Chapter 1 for more details). 
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procedure together with the Parliament. We would argue that there are two aspects of 
the decision-making process which need reform, or at least clarification. These two 
aspects concern the elements on which the decision-making process is based, and the 
nature of the decision. In short: the criteria used to put a country on the black list need 
clarification, and the decision-making process regarding these criteria should be 
different from the decision-making process regarding the placing of each individual 
country on the black or white visa list.   
i) The evaluation of the criteria for the black list 
As mentioned above, the criteria used to put together the black and white lists were 
clarified only in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2001 Visa Regulation. The 
scant information available (and the resulting list, see Chapter 10) suggests, however, 
that initially the criteria were de facto not really applied in a substantive manner. The 
resulting list seems to have been the simple intersection of the pre-existing national 
black lists, (i.e. in those cases where Member States could not reach a unanimous 
agreement, the country in question was put on the black list). This raises the question 
of how the criteria (threat of illegal immigration, crime and foreign policy 
considerations) are in reality evaluated: at the national or EU level?  The Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the 2001 Commission proposal for the Council 
Regulation on the criteria for the black list is not explicit on this point. But the fact 
that in at least one case a country was put on the black list only because four Member 
States had found that this country did not satisfy the criteria (see Chapter 10) suggests 
that the decision was in the end based on national evaluations.  
 
However, given that member countries have agreed to the transfer of sovereignty by 
agreeing to communitarize visa policy with the Treaty of Amsterdam (see Chapter 5), 
it follows that the criteria for the establishment of the black list should be evaluated at 
the EU level. In concrete terms, this means that it is not sufficient that any single 
Member State, or a small group, perceive a threat of illegal migration to put a country 
on the black list invoking the principle of solidarity. Only a threat of this happening to 
the EU as a whole should be decisive. The same should also apply to foreign policy 
considerations. For Spain, the overriding concern in relation to Columbia might be the 
desire to keep its traditional links with Latin America, but the question should be 
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whether this is also a key concern for the EU as a whole. In principle, it should be the 
task of the Commission to determine the balance of interests at the EU level.  
However, it appears that this is not done in reality, as the process leading to the 
Council Decision on the black list is preceded by a Commission enquiry with the 
Member States. If the decision was really based on an EU point of view, the 
Commission should conduct its own studies and not rely exclusively on the opinion of 
Member States. Some steps have been taken recently in this direction through the 
creation of networks among Member States providing information on issues such as 
illegal immigration, but so far they remain inter-governmental. 
 
A comparison with the decision-making process in the Eurosystem is instructive: all 
members of the Governing Council of the ECB, even those heading national central 
banks, are supposed to base their vote only on euro area considerations. The decision-
making process in the ECB is not preceded by a consultation with national central 
banks; instead the ECB conducts its own evaluation of the euro area economic and 
monetary conditions. National central banks furnish some background material, but 
their contributions are not taken as representing national points of view, but rather 
pieces of the overall picture. This is what should be done in assessing the criteria for 
the black visa list as well: the Commission should develop its own databases, 
analytical tools on immigration and threats to public security. National police forces 
and judiciary institutions would of course contribute to this effort. But the focus 
should shift from what is happening at the national level to the overall, EU-wide 
picture. 
 
ii) Criteria versus single decisions 
Chapter 9 has shown that in other countries (e.g. most notably the US) there exists a 
two-tier decision-making process: the criteria for inclusion on the black list (or 
equivalently the removal there from) are fixed in legislation, whereas the concrete 
country-by-country decisions are taken by the government. This makes sense: the 
legislature (Parliament) should fix the general criteria and the executive (the 
government) should execute them. At the EU level, one cannot find a similarly neat 
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analogy to distinguish the legislative and executive branches, but as the substance of 
the decision is different, a different decision-making process would be appropriate. 
 
The criteria should be determined in the normal legislative procedure involving co-
decision (now ordinary legislative procedure), but the application of these criteria in 
the country-by-country decisions on the composition of the black list should be left to 
the Council.6 The present procedure is too cumbersome: any change in the visa black 
list, thus even removing a single country from it, requires a full legislative act. This 
means that the ability of the EU to use visa policy flexibly in its foreign policy will be 
greatly restrained. The example of the US is again instructive in this respect: the 
difficulties which arose with the US over the application of reciprocity might have 
escalated if the US administration had not been able to make the unilateral decision to 
remove some of the new Member States from its visa black list. It might thus be 
useful to consider a delegation of the competence to the Council to decide on the 
inclusion of individual countries on the black list. 
 
3. An open issue: external recognition of the internal transfer of sovereignty 
The key problem here is simply that the rest of the world does not necessarily 
recognize the shift of sovereignty that has taken place within the EU. Chapter 9 
describes the problems that arise when third countries, especially large and powerful 
ones like the US, which still try to negotiate separately with Member States on key 
aspects of visa policy. 
 
In the field of trade policy, for example, the situation is different because the 
Community and now the Union (together with the Member States) is a signatory to 
the WTO agreements, which implies that third parties have recognized the exclusive7 
competence of the Community and now the Union in this field. This implies that 
retaliatory measures (such as countervailing duties) can be imposed only at the EU 
                                                        
6 EMU again provides an instructive analogy: the task of the ECB has been fixed in the Treaty: it is to 
preserve price stability. However, the ECB is totally free to set its policy instruments in the pursuit of 
this task. 
7 Visa policy is ‘only’ a shared competence (see Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (also called TFEU or Lisbon Treaty). In this area, the EU acquires exclusive 
competence in specific areas only by exercising the broad competence. 
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level.8 In the area of trade policy it is thus not possible to have a situation like the one 
in the visa field, where third parties such as the US impose visa requirements only on 
some Member States, disregarding the EU competence in this area.   
 
Air transport and a few other minor policy areas experienced a similar problem 
previously: the competence had moved to the European level, but Member States 
were still bound by existing bilateral agreements with third parties, which had to be 
induced to renegotiate the existing agreements with the EU. However, in these 
economic fields the partners of the EU did not really have a problem recognizing the 
transfer of sovereignty to the EU level in marginal policy fields. Visa requirements go 
to the core of sovereignty, however. In this field, third countries have naturally been 
more reticent to recognize the intra-European transfer of sovereignty. 
 
It does not help that not all countries participate in the common visa policy. It is 
naturally somewhat confusing for a foreign power to recognize the EU as the single 
partner in negotiations on visa policy when these EU institutions cannot de facto 
represent all Member States. Even more confusing for outsiders is that the EU can in 
some matters also represent non-member countries in areas that touch on national 
security issues, which in the rest of the world would be considered as the core of 
sovereignty. This variable geometry of the Schengen space has made the full 
recognition by the rest of the world far more difficult. 
 
Shifting competence within the legal order of the EU is thus only a first but necessary 
step towards the full transfer of power. Sovereignty in the wider global legal order has 
to be earned through the consent and respect of the global community. The external 
recognition of the transfer of competence still has to be fully achieved in the field of 
visa policy. This requires negotiating bilateral agreements one by one with the EU’s 
main partners, as there are no multilateral treaties in the field of visa policy to which 
the EU could adhere. There is no doubt that the EU is on the way to becoming a major 
global actor in the field of visa policy, but as yet this chapter of the story remains 
unwritten… 
                                                        
8 In the area of monetary policy as well, third countries recognize fully the shift of competence from 
national central banks to the Eurosystem. 
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4. Outlook 
A constant theme of the Europeanization of visa policy discussed in this thesis has 
been that the composition of the black list is a ‘sovereign’ right, as is the decision to 
grant or not to grant a visa. The exercise of this sovereign right was initially based on 
the interests of individual Member States but became more and more based on the 
common interest of the Community and now the Union, that is, of all the Member 
States together. In this view of the world there is no universal right to visa free travel. 
The only case where one can detect a right of the citizens of third countries to visa-
free access to the EU is in the Soysal case. However, even in this case, the right to 
visa-free travel seems to be granted only to a limited group and only as a corollary to 
an economic consideration.  Moreover, the reaction of the Commission so far seems 
to be to interpret this ruling in the narrowest possible sense to limit the ‘breach’ it has 
created in the common visa policy.   
 
This general attitude that visa policy is the exercise of a sovereign right is unlikely to 
change soon because determining who can enter the territory of a state instantly poses 
issues of public order and security; both areas that go to the heart of sovereignty. 
However, one recent development could lead to an important change in this respect. 
The recently enacted Visa Code provides in Article 32(3) for a right of appeal in case 
of refusal of a visa, albeit only applicable as of April 2011. Without this right of 
appeal officials of MS in consulates abroad maintain an incontrovertible sovereign 
right to refuse a visa to anyone they consider to be a potential danger. This right of 
appeal constitutes a potentially important innovation as for the first time it offers the 
possibility of a judicial review of what used to constitute the discretionary power of a 
consular official. Given that over 800 000 visa Schengen visa applications are refused 
each year, the impact of this right could be quite significant.  It remains to be seen, 
however, how this provision will be interpreted. If the courts limit themselves to 
checking only whether proper procedures are followed then the impact of this right of 
appeal would be limited.  
Another fundamental change looming on the horizon is the possibility of creating 
common visa issuance centres (as opposed to mere common centres for preparing 
applications for visas). The common visa policy (=list) was considered necessary, 
originally as a flanking measure because of the lack of trust among Schengen Member 
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States.  So far Member States have not been willing to exercise their sovereign right 
to issue a visa via their own consular officials although these officials have to apply 
European rules. Lack of trust could ultimately be a factor in favour of the last step of 
transferring the right to issue visas to a common body, for example a European Visa 
Service. Those Member States that do not trust the others to be strict in issuing 
Schengen visas might favour the creation of such an institution. This final step in the 
Europeanization of visa policy seems remote at this point, but given the progress 
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ANNEX 7.2 TO CHAPTER 7: EVOLUTION OF VISA POLICY REQUIREMENTS AS CRITERIA IN 
THE ACCESSION PROCESS 
(Based on the opinion and regular reports from the Commission) 
 
This annex shows the evolution of key passages taken from the relevant Commission 
reports.  The earlier reports refer to the initial avis of the Commission on the 
membership application of each country (mostly done in 1997). The subsequent 
extracts are taken from the so called regular reports, which the Commission issued in 
principle each year, starting in 1998 and finishing in the year the accession treaty was 
signed.  This annex reports for each country concerned just the key passage dealing 
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1997 avis Since 1989 many Bulgarians have sought work in EU countries, notably Germany and Greece. Bulgaria is now becoming a transit country for third country 
migrants, from Asia and Africa as well as the NIS, seeking to cross to the EU. Because of concerns about emigration trends, abuses of the immigration system 
and other relevant factors such as drug trafficking through the Balkan route, the EU decided to include Bulgaria and Romania on the list of third countries for 
which visas are required. The Bulgarian authorities are now seeking to put in place measures which effectively tighten the visa regime. The admission system is 
also being strengthened, with rules on residence and work permits and naturalisation being tightened, especially for risk countries. In March 1997 the Bulgarian 
Government decided to introduce a visa free regime for citizens of EU/EEA countries. Bulgaria is also tightening up enforcement procedures, deportation 
procedures and penalties for illegal immigration and have put in place sanctions against carriers. Bulgaria has readmission agreements with Germany, Greece, 
France, Spain, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania and is preparing agreements with Portugal, the Benelux countries, Denmark, the Czech Republic and 
Romania. It does not have such an agreement with Turkey. The Bulgarian border management system is currently being reformed, introducing common 
information systems, document control and improved surveillance. Responsibility is split between the military (Turkish border, reflecting arrangements during 
the Warsaw Pact period) and the border guard, but plans are now being implemented to create a single, civilian national border guard. 
Current and Prospective Assessment 
Bulgaria has begun to take the steps in all key areas of JHA to work towards EU requirements. In the legislative field most (but not all) key measures are either 
in place or in preparation. The difficulties Bulgaria is facing over its relations in the visa field with the EU are leading to considerable efforts on the part of the 
Government to strengthen the visa and admission systems to bring them more into line with EU systems, but there is still some way to go to achieve alignment 
with the acquis. 
1998 A comprehensive strategy to fight illegal immigration was adopted in 1997 and a number of specific measures have been put in place, such as the law to prevent 
the establishment of “phantom factories”, a law on the situation of aliens (passed on first reading) and legislation on Bulgarian identity papers that is in 
conformity with European standards. This legislation on identity papers has been put into effect and supplemented by measures to detect false papers. The 
system for issuing visas has improved markedly, thanks largely to the creation of a central data bank that can be accessed by all consulates. Further readmission 
agreements have been concluded. 
The Bulgarian border control system is in the process of reform and the border service is being demilitarised. Most border posts have an electronic link to Sofia 
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to help prevent the entry of undesirable aliens. Despite these efforts, the infrastructure at the border posts still needs improving, particularly at Sofia airport. It is 
essential that Bulgaria carry out all these reforms in order to be able to meet Bulgaria’s request to be taken off the common list. 
Conclusions 
Bulgaria has made laudable progress in meeting the short-term priorities for the Accession Partnership (combating organized crime and border management) but 
more unremitting effort will be needed to comply with the acquis. Looking ahead, these efforts will have to be supplemented by determined action on two fronts 
to achieve medium-term objectives,: 
 legislation on asylum and foreign nationals with have to be brought up to EU standards to complete the work done to install efficient controls at the borders, 
one of which will be an external border; 
 resolute action on staffing to ensure sufficient numbers and a sufficient level of training to implement the new legislation properly. 
1999 As regards immigration, following the adoption in 1997 of a strategy to combat illegal immigration, in December 1998 Bulgaria adopted and made enter into 
force a new law on foreigners which regulates the conditions of entry, stay and control of foreigners. Within this framework, it is still necessary to clarify the 
conditions applicable to family reunification. Another law which entered into force in April 1999 foresees the replacement, between now and March 2001, of 
Bulgarian identity documents by documents which cannot be forged. Means of detecting of forged documents are being installed gradually at the various border 
control points, as is the case with Sofia airport. On 1 September 1999, Bulgaria introduced a visa requirement for nationals of Bosnia- Herzegovina and of Cuba 
and decided to extend this measure, from 1 November 1999, to the following states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Khirgistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan. But nationals of Belarus and of Moldova are still not required to possess a visa. Bulgaria should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation 
and practice with that of the EU. 
Readmission agreements were signed with the Benelux countries (7/10/98), Hungary (11/11/98) and Norway (16/12/98). Therefore Bulgaria now has 
readmission agreements with 13 Member States of the Union as well as with Hungary, Norway, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Switzerland. Such agreements remain to be concluded with the United Kingdom and Ireland. Bulgaria must now concentrate on reinforcing its administrative 
capacities in order to be in a position to apply effectively legislation on immigration. 
Conclusion 
Bulgaria made some significant progress in the field of justice and home affairs, through in particular reinforcement of the legislative framework in the majority 
of sectors. The clearest advances can be noted in the fields of immigration and justice. 
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2000 As far as visa policy is concerned, Bulgaria has continued to make progress. It has rescinded agreements on visa-free regimes with Belarus, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan with effect from January 2000. A readmission 
agreement was signed with Romania in June 2000. Negotiations on readmission agreements with the UK and Ireland have started. The administrative, 
organisational and legal measures taken by Bulgaria in the past years to counter illegal migration have been further consolidated since the last Report. The 
special software programme developed for visa issuing and passport control is now operational in 59 Bulgarian diplomatic and consular missions, providing an 
online link to the Visa Centre at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bulgaria has amended the Bulgarian Identity Documents Act to accelerate the issuing of new 
documents, bringing forward from end March 2001 to end December 2000 the date by which documents must be replaced with new ones that cannot be forged. 
Some progress has been made towards meeting the short-term Accession Partnership priority of implementing effective border management control systems. 
Through amendments to the Ministry of the Interior Act in April 2000, a new definition of border control was adopted, of “guarding and controlling” instead of 
“guarding and protecting” state borders. Demilitarisation of the border police is ongoing and since 1999, progress has been made as planned with the programme 
to reduce the number of conscripts by 2,000 and the procedure has been launched to replace them with 1,300 professional police officers. To compensate for the 
reduction of personnel, the Border Police is in a process of modernising its equipment, giving priority to the border with Turkey and the Black Sea maritime 
border. Progress has also been made to improve border control facilities at Sofia International Airport to prepare for compliance with Schengen requirements, 
and new equipment for passport control has been installed at 10 major border crossing points. Statistics from the Border Police show that the attempts to illegally 
cross the borders have increased from 18,329 attempts in 1998 to 22,733 in 1999. Citizens from Romania (2,933), Turkey (2,561) and Moldova (912) lead the 
list of attempts at illegal border crossing. 
Overall assessment 
Bulgaria has already largely aligned its visa regime but maintains visa-free regimes with Ukraine, FYROM, Russia, Georgia, Yugoslavia and Tunisia. 
Readmission agreements have now been signed with all the EU member states except the UK and Ireland, where negotiations are currently underway. 
2001 Significant efforts over the past few years have brought Bulgaria’s visa policy largely into line with the policy of the EU. As a result, since 10 April 2001 
Bulgaria has enjoyed a visa-free regime with all Schengen member states. From October 2001, Bulgaria introduced visa obligation for citizens from Russia, 
Ukraine and Georgia. At the end of 2000, a new Training 
Centre for Consular officers was established. The equipment of the Visa Centre in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is being updated with the introduction of a 
new visa control computer system. Bulgaria has introduced a visa classification that is in line with the Schengen classification. The provisions of the Bulgarian 
Identity Documents Act and the Regulation on the Terms and 
Conditions for Issuing Visas by the Diplomatic and Consular Missions of the Republic of Bulgaria are in line with the requirements for a uniform visa format. 
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Border police officials have access to the database on all visas issued by the visa centre, thereby reducing the possibilities for misuse or falsification. The 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) has been 
operational since October 2000 at the main border check points. The process of replacing the identity documents of Bulgarian citizens and long-term residents, 
which started in 2000, continued and is due to be completed by the end of 2001. The new 
Bulgarian passports and identity documents are considered to be of very high quality from the point of view of document security. 
Overall assessment 
Bulgaria has already largely aligned its visa policy with that of the European Union. It maintains visa-free regimes with FYROM, Romania, Tunisia, and 
Yugoslavia. Despite recent efforts, the capacity of the visa centre will need to be strengthened to deal efficiently with the large increase in the number of requests 
for visas. 
2002 With the amendments to the Foreign Nationals Act in April 2002 and the adoption of a new regulation on the terms and conditions for issuing visas, Bulgaria 
made further progress in aligning its visa policy with the policy of the EU. A new version of the visa control computer system has been installed in 30 consular 
offices. The capacity of the visa centre has been further strengthened by means of additional staff and technical equipment. 
An action plan for the adoption of Schengen requirements was approved in November 2001. It defines measures and deadlines in order to achieve compliance 
with the Schengen acquis. Some progress can be reported in the area of external border control. 
Overall assessment 
Despite further efforts, Bulgaria’s visa policy is not fully aligned with the EU visa obligations list with regard to nationals of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
FYROM and Tunisia. Moreover, it is not yet fully aligned with the EU visa-free travel list. For 22 South and Latin American states, there is still no visa free 
regime. Although the security features of the new Bulgarian visa sticker meet very high standards, the on-line processing system does not yet extend to all visa-
issuing offices. Efforts to equip all 
diplomatic and consular missions with devices to detect forged or falsified documents should be strengthened, with special priority given to high-risk countries. 
In order to better combat illegal migration, Bulgaria should limit the number of countries whose holders of diplomatic and service passports are exempted from 
the visa obligation. Finally, Bulgaria still needs to align its legislation on seamen in transit with the EU acquis. 
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Negotiations on this chapter are continuing. Bulgaria has not requested any transitional arrangements in this field. 
2003 In the area of visa policy, the technical equipment, necessary for issuing the new sticker is in the process of being installed in all diplomatic and consular 
representations. Priority has been given to missions in Europe and high-risk migration countries. The 
administrative capacity of the Visa Centre of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been further increased with the recruitment of 21 officers. The Visa 
Centre is also connected with the computer network of the Bulgarian border check points which enables automatic transfer of all the data into the Border Police 
database, as well as with the office of the alien’s control authorities. At present 66 diplomatic and consular missions are connected to the Visa Centre. The 
remaining 27 diplomatic missions are in a process of being connected. Training of consular staff is continuing and is assured by a special Training Centre for 
consular personnel within the Visa Centre. 
Overall assessment 
As regards visa policy, alignment to the so-called negative list was almost completed already in 2002. Visas for nationals from Serbia and Montenegro, FYROM 
will be introduced upon accession and for Tunisia in December 2003. As regards the so-called 
EU positive visa list, Bulgaria still has to align its visa policy for 20 countries, most of them being Latin American countries. The administrative capacity of the 
visa centre has been further enhanced. Bulgaria is in a process of providing the necessary equipment to its diplomatic and consular missions. For the time being 
30% of the Bulgarian diplomatic and consular missions are equipped with basic equipment to detect forged or falsified documents, mainly in the high-risk 
migration countries. Training of consular staff has considerably improved. 
Negotiations on this chapter have been provisionally closed. Bulgaria has not requested any transitional arrangements in this field. 
2004 As regards visa policy, Bulgaria terminated the visa-free regime with Tunisia in January 2004. Installation of the technical equipment necessary for issuing the 
new visa sticker continued throughout the reporting period. To date the system has been installed and functions in 87 diplomatic and consular missions. 
Alignment with the so-called positive list continued throughout the reporting period with agreements for lifting the visa requirements with Switzerland and 
Malaysia and agreements extending the period of visa-free stays with Estonia and the Czech Republic. Further negotiations were held on draft agreements 
providing for visa-free regimes with the other 15 countries and special administrative regions on the positive list - Argentina, Bolivia, Brunei, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Salvador, Singapore, Uruguay, Venezuela, SAR Hong Kong and SAR Macao. 




On visa policy, Bulgaria has not yet achieved full alignment with the EU visa acquis. Bulgaria still has to terminate the visa-free agreements with Serbia and 
Montenegro and FYROM. The administrative capacity of the visa centre has been further enhanced and Bulgaria is in the process of extending to all embassies 
and consulates the on-line system capable of securing direct contact between visa-issuing authorities and the central authorities. The full range of equipment 
necessary to detect forged and falsified documents have not yet been provided to all diplomatic and consular missions and considerable efforts are still needed in 
this area. As regards the so-called EU positive visa list, Bulgaria still has to align its visa policy for 15 countries, most of them Latin American countries. 
2005 On visa policy, Bulgaria has to a large extent aligned with the provision and administrative structures needed to ensure effective implementation of the acquis 
upon accession. An Instruction for issuing visas to seamen was adopted in June 2005 as well as an Instruction for issuing visas at the border checkpoints in July 
2005. Bulgaria still has to make provision for introducing a visa regime for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, but is 
committed to do so upon accession. Bulgaria also made progress in further aligning its policy as regards the “positive” visa list. An agreement for a visa free 
regime with Uruguay was signed in January 2005 and entered into force in May 2005. Visa free agreements with SAR Hong Kong and SAR Macao were signed 
in April 2005. Preparatory measures to revoke the visa obligation for the other countries have continued. Bulgaria needs to start preparing for the implementation 
of VIS (Visa Information System) in view of lifting the internal borders upon accession to Schengen. As regards implementation and administrative capacity, 
Bulgaria now has 88 diplomatic and consular missions connected with its headquarters. Bulgaria is experiencing serious delays in installing of equipment to 
detect forged and falsified documents in diplomatic and consular posts and at the moment 50% of its missions have the required are equipment. 
Conclusion 
Bulgaria is generally meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations in the areas of migration, the fight against terrorism, 
customs co-operation, and human rights legal instruments and is expected to be in a position to implement this acquis from accession. 
Increased efforts are needed if Bulgaria is to meet the requirements for membership in relation to visa policy, asylum, judicial co-operation in civil and criminal 
matters, money laundering and the fight against drugs. In order to complete preparations for membership, Bulgaria must improve and accelerate implementation 
in these areas. Action to implement EURODAC is required as a matter of priority if Bulgaria is to be ready before accession. 
Increased efforts are also needed to fully align the Data Protection Act and to ensure the effective functioning of the Commission on Personal Data Protection. 
As regards the protection of personal data (see also chapter 3 – Freedom to Provide Services), increased efforts are now required to properly implement the 
legislation; the Commission for the protection of personal data should establish a sound administrative practice and effectively perform its core tasks, in order to 
ensure that Bulgaria will be ready to implement the acquis in this area at the time of accession. 
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2006 On visa policy, alignment with the EU positive list has continued by concluding bilateral agreements with Brazil and Venezuela. Bulgaria now participates in all 
VIS-related working groups and technical meetings and this should help to ensure that its national visa system is correctly aligned with VIS requirements. 
Bulgaria is committed to introducing a visa regime for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro before accession. Alignment with 
the EU positive list is yet incomplete. All Bulgarian consular posts have magnifying glasses, UV lamps and three metro-viewers. Furthermore, the missions have 
been equipped with specialised software to control documents. Overall, preparations in the area of visa policy are well on track. 
Conclusion 
Significant progress has been made in the area of visa policy and Bulgaria now generally meets the commitments and requirements arising from accession 




1993 avis 14. Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs 
1. The Cyprus government has undertaken to meet all obligations and responsibilities deriving from the Treaty on European Union. This implies acceptance by 
the Cypriot authorities of all decisions concerning cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs as set out in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 
2. The involvement of Cyprus in the obligations resulting from Title VI of the Treaty could entail a major effort on the part of the authorities of the island in 
order to ensure that all the necessary means are employed so that full cooperation in the areas concerned becomes a reality. The extent of this effort can be 
established only by joint examination of the details of the relevant acquis.  
1998 Immigration / Border controls 
Given its geographical situation and proximity to certain countries of origin (and transit) of illegal immigrants, the situation in Cyprus needs to be closely 
monitored. Illegal entry has been known, but has so far not reached levels of particular concern. In 1998, the law on foreigners and immigration was amended 
and tougher penalties introduced for those found guilty of assisting clandestine immigration, such as ship owners and ship’s captains. 
Conclusion 
Cyprus has made progress in a number of areas, especially in combating money laundering, drugs trafficking and, more recently, illegal immigration. It must 
press ahead with its efforts. 
In other areas, Cyprus will have to adopt the international laws relating to civil and criminal procedures without delay and ensure that rules on asylum and 
immigration are applied to EU standards. 
1999 Immigration / Border control 
The levels of economic development and social stability can favour organized flux of alliens wishing to reside in the country or as a transit point to the EU. 
Cyprus has a total of 772.49 kilometres of maritime borders. Nevertheless illegal immigration is not yet a major issue for Cyprus (estimation of 8000 illegal 
alliens) although some recent cases have been reported of smuggling of aliens especially via maritime routes. 4702 alliens were refused entry into Cyprus in 
1998. In 1999 Cyprus has signed two interim readmission agreements with Lebanon and Syria. Further efforts are needed in the transposition of the acquis 
notably regarding, rules of admission, admission for employment, family reunification, marriages of convenience and expulsion measures. Uniform resident 
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permits should be adopted and consular co-operation reinforced. The Cypriot Customs Service is committed to combating customs fraud, through a number of 
mutual assistance agreements with various partners. Co-operation has been established with the European Fraud Prevention Office (OLAF) in specific areas (e.g. 
the task force on cigarettes). Cyprus is a point for the international network engaged in smuggling cigarettes by sea. Cyprus should continue progressive 
alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. 
The Schengen visa system should be adopted. 
It would be convenient to establish links between the future legislation on asylum and the reform of the existing Aliens and Immigration Law in order to address 
cases of rejected asylum seekers who remain in the country. Current border control legislation appears to give the relevant authorities the powers needed to 
accomplish this task effectively. However additional measures must be taken (concerning in particular the inspection of documents under the terms of the 
Schengen Convention). Increased coastal surveillance may be necessary in order to decrease illegal immigration risks. 
Conclusion 
Since the 1998 Regular Report, some progress in the field of immigration, but none in the field of asylum has been noted. Concerning the fight against drugs, 
Cyprus has ratified the agreement on illegal traffic by sea transport, as suggested in the Regular Report. Six instruments in the field of judicial cooperation 
remain to be signed or ratified. During the coming year, Cyprus should therefore strengthen its visa delivery regime and adopt a forgery-proof visa, adopt new 
asylum legislation, ratify the Council of Europe convention on data protection and sign and/or ratify the international instruments for judicial cooperation. 
2000 As regards visa policy, Cyprus has been gradually aligning its visa policy since October 1999. It has extended visa requirements to nationals of Commonwealth 
countries, and has published an order revising the visa free list of countries. Cyprus also harmonised in November 1999 its policy with regard to travel facilities 
for school pupils from third countries resident in a Member State. 
As far as migration is concerned, the Aliens and Immigration Law was enacted in March 2000. The problems faced by the office of the Migration Officer 
(charges of corruption and pending applications for visa, about 17 600) led the Council of 
Ministers to decide in November 1999 to restructure the Office of the Migration Officer, who is the main authority for migration policy, and to unify it with 
other Ministry Services by creating a Public Registry Department with three separate Divisions, i.e. the Aliens Division, the Citizenship and Passports Division 
and the Registration Division. 
In July 2000 an amendment to the “Aliens and Immigration Regulations” concerning family reunification was enacted. 
Cyprus has made further progress in aligning with the acquis relating to the organisation and the development of the CIREFI (Centre for Information, Discussion 
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and Exchange on the crossing of frontiers and immigration) in May 2000. The contact point for the CIREFI information system is the Police Aliens and 
Immigration Department. In addition, the Aliens and Immigration (Carriers’ liability) Law on combating illegal immigration was enacted in March 2000. 
Overall assessment 
As regards visa policy, Cyprus should continue the process of aligning its visa legislation and practice. It has several bilateral agreements for issuing visas at the 
border with Lebanon, Syria and Israel as well as bilateral merchant shipping agreements regarding seamen in transit, which are not aligned. Cyprus should also 
provide an on-line system for issuing visas. Cyprus is undertaking efforts to prepare for the issuing of a uniform visa as well as to participate in the Schengen 
Information 
System. 
As regards migration, due to its geographical situation, Cyprus is a target country and a potential transit area for illegal immigration. As the majority of illegal 
residents have entered legally, e.g. as visitors or under not-renewable work permits, the implementation of the legislation on combating illegal migration has to 
be strengthened. In 1999 1,966 non-nationals, who were not working, were arrested because they had overstayed their visa term. Also 396 non-nationals were 
found to be working illegally (without a proper visa). Implementation of the legislation on combating illegal employment as well as on expulsion also has to be 
strengthened. In addition, Cyprus should accelerate its efforts as regards adopting legislation in the field marriages of convenience. 
2001 As regards visa policy Cyprus has gradually abolished the practice of issuing visas at the borders. In 2001, it has only been operating for nationals with whose 
countries Cyprus had has bilateral agreements to this effect (i.e. Bulgaria, Lebanon, Syria and Israel) or in exceptional cases for humanitarian reasons. 
Legislative harmonisation in the field of migration has intensified. An amendment to the „Aliens and Immigration Law“ relating to marriages of convenience 
came into force in March 2001. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers adopted a large number of decisions in view of EU measures in the field. The decisions of 
December 2000 concerned unaccompanied minors from third countries, the exchange of information in the area of asylum and immigration, joint principles for 
the exchange of data in the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI), transit for the purpose of 
expulsion, checks on and expulsion of third country nationals residing or working without authorisation, means of combating illegal immigration and illegal 
employment, and clauses to be inserted in future agreements combining matters of EU and Member-State competence. In January and February 2001, the 
Council of Ministers also took decisions as regards forgery detection equipment at ports of entry, a specimen bilateral readmission agreement and the principles 
for the drafting of protocols on the implementation or readmission agreements. In June 2001, it issued a decision to align with the acquis as regards concerted 
action and co-operation in carrying out expulsion measures. Furthermore, in July 2001 Parliament enacted a regulation on the concept of family reunification. 
Overall assessment 
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As regards visa policy, Cyprus has over the years achieved substantial alignment with the EU policy. However, eight countries on the EU list are still exempted 
from the visa requirement in Cyprus. The practice of issuing visas at the border is gradually being abolished. With regard to visas issued at the border for seamen 
in transit, the legal basis of this practice – the Merchant 
Shipping Agreements with six third countries – need to be renegotiated soon. Cyprus is continuing its efforts to prepare for the issuing of a uniform visa and its 
preparations to participate in the Schengen Information System. 
As far as migration is concerned, due to its geographical situation, Cyprus is a target country and a potential transit area for illegal immigration. As the majority 
of illegal residents have entered legally, e.g. as visitors or under non-renewable work permits, the implementation of the legislation on combating illegal 
migration should be further continued. The decisions of the 
Council of Ministers of December 2000 on checks on and expulsion of third country nationals residing or working without authorisation as well as the new 
legislation on marriages of convenience are steps in the right direction. 
The recent readmission agreement with Lebanon (a similar one is pending with Syria) foresees the repatriation of illegal immigrants to Lebanon if it is proven 
that their port of departure was in Lebanon. The implementation of this agreement should be scrutinised closely to ensure that it conforms to the principle of 
non-refoulement, bearing in mind that Lebanon (and Syria) has not ratified the Geneva Convention. 
2002 As regards visa policy, further legislative alignment was achieved notably through introduction of the Airport Transit Visa, introduction of a visa obligation for 
nationals of seven countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe) in alignment with the EU visa obligations, 
abolition of the visa obligation for nationals of Bulgaria and Israel, and revocation of bilateral agreements with Bulgaria, Israel and Lebanon for the issuing of 
visas at the borders. With Syria, agreement was reached on the effective date for the revocation of a similar agreement, i.e. on 15 October 2002. 
Cyprus has started to upgrade a number of embassies and consulates in order to react effectively to the increased workload for the issuing of visas. By 
September, over 15 additional officers had been posted in Cyprus’ embassies. 
In the field of migration, there was alignment with the acquis in December 2001 as regards admission of third country nationals for study purposes and for self-
employment and in June 2002 as regards the adoption of practices followed by Member States concerning expulsion through amendments to the Aliens and 
Immigration Regulation. 
A readmission agreement was signed with Italy in June together with another agreement on co-operation in sea surveillance for combating illegal migration in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. In July, a readmission agreement was signed with Lebanon. Contacts 
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have been established with Portugal, Romania, Egypt and Syria with a view to negotiating readmission agreements. 
Overall assessment 
As regards visa policy, Cyprus should continue the alignment of its legislation with the Common Consular Instructions. To complete the alignment with the EU 
visa obligations list, nationals of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must be removed from Cyprus.s visa-free travel list. A 
diplomatic mission should be established in Qatar or a temporary alternative solution should be found to facilitate the issuing of visas for nationals of Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Cyprus has to terminate the practice of issuing visas at the borders for members of tourist groups. 
Cyprus must terminate, by accession at the latest, the practice of granting visas onboard the ships. 
As regards migration, Cyprus should devote close attention to the conclusion of the negotiation of readmission agreements with Member States and also with the 
countries of origin of illegal immigrants. It should strengthen and implement measures to combat illegal employment and implement relevant sanctions against 
employers who employ third country nationals without a work permit. Concerning the adoption of uniform residence permits and standard expulsion documents, 
it is noted that amendments to the Aliens and Migration Regulations are required to this effect. 
2003 Cyprus has aligned its visa policy with the acquis except in the case of the Russian Federation, whose nationals are still exempted from the visa requirement, 
based on a bilateral agreement. On 30 September 2003, Cyprus gave notice of its decision to terminate the agreement and to introduce visas for Russian 
nationals as from 1 January 2004. As regards the issuing of visas at the borders, attention should be paid to the timely implementation of the acquis in this field 
in particular as regards Gulf States, Jordan, Ukraine, Belarus and Syria. Cyprus still needs to ensure alignment with the Common Consular Instructions, which 
will be done through a comprehensive new law on migration. As regards implementation and administrative capacity further efforts are needed in relation to 
infrastructure and recruitment of staff. Equipment to detect forged and falsified documents was installed in all diplomatic missions in April 2003. 
In the area of migration, Cyprus still needs to fully align with the acquis as regards in particular legislation on long-term residents. In this context, Cyprus should 
accelerate the adoption of amendments to the Aliens and Immigration Regulations. Cyprus is taking action to conclude readmission agreements, however further 
improvement is required, in particular with regard to neighbouring countries. Administrative structures are in place but a coherent training system for all 
migration services needs to be continued as regards in particular the fight against illegal employment. 
Conclusion 
Cyprus is partially meeting the commitments and requirements for membership in relation to the visa policy and in the area of asylum. Cyprus needs to adopt 
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and implement the necessary legislation as regards the issuing visas at the borders and fully align with the visa Regulation as regards Russians citizens. Urgent 
action must be taken in order to ensure the proper implementation of the existing asylum legislation as well as the recently proposed measures as regards the 
enhancement of the administrative structures for which amendments to the existing legislation are required. Attention should also be given to the technical and 
















3. CZECH REPUBLIC 
Year Czech Republic 
1997 avis Since 1989 there has been a very large increase in the number of foreign nationals resident in the Czech Republic (now approximately 200,000 ). A current 
major priority for the Czech Government is to bring these migration flows under control. Residence and work permits are required for employment, but there are 
special rules for Slovaks given their close family and residence links with the Czech Republic. The Czech authorities are preparing new aliens legislation which 
will, among other things, stipulate that all visas must be issued abroad and also cover the registration of foreign nationals within the country. The Czech 
Republic is working to deal with expulsion of illegal immigrants in a structured manner, including seeking cooperation from IOM. Readmission agreements are 
in place with the Czech Republic's direct neighbours as well as Hungary, Romania, Canada and France. It is working to bring border management systems up to 
EU standards, but is hampered by the lack of technical equipment to check machine-readable documents and the fact that its internal communication system is 
not compatible with international norms. 
1998 In its Opinion in July 1997 the Commission noted that drafts of most of the outstanding legislation were being prepared. 
The Czech Republic has not yet adopted either a new law on aliens or any concrete measures which would bring management of borders into line with EU rules. 
However, an interdepartmental committee has been set up under the Minister for Home Affairs to pave the way for adaptation of the acquis, and the ministry has 
drafted two "strategic" documents on measures to improve border management and control immigration. 
Conclusion 
There has been a marked slowing down in the rate of progress required to adjust to the EU acquis. The short-term priority of improved border control has not 
been achieved. The new government must now apply itself to carrying out its intentions and press ahead with reforms to meet the medium-term priorities of the 
Accession Partnership, specifically: - more efficient border controls and the adoption of new laws on asylum and migration, including adjustment of visa policy, 
to comply with EU standards. 
1999 November 1998's Regular Report found that the Czech Republic's alignment process had slowed down appreciably. It highlighted the meagre progress on border 
controls, which figured among the Accession Partnerships' short-term priorities. 
The Regular Report called on the Czech Republic to step up the pace of reforms with a view to adopting new legislation on asylum and immigration, adjusting 
its visa policy, The Czech Parliament has still to adopt the draft Aliens Act approved by the government on 28 April. 
In August the government adopted a resolution on the country's visa policy, detailing the introduction of visas for nationals of Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
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Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Cuba as well as visa for diplomats from North Korea and China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been 
instructed to make the necessary preparations for the introduction of visa by the end of November. It is not clear, however, when the visa will be introduced 
concretely. The Czech Republic should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. The procedure for issuing visas is 
now being 
modernised: a working party was set up for the purpose in September last year, and a pilot project, considered satisfactory by the Czech authorities, is now being 
extended to several of the Czech Republic's diplomatic missions. 
Conclusion 
Generally speaking, preparations for the adoption of the justice and home affairs acquis have speeded up, but this has yet to be reflected in the country's 
legislation (other than on drugs) or administrative structures. 
2000 Since the 1999 Regular Report, significant progress has been made in the Czech Republic in the fields of data protection, visas and migration. 
As far as visa policy is concerned, the new Act on the Residence of Aliens entered into force in January 2000. It includes new provisions on the issuing, validity 
and types of visas, as well as on uniform format. Visas are no longer granted at borders, except in certain specified extraordinary circumstances. Airport transit 
visas have been required for 11 countries since May 2000. Visa-free agreements with Cuba, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Cambodia and North Korea, as well as 
with China for holders of certain passports, were terminated during 2000. Visa requirements were formally confirmed by the government in respect of Georgia 
and Tajikistan. In May, the Government also decided to introduce visas for citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Turkmenistan. 
As regards administrative capacity, visa matters are overseen by the newly established Department for Immigration and Border Control in co-operation with the 
Alien and Border Police. An on-line system for issuing visas is currently operating in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in 59 diplomatic missions out of 107. 
The on-line connection between border crossing points and the central database of visa applicants is being tested. 
Overall assessment 
The Czech Republic has made significant progress in aligning its visa policy with the European Union, terminating existing visa-free regimes with a large 
number of countries, and preparing the imposition of visas with all countries necessary to ensure full alignment before accession. The new Aliens Act sets the 
basic legal framework to introduce measures aimed against the misuse of visas. 
The medium-term priority of the Accession Partnership regarding the alignment of visa policy has therefore been successfully addressed. In order to improve 
identity checks and detection of attempts to misuse visas it is still necessary to develop a Schengen-type visa sticker, introduce the electronicallysupported 
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system for issuing visas to all its diplomatic missions, and connect the online query system at border crossings to a central database of visa applicants. Visa 
offices throughout the country will also gradually have to be equipped with a similar system. 
2001 Since the 2000 Regular Report, further progress has been made in the Czech Republic in the fields of data protection, border control, visas. The Czech Republic 
has made good progress in aligning its visa policy with that of the EU, including as regards airport transit visas. . The amendment to the Act on the Residence of 
Aliens, which entered into force in July 2001, is a further step in the direction of full alignment with the acquis. It reduces by half (to 90 days) the time for 
issuing visas and removes some of the entry requirements like the health insurance certificate. As regards administrative capacity, visa matters are overseen by 
the Department for Asylum and Migration Policy in co-operation with the Alien and Border Police. An on-line system for issuing visas is currently operating 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 104 out of the 107 competent diplomatic missions and is connected also with the main border crossing points. 
The Czech Republic is making progress in aligning itself with the Schengen requirements and continues to prepare for future participation in the Schengen 
Information System. The Government established a very thorough Schengen Action Plan in this respect. All new passports are machine-readable, although no 
deadline has yet been set for withdrawing non machine-readable passports. 
Overall assessment 
The Czech Republic has further aligned its visa regime to ensure full alignment before accession, and the new amendment to the Aliens Act has also improved 
the conditions for granting visas. As regards administrative capacity, however, there is still a need to take full account of migratory risks and to improve identity 
checks and the detection of the misuse of visas. Not all official border crossings are yet connected to the on-line system for issuing visas. The Government has 
drawn up a high quality Schengen action plan. The successful implementation of this high-quality plan hinges on the above constraints being effectively 
addressed. 
2002 The Czech Republic has continued to make good progress in aligning its visa policy with that of the EU. It aligned its visa obligations with the acquis in 
December 2001, and is currently preparing a standard visa-free agreement with certain countries, in line with EU visa-free travel. The Act on the Residence of 
Aliens, already amended in 2001, was further amended in May 2002. Thus, a new visa sticker for short-term and long-term stay was developed which 
corresponds to the EU visa sticker as far as possible and is being gradually introduced. The country has achieved considerable progress in modernising the visa 
issuing procedure: new general consulates have been opened in Poland and the Russian Federation and an on-line system is currently operating between all 108 
Czech diplomatic missions issuing machine-readable visas (except Zimbabwe), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Alien and Border Police Service. The upgraded visa software ensuring higher data transmission speed and improved data security is now 
installed at the diplomatic missions. So far, about 800 000 visas have been issued under the new visa system. 
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Since November 2001, the Czech Republic continued to make important progress in the implementation of its Schengen Action Plan. 
Overall assessment 
The Czech Republic has almost completed the approximation of its visa regime. The outstanding task remains the alignment with the EU visa-free travel list. 
The new amendment of 2002 to the Act on the Residence of Aliens is indeed another positive development as regards the issuing of visa stickers with high 
security features. Regarding its administrative capacity, and despite the fact that the Czech Republic has continued to make notable progress, it is still necessary 
for regional and district authorities to pay attention to migration risks. 
Conclusion 
Negotiations on the chapter have been provisionally closed. The Czech Republic has not requested any transitional arrangements. The Czech Republic is 
generally meeting the commitments it has made in the accession negotiations in this field. 
2003 Preparation in the Czech Republic with regard to the Schengen provisions (Schengen Action Plan) relevant for accession is broadly satisfactory, but further 
efforts are still required to conclude the remaining bilateral co-operation and re-admission agreements, as well as an agreement with Slovakia restricting border 
crossings to designated points, and to complete alignment of the border regime in respect of the border with Slovakia. The Czech Republic should continue its 
preparations for the lifting of internal borders and full implementation of the Schengen acquis on the basis of a further decision to be taken by the Council. The 
preparation for integration into the Schengen Information System (SIS) II is progressing according to schedule. 
On visa policy, the Czech Republic has almost completed approximation of its visa regime, but still needs to align as regards EU visa-free travel and to introduce 
a Schengen-type visa sticker following the transmission of the relevant technical specifications by the EU in August 2003. Administrative structures are in place 
and are functioning adequately. 
Conclusion 
The Czech Republic is essentially meeting the requirements arising from the accession negotiations and is expected to be able to implement by accession the 






1997 avis Estonia has visa free arrangements with the UK, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and several central European countries, including Latvia and 
Lithuania with which it operates a common visa space. 
Further visa-free regimes are negotiated with other EU member states. 
Estonia has adopted the EU third country list for which visas are required. 
Estonia has introduced machine-readable passports. 
1998 Concerning visa policy, new visa rules (which are compatible with the EU acquis) have been adopted. Some types of visa (such as exit and resettlement visas) 
have been abolished, and new types (such as tourist and business visas) have been introduced. Furthermore, the rules governing the extension of visas and the 
maximum length of stay in Estonia have been clarified. A new visa sticker which is suitable for optical readers and is in line with EU standards has been 
introduced. 
Estonia has an agreement with Russia that allows persons living in the Narva–Ivangograd area to enter Estonia with an special permit instead of a visa. This 
practice is not in line with EU rules. Estonia has concluded readmission agreements with a number of countries, the latest being with Switzerland (January 
1998). 
Amendments to the Aliens Act have been introduced to grant permanent resident permits to non-citizens under certain conditions (see political criteria). With 
regard to border controls, substantial progress has been made in negotiating a border agreement with Russia. Most of the technical issues have been resolved, 
and Estonia has signalled its readiness to sign the agreement when Russia is ready. 
1999 In the field of immigration, Estonia lies off the international migration routes and is not for the time being a major country of destination or transit. In 1998, 450 
foreigners were detained while attempting to cross the border illegally. 
Estonia’s visa policy is aligned with that of the EU, except for the facilitated border crossing formalities for Russian nationals living in border areas (Narva-
Ivangorod). 
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Estonia should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. 
Conclusion 
The facilitated border crossing procedures need to be brought into conformity with EU-visa practice. 
2000 As far as visa policy is concerned, progress has been made in order to align it further. Since September 2000, Estonia has abolished visa-free border crossing for 
Russian nationals living in border areas. In addition, amendments to the Aliens Act were adopted in December 2000, regulating the issuing of visas at border 
checkpoints. Visas are no longer granted at borders except in extraordinary circumstances specified in the law. In August 2000, a regulation providing the legal 
basis for the establishment of the National Visa Register was adopted. Furthermore, requirements for airport transit as well as the list of data to be kept in the 
National Visa Register have been established. 
Overall assessment 
With the abolition of the special visa regime for Russian nationals living in border areas, progress has been made in further aligning Estonia’s visa policy. 
Estonia should continue alignment of its visa practice, such as developing the Schengen-type visa sticker and generalising the electronically supported system for 
issuing visas to all diplomatic missions. 
2001 As far as visa policy is concerned, Estonia has been making substantive progress in terms of visa alignment, terminating existing visa-free regimes with a large 
number of countries, and preparing the imposition of visas with a number of countries as required by the acquis. The Agreement between Estonia and Croatia on 
abolition of visa requirements entered into force in September 2000. Agreements on the Abolition of Visa Requirements were also concluded with Chile, Costa 
Rica, Hong-Kong, Macao and Israel. Progress has been registered in alignment with, and implementation of, the acquis in the field of control of external 
borders, and as regards preparations for the Schengen acquis. The Schengen Action Plan was approved by the Government in July 2001. Although the 
implementation of the Border Agreement with Russia is dependent upon ratification by Russian Parliament, in practice it is reportedly applied on the ground. 
As regards migration, legislation is in place for visa policy and fight against illegal immigration. In January 2001, the Parliament adopted amendments to the 
Aliens Act, Refugees Act, the Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry and the Identity Documents Act. 
Overall assessment 
Estonia has made significant progress in aligning its visa policy with the acquis but Estonia still needs to prepare for the application upon accession of the 
regulation on the uniform format for visa, in particular to improve identity checks and detection of attempts to misuse visas, and the regulation on the common 
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visa lists. Alignment with the administrative provisions of the Common Consular Instructions that need to be applied upon accession is also required. 
In the framework of the establishment of a Visa Register, which was introduced on a trial basis within the Citizenship and Migration Board at the beginning of 
September, Estonia needs to introduce the electronically-supported system for issuing visas in all its diplomatic missions, and connect the query system at border 
crossings to a central database of visa applicants. Visa 
offices throughout the country will also gradually have to be equipped with a similar system. 
2002 Since the 2001 Regular Report, further progress has been made in Estonia in the fields of data protection, border control, visas, migration, police co-operation 
and judicial cooperation. 
Estonia has made good progress in aligning its visa policy with that of the EU, includingairport transit visas. In terms of administrative capacity, Estonia has set 
up an onlinenational Visa Register. The Estonian Citizenship and Migration Board implemented theVisa Register in August 2001. In September 2001, the Visa 
Register was introduced atborder checkpoints. Since November 2001 all visas in Estonian foreign representationsare processed through the Visa Register. The 
online national Visa Register became fullyoperational in February 2002, and it will be able to function as part of the NationalInformation System (N-SIS) 
containing Schengen-compatible data.Estonia is making progress in aligning itself with the Schengen / EU requirements andcontinuing to prepare for future 
participation in the Schengen Information System (SIS II) in line with its Schengen Action Plan of July 2001. 
Estonia started to introduce new ID cards in January 2002, also for non-Estonian citizens.The ID card is an internal identification document and a device 
enabling the holder togive digital signatures. ID cards of resident aliens, in addition, contain data of residenceand work permits. The new passports, introduced in 
February 2002, are machine-readable and are compliant with EU requirements in terms of increased security levels. 
Overall assessment 
As regards visa policy, Estonia has made progress through the introduction of the new visa register. Estonia still needs to adopt the necessary provisions and 
ensureadministrative capacity in order to guarantee effective implementation of the new visa regulation upon accession. In particular, it should complete the 
alignment with the lists of countries whose nationals are exempt from visa obligation when crossing the external borders of Member States, namely through the 
conclusion of visa-freeagreements. 
Estonia should continue its efforts to align with the rules of the Common Consular Instructions and ensure proper functioning of the visa-issuing procedures, 
administrative management and organisation. All diplomatic and consular services should be provided with equipment to detect forged or falsified documents.  
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On visa policy, Estonia has almost completed alignment with the EU visa acquis. 
Estonia has introduced visas requirements for all countries with EU visa obligations and has to implement and complete bilateral visa free travel arrangements 
with 17 outstanding countries. Estonia should also introduce a visa sticker following the 
transmission of the relevant technical specifications by the EU in August 2003. As regards implementation and administrative capacity, the national visa register 
is operational, with connections with the Estonian foreign representations for processing 
visa requests. The capacity of the consulates in the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine need to be reinforced. Estonia also has to provide all diplomatic and 
consular missions with equipment to detect forged and falsified documents. 
Estonia is essentially meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations and is expected to be able to implement by accession 













1997 avis Some 40 million border crossings were made in 1995; of these some 103,000 were illegal. Migrants are coming from Romania, former Yugoslavia and the NIS, 
aiming to transit Hungary to the west (although Hungary is also becoming a target country). Hungary has visa-free agreements with EU countries and the NIS 
(for the latter invitation letters are required); Hungary is considering its position on the visa-free agreements with the NIS in the light of the requirement to 
harmonise with the EU list of third countries for which visas are required. Hungary is also modernising its consular visa issuing procedures, which already 
stipulate that visas must be issued abroad. A comprehensive review of aliens legislation is under way in the light of EU requirements. Currently some 2,000 
immigration permits a year are issued to ethnic Hungarians. Those unable to justify their 
status within the country can be subject to measures ranging from restrictions on movement to detention and deportation - these measures can be challenged 
before a court of law. Readmission agreements are in place with Austria and neighbouring countries; such agreements are in preparation with France, Germany, 
Belgium, NL and Greece and with Russia, Turkey, India, Pakistan, China and Vietnam. Border management is currently being modernised at the Austrian border 
and the Government plans (in part with PHARE assistance if made available) to upgrade information systems at the borders, introduce passport readable 
machines and to upgrade all remaining border points. The Government has submitted to parliament a draft law on border management and the organisation of the 
border guard. 
Current and Prospective Assessment 
The visa systems with regard to the NIS and other non-associated neighbours remain unsatisfactory and Hungary will need to ensure that the facilitation of 
crossing by ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries does not detract in any significant way from the need to carry out effective border controls at the 
future external border. 
 
1998 In its 1997 Opinion, the Commission stressed as a priority the need for efficient border controls including a visa regime increasingly close to that of the EU and 
an asylum policy without geographical reservations and with sufficient resources. 
Conclusion 
Hungary has confirmed its ability to make progress in taking on the Community acquis by focusing on the two major deficiencies identified in the short-term 
priorities of the Accession Partnership: asylum legislation with no geographical limits and a better system of managing border controls. Considerable progress 
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has been made in these areas. In the interests of meeting the medium-term objectives, the existing efforts should be expanded to include: 
- a law on foreign nationals and a visa policy suited to the requirements of the EU (and covering the Commonwealth of Independent States) ; 
1999 The Commission underlined in the 1998 Regular Report, the necessity of adopting a new law on foreigners and a visa policy suited to the requirements of the 
EU. 
In the area of visa policy, Hungary has prepared a programme to harmonise Hungarian visa requirements with the acquis. The visa obligation for airport transit 
for nationals of certain countries, introduced in September 1998 in accordance with the relevant EU Joint Action on airport transit arrangements, has not yet been 
implemented. Hungary should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. 
2000 Since the 1999 Regular Report, progress was registered in Hungary in the fields of visas, border management, migration and asylum. However, little progress is 
to be reported in the field of judicial co-operation.  
In the area of visas, the Hungarian legislation was further aligned with the acquis by introducing a free travel regime for citizens of New Zealand and Venezuela. 
A new agreement with Brazil was signed. In August 1999, the obligation to have airport transit visas was introduced for citizens of a number of countries. In 
June 2000, an Interim Compulsory Visa Agreement between Hungary and Russia entered into force for all kinds of income-generating activities, for the purpose 
of pursuing studies and for a stay exceeding 30 days. For all other activities, Russian citizens can enter Hungary without visa, provided that they have an 
invitation letter or sufficient financial coverage. Hungary also concluded Compulsory Visa Agreements with Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Armenia and 
Turkmenistan. 
A new visa issuing system was created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with an on-line information system supporting consular work. Simultaneously, training 
of professional staff using the new system has started, and equipment for the recognition of counterfeit or falsified documents was purchased. 
Overall assessment 
The basic provisions of the acquis in the field of Justice and Home Affairs are already implemented. 
Additional efforts are needed to align with the visa acquis, in particular as concerns the visa exemption for citizens of Belarus, Cuba, FRY, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine. The agreements on simplified formalities for border crossing signed with Ukraine and FRY will also need to be amended as they exempt citizens living 
permanently near the border from the obligation to carry passports. The regulation on a uniform visa format and the rules of the Common Consular Instructions 
also need to be further aligned. There is a need to strengthen the Consular System and Hungary’s capacity to detect falsified documents. 
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2001 Since the last Regular Report, progress has been registered in Hungary in numerous fields such as visa policy, migration, asylum, the fight against organized 
crime, corruption, drugs and judicial co-operation. 
As to visa policy new visa obligations have been introduced for Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, FYROM and Russia. Concerning the uniform visa 
format, the new Law on Entry and Stay of Foreigners adopted in May 2001 provided for new visa stickers further aligning with the acquis. The law that will be 
introduced in January 2002 also provides for the exchange of personal data between the co-operating aliens policing authorities and ensures alignment with the 
requirements of the Common Consular Instructions. These provisions will, however, only be applicable upon accession. The Hungarian on-line system to 
support the visa procedure has been extended offering access to 59 diplomatic and consular. 77 out of 91 consular missions 
received equipment for the detection of forged documents, with devices corresponding to standards set by the acquis for low risk countries, while 10 missions 
have been supplied with devices supplemented by infra-red cameras and monitors. 
Hungary has initiated local consular co-operation in certain third countries with their visa partners (France and Portugal) and instructed all its missions to 
participate in EU consular cooperation wherever possible. Staff of the office of immigration and naturalisation has been further increased. 
Furthermore, the Hungarian Government drew up a Schengen Action Plan in March 2001, which addresses the main issues of the acquis.  
Negotiations for bilateral agreements on border traffic control with neighbouring countries are under way. 
Overall assessment 
Overall, Hungary has reached a high level of alignment with the acquis. Continued efforts were made to align the Hungarian visa regime with that of the EU. 
However, further efforts are still needed to align with the acquis, in particular as regards visa obligations and visa-free travel. 
As regards Hungary's agreements on simplified border crossing with its neighbours, this kind of agreement is not in harmony with the acquis. Hungary will need 
to take the necessary steps to remedy this situation. Practical co-operation between the Hungarian Border Guards and their Romanian, Ukrainian and 
Yugoslavian colleagues is increasingly hampered by a growing discrepancy with regard to technical and other resources. 
2002 Since the last Regular Report, considerable progress has been registered in Hungary in numerous fields such as visa policy, the Schengen Action Plan and the 
fight against fraud and corruption. 
As to visa policy, new visa obligations were introduced for nationals of Cuba, the Seychelles and the Republic of South Africa. The visa requirement has been 
abolished for the special administrative regions of Macao (December 2001) and Hong Kong (February 2002). The new Act on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners, 
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which entered into force in January 2002, provided the legislative framework for the introduction of a new visa sticker with higher security standards. These 
started to be issued as of September 2002. An electronic Consular Information System supporting the issuing of visas (recording and storing the visa 
applications, printing the issued visa stickers) has become operational at the Office of Immigration and Naturalisation. All consular missions are now connected 
to the Consular Information System. The establishment of the register on visas and visa applications is in progress. In July 2002, Hungary submitted a revised 
Schengen Action Plan. As far as migration is concerned, an amended Law on Entry and Stay of Foreigners entered into force in January 2002, which introduced 
the unified residence permit and simplified expulsion rules. Anyone wanting to stay longer than 90 days in the country can apply for a one-year extendible visa. 
Residence of unlimited duration will be granted after five years of stay in the country, instead of three as before, and people with at least eight years of 
immigrant status can apply for citizenship. This means that foreign nationals will be able to initiate naturalisation procedures 13 years after arriving in the 
country. 
Overall assessment 
In the area of visa policy, legislation should be further aligned as regards EU visa obligations and EU visa-free travel. The number of staff of the Aliens Policing 
Division of the Office for Immigration and Nationality has to be increased in order to ensure that visa applications are dealt with expeditiously. 
All the provisions of the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries adopted in June 2001, including those concerning migration, will have to be 
applied in accordance with the acquis from the date of accession Negotiations on this chapter have been provisionally closed. Hungary has not requested any 
transitional arrangements in this area and is generally meeting the commitments it has made in the accession negotiations in this field. 
In order to complete its preparations for membership, Hungary.s efforts now need to focus on finalising alignment (data protection, visa policy), Bilateral 
relations remained equally constructive with most of its neighbours. However, some political tensions arose with Romania and Slovakia concerning the Law on 
Hungarians living in Neighbouring Countries (.status law.), which entered into force in January 2002. This law had been adopted in June 2001 without due 
consultation of Hungary.s neighbours. It was designed to foster the position of the Hungarian minorities abroad and granted them, on the basis of registration, in 
Hungary, certain rights and privileges in the areas of education and culture. Following the recommendations of the Council of Europe.s Commission for 
Democracy through Law (.Venice Commission.) on the roles and tasks of kin-states and home-states in minority protection, Hungary adopted in December 2001 
and January 2002 legislation implementing the status law, which is broadly compatible with these recommendations. As agreed in a Memorandum of 
Understanding between Hungary and Romania, the law should have been revised in certain points in June 2002, but no progress can be reported in this respect. 
As regards Slovakia, an agreement on the application of the law is still pending. Hungary committed itself to repeal before accession any provision, which would 
not be compatible with EC law. 
As regards the .status law., the Commission will continue to monitor the situation and will request Hungary to bring the law at the latest upon accession . in line 
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with the anti-discrimination provisions enshrined in the EC Treaty. 
2003 So far, Hungary’s preparations with regard to the Schengen provisions (Schengen Action Plan) relevant for accession are satisfactory, but further efforts will be 
needed after accession to prepare for the lifting of internal borders and the full implementation of the Schengen acquis on the basis of a further decision to be 
taken by the Council. The preparation for integration into the Schengen Information System (SIS) II is progressing well, in terms of the development of national 
applications. However, Hungary needs to monitor the situation closely. 
Hungary has made progress in the area of visa policy but has not yet achieved full alignment with the acquis, in particular as concerns the “positive” visa list. As 
regards implementation and administrative capacity, considerable progress has been made in relation to infrastructure, recruitment of staff, training and 
installation of information technology for the development of the consular network. All consular missions are connected to the Consular Information System. 
The centralised visa register has been established. Hungary is in the process of providing all diplomatic and consular missions with equipment to detect forged 
and falsified documents. 
The most important border crossing points are now equipped with the necessary materials according to Schengen standards. In addition, simplified border 
crossing agreements were concluded with Slovakia in 2002, and with Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania and Ukraine in 2003. 
Conclusion 
Hungary is essentially meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations and is expected to be able to implement by accession 










1997 avis Latvia has visa free agreements with UK, Ireland, Denmark and Iceland. 
Such agreements are about to come into force with Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
Visa-free arrangements also exist with a number of Central European Countries. 
Operates a visa-free travel zone with Lithuania and Estonia. 
Latvia has adopted the EU third-country list for which visas are required. 
1998 Since July 1997 bilateral agreements abolishing visas have entered into force with Andorra, Lichtenstein, Malta, Norway, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden. 
Similar agreement has been signed with Slovenia. 
1999 New visa legislation adopted in April 1999 
Since September 1998 bilateral visa-free regimes have entered into force between Latvia and Austria, France, Germany, Croatia, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Germany 
and Portugal and have been signed with Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
Visas, basically in accordance with the EU standards are already being delivered and by the end of 1999 are expected to be machine readable. 
Latvia has no transit visa agreements or a system for Airport Transit Visas. 
The simplified local border crossing procedures with Russia and Belarus need to be brought into line with the EU visa requirements. 
It is possible to enter Latvia on a tourist visa and to get a work permit without leaving the country. 
Students have no right to work for limited periods and are not required to prove their social insurance cover when they arrive. 
Latvia should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU.  
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2000 In January 2000 a unified visa information registration system which operates on-line with diplomatic consulates abroad was introduced.  
In May 2000 amendments were passed in the Law on issuing of visas providing for introduction of airport transit visas as from July 2000. 
Work on the implementation of the machine-readable visas continued. 
In March and in accordance with the requirements of the Schengen acquis, the Latvian government denounced the interim inter-governmental agreement on 
simplified local border crossing procedures between Russia and Latvia. The special permits have been replaced by charge-free visas for the local residents and 
these visas, unlike the special permits give access to the entire territory. 
The new regime will take effect six months after notifying the other party. 
Visas for Belarus were introduced in January 2000 
A bilateral agreement on establishing a visa-free regime was signed with Japan (in force) and with Israel in January and May 2000 respectively. 
Overall assessment. Regarding visa   policy Latvian legislation is broadly in line. 
Visa requirements have been introduced for all countries according to the acquis. 
Following the legislative amendments, the implementation of the airport transit visa regime now needs to be ensured. 
A proper transit zone at Riga airport, in order to cope with the expected larger flows of passengers carrying transit visas in the future, needs to be established. 
The on-line connection system for visa aplications between border crossing points and the central database should be completed as well as the issue of machine 
readable visas. 
Latvia will still have to develop a Schengen-type visa sticker and to generalize the electronically supported system for visa-issuing to all its diplomatic missions 
and to introduce the general obligation for personal application for visas. 
2001 As far as visa policy is concerned, progress has been made in amending visa-issuing procedure regulations which specify the conditions for refusal of entry. 
In 2000, bilateral agreements on a visa-free regime were concluded with Israel, Japan and Cyprus.  
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At present visa free regimes have been established with 32 states.  
The establishment of the transit zone at the airport was completed in August 2001. 
With a view to aligning with the acquis, Latvia has denounced the agreement with Russian on a simplified border crossing procedure for the inhabitants of the 
frontier area. Since October 2000, the special permits have been replaced  by free of charge visas for local residents 
Since November 2000, border guards have been carrying out checks on transit trains throughout Latvia and in March 2001, a decision was adopted to denounce 
the agreement with Russia on transit train passengers crossing the territory of Latvia. 
As regards administrative capacity visa matters are managed by the Department of Citizenship and Migration affairs. Since January 2001, the Unified visa 
information system has been operating online with diplomatic consulates abroad, and machine-readable visas are currently issued at 29 diplomatic and consular 
representative offices. 
Visas cannot be issued at border crossing points with the exception of Riga airport where the DCMA can issue visas to citizens of the “white list” countries. (in 
2000, 3% of the total number of visas issued were issued at the airport). 
An Action Plan on the implementation of the Schengen acquis was adopted in May 2001. 
Assessment. Latvia has continued to advance in aligning its visa policy, introducing a visa-free regime with several further countries and terminating existing 
visa-free regimes where required. 
Regarding the Unified Visa Information System (UVIS) some border crossings points still need to be connected with the online system. 
In order to improve identity checks and the detention of attempts to misuse visas, it is still necessary to prepare for the application, upon accession, of the 
regulation on the uniform format for visas and complete the connection of the query system at border crossings to a central database. Visa offices throughout the 
country will also gradually have to be equipped with a similar system. The capacity to detect falsified documents will have to be enhanced. 
The issuing of machine-readable visas needs to be completed, along with equipping of all divisions of the Department of Citizenship and Migration Affairs with 
printing machines. 
2002 The regulation concerning visa issuing was amended, i.e. extending the uniform visa and limiting the issuing of new visas. 
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Amendments in force wince May 2002 require transit visas for transit train passengers. 
Since the last regular report, agreements on a visa-free regime have been concluded with Monaco, Panama and Romania. 
At present, a mutual visa free regime has been established with 16 states, and with two states a visa free regime is applied unilaterally. 
As regards administrative capacity, the development of the Unified Visa Information System has continued and implementation of the Invitation Database and 
Entry Prohibition Database continued. 
Latvia is making progress in aligning itself with the Schengen/EU requirements and continues to prepare for future participation in the Schengen information 
system (SIS II). The government has established a very thorough Schengen Action Plan in this respect, which was revised in October 2001. 
In May 2002, the Law on Identity Cards and Passports, which defines the types, contents and usage of ID cards and passports, was adopted. The new passport 
system will include citizens and non citizens’ passports, diplomatic and service passports, as well as stateless persons travel documents. All these documents will 
serve as travel documents and will be elaborated in accordance with the demands stipulated in the resolution of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) of 1999 and the Council Resolution of 17 October 2000 as regards passport contents, structure and security. 
Assessment. Latvia has continued to advance visa policy and its legislation is now broadly in line with the acquis. It is now essential o adopt all the necessary 
provisions and to put in place the necessary structures in advance of accession in order to ensure effective implementation upon accession of the new visa acquis. 
While Latvia has further expanded the visa free regime to several countries, this alignment needs to be completed. The adoption of the envisaged new Law on 
Immigration together with the implementing regulations and instruction will be essential to address the remaining shortcomings in this field. 
While progress was made regarding the uniform format for visas in line with the acquis, Latvia should continue its efforts to align with the rules of the Common 
Consular Instructions and to ensure proper functioning of the visa-issuing procedures, administrative management and organization. Enhanced cooperation 
between the different authorities dealing with visa issues should be promoted further. The development of the on-line Unified Visa Information System is on 
track. Its extension to all border checkpoints and diplomatic and consular institutions needs now to be ensured. 




The most developed part of this chapter is the Schengen acquis, which entails the lifting of the internal border controls. However, much of this acquis will not 
apply to the acceding countries upon accession, but only after a separate Council Decision. The Schengen Implementation Action Plan aims at preparing this on 
the basis of a credible schedule for the introduction of the Schengen provisions. Binding rules which must be put in place as from accession include part of the 




instruments. On issues such as border control, illegal migration, drug trafficking and money laundering , organized crime, police and judicial cooperation, data 
protection and the mutual recognition of court judgments, acceding countries need to be equipped to meet adequate standards of administrative capacity. 
Preparation with regard to Schengen provisions (Schengen Action Plan) relevant to accession is still satisfactory, but efforts will be needed after accession to 
prepare for the lifting of internal borders and full implementation of the Schengen acquis on the basis of a further decision to be taken by the Council. 
The separation of traffic at air and sea ports should be subject to further monitoring. 
The preparation for integration into the Schengen Information System (SIS II) is still at a preliminary stage, in terms of development of national applications. 
 
Latvia has continued to advance on visa policy and its legislation is broadly in line with the EU visa acquis. Latvia has aligned with the acquis regarding 
countries with EU visa obligations. However, Latvia still has to align its policy with the acquis as regards EU visa free travel arrangements in relation to 18 
countries. 
Regarding visa issuing procedures, Latvia is largely in line with the acquis, but some implementation legislation remains to be adopted. 
As regards implementation and administrative capacity, a national visa register has been established and the Unified Visa Info System, including databases for 
invitations and entry prohibitions, is operational on-line at all embassies, consulates, and border control points. 
Efforts are still needed to continue improvements in infrastructure, recruitment of staff and training. At all diplomatic and consular missions, the technical and 
human resources capacity to detect forged and farcified documents should continue to be strengthened. 
Latvia is essentially meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations and is expected to be able to implement by accession the 








1997 avis There is a growing problem of illegal migrants, mostly from Asia, aiming to transit Lithuania to the west. Organized gangs are involved in attempts to traffic 
illegal immigrants through Lithuania to Poland. In early 1997 some 600 such migrants and potential refugees were being held at the Registration Centre pending 
resolution of their status. Lithuania has visa-free agreements with the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, several central European countries, and 
third countries, as well as Estonia and Latvia, with which it operates a visa free space. It is adopting the EU third country list for which visas are required. 
Lithuania's citizenship and aliens legislation generally respects democratic norms. Lithuania has readmission agreements Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Switzerland, Norway and the Ukraine. Lithuania is seeking to conclude, but has not yet reached, readmission agreements with Belarus and Russia. 
Border management with Belarus and Russia is still inadequate, with the border not being effectively demarcated. The border guard suffers from institutional 
and human resource deficiencies and a shortage of surveillance equipment. 
1998 On 13 February Lithuania signed a cooperation treaty with the international migration organisation under which it is developing a project to improve 
management of legal and illegal immigration. The mounting number of readmission agreements, the introduction of new identity cards and the adoption of an 
amendment to the penal code bringing in stiffer sanctions for trafficking in human beings should all help master migrant flows. Regarding border controls, 
Lithuania has fulfilled its obligations under the agreement on the demarcation of its eastern border. It is now up to Belarus to do the same. Lithuania is in the 
process of setting up a professional border guard service and equipping its border with electronic surveillance equipment. It is stepping up cooperation on border 
controls with the other two Baltic countries but controls are not yet up to EU standards. The lack of an automatic data-exchange network and lax controls at 
some crossing points are the main weaknesses. 
1999 As far as immigration is concerned, Lithuania abolished visa requirements for all Schengen states in 1998 and this came into force fully following ratification by 
Belgium in June 1999. The visa stickers are properly protected and meet EU standards. The visa legislation is, therefore, generally in line with EU requirements. 
The derogation concerning the provisional agreements on visa free crossings to the border region in Belarus and the Russian citizens of the Kaliningrad region 
will be abolished in the future. Lithuania should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. . Provisions for Airport 
Transit Visas will be needed by the time of accession although in practice, few flights transit via Lithuania and transit passengers are escorted. A new Law on the 
Status of Foreigners entered into force in July 1999. This makes the alignment in the migration area almost complete, for example by introducing carrier 
sanctions. Rules on illegal employment are in conformity with EU requirements apart from a minor procedural adjustment concerning checks on unemployed 
residents. Lithuanian has signed six re-admission agreements. However, it has not been able to obtain any formal readmission agreement with Russia. The 
practical arrangements on readmission of persons who enter illegally from Russia are the same as those of Finland, Estonia and Latvia. As far as border controls 
are concerned, Lithuania has achieved substantial results with increased investments, training and professionalism of the border police. The number of illegal 
migrants passing through Lithuania is significantly lower than in previous years reflecting the effectiveness of the measures of detection and return operations 
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established by the Lithuanian authorities. Lithuanian frontiers are well guarded. As regards the Lithuanian/Belarus border, Lithuania, which has completed the 
demarcation of its own part, is also actively contributing to the demarcation of the remaining part of the border which would normally fall under Belarussian 
responsibility. The Russian (Kaliningrad) border is marked throughout almost its entire length by a natural river boundary and is guarded by both sides. Formal 
demarcation is expected to follow the Russian ratification of the agreement signed in 1997. 
2000 As regards visa policy, there are no developments of note to report since the last Regular Report. 
In the field of border control, the Law on the State Border of the Republic of Lithuania and its Control was adopted by the Lithuanian Parliament in May 2000, 
addressing the relevant short term 1999 Accession Partnership priority. This will facilitate preparations for police and border cooperation in view of Lithuania’s 
implementation of the Schengen acquis. The Law’s main provisions include general requirements for border crossing and a simplified procedure of border 
crossing according to different categories of individuals. The new Law also sets out requirements for control of Lithuanian territorial sea and air space, rules for 
crossing of the state border by Lithuanian and foreign troops, and the imposition of a ban on transportation of nuclear or other mass destruction weapons through 
the state border. In addition, the Lithuanian Government has adopted a substantial amount of secondary legislation, in view of further complying with the acquis. 
Regarding demarcation of the Lithuania/Russia (Kaliningrad) border, formal demarcation is expected to start following the ratification by the Duma of the 
Russian Federation of the border agreement that was signed in 1997. The Lithuanian Parliament ratified the border agreement in November 1999. 
Overall assessment 
Lithuanian visa policy is close to being in line with the Schengen requirements. Lithuania has approved a list of countries whose citizens require visas and there 
is also a “white list” of countries whose citizens do not require visas, in compliance with the Schengen acquis. Lithuanian visa insets are properly protected and 
are in line with EU standards on visa protection. However, Lithuanian policy in respect of simplification of the visa regime for border residents of Belarus and 
Kaliningrad is not in line with the common visa policy and will need to be revised before accession. Furthermore, in accordance with the Schengen Agreements, 
a fully functioning National Schengen Information System has to be developed and implemented in order to ensure a secure external border and movement of 
persons. National and international inter-institutional cooperation on the visa policy should also be strengthened. The current system for issuing visas is 
computerised with a central visa register being maintained by the Migration Department. The visa register is in use at Vilnius airport. The Border Police 
Department and all the diplomatic and consular missions have access to the database of undesirable persons. 
2001 In the area of visa policy, there have been no legislative or administrative developments of note since last year’s Regular Report. 
In October 2001, Lithuania presented its Schengen Action Plan with a view to the implementation of the acquis. 
Overall assessment 
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Lithuania needs to fully align its visa policy with the acquis including as regards countries with which visa-free regime exists, visa sticker, and establishment of 
a central visa database. The Lithuanian visa regime in respect of third country citizens, including those from Belarus and Russia, will need to be brought into line 
with the acquis by the time of EU accession. 
2002 Regarding visa policy, Lithuania signed during the reporting period visa-free agreements with the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Macao and Mexico (with the 
latter for diplomatic passports holders). In January the Regulations for the Issuance of Visas were amended and as a result the airport transit visas were 
effectively introduced in April 2002. In November Lithuania requested permission from the Russian Federation to open a consulate in Sovetsk (Kaliningrad) and 
from Belarus to open a general consulate in Grodno, but no reply has yet been received. Lithuania adopted in October 2001 its Schengen Action Plan, which 
was subsequently updated in July. Lithuania continued practical preparations for its participation in the Schengen Information System. The new Law on the 
Control of Weapons, which was adopted in January and is to enter into force in July 2003, largely ensures alignment with the weapons and ammunition control 
acquis. Lithuania completed in October 2001 the 
reorganisation of the Police Department at the Ministry of the Interior and established the Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau. The Bureau includes the 
International Relations Service consisting of the Lithuanian National Interpol Bureau and is in future to include the SIRENE National Bureau. It has been 
decided that the International Relations Service will be responsible for police co-operation in accordance with Articles 39-46 of the Schengen Convention. 
Lithuania adopted in November the new Law on Passports. New passports will be in conformity with the security features of the acquis and the requirements set 
by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for machine-readable travel documents. 
New passports will be issued as from the end of 2002 at a rate of 400 000 per year. Old passports should be withdrawn from the circulation by the end of 2007. 
Overall assessment 
Lithuania has largely aligned its visa policy with the acquis. Efforts should focus on the full implementation of the new visa regulation, in particular regarding 
the list of countries whose nationals are exempt from visa obligations. Lithuania also needs to introduce a uniform format for visas in line with the acquis and 
further align with the Common Consular Instructions. It should also ensure the proper functioning of the visa issuing procedures, administrative management 
and organisation. The establishment of an online Visa Register as a constituent part of the Foreigner.s Register and the stepping up of the connection of all 
border checkpoints and diplomatic and consular institutions also need continued attention. The preparations for the introduction of transit visas for train 
passengers and lorry drivers crossing the territory of Lithuania to and from Kaliningrad as of 1 January 2003 are key developments. The Lithuanian decision on 
the general introduction of visa requirements 
for the residents of Kaliningrad as from 1 July 2003 should be implemented. Visas will also be introduced for nationals of Belarus and Ukraine as of 1 January 
2003. Lithuania should continue its efforts to open and enlarge its consular facilities in Kaliningrad, in mainland Russia and in Belarus. It should however be 
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noted that the success of these efforts depends, inter alia, on cooperation by the countries concerned. Negotiations on this chapter have been provisionally closed. 
2003 On visa policy Lithuania is continuing to align its legislation with the acquis. Lithuania needs to align with the Common Consular Instructions and be in full 
conformity with the so-called "positive" visa listswhere negotiations are still ongoing with 13 countries. Lithuania should also ensure alignment regarding the 
uniform visa format following the transmission of the relevant technical specifications by the EU in August 2003. As regards implementation and administrative 
capacity, sustained efforts are needed in relation to infrastructure, recruitment of staff, training, the installation of information technology and the establishment 
of a national visa register. This visa register needs to be connected, in a secure manner, to all diplomatic and consular posts. Lithuania is essentially meeting the 
commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations in the area of Justice and Home Affairs and is expected to be in a position to implement 
from accession the acquis in the areas of the Schengen Action Plan, data protection, visa policy, external borders, the fight against terrorism and drugs, 

















Malta should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. 
2000 No progress can yet be recorded on data protection, a short-term priority of the Accession Partnership, nor in the field of visa policy. 
Concerning border control, the passport system has been upgraded and now includes several new security features including digitised images and machine-
readable passports. 
Overall assessment 
In the field of visa policy, at present there are no Direct Airside Transit Visas (DATV) as required in the acquis for people not leaving the airport terminal. 
However, there are transit visas for non-national passengers who will arrive and depart within 24 hours. 
Many countries on the Common Visa List (CVL) do not require visas to enter Malta. Further alignment is therefore required in this regard. 
Overall, Malta must continue its efforts to harmonise its legislation with the acquis. In particular, a law on data and privacy protection, the alignment of 
Malta’s visa policy with the EU visa common list and the ratification of number of conventions for civil and penal judiciary co-operation, are necessary. 
2001 Since the 2000 Regular Report, little progress has been made in Malta in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. 
No particular development can be reported as regards data Protection and visa policy. 
There has been some progress in the implementation of the acquis in the field of control of external borders, and as regards preparations for the Schengen 
agreement. The Ministry for Home Affairs set up a project team in November 2000 to oversee Malta’s compliance with the Schengen acquis. The team drew 
up an action plan on the implementation of the acquis, which was submitted to the Commission in April 2001. The Action Plan addresses, among other things, 
staffing needs at border points and at the offices which will be connected to the SIRENE and National Schengen Information System, the Europol office, the 
aliens office, field operations and the analysis office. The project team is also acting in liaison with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the adoption of the 
Common Consular Instructions. Initial preparations are currently being made so that this Ministry would also make the necessary infrastructure and training 
preparations required for the implementation of the Schengen acquis and, in particular, those relating to consular co-operation. 
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Overall assessment 
As regards visa policy, further alignment is required. The adoption of a timetable for alignment to that end is a step forward but actual implementation of the 
alignment plan needs to start. 
As regards external borders and preparations for Schengen, work on the drawing-up of a Schengen Action Plan is a positive development. The structure of 
the border control branch/immigration branch of the Police, including certain units of the Malta Armed Forces (MAF), is effective. Co-ordination among 
competent authorities, police and Armed Forces, should be pursued and strengthened. However, at present, the maritime squad is not able to guarantee full 
control of pleasure boats and domestic fishing boats on their way to the archipelago of Malta. Compared to present Schengen standards, equipment is still poor 
and 
generally needs to be improved, particularly the control line equipment and ship- and landbased surveillance devices. 
2002 Malta has continued to make substantial progress in this chapter. Malta has made progress in aligning its visa policy with that of the EU. As from October 
2002, in line with the timetable established by the Government, Malta has introduced visa obligations for nationals from a first group of 38 countries. 
Although Malta does not yet issue airport transit vias, measures were introduced regarding the endorsement of the passports of nationals of the twelve 
countries requiring an airport transit visa under the Schengen acquis. The Immigration Police has embarked on an information campaign by including 
information on the new visa requirement in magazines and by informing travel agencies. 
Overall assessment 
As regards visas, Malta has now a precise timetable for alignment with the EU visa list. It foresees introduction of visas with another small group of countries 
(Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia) on 1 January 2003, while nationals of Libya will start requiring a visa to enter Maltese territory on the date of Malta’s 
accession to the EU. Malta should now provide all diplomatic and consular missions abroad with security and technical equipment including on-line 
connection with the central immigration authorities. Malta needs to remove visa requirements for Romanian citizens and also to align with the EU acquis on 
airport transit visas. Malta is well advanced in the adoption of the Schengen acquis. It needs to continue its preparation for full implementation of the 
Schengen acquis by further developing the Schengen Action Plan, maintaining a clear distinction between the requirements that must be applied upon 
accession and those which are connected to the Council Decision for the lifting of internal border controls. It must also set a detailed and realistic timetable to 
put in place the necessary infrastructure to adapt the seaports and airport to the Schengen / EU requirements, and must prepare the national system for the 
linkage to SIS II and continue efforts to establish the SIRENE office. Currently Malta is preparing for the implementation of the Common Consular 
Instructions. This preparation involves all parties concerned, mainly the Malta Police Force, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Armed Forces of Malta. 
An updated plan was finalised in October 2001 to acquire all the necessary equipment and provide the training required for the implementation of the acquis in 
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this area, and now needs to be implemented. Discussions are also being held to plan the steps required to conclude consular co-operation agreements with one 
or more Schengen states. 
Conclusion 
Negotiations on this chapter have been provisionally closed. Malta has not requested any transitional arrangements. Malta is generally meeting the 
commitments it has made in the accession negotiations in this field. 
In order to complete preparations for membership, Malta’s efforts now need to focus on completing alignment (visas, migration, customs co-operation) and on 
ensuring the implementation of the measures planned for the effective enforcement of the policies in this area, in particular as regards the Schengen Action 
Plan, asylum, data protection and money laundering. 
2003 Preparation with regard to Schengen provisions (Schengen Action Plan) relevant to accession is broadly satisfactory, but efforts will be needed after 
accession to prepare for the lifting of internal borders and for full implementation of the Schengen acquis on the basis of a further decision to be taken by the 
Council. The Schengen Action Plan was recently updated. Malta should continue with the further enhancement of equipment, in particular passport readers at 
the points of entry. The lack of passport readers at Malta International Airport as a main entrance gate to Malta should be addressed with urgency. 
Although an IT programme has been established, preparations for integration into the Schengen Information System (SIS) II are still at a preliminary stage, in 
terms of the development of national applications. Malta should accelerate the implementation of this programme and allocate sufficient financial means and 
manpower. 
Malta is broadly in line with the requirements of the EU acquis concerning visa policy. Malta has introduced visa requirements for Turkey, Marocco, Tunisia 
and Egypt, but still has to make provision for introducing visas for Libya. Malta still has to align its policy as regards the so-called “positive” visa list. As 
regards implementation capacity further efforts are needed in relation to infrastructure, recruitment and training of staff, and installation of information 
technology for the consulates. Some structural modifications at the Tripoli embassy have been achieved. Malta also has to provide all diplomatic and consular 
missions with equipment to detect forged and falsified documents. 
Conclusion 
Malta is essentially meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations and is expected to be able to implement the acquis in 





1997 avis Some 237 million border crossings were made in 1995. Many illegal migrants, especially from the NIS and increasingly from Asia, are seeking to cross to 
Germany, but also to stay in Poland, for economic reasons. At present the Polish Government does not have effective control on the residence of migrants and 
the new Aliens Law currently before Parliament aims to put in place an effective residence control system. Poland allows visa free visits from the West. Visa 
free access, with an invitation letter, is also allowed from NIS. Poland has in place the necessary legal and administrative measures covering deportation, 
detention and liability of carriers. Readmission agreements are in place with the Schengen countries, Greece, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovakia and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Border control is a particular priority for Poland. Parts of Poland's borders are vulnerable to exploitation by criminal 
gangs seeking to bring illegal immigrants to the West. Poland is working closely with some EU Member States, on both the Western and Eastern borders, to put 
in place the necessary procedures and facilities and is keen to develop these to the level that will allow it to accede to the Schengen convention. 
Current and Prospective Assessment 
Because of its geographical position (bordering the EU, several Associated countries and the NIS) its size and difficulties with reform in some areas, Poland is 
facing some significant challenges in the JHA sector. Poland has begun to take major steps to tackle these. For the most part the necessary domestic legislation 
and international conventions are in place, but important work still needs to be carried out on data protection and issues such as aliens law. Its visa policy 
towards the NIS is a matter of concern. The current major reform of the Ministry of the Interior is designed to improve the overall effectiveness of JHA 
institutions within the framework of the rule of law. 
 
1998 A new Aliens Act came into force on 27 December 1997 aligned on EU law, particularly in terms of admission rules. There are as yet no implementing 
provisions. There has been steady progress on visa policy, one of the short-term priorities of the accession partnership. Waiver agreements with Armenia, North 
Korea and Vietnam have been rescinded, but the more urgent situation with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus has yet to be settled. 
Conclusion 
One of the short-term priorities in the accession partnership was better border control, particularly with Belarus and Ukraine, and alignment on the EU's visa 
arrangements. Progress has been recorded in both these areas. 
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1999 The challenges identified in the 1998 Regular Report in the areas of drugs, border controls, immigration, visa policy and international crime remain significant 
and the judicial process still requires extensive improvement. 
In respect of immigration, Poland is a transit country on the way to Western Europe for large groups of immigrants from the neighbouring region and Southern 
Asia. Poland should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. Poland still has to undertake efforts to align its visa 
policy to the EU line since nationals of states subject to visa obligation under EU rules may enter Poland without a visa, inter alia, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
The 'official invitation' delivered by the local Polish Administration is not a substitute to the visa although it represents the first step towards a full control, since 
all such visitors are then registered. 
The improvements to the eastern border of Poland to make it comply with the requirements of an external EU border are seemingly proceeding in an 'ad hoc' 
manner. 
Aside from the purely JHA requirements due care is expected in safeguarding cross border and international relations with eastern neighbours and in establishing 
the proper sequential 'international co-operation' planning of the establishment of the future 'external border'. 
Conclusion 
Poland needs to address key deficiencies in the short term in particular the comprehensive reform of the legislation on foreigners should remedy the deficiencies 
in admission requirements and visa policy. 
2000 Since the 1999 regular report, progress has been noted in general in Poland in all the areas covered by co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs” 
As far as development of the visa policy is concerned, the Polish government has now authorised the Minister of Foreign Affairs to start bilateral discussions on 
the canceling of visa free travel from Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine. This is an important policy signal, particularly in respect of the Ukraine where currently 
neither visa nor "voucher" system is required. In line with this, progress has been made over the past twelve months in the further strengthening of administrative 
capacity so as to be able to align the Polish visa regime. New consular offices have been opened in Russia, Armenia, and Mongolia, and three have been opened 
in the Ukraine. Upgrading of offices has also taken place in Kaliningrad, Minsk and Brest on the Belarus border. Computerisation of the visa issuing process has 
begun and is being extended to all consular offices, which will allow for 
positive vetting controls at the border posts which are already equipped with computerised passport reading technology. 
Overall assessment 
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Some progress has been made in alignment with the acquis. Visa policy is moving towards alignment though a process of gradual adoption in parallel with the 
establishment of the necessary administrative capacity aimed at sustaining cooperation 
at the future external border. 
2001 Since the 2000 Regular Report, fundamental legislative steps have been taken in Poland in the fields of border controls, police co-operation, data protection, 
visas and migration. However, only limited progress can be reported on the fight against fraud and corruption and in judicial co-operation. 
As far as visa policy is concerned, the amendment to the Aliens Act which was adopted in June 2001 and entered into force in July 2001 brings Poland into close 
alignment with the acquis. An “EU” format for Polish passports is provided for by a Regulation adopted in May. 
During the reporting period, Poland terminated visa exemption agreements with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Cuba. The intended visa introduction for Belarus, Russia and Macedonia has not yet taken place, due to the fact that the negotiations with the 
countries concerned have not been completed, and due to a lack of funding. Visas continue to be granted at borders in increasing numbers. This practice is not in 
line with the acquis. 
A series of measures have been introduced in the past twelve months with a view to strengthening administrative capacity in this field. Since spring 2001, the 
Polish computer system for migration POBYT has been available on-line in the relevant Voivodship (regional) departments and at 72 border-crossing points. 
Some modest additional strengthening of consular structures has been undertaken compared to that reported last year. In order to prepare for the visa 
introduction for Ukraine, the location has been chosen for the opening of two new consular posts in Ukraine: Lutsk and Odessa. Poland adopted a Schengen 
Action Plan in August 2001. 
Poland adopted a Schengen Action Plan in August 2001. This constitutes a supplement to the Integrated Border Management Strategy for the planned legislative 
and institutional changes resulting from the Schengen acquis. 
Overall assessment 
With the 2001 amendments to the Aliens Act, Poland has largely completed the legislative alignment of its visa policy with that of the European Union. Poland 
has also terminated existing visa-free regimes with a large number of countries, and is preparing the imposition of visas on all countries necessary to ensure full 
alignment before accession. Visa-free regimes have still to be abolished in the cases of Belarus, Russia, Macedonia and Ukraine. The administrative capacity 
remains insufficient mainly due to lack of funding, despite further computerisation efforts. It is crucial for Poland to improve its administrative capacity and 
provide for the necessary funding in view of the very large number of visa applications expected. 
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However, Poland’s remaining lack of visa alignment in respect of Russia, Belarus and especially Ukraine (see above) is proving detrimental to the effectiveness 
of the border management. This is especially important as the pressure is increasing on the external borders, especially on sea borders. 
2002 Since the 2001 Regular Report, little progress can be reported as regards visa policy. 
As far as visa policy is concerned, adjustments have been made since the last Regular Report to the timetable set out in the Polish National Programme for 
Preparations for membership for completing alignment with the acquis. Visas for Cuba were introduced, with some delay, in February 2002. As a first step in 
introducing visas with the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine, in May 2002 Poland notified the national authorities about the termination of the agreement 
of 1985 (with the then Soviet Union) on simplified border crossing with these countries. The termination will take effect 12 months after notification, but until 
the full introduction of visas this measure is not expected to have a marked impact on bilateral traffic with these countries, since the agreement with the Russian 
Federation has in essence been frozen since 1994, and those for Belarus and Ukraine nationals concern about 6000 people a year. FYROM was notified in July 
2002 of the termination of the visa-free agreement, with effect as of November 2002. 
With regard to development of human and material capacity during the reporting period, in December 2001 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a Co-
ordination Unit for preparations for the introduction of the EU visa regime with the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine as from July 2003. The plans 
include the development of infrastructure, including the opening of 2 new consulates in Ukraine (in Lutsk and Odessa), adjustments at 10 existing consulates in 
the Russian Federation, modernization of three consulates in Belarus, information technology equipment, staffing and training. 
The design phase of the information technology infrastructure for delivering visas in consular posts abroad has been almost completed, but implementation is not 
yet evident. Little progress seems to have been made since October 2001. 
Following the extension of the list of countries subject to visa obligations before entering Poland, the number of visas issued in the consular posts increased in 
2001 to some 244 000, which was a 30% increase compared to 2000. The number of visas issued in Poland at the voivodship level (figures originating from the 
Office for Repatriation and Aliens) has, conversely, decreased, following the entry into force of the new Aliens Law, in July 2001. In 1998, almost 44 000 visas 
had been issued in Poland, compared to 13 446 in 2000 and 11 232 in 2001. In December 2001 a decision was taken by the Chief of the Border Guard 
Headquarters in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to radically decrease from January 2002 the number of visas issued at border crossings. 
Actual practice should be in line with Schengen rules, which provide for visa issuance at the border only in exceptional cases. The results are tangible: whereas 2 
825 visas were issued at the borders in the first quarter of 2001, only 256 were issued during the same period of 2002, which means a decline of more than 90%. 
Overall assessment 
Further efforts are required with respect to visa policy. The most difficult aspects of achieving full alignment with the EU visa acquis remain to be tackled. 
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Poland still has to make provision for introducing visas for three of the countries with EU visa obligations: the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine. As for 
the EU visa-free travel list, Poland has not yet completely aligned its visa policy. Indeed, nationals of some countries on that list are still required to obtain visas 
for travel to Poland (Australia, Canada, Brunei, Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador, New Zealand and Venezuela). Moreover, further 
adjustments may be required to the "invitation" procedure so as to address concerns that it does not fully meet the requirements of the acquis. Alignment with the 
list of countries for airport transit visas is also needed. The full alignment of the Polish visa policy will require a very significant strengthening of the 
administrative capacity to enable a number of visas several times greater than the current rate to be issued. Substantial efforts are required in terms of staff, since 
the consular staff should be considerably increased, and in terms of infrastructure, notably the extension of the consular network and the related information 
technology systems to diplomatic and consular representations and border crossing points. The equipment required for the detection of falsified documents, as 
recommended in the Council recommendations of May 1998 and April 1999, is not yet in place. The same applies for most of the border crossing points. Full 
compliance is still needed as regards the visa sticker and its security features. Negotiations on this chapter have been provisionally closed. Poland has not 
requested any transition periods under this chapter in the negotiations. Poland is meeting the majority of the commitments it has made in the negotiations in this 
field. There have been some delays in meeting the time-tables for introducing visas to third countries and in the case of the Russian Federation, Belarus and 
FYROM, these timetables have been revised. 
2003 The most developed part of this chapter is the Schengen acquis, which results in the lifting of internal border controls. However, much of this acquis will not 
apply to the acceding countries upon accession, but only after a later separate Council Decision. The 
Schengen Implementation Action Plan aims at preparing this on the basis of a credible schedule for the introduction of the Schengen provisions. Binding rules 
which must be put in place as from accession include part of the rules on visas, rules on external borders and the acquis on migration, asylum, police co-
operation, combating organized crime, fight against terrorism, fraud and corruption and drugs, customs co-operation as well as human rights legal instruments. 
Preparation with regard to Schengen provisions (Schengen Action Plan) relevant for accession is still broadly satisfactory, but certain delays have occurred in 
completing legal alignment as regards border control and surveillance. 
On visa policy, alignment with the regulation concerning visa-obligated and nonobligated countries is continuing. Poland has aligned its policy with the so-
called "negative" list by the introduction, as from 1 October, of visa obligations for its three eastern neighbours: the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine. 
Poland still has to fully align its policy as regards the so-called “positive” visa list. As regards implementation and administrative capacity Poland continues to 
face important challenges. Further efforts are needed in relation to infrastructure, recruitment of staff and training, as well as for installation of information 
technology for the consulates in the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine. Furthermore, an adequate national visa register still needs to be established. 
Poland also has to provide all diplomatic and consular missions with equipment to detect forged and falsified documents. 
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Conclusion 
Poland is partially meeting the majority of commitments and requirements for membership in relation to the Schengen Action Plan, visa policy, external 


















1997 avis Immigration/Border Control 
Romania estimates there are some 18 000-20 000 illegal immigrants from Asia and Africa on its soil. Organized crime is involved in human trafficking. As a 
consequence of unsatisfactory visa, admission and border control policy, in the early 1990s the EU placed Romania on the list of third countries for which visas 
are required. Romania has now adopted the EU third country list, having suspended its visa-free agreements with 17 countries. The authorities have taken steps 
to reform visa-issuing procedures, to verify invitation letters, and tighten up passport-issuing procedures. A new law on foreigners is in preparation, aiming to 
tackle illegal immigration, clandestine labour, deportation of illegal migrants and to tighten up the residence regime. Readmission agreements are in place with 
15 countries. Romania is also working to improve its border management systems; information networks are limited and the frontier guard remains largely 
unreformed. 
 
Current and Prospective Assessment 
Romania has made some progress in meeting the EU acquis in the area of asylum, but progress in other areas is limited. Accountability of the JHA authorities is 
in place formally, but the level of public scrutiny is, in practice, limited and prosecution of abuses rare. Romania's JHA institutions and the judiciary are at an 
early stage in the reform process. There is only very limited experience at official level of JHA cooperation with EU countries. 
Long-standing problems exist in the field of immigration, visa and border control policy which are only now being addressed. Organized crime is a particular 
problem and implementing mechanisms and instruments to address it are still at an early stage. Drug trafficking is a serious problem which is not effectively 
under the control of the authorities. 
Conclusion 
Romania faces particular challenges in the JHA area. Until now it has made only limited progress towards meeting the necessary conditions of the JHA acquis. It 
will be difficult to meet the acquis (present and future) requirements in the medium term. The necessary progress in this field is dependent on a more general 
institutional reform which derives from the political process. 
1998 In July 1997 the Commission noted that Romania had particular problems in the area of justice and home affairs, particularly as regards supervision and control 
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of enforcement agencies and the fight against organized crime and drugs. Little had been done to tackle issues such as immigration policy, issuing of visas and 
border control. Progress would depend on a process of generalized institutional reform. 
Immigration /Border controls 
Romania is both a country of emigration and a country of transit. It has extended (to 85) the list of countries whose nationals are subject to visa requirements, 
and on the EU's recommendation it now requires an airport/port transit visa from nationals of 12 countries. It has so far concluded readmission agreements with 
nine EU Member States and cooperation in this area is satisfactory. 
However, no significant progress has been recorded on border controls, though this was one of the three short-term priorities of the Accession Partnership and 
particular attention should be paid to the borders with Moldova and Ukraine and the port of Constanta. The reasons for this inaction include poor demarcation of 
the respective duties of border guards and border police and grossly inadequate training. Romania urgently needs to clarify the interdepartmental division of 
responsibilities and make a major effort to acquire surveillance equipment and information systems. This is one of the things that must be done before acceding 
to the country's request to be taken off the common list. 
Conclusion 
In the short-term priorities for the Accession Partnership the Commission called on Romania to step up its efforts to combat corruption and organized crime and 
improve border controls. No significant progress has been recorded in any of these three areas. 
There have been some improvements on visas and readmission policy, and seven major international legal instruments have been signed or ratified or have 
entered into force. Even on this front, however, Romania still has to ratify some agreements, including the European Conventions on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters and Money Laundering, and adopt the necessary implementing legislation. 
Broadly speaking what is required now is for Romania to give effect to the numerous reforms announced in the field of justice and home affairs, particularly the 
institutional reform urged on it by the Commission in July 1997, and allocate the human and financial resources necessary for their effective implementation . 
1999 In the 1998 Report the Commission concluded that no significant progress had been achieved on combating corruption and organized crime and improving 
border control. Some progress was registered on visas, readmission policy and adoption of a number of international legal instruments. It was concluded that 
Romania broadly speaking should give effect to the numerous reforms announced in the field of justice and home affairs, particularly the institutional reform, 
and allocate the human and financial resources necessary for their effective implementation. 
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Immigration/Border control 
So far as immigration is concerned, illegal frontier crossing is considered since June 1999 as an criminal act punishable by 3 months to 2 years imprisonment. 
Similarly the act of recruiting, directing and guiding a person with the purpose of illegal frontier crossing is also considered a criminal act which, in ‘aggravating 
circumstances’, can be punished by up to 7 years imprisonment. Despite these legal developments, the 1969 Aliens Law is still in force and Romania should give 
the highest priority to the adoption of a new law on foreigners fully in line with the acquis, especially in the fields of rights of residence of foreigners and the 
provision regarding the exit of foreigners from Romania. 
Romania continues to be concerned by EU visa requirements for its citizens and requests that this restriction be lifted. The requirement is perceived as 
discriminatory and as creating a practical obstacle in particular to business links and to activities in the context of European Integration. The visa requirement has 
so far been maintained because of insufficient internal control on immigration and control at the external borders. 
Romania has taken a number of measures to comply with the EU visa requirements. On the basis of a Government Ordinance of June 1999, the procedures for 
granting visas have been significantly streamlined with effect as from January 2000 : visas will no 
longer be granted at the border posts but exclusively by the diplomatic missions and consular offices of Romania. But there are still many differences between 
the EU and the Romanian lists of countries whose nationals need a visa. 
Romania should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. 
In 1999, Romania has signed a readmission agreement with Denmark. Romania has now 19 readmission agreements: 12 with EU Member States, 5 with other 
associated countries, one with Switzerland and one with India. 7 new agreements are under negotiation. Romania has accepted the Constitution of the 
International Organization for Migration and was admitted as full member in November 1998. Within the last year the number of foreign citizens not permitted 
to enter Romania has doubled. 
So far as borders are concerned, the process of restructuring the institutions in charge of border management and control has started. In June 1999 a Government 
Ordinance modified the Law on the State Frontier to bring the Border Guard and the Border Police under the single authority of a “Border Police General 
Inspectorate”. A pilot project coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior was then carried out in order to test the effective functioning of this “unified structure”. 
Several expert missions have been carried out that has resulted in the identification of a number of short-comings. On this basis an ambitious multi-annual 
programme was launched to upgrade the equipment at the borders, priority being given to the frontier with Ukraine and Moldova, including the Danube delta. 
The implementation of this programme, which will take several years, is an urgent necessity since, for example, out of the 64 border points of Romania only 5 
have proper equipment to check the validity of passports and visas. 
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The positive evolutions mentioned above should now be confirmed through the full merger between Border Guard and Border Police, the implementation of a 
common high quality training, the actual demilitarization of these services and the replacement of conscripts by professional policemen according to a clear and 
rigorously implemented plan. 
There is also a particular need to continue strengthening the infrastructure and equipment, including men outfit, at the border-crossing points and on the green 
and blue frontiers. In the context of the pre-accession strategy, and need to reinforce the future 
Eastern border of the EU the Commission intends to continue to provide important assistance in this field. However, Romanian should support this equipment 
programme by improving the pay and the working conditions of Border Guards and Border 
Policemen. 
Conclusion 
There has been some progress in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, with the exception of asylum and drugs. The most significant progress is registered in the 
field of justice but some progress is also visible on immigration, border management and police. 
Short term priorities of the Accession Partnership have therefore been partly met. Romania must now urgently implement the important measures announced by 
its authorities. Some important pieces of legislation have to be adopted or amended and the 
restructuring and modernization of the relevant administrations, especially those depending from the Ministry of Interior, have to be completed so as to ensure an 
effective implementation of the legislation. In particular, the demilitarization of the 
Ministry of Interior and its subordinated institutions, primarily the Police and the Border Police General Inspectorate is a priority which must be implemented 
without delay. 
In most Justice and Home affairs sectors, there is a widespread need for improvement of pay and working conditions, training and equipment. Regarding 
equipment, the programme for upgrading the borders should be carried on according to a precise and well monitored schedule. 
It is important that Romania rapidly takes further measures to strengthen the effective implementation of the visa policy, with a view to the forthcoming decision 
in the Council on the new visa list. 
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2000 As far as visa policy is concerned, the Aliens law from 1969 is still in force. A proposal for a new aliens law has been adopted by both the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies and is presently being dealt with by the Conciliation Committee of the two houses of the Parliament. Starting from 1 July the Romanian 
authorities introduced restrictive conditions for issuing visas for citizens of a number of former USSR countries. Romania has now a restrictive visa regime with 
all former USSR countries except Moldova. From August 2000 a visa regime has been introduced towards several countries in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific 
Ocean. The decision not to grant visas at border points except in special cases has been postponed as regards nationals of EU and NATO Member States, Israel, 
Switzerland, Japan and Australia. 
As far as border control is concerned, a new organisational structure came into force in July 2000 under which the regional commands, which previously 
covered several counties, have been split up into many small units. The process of demilitarisation has also started and new training programs are being 
developed for border police officers. Amendments in the law on the Romanian State Borders in June 1999 set up the General Inspectorate of the Border Police 
which has jurisdiction over all state borders and is also responsible for the Coast Guard service. However, the full revision of the law on the state borders and the 
elaboration of a law on the functioning and organisation of the border police have not yet been adopted. 
Regarding migration, two new readmission agreements have been concluded, one with Ireland and another with Bulgaria. 
Overall assessment 
Some important legislation has been adopted recently in the field of justice and home affairs but it remains a cause of concern that some of this legislation has 
been adopted through government ordinances without proper consultation. Much remains to be done on legal approximation and on strengthening administrative 
capacity. Especially the process of reforming the border police and the national police should be speeded up and the corruption problem needs to be addressed 
with radical measures. 
Despite recent reforms of visa policy Romania still needs to align the list of countries whose citizens need a visa to enter Romania with the equivalent list for the 
EU. The data information system for issuing and checking visas also needs to be improved. There is not yet an on-line data transmission system for visa 
applications between the Romanian diplomatic missions abroad, the central administration in Bucharest and the Romanian border posts. Visa stickers are 
manufactured with methods using special ink and laser components. Romanian passports are manufactured with a safety proof technique which complies with 
international standards for machine-readable passports. A new type of passport is envisaged, containing security features fully compatible with Schengen 
requirements. Romania is one of the main transit countries for illegal immigration to Western Europe. 
In the field of border control there is a lack of equipment especially for night surveillance. Progress is also needed to prepare for future participation in the 
Schengen co-operation where there is among other things a need to rebuild terminals at many airports. Due to the high costs involved, such plans have been 
delayed. The laws on the state frontier and on the border police need to be revised. The reform of the border police has started but so far there has been little 
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impact at the operational level. Further initiatives need to be taken to restructure and strengthen the Border Police. The progressive replacement of conscripts by 
contracted sergeants should continue. Training of staff needs to be developed and there is a need to develop a long-term border management strategy and 
interagency co-operation. Community assistance through the annual border programmes needs to be complemented by substantially increased national budget 
allocations. 
Regulation regarding migration is very limited due to the continued application of the 1969 Aliens Law. There are at present 13 agreements on readmission 
concluded with EU Member States and 8 agreements with other countries. There is a need to conclude more readmission agreements with neighbouring 
countries as well as with countries of origin for illegal immigrants. There is also a need to adopt adequate provisions on illegal immigrants and in particular to 
clarify the procedures for their expulsion. 
Overall assessment 
Despite recent reforms of visa policy Romania still needs to align the list of countries whose citizens need a visa to enter Romania with the equivalent list for the 
EU. The data information system for issuing and checking visas also needs to be improved. There is not yet an on-line data transmission system for visa 
applications between the Romanian diplomatic missions abroad, the central administration in Bucharest and the Romanian border posts. Visa stickers are 
manufactured with methods using special ink and laser components. Romanian passports are manufactured with a safety proof technique which complies with 
international standards for machine-readable passports. A new type of passport is envisaged, containing security features fully compatible with Schengen 
requirements. 
Romania is one of the main transit countries for illegal immigration to Western Europe. In the field of border control there is a lack of equipment especially for 
night surveillance. Progress is also needed to prepare for future participation in the Schengen 
co-operation where there is among other things a need to rebuild terminals at many airports. Due to the high costs involved, such plans have been delayed. The 
laws on the state frontier and on the border police need to be revised. The reform of the border police has started but so far there has been little impact at the 
operational level. Further initiatives need to be taken to restructure and strengthen the Border Police. The progressive replacement of conscripts by contracted 
sergeants should continue. Training 
of staff needs to be developed and there is a need to develop a long-term border management strategy and interagency co-operation. Community assistance 
through the annual border programmes needs to be complemented by substantially increased national budget allocations. 
Regulation regarding migration is very limited due to the continued application of the 1969 Aliens Law. There are at present 13 agreements on readmission 
concluded with EU Member States and 8 agreements with other countries. There is a need to conclude more readmission agreements with neighbouring 
countries as well as with countries of origin for illegal immigrants. There is also a need to adopt adequate provisions on illegal immigrants and in particular to 
  533
clarify the procedures for their expulsion. 
2001 As far as visa policy is concerned, the conditions and criteria for obtaining visas have been specified in methodological norms implementing the new Law on 
Aliens and in common instructions agreed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labour. The new Law on Aliens and 
the provisions on visas were adopted in April 2001. Particularly strict conditions are applied to citizens of 86 countries with high migratory tendencies. Since 1 
January 2001, visas can, as a rule, only be obtained from Romanian diplomatic missions and consular offices. They are only issued at border posts in exceptional 
cases. Since 1 July 2001, Moldovan citizens have needed to have a passport to enter Romania. All visa applications are sent from the diplomatic or consular 
missions to the National Visa Centre, which takes the final decision on the issuing of a visa. The applications from nationals of countries with high migration 
tendencies are also sent, for a further check, to the Directorate for Aliens and Migration Issues of the Ministry of Interior. A new Schengen-compatible type of 
visa application form has been introduced. Training activities have been carried out as regards preparations for the Schengen Agreement. 
Otherwise there have been no significant developments in this area. 
As regards migration, a new Aliens Law entered into force in May 2001, establishing the conditions for entry and stay in Romania as well as the regime for 
expulsions. As indicated, the Government also adopted the ‘methodological norms’ to implement the above-mentioned law. These norms contain detailed 
provisions specifying the procedures for applying the law as regards checking of documents, issuing visas, granting residence rights and expelling aliens. 
Recently adopted legislation has also tightened the conditions for obtaining work permits in Romania. A necessary pre-condition is the possession of a work visa 
(i.e. persons having a student visa are therefore no longer allowed to obtain a work permit). 
The Government has signed an agreement with the International Organisation for Migration, to establish a centre offering temporary protection for women 
victims of trafficking as well as managing programmes supporting their reintegration into society. 
In 1998, 2,830 foreigners were expelled for not complying with the conditions of entry and stay in Romania. This number increased in 1999 to 3,431 aliens, but 
then decreased to 2,498 in 2000. 
Overall assessment 
Romania has also made significant progress in aligning its visa policy with that of the European Union. There are 156 countries whose citizens need a visa to 
enter Romania, while nationals of 35 countries, including the EU Member States, are exempted from the visa requirement. Further alignment with the EU visa 
policy should continue, in particular with regard to the introduction of visa obligations for countries with high migration potential. 
Romania should start the preparations for participation in the Schengen area and develop a Schengen Action Plan. 
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Romania has concluded readmission agreements with all Member States except the United Kingdom and Portugal. These agreements are all in force, except the 
agreements with Finland and Ireland, which have been signed but not yet ratified. In addition, 6 readmission agreements with candidate countries (Poland, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and 
Bulgaria) are in force. There are also agreements with Switzerland, India, Croatia and Moldova. The Romanian Government has re-negotiated the readmission 
agreements with Sweden, Slovenia and Hungary in order to update and align them with the relevant EU recommendations and standards. For the same purpose 
the agreement with Austria is in the process of negotiation. 
2002 As far as visa policy is concerned, over the past few years Romania has brought its visa policy largely in line with the policy of the EU. As a result, since 
January 2002 Romania has enjoyed a visa-free regime with all Schengen Member States. Romania adopted provisions that entered into force at the same time as 
the visa-free regime which stipulate that Romanian nationals travelling to countries where an entry visa is not required must prove that they have sufficient 
resources to cover the intended stay abroad, a return ticket and valid health insurance. Romania does not yet comply with the acquis as regards the list of 
countries whose nationals do not need a visa to enter the EU. During the reporting period bilateral agreements to lift visa obligation entered into force with 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta and Venezuela. A visa obligation was introduced in January 2002 for nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Romania has decided to 
introduce the visa obligation for nationals of FYROM from the beginning of 2003. Romania does not yet require visas for nationals of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the Republic of 
Moldova, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. New consular instructions entered into force in July 2002 stipulating that visas can only be issued by 
diplomatic and consular missions. This puts an end to the practice of issuing visas at border crossing points. 
As regards migration, progress has been rather limited. With regard to uniform residency permits, Romania adopted in June 2002 legislation for the issuing of 
new Romanian identity and state border crossing documents for third country nationals. Over the last year, readmission agreements were ratified with Albania, 
Austria, Croatia, Hungary, the Republic of Moldova and Sweden. Agreements with Lebanon and Norway were signed. 
The Directorate for Aliens and Migration Issues, which is the central co-ordinating body, has concluded co-operation protocols with the General Directorate for 
Combating Organized Crime and Drugs Traffic and with the national carrier in order to return illegal aliens to their country of origin or of departure. In June 
2002 the Government concluded an agreement with the International Organisation for Migration on co-operation in the field of voluntary humanitarian assisted 
repatriation. 
Overall assessment 
Romania has further aligned its visa policy with that of the European Union. However, further steps towards full alignment are required - in particular as regards 
the list of countries whose nationals need a visa to enter the EU and the list of countries whose nationals are exempted from such an obligation. Romania should 
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take appropriate measures to make the features of the national visa sticker more secure. Administrative capacity remains insufficient: the National Visa Centre is 
understaffed and technical equipment available to visa issuing services remains poor. Romania should step up efforts to provide all diplomatic and consular 
offices with technical equipment for detecting forged and falsified documents, focusing in particular on high-risk countries. 
The Schengen Action Plan which the Romanian authorities have presented needs to be further elaborated and should cover all policy areas included in the 
Schengen acquis. A clear distinction should be made between the requirements that must be applied upon accession to the EU and those which are connected 
with the eventual Council Decision on the lifting of internal border controls. Romania should continue its efforts to establish an operational National Information 
System containing Schengen-compatible data. 
As to migration, considerable efforts in terms of both legal approximation and administrative capacity are still required. Legislation needs to be amended in 
several areas such as entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purposes of employment, self-employment and studies, long-term residents and 
unaccompanied minors. In order to comply with the acquis, Romania must also introduce the possibility of lodging an appeal with suspensive effect against 
expulsion decisions and return measures. Romania has concluded 27 readmission agreements in total. It should continue these efforts, focusing above all on risk 
countries. 
2003 As far as visa policy is concerned, the new Aliens Law introduced the distinction between short- and long-term visas, introduced special provisions regarding 
citizens from EU member states, and eliminated exit visas. A new visa sticker was approved in April 2003 for use from the beginning of 2004. From January 
2003 Romania introduced a visa obligation for nationals from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A bilateral agreement to lift visa obligations entered 
into force with Singapore in February 2003 and a similar agreement has been reached with Estonia. A visa-on-line computer system linking Romanian 
consulates, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, and local units within the Directorate for Aliens and Migration Issues is 
being installed. The number of Romanians who were not permitted to exit the country increased from 23 311 in 2001 to 417 969 in 2002. 
In the area of migration, a new Aliens Law was adopted in December 2002 that contained provisions on the entry and stay of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of employment, self-employment and studies, long-term residents, unaccompanied minors, appeals against expulsion decisions and return measures. In 
May 2003 the government issued a decision lifting the obligation for long-term visas for economic and commercial activities for nine of the acceding countries. 
The Directorate for Aliens and Migration Issues, the central co-ordinating body, was nominated as the Aliens Authority. The Directorate concluded co-operation 
agreements with a number of government agencies and collaboration with the National Refugee Office has improved. Re-admission agreements were signed 
with UK, Portugal and Latvia during the reporting period. In February 2003 an Emergency Ordinance suspended the passports of Romanians who have 
committed offences abroad. Romania reached an agreement in October 2002 to facilitate the return of minors staying illegally in France. There was also a sharp 
reduction in the number of foreign nationals detected attempting to cross the Romanian border illegally, down from 3,577 in 2001 to 2,045 in 2002 (of which 
three-quarters were trying to enter Romania). The number of Romanians returned from the Schengen Area increased from approximately 9,000 in 2001 to over 
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11,000 in 2002 and almost 10,000 for the first half of 2003. 
Overall assessment 
As far as visa policy is concerned, the visa-free regime introduced for Romanian nationals by Schengen member states in January 2002 has had mixed results. 
Despite an almost eighteen-fold increase in the number of Romanians who were not permitted to exit in 2002 compared to 2001 and an overall decrease in exits 
from Romania by more than a million, the number of Romanians returned from the Schengen Area has continued to increase. Romania has made some progress 
amending the list of countries whose nationals are exempted from visa obligations but does not yet fully comply with the acquis. Romania is in the process of 
aligning with the acquis on the list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU and is engaged in negotiations to introduce visas with Ukraine and 
Turkey, will enter into negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro, has finalised an agreement with Russia, and will apply visas to Moldovan nationals upon 
Romania's accession to the EU. Human resources in the area of visa policy have not changed significantly during the reporting period. Thorough training in the 
new visa-on-line system will be required if this is to make an appreciable impact in the future. General administrative capacity remains low with significant room 
for improvement especially as concerns risk analysis. Romania should step up efforts to provide all diplomatic and consular offices with the necessary technical 
equipment, particularly in high-risk countries. 
In the field of migration, the Directorate for Aliens and Migration Issues is capable of managing re-admission and expulsion to remote countries. Despite the 
strict self-imposed exit requirements, and the fact that Romanians sent back to Romania face up to five years in prison, there has been an increase in the number 
of Romanians returned from EU member states. The large numbers of Romanian nationals involved in petty crime, aggressive begging and other anti-social 
behaviour across the EU has prompted several member states to take action. The southern border with Bulgaria is the one most targeted by those attempting to 
enter Romania illegally and the good co-operation between both countries is therefore welcomed. The agreement on co-operation in the field of voluntary 
humanitarian-assisted repatriation concluded last year with the International Organisation for Migration has not yet been ratified by Romania. Co-operation with 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees is gradually improving. 
2004 As far as visa policy is concerned, Romania introduced a visa regime for four countries on the EU’s negative list (Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Serbia and 
Montenegro) during the reporting period. The visa obligation was abolished for four countries on the EU’s positive list, namely Switzerland, Liechtenstein, 
Estonia and Lithuania. During 2003 a total of 808 visas were issued at Romania’s borders. The first phase of the “visa-on-line” system is now operational and 
links the Aliens Authority in Romania with diplomatic missions in Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, and Egypt. Additional staff working on 
visa issues has been deployed to the diplomatic missions of most of these countries. The number of staff in the National Visa Centre has doubled from 5 to 10 
and the total number working in the General Directorate of Consular Affairs is now 40. The number of Romanians who were not permitted to exit the country 
almost tripled from 417,969 in 2002 to 1,216,625 in 2003. In 2003 there were 18,138 Romanians returned from the Schengen Area and during the first half of 
2004 this trend was again upwards as there were 12,000 returns. 
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In the area of migration, a national migration strategy was adopted in April 2004 and the Aliens Authority was established as an autonomous body in March 
2004. A Head of Authority has been appointed and 430 out of the 611 attributed posts are now filled. The Authority also signed a co-operation protocol with the 
General Directorate for Consular Affairs and is now connected to the National Visa Centre through the “visa-on-line” project. Readmission agreements were 
signed with Macedonia, Estonia, Turkey and Lithuania. The Authority is consulted by the National Visa Centre on cases and applications for extension of the 
right to stay. Official statistics indicate that the Authority was consulted by the National Visa Centre in 4,369 cases (giving negative advice in 1,332 cases) and 
handled 36,607 applications for extension of the right to stay (rejecting 1,260). 
Overall assessment 
On visa policy, while Moldova is now the only country on the EU negative list with which Romania has not introduced a visa regime, the agreements signed 
with Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Serbia and Montenegro during the reporting period are not fully in line with the Schengen acquis and will need to be revised. 
Additional effort will also be needed to ensure abolition of the 17 remaining visa regimes for countries on the EU positive list and the agreements already 
negotiated with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Slovakia and Singapore need to be brought fully into line with the acquis. There should also be 
an acceleration in the roll out of the “visa-on-line” system in order to ensure full implementation by the end of 2004. Printing facilities have now been secured 
for the new visa stickers but efforts should be stepped up to ensure that they can be issued as planned in September 2004. The numbers of those attempting to 
exit Romania without fulfilling the legal requirements again rose sharply over the reporting period. The reinforcement of staff and equipment played a significant 
role in increasing 
the numbers of detections, but as the statistics continue to indicate a growing emigration pressure at Romania’s borders as well as an increase in the number of 
Romanians being returned from the Schengen area, additional resources may be required in the future. 
In the field of migration, the establishment of the Aliens Authority as an autonomous body represents a positive development and its administrative capacity has 
been enhanced through the creation of additional posts, training with EU Member States and acquiring IT equipment. Additional efforts are required to fill the 
30% of posts that still remain vacant, especially as the total number of current staff actually fell during the reporting period from 490 to 430. A significant level 
of economic migration remains a feature of Romanian society: an estimated 1.7 million Romanians have already migrated in search of work. 
2005 On visa policy, Romania has to a large extent adopted the provisions and administrative structures needed to ensure effective implementation of the acquis upon 
accession. Moldova remains the only country on the EU negative list with which Romania has not introduced a visa regime, and negotiations are ongoing to 
align fully the agreements already signed with Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Serbia and Montenegro with the Schengen acquis before accession. Furthermore, 
the EU has just concluded an agreement with Russia on visa facilitation which, upon its entry into force, will replace bilateral agreements on short-term visas 
concluded by Member States. Additional effort will also be needed to ensure abolition of the 12 remaining visa regimes for countries on the EU positive list. The 
second phase of the roll out of the “visa online” system has been concluded and it is planned that the remaining consular offices be connected by July 2006. 
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Romania needs to start preparing for the implementation of Visa Information System (VIS) in view of lifting the internal borders upon accession to Schengen. 
Additional efforts are required to install more sophisticated equipment to detect forged and falsified documents in diplomatic and consular posts especially in 
high-risk countries. New visa stickers with some of the EU security and antiforgery features started being issued on schedule in September 2004. While visas are 
issued only at the border in accordance with the Schengen criteria, visa stickers should replace stamps as soon as possible and the latest upon EU accession for 
security reasons. 
In the area of migration, the legislative framework is now well aligned with the acquis and a new reception centre has opened. Romania has concluded and 
ratified 30 readmission agreements. Implementation of the National Migration Strategy has continued and in January 2005 a Plan was approved to combat illegal 
immigration. There are currently 118 vacancies in the Authority for Aliens and a number of its territorial structures are still not connected to the IT network. 
Practical co-operation with the Border Police on cross-border crime and illegal overstays has improved. Immigration liaison officers are posted in 12 EU 
Member States and in Bulgaria and Ukraine. 
Conclusion 
Romania is generally meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations and is expected to be able to implement by accession 
the acquis in the areas of migration, asylum, the fight against terrorism, customs co-operation, and human rights legal instruments. 
Increased efforts are required if Romania is to meet the requirements for membership in relation to the implementation of the visa policy, data protection, 
police co-operation and the fight against organized crime, money laundering, judicial co-operation in civil and criminal matters, and the fight against 
drugs. Further attention is needed in several areas including significantly increasing staff levels, equipment and training for the Police and Gendarmerie; 
enhancing the fight against drugs; and making the Authority for Personal Data Processing fully operational by increasing its staff, ensuring its budget and 
considerably strengthening the implementation of data protection legislation, without which there is a risk that Romania may not be ready to implement the 








1997 avis Some 89 million border crossings were made in 1995; of these some 2,000 were revealed as being illegal. Slovakia is working towards the EU list of third 
countries for which visas are required, but visa-free agreements are still in place with Belarus, 
Russia, Cuba, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine (for the latter invitation letters are required). The 1995 law on Residence and Border Crossing regulates residence, 
visa and border crossing procedures. Readmission agreements are in place with Austria and 
its other neighbouring countries, Romania, Croatian Slovenia and Bulgaria. Slovakia is currently negotiating such agreements with the Benelux countries and 
Germany. Border management is currently being modernised. 
Conclusions 
Slovakia appears to have the administrative capacity and infrastructure to meet the justice and home affairs acquis (present and future) in the medium term. But 
it will have to demonstrate its commitment to introduce the necessary reforms, notably in the 
development of visa policy toward the NIS, border management and migration control, extradition, and combating organized crime and corruption. 
1998 In its July 1997 Opinion, the Commission had stressed that Slovakia had to prove its commitment to carrying out the reforms needed, particularly with regard to 
visa arrangements. 
Though there has been no general revision of the laws regarding foreign nationals, there have been isolated examples of progress, such as the new passport law, 
which entered into force on 1 January 1998 and gives every citizen the right to a passport. With regard to visa policy, progress remains very limited. A working 
party has been set up to prepare the necessary changes, but these have not materialised, despite the urgency of the matter. 
Conclusion 
Despite the progress made with legislation, a number of adjustments are still needed. Actual implementation of legislation has moreover seen very limited 
progress. Although no short term priorities were set out in the Accession Partnerships, an effort in combating organized crime would have been timely. It matters 
all the more that a genuine effort should be made with the medium-term priorities, particularly border controls and the implementation of asylum and migration 
legislation (including bringing visa policy closer to that of the Community). 
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1999 There was no progress concerning the alignment of the Slovak visa legislation to EU - requirements particular with regard to Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The 
visa sticker has still not been introduced. Even though the detection rate for illegal border 
crossings was on the rise (8.320 persons in 1998; 5000 in 1999 up to the end of September) the Slovak border guards still lack training and the equipment 
needed in order to guarantee an efficient control of the borders. Slovakia should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the 
EU. 
2000 Since the 1999 regular report, significant progress has been registered in the Slovak Republic in the fields of visa and asylum. 
As far as visa policy is concerned, the amendment to the Law on the residence of foreigners entered into force in April. It includes provisions on the issuing of 
visas. Visas are no longer granted at borders, except for humanitarian reasons. Visa stickers were introduced as of 1 January 2000 replacing the old visa stamps. 
Harmonisation of Slovakia’s visa policy continued. The Government introduced a visa requirement for Ukraine with effect from end of June 2000 and decided to 
abolish the current non-visa regime with Russia and Belarus as of the beginning of next year and with Cuba not later than six months prior to the entry of 
Slovakia to the EU. 
In May 2000, the Border and Foreigners Office was established. It is responsible for granting various forms of stay to foreign nationals who come to Slovakia to 
work, to study or who have received refugee status. It is, at the same time, the appeal body for decisions made by first instance bodies of the police force 
concerning visas, stays and expulsion. 
Overall assessment 
By introducing visa stickers, Slovakia has met one important short-term priority of the 1999 Accession Partnership. Yet, efforts to upgrade and complete the visa 
system have to be maintained. In particular, an on-line system for issuing visa and a central registration system need to be established. 
2001 Since the 2000 Regular Report, some progress has been made in Slovakia in the field of justice and home affairs. Particular progress can be reported in the fields 
of border control, visa policy and police co-operation. 
As far as visa policy is concerned, in June 2001 the Slovak Government approved a new Visa Policy Concept, aiming at further harmonising its policy with the 
acquis. The Slovak Republic has terminated the Agreement on a visa-free regime with Ukraine and the Agreement between the Slovak Republic and Ukraine on 
simplified border-crossing procedures for nationals with permanent residence in municipalities in the border areas. The Government adopted a Resolution in 
January 2001 according to which specific categories of persons may receive their visa free of charge or at a reduced charge, implying a partial softening of the 
regime. A visa requirement was introduced for nationals of Belarus and the Russian Federation with effect from January 2001. 
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Slovakia adopted its Schengen Action Plan in September 2001. 
Overall assessment 
The existing legislation for visa issuing procedures is partly in line with the acquis. The Slovak Republic has legislation that regulates the format of visas 
comparable with the legislation and practice of the EU member states. Partial alignment has so far been achieved with the relevant acquis. Visa policy needs to 
be updated to prepare for full alignment with the relevant EC 
Regulation and the setting-up of an on-line system for the issuing of visas and a central register has yet to be achieved. The Slovak Republic has yet to publish 
the list of countries whose nationals will be required to be in possession of airport transit visas. The Agreement on a visafree regime concluded with Cuba is to 
be terminated. As regards administrative capacity, 
Slovakia has not yet completed the on-line system for the issuing of visas, nor a central visa register. 
2002 Since the 2001 Regular Report, further progress has been made in this area, particularly in the fields of data protection, visas, border control, migration, asylum 
and police cooperation. Slovakia has made good progress in aligning its visa policy with that of the EU. The new Act on the Stay of Foreigners, which entered 
into force in April 2002, specifies the type of visas which may be issued (short term, long-term, transit and airport transit visas) as well as the procedures for 
their issuance. Consular Instructions, which are intended to ensure alignment with the Common Consular Instructions, entered into force in June 
2002. Slovakia has almost completed alignment with the Regulation on visa requirements for countries which are under visa obligation, except for Cuba, South-
Africa and the Seychelles, for which the visa obligation will be introduced six months before accession at the latest. Slovakia needs to complete alignment as 
regards countries which are exempt from the EU visa obligation. It still needs to sign agreements on abolition of visa requirements with 16 countries and 2 
Special Administrative Regions as well as to amend valid agreements with Malaysia and Italy. As regards administrative capacity, a central visa authority, which 
is part of the Border and Aliens Police Force, was established in February 2002. In addition, in order to complete the on-line system for issuing visas and the 
central visa register, a number of new on-line connections were established in April 2002. A new visa sticker was also introduced in April 2002, in order to meet 
EU security standards. 
Overall assessment 
Concerning visa policy, adequate implementation of the Act on the Stay of Foreigners must be ensured. Slovakia should also continue to implement the plan for 
alignment with the Regulation on visa requirements, in particular as regards harmonisation with the EU visa-free travel lists. In addition, Slovak travel 
documents do not yet fulfil EU security standards. Furthermore, Slovakia should equip all its consular and diplomatic missions abroad with the full range of 
equipment necessary to detect false and falsified documents. Negotiations on this chapter have been provisionally closed. Slovakia has not requested any 
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transitional arrangements in this area. Slovakia is generally meeting the commitments it made in the accession negotiations in this field. In order to complete 
preparations for membership, Slovakia’s efforts now need to focus on completing legislative alignment (visa, migration, judicial co-operation), and in  particular 
on further reinforcing the administrative capacity in order to strengthen border control management, the fight against illegal immigration and organized crime, 
including trafficking in human beings and drug trafficking, and to improve capacity in combating fraud and corruption. 
2003 On visa policy, Slovakia has not yet achieved full alignment with the EU visa acquis. Slovakia still has to terminate the visa-free agreements with Cuba, South 
Africa and Seychelles. Slovakia is not yet fully aligned with the “positive” visa list and should accelerate this process as regards the remaining countries. In 
addition, the law on expatriate Slovaks needs to be amended, so as to achieve full alignment with the acquis on the necessary requirements. As regards 
implementation and administrative capacity, 
Slovakia is in the process of extending to all embassies and consulates the on-line system capable of securing direct contact between visa-issuing authorities and 
the central authorities. The full range of equipment necessary to detect forged and falsified documents has not yet been completely provided to all diplomatic and 
consular missions. 
Conclusion 
Slovakia is partially meeting the commitments and requirements for membership in relation to the Schengen Action Plan, data protection, visa policy, 











1997 avis Some 190 million border crossings were made in 1995; of these some 4,200 were revealed to be illegal. Migrants are coming from Romania, Sri Lanka, Turkey 
and China. Slovenia follows the EU list of third countries for which visas are required and uses the EU standard visa format. Residence and immigration issues 
relating to aliens are covered by the 1991 law on Foreigners. Readmission agreements are in place with Austria, Benelux, France, Greece Hungary, Croatia, 
Switzerland, Slovakia, Romania and Canada. Border management is thorough and effective. 
1998 In December 1997, new legislation on national identity documents came into being. This made them harder to forge and made provision for entries in Slovene to 
be supplemented by the other national languages in the regions concerned, plus an English translation. In the short term, legislation on foreign nationals is 
indispensable and border controls must be improved. This raises the issue of determining the border with Croatia, an important matter in that it will be an 
external frontier of the Union. This concern derives from the fact that Slovenia, having lifted its geographical reservation, is becoming a transit country for 
illegal immigrants, mainly from Croatia and Hungary; it would therefore be desirable to set up programmes to assist return. 
Conclusion 
Beyond measures connected with the police, Slovenia has taken few significant steps since July 1997. If it is to attain the medium-term objectives set in the 
Accession Partnership, it needs to make a substantial effort in the following areas : 
 legislative policy, from the point of view both of international instruments (e.g. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) and of making adjustments to 
domestic laws (e.g. asylum and drugs); 
 stepping up training to enable staff to cope with enforcing new legislation, particularly that dealing with foreign nationals. 
1999 There has been very considerable progress in the adoption and revision of legal instruments. So far as immigration is concerned, a new Law on Foreigners was 
adopted in July 1999 as well as the Law on the Status of Citizens of the other SFRY Successor States. 
In June 1999, Slovenia annulled visa exemption agreements with FYROM and Turkey. Turkish citizens will need visas as of 1 December and citizens of 
FYROM since 1 September 1999 to enter Slovenia. Slovenia should continue progressive alignment of visa legislation and practice with that of the EU. 
The issue of final demarcation of the border with Croatia is still outstanding. Slovenia has still to adopt a new law on border control. Border controls must indeed 
be reinforced, especially at the green border with Croatia since Slovenia is becoming a transit country for illegal immigrants, mainly from Croatia and Hungary. 
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Particular attention should be paid to the upgrading of the enforcing agencies (police and customs, borders guards) in terms of staffing, equipment and training. 
Conclusion 
Slovenia has made an impressive effort in the adoption of new legal instruments. This legislative progress has been complemented by the creation of new 
structures in the field of immigration and asylum and by the allocation of some budgetary resources for immigrants’ accommodation, border policing, 
recruitment and training of judges. An improvement of the judiciary in the area of penal cases has been registered. 
2000 Significant progress has been made since the last Regular Report in the Justice and Home Affairs sector on policy development, harmonisation of legislation and 
strengthening of the administration. Progress has been made especially in the adoption of legislation for control of illicit drugs. However, full implementation of 
the acquis will require a further sustained effort. 
As concerns visa policy, the harmonisation of the Slovenian visa list was completed in 1999. The introduction of visa requirements for Bulgaria and Romania in 
line with the present acquis led to political problems. Therefore, arrangements were made for visafree travel for certain categories of people pending the 
adoption of a new EC Regulation on visa lists presently under discussion. A regulation concerning issuing of visas for foreign nationals intending to work in 
Slovenia was adopted in February but repealed in March 2000 following criticism about over-restrictive provisions. The electronic system for issuing visas is 
being installed and is working in eight diplomatic and consular representative offices. Instructions on issuing visas by diplomatic missions and consular posts 
have been prepared and are being applied, with the exception of those provisions which will be applicable only after accession. New stickers for visas and 
residence permits harmonised with the acquis and international standards came into use in June 2000. A Law on passports for Slovenian citizens was adopted in 
July. It regulates the passport issuing procedures, monitoring and sanctions against violations. New passports are due to be issued at the beginning of 2001; they 
will contain more elements for protection against fraud. There has been no progress in resolving the question of the sea and land border with Croatia in Piran 
Bay and in South Eastern Slovenia. As far as migration is concerned, the Law on Foreigners covers the entry and residence of foreign nationals in Slovenia. 
Implementation of the law was identified as a shortterm priority in the Accession Partnership, and it has been partly fulfilled. Part of the implementing 
legislation has been adopted – for instance concerning issuing of visas and residence permits. 
Overall assessment 
The overall situation and level of alignment in the Justice and Home Affairs area is in general good, with the exception of border control, on which further 
efforts are still needed Slovenian visa policy is close to alignment – however, Slovenia still has to align its legislation as far as airport transit visas are concerned. 
2001 Slovenia has made some progress since the last Regular Report on Justice and Home Affairs, both in terms of the harmonisation of legislation and strengthening 
of the administration. Concerning visa policy, instructions on issuing of visas at border crossings, (including refusal of entry for foreign nationals), on issuing of 
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visas on humanitarian grounds and on revoking a visas were introduced in January 2001. A list of countries whose citizens need airport transit visas when 
transiting through Slovenian airports was adopted in July 2001. New Slovenian passports were issued in March 2001 on the basis of the Law on passports for 
Slovenian citizens adopted last year. The introduction of the electronic information system (Vision) continued. The Slovenian and Croatian Governments agreed 
in July 2001 on the demarcation of the outstanding parts of the sea and land border. Once the agreement is ratified by both Parliaments, Slovenia’s last remaining 
border issue with its neighbours will have been settled. The border co-operation agreement with Croatia, which had been awaiting ratification since 1997, was 
ratified by Slovenia in July 2001. In May 2001, the Government adopted a Schengen Action Plan identifying the needs for the period 2000 – 2005 for further 
recruitment of staff to ensure adequate control of the future EU external border, and for training and purchase of equipment. 
Overall assessment 
The overall situation and level of alignment in the Justice and Home Affairs area is good although establishing adequate border controls especially at the future 
EU external border as well as implementation of the Asylum Act will require a further sustained effort. Slovenian visa policy is close to alignment. The only 
outstanding question is the visa policy on Romania. However, the Government decided last year that Slovenia will follow the visa policy of the EU on Romania. 
2002 Since the 2001 Regular Report, further progress has been made in Slovenia in the fields of data protection, migration, asylum, police co-operation, and the fight 
against organized crime. However, little progress can be reported in the area of drugs. 
Slovenia and Bulgaria signed an agreement in November 2001 on abolition of visas and co-operation in a number of areas (see below). The installation of the 
on-line system for issuing visas has continued and now over half of the Slovenian missions abroad are covered. Slovenia’s visa policy is in line with that of the 
EU. 
Overall assessment 
Slovenian visa policy is fully aligned with that of the EU now that Romanian nationals no longer need a visa to enter the territory of the EU Member States. 
Conclusion 
Negotiations in this chapter have been provisionally closed. Slovenia has not requested any transitional arrangements in this field. Slovenia is generally meeting 
the commitments it has made in the accession negotiations in this area. 
2003 Slovenian visa policy is fully aligned with that of the EU. As regards implementation and administrative capacity, the on-line system for visas has been 
introduced in almost all Slovenian missions abroad. 
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ANNEX 8.1 TO CHAPTER 8: MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR A LOCAL 
BORDER TRAFFIC REGULATION OF 2005  
 
1. Purpose. The purpose of the proposal was to lay down common rules on the criteria 
and conditions for establishing a regime of local border traffic at the “external land 
borders” of the Member States. 
2. Geographical scope. For the purposes of the proposal, these land borders are defined 
in such a way as to accommodate the three stages of Schengen integration in the 
newly acceding states. Thus, land borders are considered: 
(a) as the borders between a Member State and a neighbouring third country (e.g. 
Poland and Ukraine);  
(b) as Member States fully implementing the Schengen acquis and as Member 
States bound to apply this acquis in full but for which the Council decision 
authorizing it to fully apply that acquis should not have entered into force (e.g. 
Germany and Poland 2004-2007); and  
(c) two Member States bound to apply the Schengen acquis in full, but for which 
the Council decision authorizing them to fully apply that acquis had not 
entered into force (Poland and Slovakia 2004-2007).  
3. Personal scope. The proposal covered only third-country nationals lawfully residing 
in the border area in a neighbouring country for at least one year (“border 
residents”). EU citizens and third-country nationals enjoying the community right to 
free movement are excluded from the application but in cases where the facilitation 
of border crossing goes beyond this right, the scope can be extended to cover them.  
4. Border crossing facilitation. The proposal defines the specific conditions and 
documents required to cross the border for the purpose of local border traffic. 
5. Visa. As regards border residents subject to the visa obligation, a special visa (type 
L) is proposed. This was envisaged to be a multiple-entry visa issued for at least one 
year and for a maximum five years, entitling the holder to stay in the border area of 
the issuing Member State for seven consecutive days maximum and without 
exceeding a maximum of three months within any half-year period. Such visas 
would be issued following the provisions of the Common Consular Instructions for 
the Member States fully implementing the Schengen acquis and following their 
national legislation, for those who are not yet implementing it fully.  
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6. Implementation. As with the adoption of the proposed Regulation setting out the 
Community regime on local border traffic, the external competence on this matter 
would have been conferred on the Community. The Commission proposed that the 
actual implementation be delegated to the Member States and conducted through 
bilateral agreements. However, such agreements have to comply with and do not 
affect the provisions established by this Regulation.  
7. Reciprocity. At least equivalent treatment should be granted by the neighbouring 
countries to EU citizens or third country nationals resident in the border area of a 
Member State who wish to cross the border of a neighbouring third country and stay 
within its border area for the purpose of local border traffic. 
 
Based on a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and 
amending the Schengen Convention and the Common Consular Instructions, COM (2005) 56 






ANNEX 8.2 TO CHAPTER 8: MAIN PROVISIONS OF SOME LOCAL BORDER TRAFFIC AGREEMENTS 




Hungary-Ukraine Agreement. The Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement of 19 September 2007 
seems to be the first bilateral local border traffic agreement signed following the entry into 
force of the Local Border Traffic Regulation. It follows the tradition of agreements signed in 
the past between Hungary and the USSR. The first agreement on the facilitation of state 
border crossing for citizens residing in border administrative units was signed on 1 August 
1985, and was later replaced by the Agreement on facilitated state border crossing regime for 
the citizens residing in border areas, signed between Hungary and Ukraine on 26 February 
1993. However, on 1 August 2003, all previous agreements had to be denounced as part of the 
process of accession to the EU.  
 
The main elements of the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement are as follows: 
 
- Scope. The information on the exact territorial scope of the agreement is contradictory. 
According to Ukrainian authors1 the border area is defined as being 50 km, similar to the 
Slovak-Ukrainian agreement but in contrast to the Polish- Ukrainian agreement. Others 2 state 
that the agreement uses a 30 km reference to define a border area, but then in the annexes 
where the exact administrative regions to which the agreement applies are enumerated, the list 
includes Ukrainian and Hungarian municipalities actually located within a 50 km distance 
from the border. The total number of municipalities to which the agreement applies is 384 on 
the Ukrainian side and 244 on the Hungarian side of the border. Based on this, Ukrainian 
estimates show that access to the local border traffic scheme would affect approximately 600 
000 to 750 000 Ukrainian citizens resident in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine.  
- Duration of stay. The local border traffic permit entitles its holder to a multiple entry and 
stay for a maximum of 90 days in any six month period. Thus, the allowed stay in terms of 
duration is equal to the one granted on the basis of a Schengen visa but the territory to which 
                                                        
1 MITRYAYEVA, “Schengen border: A view from Transcarpathia”, Європейський простір - портал 
проєвропейського громадянського суспільства України, [European space - portal of the pro-European civil 
society of Ukraine], 7 April 2009, available at: 
 http://eu.prostir.ua/view/233916.html?print. 
2 LASTOFKA, op. cit. 
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it applies is different. The holders of the local border traffic permit are entitled to a stay in the 
border area as defined by the agreement, while the Schengen visa entitles its holder to access 
to the entire Schengen territory. The permit is issued by the consular authorities of the state of 
entry. 
- Grounds for obtaining the permit. The minimum period of permanent residence in the border 
area which can entitle a citizen to apply to the local border traffic permit is 3 years. The fact 
of residence is proven by national passport, Ukrainian travel passport or registration certificate 
of the place of residence.  
- Duration of the permit. The permit is issued for a minimum of one year and a maximum of 
five years. Its cost is set at €20 and is thus slightly lower than the cost of a short-stay 
Schengen visa, which in the case of Ukrainian citizens is set at €35. In this agreement, like the 
Slovak-Ukrainian one, there is a maximum period in which the permit has to be issued; 30 
days from reception of the application.  
- Sanctions. To ensure compliance with the rules of the agreement and especially with the 
geographical limitations of the permit, the sanctions foreseen include deportation/expulsion 
from Hungary for a period up to five years.3  
 
 
Slovakia-Ukraine Agreement. The agreement between Slovakia and Ukraine has similar 
provisions along the lines of the requirements of the Local Border Traffic Regulation but with 
some differences. In this case, the agreement covers an area within 50 km of the common 
national border. Apparently, in this case the proposal did not meet with objections from the 
Commission. With such a border area definition, the residents of 295 municipalities of 
Zakarpattya oblast of Ukraine, or about 400 000 people and 299 municipalities in Slovakia, 
will fall under the agreement. 
  
Other elements of the agreement include: 
- Duration of stay. Based on the simplified border crossing permit, the residents of the border 
areas will have the right to stay in the border area of the neighbouring state for up to 30 days 
from the date of entry. However, the requirement applicable to short-stay visas also applies 
here, namely that the total stay may not exceed 90 days in any period of 180 days.  
- Grounds for obtaining the permit. The requirement making the residents eligible for issuing 
of the permit is a three-year period of permanent residence (while in the case of Poland only 
                                                        
3 MITRYAYEVA, op. cit.  
  550
one year of residence is required) in the municipalities covered by the border area. Family 
members who do not meet this criterion will also be entitled to obtain the permit. The fact of 
residence will be certified by a Ukrainian passport and a certificate issued by the competent 
Ukrainian authorities.  
- Duration of the permit. The permit will be long-term, issued for a period of at least one year 
and for maximum of five years. The document will be issued by the consulates of the country 
of entry and there is a maximum period for the completion of this administrative operation 
(within 60 days of the date of application). When issuing the permit, the authorities will also 
take into account whether the applicant is a bona fide traveller or not. 
- Sanctions. Sanctions in the form of prohibition of entry and expulsion are provided for if a 
traveller breaches the rules of local border traffic.4 
 
Poland-Ukraine Agreement. The Polish-Ukrainian agreement was signed in March 2008 
and covers a 30 km zone from the border with select municipalities up to 50 km from the 
border also covered by the scheme. Originally, Poland requested a 50 km zone but after 
objections from the European Commission, the general rule was set at 30 km from the border 
with a few exceptions for municipalities in the 50 km zone.5 According to the Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs at the time of signing, the agreement was meant to cover a zone 
encompassing 1822 towns and villages on the Polish side from two administrative units (ca. 
800 000 residents), while on the Ukrainian side 1545 towns and villages from three regions 
are covered (ca. 1.5 million residents).6 The required period of residence in the border area for 
the issuing of the border permit is one year. According to the Polish Foreign Ministry, the 
country is ready to issue 300 000 to 500 000 local border permits. The intention to establish a 
local border traffic regime for the largest possible area clearly shows Poland’s commitment to 
facilitating cross-border cultural, economic and social contacts, especially considering the fact 
that since Poland joined the Schengen area on 21 December 2007, Ukrainian citizens are no 
longer able to apply for multiple entry and free of charge visas but instead have to apply for a 
                                                        
4 Cross-Border Cooperation/Söderköping Process, “Ukraine, Slovak republic sign local border traffic 
agreement”, 30 May 2008, available at http://soderkoping.org.ua/page18829.html. 
5 “Poland eases border crossing for Ukrainians”, Kyiv Post, 06 March 2008, available at 
http://www.kyivpost.com/world/36924, accessed in June 2009. 
6 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Communiqué on the initialling of the Agreement on the rules of local 
border traffic between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, 03 
March 2008, available at http://www.msz.gov.pl.  
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Schengen visa at the cost of €35 for single entry.7 In some cases this can represent a monthly 
wage or pension.  
 
Other Member States.  Several Member States, mainly or exclusively new ones on the 
Eastern land border of the EU, have declared an interest in the conclusion of a bilateral local 
border traffic agreement, e.g. Bulgaria with Macedonia and Serbia, and Romania with 
Moldova and Ukraine.  
 
The Bulgarian Council of Ministers approved the draft agreement with Macedonia on local 
border traffic on 21 May 2009, as negotiation guidelines for the Minister of the Interior who is 
to sign the agreement, subject to subsequent ratification. The scheme will be open to citizens 
of both countries who have been resident in the border areas for at least two years, as well as 
family members. The other provisions are standard: 30km border area but extendable to 50km 
if such are the borders of the administrative units in the country concerned. The local border 
traffic permit issued is valid for a period of one to five years and allows a stay of 90 days in 
any 180 day period.8 A local border traffic agreement was also discussed with Serbia.9 
 
As of mid-2009 Romania was also negotiating an agreement with Ukraine10 and with 
Moldova.11 
 
Lithuania is also negotiating an agreement with Russia which will cover the border between 
the Kaliningrad region and Lithuania. The border zone under negotiation is 30 to 50km, which 
will cover a significant part of the territory of the Kaliningrad region.12 
 
                                                        
7 LASTOFKA, “The proliferation and evolution of visa regimes on the Eastern borders of the European Union”, 
Challenge Working Paper, WP 7, May, (2009). 
8 “Bulgaria introduces local border traffic regime with Macedonia”, Europe.bg, 21 May 2009, available at 
http://www.europe.bg/htmls/page.php?category=5&id=21770 (in Bulgarian). 
9 “A unique visa agreement is under preparation with Serbia”, News.bg, 01 October 2008, available at 
http://news.ibox.bg/material/id_47388049. 
10 “Ukraine-Romania talks on coordination of draft bilateral agreement on local border traffic took place in 
Bucharest”, Ukrainian National Radio, 16 February 2009, available at http://www.nrcu.goc.ua. 
11 AVRAM AND MÜLLER, “Moldova’s Border with Romania: challenges and perspectives after Romania’s 
accession to the European Union”, South-East Europe Review, 3/2008, (2008), pp. 399-429. 
12 According to information from the Permanent Representation of Lithuania to the EU; see also Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, 15 May 2009: Lithuania and Russia consult about ways to intensify mutual 
relations, available at 
http://diplomacymonitor.com/stu/dma1.nsf/uh/ccD0FC0E98095772C4852575B80039500C, for information on 
the Lithuanian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission meeting of 14 May 2009.  
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Hungary's negotiations with Serbia on such an agreement failed. It was meant to facilitate the 
movement to Hungary of 250 000 ethnic Hungarians living in the Serbian province of 
Vojvodina. The failure of the negotiations is attributed to a certain extent to the fears of the 
same ethnic Hungarians about the dissolution of their ethnic homogeneity through Serbians 
moving to the border areas to benefit from the agreement. They also feared differential 
treatment of the ethnic Hungarians, only 60% of whom live in the proposed 50km border area. 
Ultimately, they were opposed to any measure that offered only temporary or specific 
solutions, while the main demand towards Hungary - that of dual citizenship was not 
considered.13 
                                                        
13 TERNOVÁCZ, “Vajdaság: Miért nem kell kishatárforgalmi megállapodás”, 20/10/2007, Magyarország.ma, 20 
October 2007, available at http://www.magyarorszag.ma/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=8385, 
accessed in April 2009, cited in LASTOFKA, op. cit. 
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ANNEX.8.3 TO CHAPTER 8: CATEGORIES OF PERSONS BENEFITING FROM A WAIVING OF THE 
VISA FEE BASED ON VISA FACILITATION AGREEMENTS 
Category Russia Ukraine Moldova Western 
Balkans 
     
Members of official delegations, 
participating in meetings, consultations etc. 
X x X x 
Members of professions participating in 
international  exhibitions, conferences, 
seminars 
  X x 
Drivers conducting international cargo and 
passenger transportation services 
 x X x 
Members of train, refrigerator and 
locomotive crews in international trains 
 x X x 
Journalists  x X x 
Persons participating in scientific, cultural 
and artistic activities including university 
and other exchange programmes 
X x X x 
Pupils, students, post-graduate students and 
accompanying teachers 
x x X x 
Participants in international sport events 
and persons accompanying them in a 
professional capacity  
 x x x 
Participants in youth international sports 
events 
X    
Participants in official exchange 
programmes organized by twin cities and 
other localities 
X x X x 
FoClose relatives (spouse, children, parents, 
grandparents and grandchildren) 
X x X x 
Representatives of civil society 
organisations when undertaking trips for 
the purposes of educational training, 
seminars, conferences 
   x 
Members of national and regional 
Governments and Parliaments, 
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court  
X x X  
Disabled persons and the person 
accompanying them, if necessary 
x x X x 
Persons having presented documents 
proving the necessity of their travel on 
humanitarian grounds including medical 
purposes 
X x X x 
Children under the age of 18 and dependent 
children under the age of 21 
 x   
Pensioners  x X x 
Representatives of religious communities     x 
Children under the age of 6    x 
Mayors and members of the municipal 
councils 
   Only 
Macedonia 
Persons politically persecuted during the 
communist regime 
   Only Albania 
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ANNEX 10.1:  BULGARIA AND ROMANIA: CRITERIA FOR VISA FREE TRAVEL 
 
This annex reviews the details of the analysis that led the Commission to recommend that the 
two countries be taken off the black visa list.  Particular attention will be paid to a special 
legal measure these two countries enacted which restricted the freedom to travel of their own 
citizens.  At the time it appeared that such a measure might become a condition for other 
countries as well.  But this did not happen.  The Balkan countries which were taken of the visa 
black list in 2009 did not enact similar measures.  
 
A 1.1 Key issues in the case of Bulgaria 
The Commission’s 2001 report on Bulgaria consists of three main sections:14 
 
1) the legal framework and administrative practices at Bulgarian borders, including visa 
policy – whether the Bulgarian visa list corresponds to that of the Union, border 
surveillance, carrier sanctions, sanctions for illegal migration to the member states and 
sanctions on facilitators of illegal migration to the member states; 
2) repatriation of Bulgarian nationals to Bulgaria – whether member states are having 
trouble repatriating Bulgarians to Bulgaria; 
3) additional measures such as technical equipment at borders and cooperation with 
Greece, including tour operators. 
 
Looking at the report on Bulgaria more closely, in Section 1, the Commission notes the 
following matters as relevant to the lifting of the visa requirements: 
 
 Bulgaria has introduced new passports that meet the requirements of the EU regarding 
safety measures against forgery. 
 The facilities for issuing visas at the border have been abolished; criminal sanctions and 
fines for irregular border crossings and forged documents have been set. 
 Concerning sanctions on illegal emigration to the member states, Bulgaria has 
introduced legislation making it a criminal offence in Bulgaria to commit an offence 
                                                        
14 See the Report from the Commission to the Council regarding Bulgaria in the perspective of the adoption of 
the regulation determining the list of third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt of that requirement COM(2001) 61 final, 02 
February 2001. 
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against the immigration law of any member state, over which immigration laws the 
Bulgarian government has no control. 
 Sanctions have been established on the facilitation of illegal immigration/emigration. 
 Bulgaria is aligning its visa policy to that of the EU – it is in the process of introducing 
visa requirements for Georgians, Russians, Ukrainians and Tunisians. For the moment it 
is only seeking to maintain a visa-free regime with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and Macedonia; 
 Staffing and equipment at Bulgarian borders have been provided. 
 
Under Section 2 of the report, repatriation of illegal residents to Bulgaria, the Commission 
notes as relevant to the decision whether to maintain or abolish visa requirements that 
Bulgaria has readmission agreements in force with ten member states and six other states; 
further readmission agreements are in the process of being concluded. Additional readmission 
agreements are also being negotiated with many other countries. 
 
In Section 3, additional measures to be taken by Bulgaria are set out. These include more 
computerized control systems at border posts, an action plan with Greece, more legislation on 
carriers’ sanctions to provide for penalties on carriers who take persons out of Bulgaria who 
do not have the necessary documents to enter wherever they are going. Here again is an 
example of cross-recognition.  
 
Finally, in Section 4 there is a description of an information campaign to Bulgarian citizens 
advising them of the limits of their new visa-free travel right. An oblique passage refers to 
working contacts between Bulgarian authorities, the tour operators association and the 
consulates of the Member States. In the context of local consular cooperation, consular 
officials exchange information about the reliability of tour operators as visa intermediaries. 
 
As far as reciprocity is concerned, in March 1997 Bulgaria had already unilaterally lifted the 
visa requirement for EU nationals entering Bulgaria for short stays. 
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A 1.2 Key issues in the case of Romania 
The interim Romania report15 has the following headings: 
 
1) border controls, including institution building, investment in technology, legal 
provisions, visa policy and others; 
2) travel document safety;  
3) migration policy; 
4) Romanian citizenship; 




The interim report notes with approval that a unified border police has been established along 
with a long-term programme of professionalization and demilitarization of the border police. 
Further, the substantial investment in technical equipment mainly focused on Southern 
Ukraine and Moldova are noted. Under the heading "legal provisions and statistics related to 
border crossing", over the period 1998-2000, 10,524 foreign nationals were forbidden from 
leaving Romania. 2,333 of these had an onward destination to an EU state. The majority were 
nationals of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and China. The reason for preventing 
their departure was primarily irregularity in their travel documents. Over the same period, 
27,407 Romanian nationals were forbidden from leaving Romania. Criminal investigations, 
false documents, persons hidden in vehicles and travel document irregularities were the 
reasons given in 7,356 cases. Thus 20,000 Romanians were prohibited from leaving their 
country without reference to a particular legal provision. As will be demonstrated later in this 
study, they might have been part of those who have fallen victim to some preventive 
administrative measures aimed at decreasing the emigration of Romanian citizens. 
 
In the second section, the report considers Romania’s visa policy. The report states:  
 
86 countries which have a visa obligation for their citizens and whose nationals display 
high migration tendencies are subject to a restrictive visa regime, the entry to Romanian 
territory being granted only if the citizens from these countries have a certified invitation 
                                                        
15 See Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council: Exemption of 
Romanian citizens from visa requirements, COM (2001) 361 final, 29 June 2001; see also the Intermediate report 
on visa issues (Romania), COM (2001) 0061 final, 2 February 2001. 
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and a bank guarantee at the disposal of the Romanian authorities to be used in case of 
repatriation. Visas are issued only after the authenticity of the invitations is confirmed.  
 
These documentary requirements, including bank guarantees at the disposal of the 
government, go far beyond anything contained in the Schengen Common Consular 
Instruction.  
 
The report also notes the arrangement between Romania and Moldova that their citizens may 
pass the mutual border on presentation of an identity card. The report expresses satisfaction 
that this regime is being phased out, firstly at the fact that Moldavian citizens will require 
passports to enter Romania by 1 July 2001. Subsequently, the Commission expects Romania 
to apply visa requirements to Moldavians. The other countries whose nationals do not require 
visas to enter Romania, but are subject to such an obligation in the EU are: Bosnians, 
Yugoslavs, Macedonians, Turks, Russians and Ukrainians.  
 
The report continues: safety measures in procedures have been reconsidered; the manufacture 
of Romanian passports meets with approval in the report – the mechanisms are sufficiently 
advanced to meet the EU’s requirements. The legal provisions for issuing passports and 
identity documents is reviewed, as well as the way in which blank documents are stored and 
stolen documents accounted for. 
 
The lack of legal measures is the subject of negative comment in the report. In particular it 
notes that there were 6,960 asylum applications submitted in the EU and North America by 
Romanian nationals in 2000. This figure is produced in the context of a lax exit policy rather 
than in the context of concern about human rights protection in Romania. The legal possibility 
for Romanian nationals to renounce their citizenship is considered. The report points out that 
in a number of EU states Romanians have renounced their citizenship (certified by the 
Consulate) and thus made themselves irremovable. The Commission’s report expresses some 
satisfaction with the answers provided by the Romanian authorities (i.e. that there is no power 
to consulates to give such certificates) but it is apparent that further efforts are expected. 
Carriers’ sanctions only apply as regards persons being brought to Romania without correct 
travel documents. However, the Commission does not explicitly criticize the fact that 
legislation is lacking, making it an offence for carriers to take people out of Romania without 
the travel documents required at the destination.  
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The report notes the strengthening of legal provisions for the expulsion of irregular foreigners 
and for their detention pending expulsion. The report provides statistics about numbers of 
irregulars, a subject on which reputable experts are very reticent. It states:  
it is estimated that around 40,000 aliens cross the [Romanian] border illegally with the 
purpose of reaching the EU; according to the Romanian authorities, 20,000-30,000 aliens 
are temporarily staying in Romania waiting for an opportunity to move westwards. Most 
of the illegal immigrants come from Asia and Africa. 
 
The final report on Romania is substantially longer and more structured than the interim one 
but overall it is structured along the same lines as the interim report16 and also provides a 
systematic review of each theme in three parts: legal provisions, institution building, technical 
equipment and investment programmes and commitments.  
 
A 2) Bulgaria and Romania: examples of a road map to visa-free travel? 
This brief review of the reports on Bulgaria and Romania clarifies the list of measures 
identified as essential by the Commission for removal from the visa black list: security of 
passports, readmission agreements and reciprocity. However, in their attempt to meet all EU 
requirements, both countries went way beyond the criteria identified by the Commission, 
while at the same time the evaluation of important aspects, such as crime, did not appear 
prominently in the reports. Nevertheless, the issue of border controls, although not forming 
part of one of the criteria for visa exemption, occupies an important place in both reports.  
 
In general, all the reports seem focused on controlling immigration, both into Bulgaria and 
Romania and from those two countries into the European Union. Looking at the reports from 
this perspective explains the prominent place of border controls, as they are deemed essential 
in reducing both the number of immigrants and emigrants for the two countries. Bulgaria and 
Romania were put in a position to prove that they can curb illegal emigration originating from 
their territory. However, this, as mentioned earlier, cannot be achieved easily in a democratic 
society, where the individual benefits from a number of rights. Faced with such an objective, 
                                                        
16 The report contains four main parts: (1) Romania as a transit country for third country nationals (border 
controls carried out by Romanian authorities on entry, transit and exit; Romanian visa policy; Romanian travel 
documents and identity documents; Romanian legislation and asylum); (2) Illegal emigration of Romanian 
nationals to the Member States (border controls carried out by Romanian authorities on Romanian citizens 
leaving the country; law and other rules on Romanian citizenship and stateless persons; economic and social 
dimension); (3) Repatriation of third country nationals and Romanian nationals illegally residing in Member 
States (readmission agreements concluded by Romania; building a network of liaison officers; cooperation with 
airlines companies; commitments); (4) Conclusion and Recommendations. 
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both countries adopted a new legal tool which was questionable from a human rights 
perspective. 
 
A 3) A new legal tool: administrative measures on travel 
This legal tool essentially consisted of the confiscation of passports (combined with a travel 
ban) on citizens who had infringed the residency or immigration laws of other countries.  This 
is explicitly referred to by the Commission. For example, the report on Bulgaria notes two 
elements that were key for the decision to remove the country from the black list: the 
introduction of (1) new, more modern identity documents and (2) sanctions on illegal 
immigration to the member states. This second element will now be considered in detail, in 
parallel for both Bulgaria and Romania.17 
 
Three details will be considered separately: 
i) Legal basis 
ii) Form of restriction and duration 
iii) Reasons for imposing the measure 
 
This brief examination of the legal details is then followed by a brief discussion of post-
accession developments. 
 
i) Legal basis 
In the case of Bulgaria all rules can be found in one act, the Law on the Bulgarian 
Identification Documents (LBID) first adopted in 1998 and frequently amended thereafter. 
 
In the Romanian case, the administrative measure was not contained in one act but regulated 
by several on a different level – government ordinances and laws. 
 
ii) Form of restriction and duration 
                                                        
17 An in-depth analysis of both cases can be found in TCHORBADJIYSKA, “The constitutional price of visa free 
travel: the cases of Bulgaria and Romania”, (2009), for the measures applied in Bulgaria and an analysis of the 
case law of the Supreme Administrative Court in Bulgaria see, TCHORBADJIYSKA, “EU Migration Phobia and 
Citizens Rights’ in the Candidate Countries”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 8, n. 2, (2006), pp. 
143-162(20). 
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The preventive measure foreseen in the Bulgarian Article 76 LBID can take two forms: a ban 
on leaving the country and a refusal to issue passports, which can be imposed independently 
or can be cumulated. The ban is general; it forbids the Bulgarian citizen from leaving the 
country and thus from visiting not only the country whose legislation they have breached but 
also any other country. The measure is valid for a period of two years. 
 
In the case of Romania, the limitation appears to be cumulative – prohibition to leave the 
country and withdrawal (or what the Commission calls in its report – temporary suspension) 
of passports. However, the travel ban is valid only for travel to the country where the reason 
for the measure arose. 
 
The original duration of the ban in the provisions of 1998 was 3 to 12 months but was 
extended following an amendment of 2002 to a period of 1 to 5 years. This extension was one 
of the commitments that the Romanian government took prior to the Commission Report of 
2001.18 But it was later shortened to three years. 
 
iii) Grounds for imposing the measure 
Bulgaria. The text of LBID mentions two reasons for the imposition of the measure. The text 
of the law is self-explanatory; Article 76 reads: 
 
May not be permitted to leave the country, passport and substituting documents to 
be issued of:19 
 … 
5. persons who, during their stay in another country, have committed offences 
against its legislation – two years from the receipt of an official letter from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the documents for compulsory removal or 
expulsion, pointing out the committed offence, by the competent bodies of the 
respective country; 
6. persons who are removed or expelled from another country for violation of the 
entry and residence regime – for a period of two years from the receipt of an 
official letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the committed offence or 
from the date of receipt by the competent authorities of the documents for the 
compulsory removal or expulsion. 
 
                                                        
18 The Report clearly states that “in order to combat illegal immigration of Romanian nationals to EU countries, 
the Romanian authorities intend to increase the penalties (e.g. extending the period of suspension of the passport) 
to be inflicted on nationals illegally emigrating to the EU Member States and returned on the basis of 
readmission agreements”. 
19 Before 1 January 2007, the text continued with “and the issued to be withdrawn” (meaning those documents 
which were already issued). 
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Romania.  
In Romania the key element is the return based on the readmission agreements signed 
between Romania and third states.20 The fact of readmission is sufficient regardless of its 
causes. Moreover, according to the Commission Report of 2001, this measure of withdrawal 
or temporary suspension of a passport is automatically used in the case of repatriation of 
Romanian citizens expelled from a foreign country. The same is applicable to Romanians who 
commit offences or other law breaches abroad, if the Romanian authorities are informed of it.  
 
A 4) Developments post-accession  
It was generally assumed that accession to the EU would put an end to these administrative 
measures limiting the right to travel abroad, at least as far as the expulsions from other EU 
countries are concerned.21  Withdrawing a passport does not make sense when the citizens of 
Bulgaria and Romania can travel within the EU only with an identity card. Moreover, the 
grounds on which other Member States can refuse the benefits of free movement to citizens 
from other Member States are strictly limited. However, the acts in force were not repealed 
but only slightly amended. What could their impact be after accession? 
 
Until accession to Schengen, the border controls between Bulgaria and Romania and the rest 
of the EU states remain. However, travel (at least within Europe) requires only an identity 
card.22 The sanctions envisaged under both the Bulgarian and the Romanian law do not only 
include refusal to issue a passport (or withdrawal of already issued ones) but also a ban on 
leaving the country. The ban in practice means that the name of the person concerned is 
included in a national database, and whenever s/he appears at border checkpoint, may be 
refused to leave the country. Hence, the measures should still have an effect after accession, 
but before the abolition of border controls. 
 
The situation will naturally change upon accession to the Schengen area. Without border 
controls, a ban on leaving the country can no longer be implemented. Thus the preventive 
measure discussed here will be devoid of purpose; at least as far as the Schengen states are 
                                                        
20 Article 38 (a) of Law n. 248 of 20 July 2005. 
21 Expulsions from the EU Member States account for about 50% of all returned from Romania and more than 
2/3 of those returned to Bulgaria.  
22 And the cases when an identity card might be withdrawn under Bulgarian law are strictly limited to cases of 
detention and imprisonment. 
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concerned. For all other states, the possibility to impede departure from the country will 
remain. 
 
Of course, even after accession to the EU and later to Schengen, it will still be possible for 
Bulgarian and Romanian citizens to be returned on the grounds that they are illegally present 
on the territory of another Member State. This can happen in cases when they have overstayed 
their allowed stay and, for one reason or another, are not covered by the provisions on the free 
movement of persons. What the exact limits of the provisions are will be for the European 
Court of Justice to decide.  
 
In the meantime, the ECJ has already had the occasion to look at the compatibility of 
Romanian provisions with European law. In the case C-33/07 a Romanian Court asked 
questions about the compatibility of the provisions of Romanian legislation with the principle 
of free movement of persons guaranteed by Article 18 EC. Of particular relevance is the first 
question on whether Articles 38 and 39 of Law 248/2005 (discussed above) which prevent 
persons (who are Romanian citizens and now citizen of the Union) from moving freely in 
another State (in this case, a Member State of the European Union), constitute an obstacle to 
the free movement of persons upheld by Article 18 EC. This question is linked to that of 
whether a Member State of the European Union (in this case Romania) places a limitation on 
the exercise of the right of free movement of citizens within the territory of another Member 
State. 
 
The answer of the European Court of Justice in Case C-33/07 Jipa is the following: 
 
A national of a Member State who has been repatriated from another Member State 
enjoys the status of a citizen of the Union under Article 17(1) EC and may therefore rely 
on the right pertaining to that status, including against his Member state of origin, and in 
particular the right conferred by Article 18 EC to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States. In that regard, the right of freedom of movement includes 
both the right for citizens of the European Union to enter a Member State other than the 
one of origin and the right to leave the State of origin. The fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the EC Treaty would be rendered meaningless if the Member State of 
origin could, without valid justification, prohibit its own nationals from leaving its 
territory in order to enter the territory of another Member State.23 
 
The ECJ judgment thus provides some clarity as to the compatibility of the administrative 
measures that are in issue here with the free movement provisions of European law. However, 
                                                        
23 Case C-33/07, Jipa, Judgment of 10 July 2008, para 17-18. 
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the Court seems to hedge its position by saying only restrictive measures “without valid 
justification” would be contrary to the principle of freedom of movement within the EU.  
Unfortunately no further guidance was given as to what would constitute a valid justification. 
 
However, this judgment could not answer the question of whether these provisions were 
compatible with the national constitutions (of Bulgaria and Romania, respectively). The 
question remains open because, somewhat surprisingly, no case has been brought to the 
constitutional courts of these countries.  
 
